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From Intersubjectivity to Interinstrumentality. The Example of Surface Science. 
Abstract:  My aim is to show how a strategy used in the experimental sciences, which I 
name “interinstrumentality”, can minimize the role of sociological factors when one tries 
to understand how the debates about the interpretation of  data come to an end. To defend 
this  view,  two  examples  are  presented.  The  first  is  historical  –  the  invention  of  the 
Scanning  Tunneling  Microscope  (STM)  –  and  the  second  is  collected  during  an 
ethnographic  study  in  a  surface  science  laboratory.  I  would  like  to  emphasize  that 
interinstrumentality contributes to objectivity of the experimental results and constitutes a 
part of it as well as intersubjectivity. 
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1. Introduction 
Among the methodological requirements to which all scientific work is submitted, one of 
the first is the objectivity of processes and results. But what is objectivity? And how should 
one use the notion in a meta-epistemological perspective? If one thinks along with Daston 
(1992) that the term is unclear, it is probably because it is an umbrella-term. Let us just say 
that “absolute objectivity” (Megill, 1994) is based on the belief that the reality could be 
described  literally,  weeding  out  most  of  the  subjectivity’s  effects.  Such  a  definition 
constitutes more a problem than a solution. If the aim of our study is to take into account  
the day-to-day practices of laboratory, perhaps it would be better to agree with Putnam 
when he writes (2003, 142):  “In scientific practice, the questions about objectivity do not 
concern  metaphysics.”  Thus,  objectivity  has  to  be  conceived  as  a  continuum.  Putnam 
asserts:  “If we consider our statements as based on a continuum (…), the statements which 
eminently  depends  on  our  interests,  on  our  points  of  view  and  on  our  idiosyncratic 
characteristics,  are  the  subjective  extremity  of  the continuum,  whereas  the  statements 
become more objective and could pretend to be more true as they less rely on idiosyncratic 
points of view or on personal interests” (2003, 141).
 Usually,  objectivity  is  related  to  intersubjectivity.  Even  if  contemporary 
philosophers of science admit that intersubjectivity is hard to define, this notion permits to 
emphasize  on  the  collective  dimension  of  the  scientific  activity.  To  constitute 
intersubjectivity, a communication between subjects (ideally interchangeable subjects) is 
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needed, their purpose is to get an assessment of their process and the evaluation of the 
results provided by each member. Such a definition underlines the fact that we have no 
more confidence in individual reason as a way to establish absolute truths. The scientific 
intelligence is now conceived as distributed. Besides, this definition of intersubjectivity has 
the advantage to avoid the a priori issued of the fundationalists positions (divine guarantee, 
first principles…). 
Even if this definition of objectivity presents many advantages, we have to keep its 
limits  in  mind.  Indeed,  the  term  “intersubjectivity”  is  not  consensual:  perception’s 
agreement in a phenomenological perspective; critical thinking of the researchers which 
allow them to eliminate false theories, and determine which of the remaining theories is the 
best  available  one;  collective  confidence  attached  to  discipline’s  standards.  In  all 
definitions,  for  philosophers  as  for  sociologists  or  for  historians  of  science,  a  central 
feature is the concordance of the individual points of view. And none could reasonably 
dispute such assertion: the subjects are, ultimately, the ones who assign the signification to 
data, and who decide how they will validate the knowledge as true and justified. But this 
assertion could be expressed more or less radically. We could consider that the construction 
of  consensus  in  the  scientific  community  may  rely  on  determining  factors  such  as 
psychological characteristics, know-how, tacit knowledge of scientists themselves.  This 
consensus could also rely on the social contexts in which those researches appeared. In that 
matter of case, the natural world’s phenomena, which are studied, play only a limited role 
in the elaboration of scientific knowledge. This is the point of view of cognitive relativism. 
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In the rest of my paper, I will focus on a contemporary version of this cognitive relativism: 
the relativistic Sociology of Science lead by Harry M. Collins1. This relativism is assumed 
as a fundamental injunction for the methodology of empirical studies. The methodology at 
work in this kind of sociology relies on observation of day-to-day practices as they occur 
in laboratory (either with an ethnographic approach or with historical studies).  According 
to this approach, such observations permit to produce a non reductivist description of the 
scientific work. 
 My study  also  tries  to  pay  attention  to  the  day-to-day  activities  in  scientific 
laboratory,  but  it  gives  results  which  contradict  previous  conclusions  promoted by the 
relativistic sociology of science, as I will show it in the following pages. The attention 
given  to  the  practices  elicits  strategies,  which  aim  to  strengthen  the  objectivity  of 
experimental results and, by the way, refutes the fact that objectivity only relies on social 
consensus. Interinstrumentality is the name I give to the strategy described in this paper. 
In a first part, I specify briefly the thesis on which I opposite:  Collins’ Empirical 
Programme of Relativism.  In a second part, I use an historical example - the invention of 
STM–  to  carry  off  my  critic.  This  illustration  permits  to  identify  the  role  of 
interinstrumentality, when the validity of a new instrument is settled. In a third part, I will  
underline  that  such  a  strategy  does  not  characterize  only  exceptional  events  (as  the 
invention of a new scientific instrument). It could also appear in the day-to-day activities 
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of surface science laboratory,  as  the second example,  borrowed from my ethnographic 
studies2, will underline it.
2. Collins’s Empirical Programme of Relativism 
Collins brings out the stages of an “Empirical Programme of Relativism” (EPOR), since 
his synthetic article of 1981. The stages of the programme (stages 1 and 2 of EPOR) aim: 
- to demonstrate that experimental data are submitted to a so-called “interpretative 
flexibility”;
- to  clarify  the  processes  which  give  an  end  to  the  debate  between  competing 
interpretations.
2.1. The Interpretative Flexibility of Data 
In Collins’ studies, the interpretative flexibility expresses the fact that the same empirical 
data,  produced or  collected  during  a  research,  could  be  differently interpreted.   Many 
factors, according to Collins, could explain such an ‘interpretative flexibility’. One of them 
is tacit  knowledge,  about  which Collins stresses particularly in his work.  For him, the 
scientific practice is not resumed by formal rules or heuristics. Tacit knowledge can never 
be fully articulated or translated into a set of rules3. My reader might be surprised,  but I 
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agree on the Stage 1 of EPOR. Indeed, it focuses on a fundamental element of science, as it 
runs in the laboratory:  the contingency is irreducible in the day-to-day practices.
2.2. The End of Debates between Competitive Interpretations of Experimental Data
The Stage 2 of EPOR aims to offer an explanation about how the debates generated by the 
interpretative  flexibility,  introduced  at  the  Stage  1,  could  be  ended.  In  their  empirical 
studies,  the relativistic sociologists  consider that the only factors which are relevant to 
conduct the debates to end are micro- and macro-social factors. Collins himself writes: “In 
each case (…), coherence and accumulation of experimental  results  are not  enough to 
explain closure – reference to rhetoric, authority, institutional positions, and everything that 
comes under the « catchall » terms interests and power, is also required. (...) the consensual 
interpretation of day-to-day laboratory work is  only possible within constraints  coming 
from “outside that work’” (Collins 1982, 141-142).
If one accepts to consider this second stage of EPOR as relevant, one must agree with a 
particular  vision  of  science  concerning  the  role  of  intersubjectivity.  Considering  that 
intersubjectivity  alone  produces  the  content  and  the  methods  of  science  seems  to  be 
radical;  but  it  is  the  conclusion  when  the  constraints  from  the  natural  word  are  not 
considered  as  a  decisive  factor,  whereas  the  mutual  understanding  of  the  subjects  is 
essential.  Collins  (1981a,  3)  is  explicit  about  this  point:  “the  approach  ‘embraces  an 
explicit  relativism in  which  the  natural  world  has  a  small  or  non-existent  role  in  the 
construction of scientific knowledge”. And mutual understanding is characterized by him 
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as follows: “(…) mutual understanding seems to be possible even when nothing real is the 
subject matter. The quality of a poem or a picture, the number of angels that could dance 
on the head of a pin, or the cut of the emperor’s new clothes can all be discussed without  
there being any lumps in the world that correspond to them.” (1992, 174).
So should we renounce to an ideal of objectivity as the relativistic sociologists do? Should 
we restrict  to  nothing the role  accorded to  phenomena in  the constitution  of  scientific 
knowledge? I don’t think so. We have to consider the fact that the researchers, in their 
laboratories, are competent enough to be reflexive about their practices. Indeed they are 
aware  of  the  interpretative  flexibility  due  to  their  idiosyncratic  features,  their  tacit 
knowledge, the problems inherent to technical devices, and the impossibility to identically 
reproduce an experiment. Moreover, they are daily confronted with situations including 
uncertainty. To reduce this intrinsic limitation of the data’s collect, the scientists develop 
strategies to increase the degree of objectivity of their results. One of their strategies could 
be called “interinstrumentality”.  Some authors proposed a quite similar point of view: 
Chang, 2001; Culp, 1995; Hacking 1983; Hudson, 1999; Nederbragt, 2003; Wimsatt, 1981. 
The fact to report to various different methods in order to confirm a hypothesis has several 
denominations:  ‘robustness’ for Wimsatt (1981) or Chang (1995), ‘triangulation’ for Star 
(1986), ‘independence of route’ for Hudson (1999), ‘multiple derivability’ for Nederbragt 
(2003). 
Three  remarks  in  order  to  argue  for  the  interest  of  my study.  Firstly,  it  concerns  the 
contemporaneous physics contrary to the previous which are about biology, except those of 
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Chang. Secondly, the biologists evoked in these studies try to locate the same entities. In 
surface science, the approach is a little bit different. Most frequently,  the aim is not to  
locate the same objects on the images produced by different microscopes: it is impossible 
because  the  samples  are  deteriorated  by the  microscope’s  handling.  For  example,  if  a 
scientist  uses a STM to observe cobalt  atoms on a gold surface,  the sample would be 
deteriorated. He will clean the gold substrate before evaporating cobalt. This new sample 
could be studied with a Transmission Electron Microscope (TEM) in order to confirm the 
presence of cobalt atoms. TEM allows to observe the atomic structure of a sample.  In 
surface science, using various instruments aims to make sure that the properties expected 
from the studied objects are real. Thirdly, none of these studies points particularly that the 
interinstrumentality is a daily approach. Finally, few authors have considered the role of 
interinstrumentality  during  the  phases  of  invention  and  diffusion  of  a  new instrument 
contrary to the present study.
For  me,  ‘interinstrumentality’ could  be  characterized  as  a  consecutive  use  of  various 
instruments based on different physical principles in order to realize an experimental study. 
Each instrument provides  a  specific  kind of  information  about  the object  studied.  The 
information can be chemical,  topographic,  magnetic,  electronic...  The robustness of the 
interpretation is based for the scientists on the concordance between them4.
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3. Interinstrumentality and the Acceptance of the Scanning Tunneling Microscope 
How could interinstrumentality play a role in the consensual agreement’s process about the 
reliability of the STM? Designed in 1981 by Gerd Binnig and Heinrich Rohrer, the STM 
awarded the Nobel Prize of Physics in 1986. This microscope opens the door to what we 
call now nanotechnologies: single atoms on a surface can be displayed in three dimensions. 
The STM is based on the concept of quantum tunneling. When a conducting tip is brought 
very near to the surface to be examined, a voltage difference applied between the two can 
allow electrons to tunnel through the vacuum between them.  This is the tunneling effect 
phenomenon in contradiction with the classical physics.   The stakes were high:  was it 
possible to build a macroscopic device which did not perturb the quantum effect observed 
only  in  the  infinitesimal  world?  At  that  time,  most  of  the  scientists  considered  such 
ambition as unattainable.
Focusing on the process which conducts to the invention of STM, a surprising complexity 
emerges. Initially, Binnig and Rohrer did not expect to build a new microscope. They had 
insufficient  knowledge about  microscopy and surface  science.   At  the  request  of  their 
colleagues, whom studied insulating layers for electronic components, they researched a 
way to study finely the defaults of some materials. The original idea then was not to build a 
microscope  but  rather  to  perform spectroscopy locally  on  an  area  less  than  100 Å in 
diameter. Only after many weeks, they realized that their probe could collect topographic 
information in addition to spectroscopic local information (Binnig & Rohrer 1986, 392). 
The STM was born.
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In 1981, the first results were coldly received by the scientific community: in a private 
conversation,  a  researcher  from  the  GSI  told  me:  “These  first  images  were  literally 
incredible”. Some scientists went so far as to charge Binnig and Rohrer with fraud.  “My 
personal opinion is, in that period, many scientists considered atom as a sacred object. It 
could never be handled. So an approach allowing to see and to handle atoms with such an 
accuracy was counterintuitive.  The scientists  did not  want  to consider  such possibility. 
Indeed  they  refused  to  discuss  it.  It  was  like  a  taboo,  like  to  talk  about  the  devil.” 
(interview with Binnig and Rohrer, 2001)5. The first submission of the paper about the 
tunneling effect in open air was rejected. The referees argued that the study of the samples 
should be done under ultra-high vacuum in order to eliminate any possible contamination. 
And even if this procedure would be used, the samples could be corrupted before their 
insert  in  the  ultra-high  vacuum  enclosure.  A second  critic  of  the  referees  was  the 
insufficiency of the theory used to explain data. In response, Binnig and Rohrer argued in 
order to obtain the agreement of their colleagues. 
The publications  written  since 1981 to  1985 reveal  the different  steps  of  this  process. 
Besides  scientific  reports  about  their  new data,  each  paper  intended to respond to  the 
detractors’ critics. My analysis reveals six strategies developed by Binnig and Rohrer: 
(1) To consolidate the theoretical foundations of the phenomenon; 
(2) To  avoid  all  possible  exogenous  variables  (vibrations’ reduction,  vacuum’s 
improvement, better proceedings to prepare the samples…);
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(3) To simplify the manipulation of the instrument,  in order that other scientists 
could run the same experiment; 
(4) To show the interest of the instrument in some other scientific areas;
(5) To study simple and well-known surfaces.
(6) To  resort  to  interinstrumentality,  in  other  words,  to  collect  data  with  other 
scientific devices such as X-ray diffraction, TEM, etc.
These six strategies could be found in their papers during this period:
- In  Applied Physics Letters (1982), the authors argue that the sources of vibration 
are enough controlled to interfere anymore with the collected data (Strategy  2)
- In  Physical Review Letters (1982), in order to convince their peers that the data 
collected  with  the  STM were  not  the  product  of  their  imagination,  they  use  a 
common  technique  in  Surface  Science,  the  Low-energy  electron  diffraction  
(LEED) (Strategy 6); 
- In  Surface  Science (1983),  Binnig and Rohrer,  who have technically simplified 
their instrument, try to convince the community of the surface science physicists of 
the  STM’s  interest  for  their  own  researches.  To  do  that,  they  study  materials 
commonly used in surface science such as gold and silicon. To convince that their 
results are not a fancy, they compare them with others produced with instruments 
which have acquired a reliability in the community (Strategies 4, 5 and 6); 
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- In Surface Science Letters (1983), they use well-known materials and well-known 
instruments  based  on  different  physical  principles   such  as  TEM  and  X-rays 
diffraction (Strategies 5 and 6);
- In 1984, they are more confident in their method. Indeed, other researchers give a 
consistent theoretical basis to STM. From then on, Binnig and Rohrer endeavour to 
make  their  observations  easier  to  reproduce.  In  their  publication  of  1984,  in 
Physica  B,  they  stress  that  the  main  source  of  problems  is  constituted  by  the 
metallic tip of the STM. They try to solve it (Strategies 1 and 3); 
- Still  in  1984,  in  Surface  Science,  they  respond  to  a  main  critic:  the  risk  of 
contamination  during  the  sample’s  handling.  They  study  gold’s  samples  with 
different instruments (LEED and Auger spectroscopy of electrons - AES -), without 
any move of the samples. The same sample stays in the vacuum’s enclosure and is 
examined successively with each instrument. Such handling reduces drastically the 
possibilities of contamination (Strategies 2, 5 and 6);
- In Surface Science Letters (1985), they increase the images of the silicon 7 x 7, and 
above all they corroborate their results appealing to AES and to LEED (Strategies 5 
and 6);
- The final paper is published in Scientific American, so the STM can be known by a 
large public. 
This brief historical background reveals the numerous trial-and-errors needed to pass from 
the  first  version  of  STM  including  a  remarkable  complexity  to  the  easiest  handling 
versions  used  today  commonly  in  surface  science  laboratories.  The  numerous 
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improvements  made  to  the  first  version  of  STM  result  partially  from  the  objections 
expressed by the scientific community to Binnig and Rohrer: to put the STM under ultra-
vacuum enclosure in order to restrict the contaminations, to integrate in their plan other 
instruments  already  used  in  1980s  as  LEED,  AES,  etc.  The  debt  contracted  with the 
detractors is essential: they urge the two researchers to justify their theoretical principles 
and  to  modify  their  instrument.  Binnig  and  Rohrer  had  to  convince  their  colleagues 
providing good arguments in order to get the agreement of their peers. Each paper analyzed 
previously replied to a category of objections. The force of Binnig and Rohrer is not only 
in their  attempt to test  the reproducibility of their  own experiments,  but in their  quasi  
systematic use of instruments commonly ran by their detractors in order to support their 
own  argumentation.  The  scientists  relied  on  well-known  instruments  used  in  surface 
science (as LEED, AES, TEM …) to confront their own results to those of others.  This 
approach has two aims: to convince themselves of the reliability of their results and to 
convince their colleagues.
One could suppose that interinstrumentality is necessarily needed in such case, because of 
the  controversial  nature  of  the  STM.  But  I  want  to  underline  the  fact  that 
interinstrumentality does not allow scientists to suppress all ambiguities and so to lead to 
absolute certainty, but it allows so “to decrease the risk of error” in their interpretation of 
the results. They increase the robustness of their conclusions.
When the process is achieved, has the STM a status which is once and for all justified? 
Could one use it as a black box? We answer both yes and no. The reliability of the results 
produced  with  a  STM  is  no  more  discussed.  A student  could  easily  learn  to  run  it. 
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However,  when  the  aim  is  to  use  the  instrument  in  certain  conditions  such  as high 
resolution, for example, it is very difficult to master the various parameters and it needs a 
close knowledge of the instrument in order to obtain satisfactory results. In that case, the 
STM could not be considered as a black box.
In their day-to-day activities, the physicists are aware of the numerous uncertainties linked 
to the use of instruments as the STM, uncertainties which involve interpretative flexibility 
of data. The samples being irrevocably damaged with each observation, the experiments 
are strictly speaking not reproducible. The problem of reproducibility links in such a case 
to the mastery of concrete operations. Indeed, to master the technical factors (such as the 
variable quality of the vacuum, the reduction of the mechanic or electronic disturbances, 
etc.) is extremely problematic. Moreover, the tacit knowledge plays a great role in this kind 
of experiment (some manual know-how is needed in the polishing of a sample of metallic 
materials, in the preparation of the tip of a STM, contaminations, etc.). All variables have 
to be considered and to be mastered. An image of good quality needs frequently weeks to 
months to be produced with a STM. The surface science researchers are aware of the 
eminently problematic nature of the reproducibility so as the interpretative flexibility of the 
collected data. However, contrary to Collins, who argues that social factors are decisive for 
the end of the controversies, we can consider that such role is devolved in particular to 
interinstrumentality.   Indeed  the  scientists  are  not  confronted  to  endless  controversies, 
because they can use strategies as interinstrumentality. In surface science, they use it quasi 
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systematically in order to reduce the interpretative flexibility, even if, in a first stage, the 
experiment seems to run perfectly.
4. Interinstrumentality and Day-to-Day Research in Surface Science
The case developed briefly in this part is based on ethnographical observations in a surface 
science laboratory. I consider such case as representative from the daily practices in the 
laboratory. The young scientist described here aims to get carbon nanotubes. To produce 
these, he elaborates a sample in which he believes that he has made grow such nanotubes. 
To study them, he uses a scanning electron microscope (SEM) which gives morphological 
information about the sample. The scientist sees, in his own terms, “a forest of spaghetti”. 
He considers that this “forest” corresponds to the expected nanotubes. At that point of his 
research, all seems to be coherent with his expectations and the handling occurred during 
the  sample’s  preparation.  A priori,  nothing  constraints  him  to  confirm  his  first  SEM 
observations. But the scientist has learned that one sort of information produced with only 
one instrument could not be enough. So he has to try to corroborate his first observations. 
That is why he chooses to study his sample with a TEM in order to reveal the carbon 
atomic structure and to  obtain chemical  precisions at  the same time. After  many work 
sessions with TEM, the researcher does not have the expected result: he observes on the 
images things which seem to be nanotubes’ traces but the chemical analysis of these does 
not reveal carbon.
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Figure 1: Nanotubes’ traces or not? Micrograph performed with TEM.  G. Erhet GSI .
How can this surprising fact be explained?  Is it a problem of instrumental artifact? Or an 
artifact  induced  by  the  preparation  of  the  sample?  The  two  microscopes  delivered 
conflicting informations. The physicist is now engaged in a laborious investigation in order 
to eliminate all the possible causes of artifacts. One has to precise that one major difficulty 
of  such  approach  is  the  impossibility  for  the  scientist  to  determine  a  priori  if  the 
incompatibility of the results between the two microscopes is due to a single artifact or by 
unfortunate  conjunction  of  various  artifacts.  In  order  to  succeed,  one  has  to  use  an 
abductive  reasoning  (Peirce,  1903).  This  abductive  stage  is  essential  for  two  reasons: 
firstly, it is the creative side of a research’s work and secondly, nothing guarantees that a 
researcher always produces fruitful abductive hypotheses. We observe that a problem could 
be  generated  by  a  conjunction  of  various  causes.  Moreover,  our  observation  of  the 
activities  in  this  surface  science  laboratory  leads  us  to  assert  that  the  competence  to 
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formulate abductive hypotheses is variable from a researcher to another. This variation has 
direct effects on the quality of the researches, creating a degree of uncertainty.
Our scientist faced to a surprising phenomenon (the absence of nanotubes on the sample 
observed with TEM) should formulate hypotheses about its origin and corroborate them or 
not. In this case, hypotheses would be about the possible causes of artifacts: would the 
problem be linked to the preparation of  the nanotubes? Would the microscopes  or the 
computers  used  to  produce  data  dysfunction?  After  a  process  of  three  months,  the 
researcher  finally finds that  the preparation of nanotubes is  the source of his  problem. 
Contrary to his expectations, he did not produce carbon nanotubes, but another substance. 
In the case related here, the resort to interinstrumentality does not permit to confer to the 
first SEM images the status of proof. Consequently they could not be published and the 
study must run again including the constitution of new hypotheses.
Finally, we observe that an image produced by a microscope could never be considered by 
the scientists as a sufficient convincing proof. The scientists have to evaluate data with 
other instruments (TEM, STM, AES…) in order to produce other images and other results. 
Almost all of these instruments involve resorting to tacit knowledge and generate a part of 
interpretative  flexibility.  But  what  scientists  are  searching  is  the  reliability  of  the 
information  issued  from  the  observations  collected  with  the  instruments.  To  obtain 
congruent  information  allows  conferring  a  status  of  element  of  proof  to  such  images 
instead of a status of simple and local coincidence. To resort to interinstrumentality is a 
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way to reduce the uncertainty.  What the scientist aims to produce is a kind of Peircean 
cable constituted with many fibers (each fiber is, for example, an image). A cable is robust 
because it is made of many fibers and, unlike a chain, the solidity of which depends on its 
weakest link, the cable remains robust even if one or two of its fibers break. (Callebaut 
1993,  57).  This  Peircean  cable  resorts  to  theoretical  models,  to  intersubjectivity,  and 
especially  to  interinstrumentality.  When  the  Peircean  cable  is  considered  as  enough 
consistent,  i.e when the elements of proof are sufficiently matching and coherent among 
them to resist to objections, the scientists publish. However, a Peircean cable is always 
potentially  subject  to  revision:  new  elements  can  be  added,  its  composition  can  be 
criticized, it can be considered as insufficient or too partial. The texts of the referees are a 
particular and eloquent example of this last point. The referees stress frequently that the 
researchers  assert  such  thesis  relying  on  data  insufficiently  corroborated  by  other 
instruments.
5. Conclusion 
With the two case studies briefly evocated above, I try to show that it is possible to enrich 
our understanding of the concept of objectivity, and most particularly when it concerns the 
results  obtained  in  natural  sciences.  Traditionally,  its  definition  refers  mainly  to 
intersubjectivity. I propose to complete it with a set of strategies, and especially the one I  
called interinstrumentality6.  What  the interinstrumentality questions  are the  conclusions 
proposed by Collins. For me, social factors are not essential to end the controversies due to 
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the interpretative flexibility. I could have two points of agreement with Collins: firstly, the 
choice of a strategy as interinstrumentality is based on a consensus among the scientists, 
and secondly the results produced with each instrument include social factors in a more or 
less large sense. But the convergence of results could not be reduced to social factors. For 
me,  interinstrumentality increases  the degree of  reliability but  cannot  succeed to  reach 
absolute reliability. It permits to conduct the investigation up to the point in which the 
hypotheses are considered as true “beyond all reasonable doubt”. So objectivity can no 
more be understood as a question of ‘all’ or ‘nothing’ but as a  continuum according to 
Putnam (2003). Objectivity is a question of more or less. 
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Abstract: I present three reasons why philosophers of science should be more concerned 
about violations of causal faithfulness (CF). In complex evolved systems, mechanisms 
for maintaining various equilibrium states are highly likely to violate CF. Even when 
such systems do not precisely violate CF, they may nevertheless generate precisely the 
same problems for inferring causal structure from probabilistic relationships in data as do 
genuine CF-violations. Thus, potential CF-violations are particularly germane to 
experimental science when we rely on probabilistic information to uncover the DAG, 
rather than already knowing the DAG from which we could predict the right experiments 
to ‘catch out’ the hidden causal relationships.  
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1. Introduction 
Several conditions must be met in order to apply contemporary causal modeling 
techniques to extract information about causal structure from probabilistic relationships 
in data. While there are slightly different ways of formalizing these requirements, three of 
the most important ones are the causal Markov, causal modularity, and causal faithfulness 
conditions. Potential failures of the first two of these conditions have already been the 
subject of discussion in philosophy of science (Cartwright 1999, 2002, 2006; Hausman 
and Woodward 1999, 2004; Steel 2006; Mitchell 2008; Woodward 2003, 2010). I will 
address failures in the third condition, causal faithfulness, and argue that failures of this 
condition are likely to occur in certain kinds of systems, especially those studied in 
biology, and are the most likely to cause trouble in experimental settings.  
Faithfulness is the assumption that there are no precisely counterbalanced causal 
relationships in the system that would result in a probabilistic independence between two 
variables that are actually causally connected. While faithfulness failures have been 
discussed primarily in the formal epistemology literature, I will argue that violations of 
faithfulness can impact experimental techniques, inferential license, and issues 
concerning scientific practice that are not exhausted by the formal epistemology 
literature. 
In particular, a formal methodological perspective might suggest a distinction 
between genuine and merely apparent failures of CF, such that supposed examples of CF-
violating systems are not ‘really’ CF-violating, but merely close. But as I will argue, this 
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distinction is not epistemically justifiable in experimental settings: we cannot distinguish 
between genuine and merely apparent CF violations unless we already know the 
underlying causal structure; without this information, merely apparent and genuine CF 
violations will be indistinguishable. Violations of CF faithfulness are particularly 
germane to experimental science, since CF is the assumption that takes us from 
probabilistic relationships among variables in the data to the underlying causal structure. 
In contrast, for instance, the Causal Markov condition takes us from causal structure to 
predicted probabilistic relationships. Going from data to underlying causal structure is the 
most common direction of inference from the epistemic vantage point of science. Rather 
than beginning by knowing the true causal graph of the system in question to predict 
probability distributions, experiment moves from probabilistic relationships to the 
underlying causal structure.  
This means that failures of CF arguably have the most potential for wreaking 
havoc in experimental settings, and have interesting methodological consequences for the 
practice of science: we should expect to find epistemic practices that compensate for CF-
violations in fields that study systems where faithfulness is likely to fail. Thus, these 
conditions are of interest not only to those working on formal modeling techniques, but 
also to broader discussions in philosophy of science, especially those that concern 
epistemic practices in the biological, cognitive, or medical sciences. 
 
2. Violations of the Causal Faithfulness Condition 
Violation of CF occurs when a system involves precisely counterbalanced causal 
relationships. These causal relationships appear “invisible” when information about 
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conditional and unconditional probabilities is used to ascertain a set of possible causal 
directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) that are consistent with data from that system. More 
precisely: 
 
Let G be a causal graph and P a probability distribution generated by G. <G, P> 
satisfies the Faithfulness Condition if and only if every conditional independence 
relation true in P is entailed by the Causal Markov Condition applied to G. (Spirtes, 
Glymour, and Scheines 2000, 31) 
 
One can think of faithfulness as the converse of the Causal Markov condition: 
faithfulness says that given a graph and associated probability distribution, the only 
independence relations are those that follow from the Causal Markov condition 
alone and not from special parameter values… (Woodward 2003, 65) 
 
Informally, variables should only be probabilistically independent if they are 
causally independent in the true causal graph; when causal relationships cancel each other 
out by having precisely counterbalanced parameter values, the variables are 
probabilistically independent, but not causally independent. Thus, in systems that have 
CF-violating causal relationships, the probabilistic relationships between variables 
include independencies that do not reflect the actual causal relationships between those 
variables.  
Probabilistic relationships are used to generate possible causal graphs for the 
system. There may be multiple distinct causal graphs which all imply the observed set of 
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probabilistic relationships. The candidate graphs can then be used to generate further 
interventions in the system that will distinguish between the graphs; if two candidate 
graphs make different predictions for the consequences of an intervention on variable A, 
then performing this intervention on A should return an answer as to which of the 
candidates graphs matches the observed results. The use of probabilistic data to generate 
candidate causal graphs that can then be used to suggest further interventions can save 
huge amounts of time and energy by focusing on a few likely candidates from an 
indefinitely large number of candidate causal structures. 
DAGs of causal faithfulness violations may take several forms. For example:  
 
Figure 1a      Figure 1b 
                         
 
Some authors (Pearl 2000, Woodward 2010) rely on a stronger constraint, causal 
stability, which requires that probabilistic independence relationships be stable under 
perturbation of parameter values across some range, to eliminate “pathological” (i.e. CF-
violating) parameter values.  
 
Definition 2.4.1 Stability:  
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Let I(P) denote the set of all conditional independence relationships embodies in P. 
A causal model M = <D, Θ> generates a stable distribution if and only if P(<D, 
Θ>) contains no extraneous independences – that is, if and only if I(P(<D, Θ>)) ⊆ 
I(P(<D, Θ`>)) for any set of parameters Θ`. (Pearl 2000) 
 
Violating causal stability would require a system to respond to changes in one parameter 
value with compensating changes in another parameter, so that the values remain exactly 
counterbalanced for some range of values.  
The potential for CF-violations to reduce the reliability of methods for extracting 
causal structure from data is well-known in formal epistemology. However, I will argue 
that philosophers of science in general should pay more attention to such violations; 
understanding the difficulties that CF-violations pose will enhance our ability to 
accurately characterize features of experimental practice, and should be included in 
normative considerations regarding evidence and inference. The main arguments in this 
paper can be summarized in three brief points: 
 
(1) Even if CF-violating systems are measure 0 with respect to the set of causal 
systems with randomly distributed parameter values, this does not imply that we 
will only encounter them with vanishing probability. CF-violating systems may be 
of particular interest for modeling purposes compared to non-CF-violating systems, 
in particular because certain kinds of systems may have structural features that 
render CF-violating parameter values more likely. 
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(2) As an example of point 1, structural considerations regarding dynamically 
stable systems that are the result of evolutionary processes should lead us to expect 
CF-violations in various biological systems. For systems that have evolved to 
maintain stable equilibrium states against external perturbation, we should also 
expect violations of the stronger condition, causal stability. I briefly present an 
example of this: mechanisms for salinity resistance in estuary nudibranchs. 
 
(3) ‘Apparent’ CF-violations in equilibrium-maintaining systems can be generated 
in certain experimental conditions even though the actual causal relationships in 
question may not be exactly balanced. Some measurement circumstances will result 
in a data set that violates CF, even if the actual system being measured does not 
genuinely violate CF. We should be as concerned with merely apparent as with 
genuine CF-violations, since both kinds of violations lead to the same difficulties 
for moving from probabilistic relationships in data to accurate DAGs of systems.  
 
These three points highlight why philosophers of science in general should be concerned: 
causal systems may not genuinely violate CF, but yet pose the same problems for 
experimental investigations as if they did. Apparent CF-violations occur when systems do 
not in principle violate CF but appear to due to measurement issues connected with data-
gathering. In both genuine and merely apparent CF-violations, probabilistic relationships 
in the data will suggest a set of candidate causal graphs that are inaccurate; as a result, 
further interventions will yield conflicting answers. Scientists could in principle ‘catch 
out’ these merely apparent CF-violations if they knew exactly how to test for them. But to 
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do this, they would need the DAG, and this is the information that they lack when 
proceeding from the data to underlying causal structure. When we have incomplete 
knowledge of the causal structure of the system under investigation, we lack this ability 
to distinguish between merely apparent and genuine CF-violations. Both raise the same 
problems. 
 
3. The measure of CF-violating systems 
Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000) offer a proof that CF-violating systems are 
Lebesgue measure 0 with respect to possible causal systems, while non-CF-violating 
systems are measure 1. “The parameter values—values of the linear coefficients and 
exogenous variances of a structure—form a real space, and the set of points in this space 
that create vanishing partial correlations not implied by the Markov condition have 
Lebesgue measure 0” (41). From this, they conclude that we are vanishingly unlikely to 
encounter CF-violating systems, and so proceed on the initial presumption that any given 
causal system is not CF-violating. This proof may be part of the reason why 
comparatively little attention has been paid to causal faithfulness compared to the causal 
Markov and modularity conditions. However, the fact that CF-violating systems are 
measure 0 in this class does not imply that we will not encounter them with any 
frequency.  
To motivate this, consider an analogy with rational numbers. They are also 
measure 0 with respect to the real numbers, while irrational numbers are measure 1. And, 
there are circumstances under which we are vanishingly unlikely to find them. If a 
random real number were to be chosen from the number line, the probability that we will 
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draw an irrational number is so overwhelming as to warrant ignoring the presence of 
rational numbers. However, this does not imply that rational numbers are unlikely to be 
encountered simpliciter: bluntly put, we don’t ‘encounter’ the numbers by randomly 
drawing them from the number line. Rational numbers are encountered overwhelmingly 
more often than one would expect from considering only the proof that they are measure 
0 with respect to real numbers. 
The Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines proof assumes that all parameter values 
within the range of a continuous variable are equally probable (Zhang and Spirtes 2008). 
Without this assumption, one can’t presume that the CF-violating values are vanishingly 
unlikely. For instance, this assumption does not hold for systems that involve 
equilibrium-maintaining causal mechanisms. Such mechanisms work to maintain 
counterbalanced parameter values, rendering it much more likely that parameter values 
will result in CF-violations.  
It is true that if causal systems took on parameter values randomly from their 
range, we would expect to encounter CF-violating systems with vanishingly small 
probability, and in that scenario, we could safely ignore CF-violations as a real possibility 
on any given occasion. However, some systems survive, and become scientifically 
interesting targets for investigation, precisely because they achieve long-term dynamic 
equilibrium using mechanisms that rely on balanced parameter values. In such systems, 
the parameter values are most certainly not indifferently probable over their range. In 
fields like biology, neuroscience, medicine, etc., we are disproportionately interested in 
modeling systems that involve equilibrium maintaining mechanisms. This suggests that 
our modeling interests are focused on CF-violating systems in a way that is 
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disproportionate to their measure when considered against all possible causal systems. 
Thus, we cannot conclude from the fact that CF-violating parameter values have measure 
0 with respect to all possible parameter values that we will not encounter such violations 
on a regular basis. 
Zhang and Spirtes (2008) discuss some circumstances in which systems may 
violate CF. However, their discussion makes it seem like CF-violations occur primarily in 
artificial or constructed circumstances. One such example is homeostatic systems, which 
maintain equilibrium against some range of perturbations, such as thermostats 
maintaining a constant temperature in a room. Zhang and Spirtes demonstrate that CF can 
be replaced with two distinct subconditions, that, taken together, provide almost the same 
inferential power as causal faithfulness. If systems violate only one of these 
subconditions, such violations can be empirically detected. This is an extremely useful 
result, and increases the power of Bayes’ nets modeling to recover DAGs from data. 
However, this result should not be taken as resolving the problem.  
In particular, their use of a thermostat as example of a homeostatic system does 
not do justice to the incredibly complex mechanisms for homeostasis that can be found in 
various biological systems. Considering these more sophisticated examples provides a 
clearer view of the potential problems involved in modeling such systems under the 
assumption of causal faithfulness.  
 
4. Evolved dynamical systems and equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms 
The tendency for evolved systems like populations, individual organisms, 
ecosystems, and the brain to involve precisely balanced causal relationships can be easily 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -34-
  11 
explained by the role these balanced relationships play in maintaining various 
equilibrium states (see, for instance, Mitchell 2003, 2008). Furthermore, the mechanisms 
by which organisms maintain internal equilibrium with respect to a huge variety of states 
will need to be flexible. They need to not simply maintain a static equilibrium, but 
respond to perturbation from the outside by maintaining that equilibrium. This means that 
many mechanisms for equilibrium maintenance will have evolved to keep an internal 
state fixed over some range of values in other variables, not merely for a single precise 
set of values. Any system that survives because of its capacity to maintain stability in the 
face of changing causal parameters or variable values will be disproportionately likely to 
display CF-violating causal relationships, and, more strongly also violate causal stability. 
An intriguing example is nudibranchs, commonly known as sea slugs (see 
especially Berger and Kharazova 1997). Many nudibranchs live in ecosystems such as 
reefs, where salinity levels in the water change very little. These nudibranchs are 
stenohaline: able to survive within a narrow range of salinity changes only. In cases 
where salinity levels vary over narrow ranges, nudibranchs respond to changes in salinity 
levels by a cellular mechanism for osmoregulation, where cells excrete sodium ions or 
take in water through changes in cell ion content and volume. This mechanism provides 
tolerance, but not resistance, to salinity changes, because it maintains equilibrium by 
exchanging ions and water with the surrounding environment. In cases of extremely high 
or low salinity, this mechanism will cause the animal to extrude too much or take in too 
much (this is why terrestrial slugs die when sprinkled with salt). 
Euryhaline nudibranchs, found in estuary environments where saline levels may 
vary dramatically between tides and over the course of a season or year, display a much 
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higher level of resistance to salinity changes. There is a pay-off, in the form of increased 
food sources with reduced competition for nudibranchs that are able to withstand the 
changing saline levels. But in these environments, the osmoregulatory mechanism for 
salinity tolerance is insufficient. A further mechanism has evolved in nudibranchs (and in 
molluscs more generally) for salinity resistance in conditions of extreme salinity 
variations in the external environment. These two mechanisms for salinity regulation in 
euryhaline nudibranchs are fairly independent. The osmoregulation mechanism is 
supplemented with an additional mechanism which involves hermeticization of the 
mantle, which prevents water and ion exchange with the outside environment.. This can 
accommodate changes in salinity that take place over fairly short periods of time, since 
salinity levels can change dramatically over the course of an hour. Instead of maintaining 
blood salinity at the same level as the outside environment, this additional mechanism 
allows the organism to maintain an internal salinity level that differs from that of its 
environment. Mantle hermeticization and osmoregulation are distinct mechanisms, but in 
contexts of extremely high or low salinity, they will both act such that the variables of 
external and internal salinity are independent 
Further, there are two distinct mechanisms in muscle cells that work in coordination 
in extreme salinity cases to maintain a balance of ions inside the muscle cell. The 
concentration of these ions, especially sodium and potassium, can change dramatically in 
low or high salinity levels. There are two ion pumps in the cell that maintain overall ion 
concentration at equilibrium across a fairly substantial range of salinity variation in the 
external environment. Even though external salinity has several causal effects on the 
internal ion balance of a cell, these two variables will be probabilistically independent for 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -36-
  13 
a range of external salinity values (in particular, for the range in which the organisms are 
naturally found). 
 
The ion balance of muscle cells during adaptation to various salinities could not be 
achieved by virtue of the Na/K-pump alone, removing sodium and accumulating 
potassium. As it is clear from the data obtained, the concentration of both ions 
drops at low salinity and increases at high salinity. Therefore, the effective ion 
regulation in molluscan cells can be provided only by cooperative action of two 
pumps – the Na/K-pump and Na,Cl-pump, independent of potassium transport. 
(Berger and Karazova 1997, 123-4) 
 
There are several points that this example illustrates. The first is that of the 
comparative probability that a complex system, such as an organism like a nudibranch, 
will display CF-violating causal relationships in the form of mechanisms that maintain 
equilibrium. Consider the (Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000) proof that assumes that 
all parameter values are equally likely. We can see how this falls apart in the case of 
evolved systems. Let’s grant that, in some imaginary past history, all the parameter 
values for mechanisms such as these two ion pumps were equally likely. This would have 
resulted in a vast number of organisms that ended up very rapidly with internal ion 
imbalances and then (probably rather immediately) died. The organisms that managed to 
stick around long enough to leave offspring were, disproportionately, those with 
mechanisms that were precisely counterbalanced to maintain this internal equilibrium. 
Having CF-violating mechanisms would be a distinct advantage. The same applies for 
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other important equilibrium states –organisms with less closely matched values are less 
capable of maintaining that equilibrium state. Insofar as these are important states to 
maintain, it becomes extremely probable that. Over time, those with the closest matches 
for parameter values will be more likely to survive. Thus, even if we grant the 
assumption (already unlikely in this context) that all parameter values start out as equally 
likely, we can see how rapidly the CF-violating ones would come to be vastly 
overrepresented in the population. 
The second point it illustrates is how such sophisticated equilibrium-maintaining 
mechanisms can violate CF in a much more problematic way than the comparatively 
simplistic thermostat example considered by Zhang and Spirtes.
1
 Finally, note that the 
two ion pump mechanisms are not balanced merely for a single external salinity value: 
they are balanced for a range of values. Thus, this example violates not merely CF but 
also the stronger condition of causal stability.
2
 
I am certainly not claiming that all causal relationships in such systems will 
violate CF or causal stability. But it is possible that, for any given system that involves 
equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms, and especially for those with sophisticated evolved 
equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms, there will be at least some causal relationships in 
                                                        
1 Note that a DAG representing the two mechanisms for the ion pumps, connecting 
external salinity levels as a variable to a variable representing internal ion balance 
in muscle cells, is not of the triangular form that is potentially detectable using the 
methods in Zhang and Spirtes (2008). 
2 This example also provides weight to the Russo‐Williamson thesis, that 
information about probabilistic relationships requires supplementation with 
information about underlying mechanisms in order to justify causal claims. These 
examples suggest how investigation into mechanisms for equilibrium‐maintenance 
compensate for the methodological issues that CF violations generate; we would 
expect the Russo‐Williamson thesis to hold particularly of systems liable to violate 
CF.  
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the system that violate either or both of these conditions. This changes the stance we take 
at the beginning of an investigation: rather than starting from the assumption that CF-
violations are vanishingly unlikely, and only revisiting this assumption in the face of 
difficulties, we should start investigations of such systems with the assumption that it is 
highly likely that there will be at least one such spurious probabilistic independence. 
 
5. Apparent CF-violations and their experimental consequences 
Consider a possible response to the argument in the previous section. One might 
be concerned that the examples I offer do not involve genuine CF-violations–when 
examined more closely, it may turn out that the causal relationships in questions are not 
exactly balanced, but merely close. This response might involve the claim that even in the 
case of biological systems, CF is not genuinely violated, because there are slight 
differences in parameter values that could be identified, especially if one performed the 
right interventions on the systems to ‘catch out’ the slight mismatch in parameter values. 
Or, by taking recourse to causal stability, one might say that while the equilibrium state 
of some systems involves precisely counterbalanced causal relationships, in the case of 
perturbation to that equilibrium, these relationships will be revealed. Perturbation of 
systems that return to equilibrium would thus be a strategy for eliminating many (or 
most) merely apparent CF-violations. 
Answering this challenge brings us to the heart of why CF-violations deserve 
broader discussion. Considered from a formal perspective, there is a deep and important 
difference between systems that actually violate CF, or causal stability, and those that do 
not. This fact motivates a response to merely apparent CF-violations that takes them to be 
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not methodologically problematic in the same way that genuine ones are. But the ways in 
which merely apparent CF-violations can be ‘caught out’ generally will require 
information about the DAG for the system, in order to predict precisely which variables 
should be intervened on, within what parameter ranges, in order to uncover closely-but-
not-exactly matched parameter values. While it is in principle possible to do this, it 
requires knowing precisely which intervention to perform, and it is this information that 
will be lacking in a large number of experimental situations where we don’t already have 
the DAG for the system, since that is what we are trying to find. 
Thus, a particular data set drawn from a target system for which investigators are 
seeking the DAG may have spurious conditional independencies between variables (i.e. 
violate CF) even though in the true DAG, those parameters are not precisely balanced. In 
other words, depending on how the data is obtained from the system, the data set may 
violate CF even though the system itself doesn’t. How could this happen? There are a 
soberingly large number of ways in which a data set can be generated such that a merely 
apparent CF-violation occurs. The point to note here is that merely apparent violations 
will cause exactly the same problems for researchers as would genuine CF-violations. 
There are methodological issues in dynamically complex systems such that a non-CF-
violating system may nevertheless result in a dataset that is CF-violating. Here are some 
ways in which this may happen. 
The first is quite obvious: parameter values that are not exactly opposite may 
nevertheless be close enough that their true values differ by less than the margin of error 
on the measurements. Consider the parameter values in diagram 1a. A genuine CF-
violation will occur if a=-bc. However, an apparent CF-violation will occur if a±ε1=-
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bc±ε2. Concerns about the precision of measurements and error ranges are well-known, 
but it is useful to consider them here with respect to the issue of causal faithfulness as 
another way to flesh out their role in investigatory practices. 
Two other ways in which apparent CF-violations may occur concern temporal 
factors which may play a key role in the ‘catching’ of equilibrium-balanced causal 
relationships. Temporal factors can distinguish systems with or without causal stability, 
for instance, a CF-violating system that is fragilely balanced.  
Consider the time scale of a system that involves balanced causal relationships for the 
purposes of restoring and maintaining some equilibrium state: this may be on the order of 
milliseconds for some cellular processes, tens to hundreds of milliseconds for many 
neurological processes, minutes to days for individual organisms. After a perturbation 
takes place, the system will re-establish equilibrium during that range of time. In order to 
successfully ‘catch’ the counterbalanced causal relationships in the act of re-
equilibrating, the time scale of the measurements must be on a similar or shorter time 
scale. If the time scale of measurements is long with respect to the time scale for re-
establishing equilibrium, these balanced causal relationships will not be caught.  
This basic point about taking state change data from dynamic processes has 
particular implications for CF-violations. For processes that re-equilibrate after 50 ms, for 
instance, a measurement device that samples the process at higher time scales, such as 
500ms, will miss the re-equilibration. Thus, even though the system does not violate 
causal stability, it will behave as if it does, as it will appear that there is a conditional 
independence between two variables across some range of values, namely, the range 
between the initial state and the state to which the system was perturbed. In particular, if 
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we do not know what the time scale is, or is likely to be, for re-equilibration, we cannot 
ensure that a persisting probabilistic independence between two variables in question is 
genuine or a consequence of an overly fast re-equilibration timescale. 
Not only does comparative time scales matter for apparent CF-violations; there 
are also possibilities for phase-matched cycles that that will make a non-CF-violating 
oscillating system appear to violate CF. Some systems develop equilibrium mechanisms 
that result in slight oscillations above and below a target state. If the measurements from 
this system are taken with a frequency that closely matches that of the rate of oscillation, 
then the measurements will pick out the same positions in the cycle, essentially rendering 
the oscillation invisible. This would constitute an apparent CF-violation as well. 
Predicting possible CF-violations, real or apparent, requires information about the 
dynamic and evolved complexity of the systems in question, the particular equilibrium 
states they display, the time scale for re-establishment of equilibrium compared with the 
time scale of measurement, and/or the cycle length for cyclical processes. 
 
6. Conclusion 
To summarize briefly: some kinds of systems, especially those studied in the so-
called ‘special sciences’, are likely to display the kinds of structural features that lead to 
CF-violations, such as mechanisms for equilibrium maintenance across a range of 
variable values. Some systems that do not have CF-violating DAGs may nevertheless 
generate CF-violating data sets. When we are considering the inferences made from 
probabilistic relationships in data to a DAG for the underlying system, and do not already 
have the DAG in hand, we cannot distinguish between genuine and merely apparent CF-
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violations; both will cause the same epistemic difficulties for scientists, which is why 
merely apparent CF-violations deserve broader attention. 
It’s important to note that I am not discounting the extraordinary achievements in 
formal epistemology and causal modeling that have marked the last two decades of 
research on this topic. The steps forward in this field have been monumental, including 
the development of methods by which to reduce some of the issues arising from CF-
violations (such as Zhang and Spirtes 2008). Rather, my goal is to clarify the ways in 
which apparent CF-violations can arise, the kinds of structural features a system might 
display that would increase the likelihood of CF-violation, and to bring this issue from 
discussion in formal epistemology into consideration of scientific practice more broadly. 
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Abstract.  This essay considers the extent to which a concept of emergence can be associated with Effective Field 
Theories (EFTs).  I suggest that such a concept can be characterized by microphysicalism and novelty underwritten 
by the elimination of degrees of freedom from a high-energy theory, and argue that this makes emergence in EFTs 
distinct from other concepts of emergence in physics that have appeared in the recent philosophical literature. 
 
1. Introduction. 
2. EFTs and the Elimination of Degrees of Freedom. 
3. An Interpretation of EFTs. 
4. Emergence in EFTs. 
5. Other Notions of Emergence. 
6. Conclusion. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
An effective field theory (EFT) of a physical system is a description of the system at energies 
low, or distances large, compared to a given cutoff.  EFTs are constructed via a process in which 
degrees of freedom are eliminated from a high-energy/short-distance theory.  Formulating a 
concept of emergence for EFTs is important for at least two reasons.  First, EFTs play essential 
roles in contemporary physics:  many authors believe the Standard Model of particle physics is 
an EFT, and most if not all condensed matter systems can be described by EFTs.  Second, the 
types of physical systems that can be described by EFTs have been associated with various 
concepts of emergence in the recent philosophical literature:  Mainwood (2006) suggests that the 
"new emergentism" of condensed matter physicists (e.g., Anderson 1972, Laughlin and Pine 
2000) can be characterized by microphysicalism and novelty underwritten by the physical 
mechanisms of spontaneous symmetry breaking and universality.  Morrison (2012) similarly 
stresses the role of spontaneous symmetry breaking as essential to a concept of emergence, while 
Batterman (2011) focuses on universality.  On the other hand, Wilson (2010) claims an 
appropriate concept of emergence should be based on the elimination of degrees of freedom from 
a theory in physics.  I will suggest that while a concept of emergence appropriate for EFTs shares 
aspects of these views, it is distinct from them. 
 
The plan of the essay is as follows.  Section 2 reviews the steps involved in the construction of 
an EFT, section 3 offers an interpretation of EFTs from which section 4 extracts a concept of 
emergence based on the notions of microphysicalism and novelty.  Finally, section 5 compares 
this concept with recent discussion of emergence in the philosophical literature. 
 
 
2.  EFTs and the Elimination of Degrees of Freedom 
The concept of emergence I wish to associate with EFTs will ultimately be based on the 
elimination of degrees of freedom from a field theory in physics.  I will take a degree of freedom 
associated with a theory to be a parameter that needs to be assigned a value in order to provide a 
dynamical state description of a physical system described by the theory.  A dynamical state 
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description is a description of the system at an instant in time that, in conjunction with an 
equation of motion, determines a future or a past state.  Thus, for example, a dynamical state 
description of a free classical particle governed by a second-order partial differential equation of 
motion (Newton's second law, for instance) is specified by the values of its position and 
momentum.  In three spatial dimensions, this amounts to 6 degrees of freedom.  A dynamical 
state description of a free classical field φ(x) governed by a second-order partial differential 
equation of motion is specified by the values that φ(x) and its first derivative ∂µφ(x) take at every 
point x of spacetime, which amounts to an infinite number of degrees of freedom. 
 
For some field theories, degrees of freedom associated with high energies (or short distances) 
can be eliminated in such a way that the result is an effective field theory that produces the same 
predictions as the original when restricted to low energies (large distances).  One advantage of 
using the effective theory is that it makes calculations more tractable.  Moreover, many quantum 
field theories can only be solved via perturbative expansions which contain divergent integrals at 
high energies.  For these theories, the construction of a low-energy effective theory provides not 
just a practical way of avoiding these divergences, but a conceptual framework on which to build 
an interpretation of what these theories are telling us about the world.  This construction 
proceeds in two steps: 
 
(I) The high-energy degrees of freedom are identified and integrated out of the Lagrangian 
density representing the theory. 
 
This first step assumes that the theory is encoded in a Lagrangian density L[φ], which is a 
functional of a field variable φ(x).1  This means that L[φ] depends on all the possible functional 
forms the field can take, each form φ(x) taking values at all spacetime points x.  Each such form 
of φ(x) represents a possible field configuration of field values; i.e., a possible way the field 
could be spread over spacetime.  To identify the high-energy degrees of freedom, one first 
choses an appropriate energy cutoff Λ and then decomposes the field variable into high- and low-
energy parts, φ(x) = φH(x) + φL(x), where φH(x) and φL(x) are associated with momenta greater 
than and less than Λ, respectively.  Once this is done, the high-energy degrees of freedom φH(x) 
are integrated out of the generating functional Z constructed from L[φH, φL], 
  
 Z = ∫ DφL DφH  ei∫ d
4
x L[φL, φH] =  ∫ DφL  ei∫ d
4
x Leff[φL] .
 
(1) 
 
This functional integral is taken over all possible field configurations of the high-energy degrees 
of freedom φH(x).  This literally eliminates these degrees of freedom from the Lagrangian density 
by replacing them with appropriate configurations of the remaining degrees of freedom 
(conceptually, in the same way a variable y is eliminated from an algebraic equation ax + by = c, 
by replacing it with an appropriate relation for the remaining variable:  y = (c − ax)/b).  The 
result of this is an effective Lagrangian density Leff[φL] that depends only on the low-energy 
degrees of freedom φL(x). 
                                                
1
 In general a Lagrangian density of a field theory L[φi, ∂µφi], i = 1...N, µ = 0, 1, 2, 3, is a functional of N field 
variables φi(x) and their first (and possibily higher-order) derivatives.  For the sake of exposition, I'll restrict 
attention to a single scalar field variable. 
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Typically, the functional integral over φH(x) in (1) is not exactly solvable, and even when it is, it 
may result in an effective Langrangian density that contains non-local terms (in the sense of 
depending on more than one spacetime point).  These problems are jointly addressed by the 
second step in the construction of an EFT: 
 
(II) The effective Lagrangian density is expanded in a local operator expansion 
 
 Leff = L0 + ∑i ciOi (2) 
  
 where L0 can be taken to be the interaction-free Lagrangian density (for weak interactions), 
the ci are coupling constants, and the sum runs over all local operators Oi allowed by the 
symmetries of L. 
 
Steps (I) and (II) can be characterized in the following ways: 
 
(i) First, the effective Lagrangian density is formally distinct from the high-energy Lagrangian 
density.  To the extent that this entails that the Euler-Lagrange equations of motion of the 
effective theory are distinct from those of the high-energy theory, the low-energy degrees 
of freedom φL(x) are dynamically distinct from the original degrees of freedom φ(x).
2
 
 
(ii) Second, while the local operator expansion in Step II can be viewed formally as an 
approximate perturbative solution to the path integral (1), one can argue that an effective 
Lagrangian density is not simply an approximation of a high-energy Lagrangian density.  
In many cases, the exact form of the high-energy Lagrangian density is unknown, but an 
effective Langrangian density can still be constructed.  Such a "bottom-up" EFT is obtained 
by including in the local operator expansion (2) all terms consistent with the symmetries 
and interactions assumed to be relevant at the energy scale of interest.  A "folk theorem" 
identified by Weinberg (1979, pg. 329) then justifies viewing such bottom-up EFTs as not 
simply approximations to a high-energy theory.
3
  This suggests that, even in the context of 
a "top-down" EFT for which a high-energy theory is known, the local operator expansion 
conceptually stands on its own. 
 
(iii) Finally, the elimination of degrees of freedom in the construction of an EFT results from 
the imposition of a constraint (an energy, or minimum length, cut-off) directly on a 
Lagrangian density, as opposed to a set of equations of motion.  Again, the result is a 
formally distinct effective Lagrangian density with a distinct set of equations of motion and 
a distinct set of dynamical variables. 
 
                                                
2
 For a Lagrangian density L[φi, ∂µφi], i = 1...N, the Euler-Lagrange equations of motion are defined by ∂L/∂φi − 
∂µ(∂L/∂(∂µφi)) = 0. 
3
 The folk theorem states that "...if one writes down the most general possible Lagrangian, and then calculates 
matrix elements with this Lagrangian to any given order of perturbation theory, the result will simply be the most 
general possible S-matrix consistent with analyticity, perturbative unitarity, cluster decomposition, and the assumed 
symmetry principles"  (Weinberg 1979, pg. 329). 
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3.  An Interpretation of EFTs 
The fact that EFTs come in two flavors, top-down and bottom-up, and that only the former is 
explicitly associated with a high-energy theory, might initially give one pause in attempting to 
formulate a notion of emergence appropriate for EFTs.  In particular, the concern might be that 
such a notion assumes a distinction between a theory that describes emergent phenomena and a 
second theory that describes phenomena from which the former emerge; and such a distinction 
can only be made in the case of a top-down EFT.  But this objection is easily blunted:  Nothing 
in the construction of a bottom-up EFT precludes us from assuming that an associated high-
energy theory exists; rather, the working assumption is simply that we do not know the form this 
high-energy theory takes.  (A high-energy theory in this context need only be a theory that 
describes phenomena at an energy scale above that associated with an EFT; i.e., it need not be a 
Grand Unified Theory applicable to all energy scales in toto.)  Moreover, even in the top-down 
context, the EFT does not completely determine the form of the high-energy theory:  for a given 
high-energy theory, more than one top-down EFT can be constructed. 
 
These considerations suggest the following interpretation of EFTs, both top-down and bottom-
up: 
 
(a) Failure of law-like deducibility.  If we understand the laws of a theory encoded in a 
Lagrangian density to be its Euler-Lagrange equations of motion, then the phenomena 
described by an EFT are not deducible consequences of the laws of a high-energy theory. 
 
(b) Ontological distinctness.  The degrees of freedom of an EFT characterize physical systems 
that are ontologically distinct from physical systems characterized by the degrees of 
freedom of a high-energy theory. 
 
(c) Ontological dependence.  Physical systems described by an EFT are ontologically 
dependent on physical systems described by a high-energy theory. 
 
Claims (a) and (b) are suggested by the formal distinction between an effective Lagrangian 
density and a high-energy Lagrangian density, and their corresponding Euler-Lagrange equations 
of motion.  In the case of (b), this suggests that the degrees of freedom of an EFT are 
dynamically distinct from those of a high-energy theory; moreover, the former are typically 
encoded in field variables that are formally distinct from those that encode the latter (i.e., 
different field variables appear in the Lagrangian densities of an EFT and a high-energy theory).  
On the other hand, the fact that the degrees of freedom of the former can be identified, via Steps 
(I) and (II) outlined above, as the low-energy degrees of freedom of the latter suggests (c):  the 
physical systems described by an EFT do not completely "float free" of the physical systems 
described by a high-energy theory. 
 
I'd now like to flesh out the above interpretation with two examples, and then extract a notion of 
emergence from it.  The following examples are of a top-down EFT for a 2-dimensional quantum 
Hall liquid, and a bottom-up EFT for general relativity. 
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Example 1.  A Top-Down EFT for a 2-dim Quantum Hall Liquid. 
The high-energy degrees of freedom of a quantum Hall liquid describe electrons moving in a 2-
dimensional conductor and coupled to external magnetic and Chern-Simons fields.  This is 
described by a non-relativistic Lagrangian density, 
 
 L = iψ†{∂t − ie(A0 − a0)}ψ − (1/2m)ψ
†
{∂i + ie(Ai + ai)}
2ψ + µψ†ψ + ϑεµνλaµ∂νaλ (3) 
 
where the field variable ψ encodes the electron degrees of freedom, the pair (A0, Ai), i = 1, 2, 
encodes the degrees of freedom of an external magnetic field, aµ (µ = 0, 1, 2) encodes the 
degrees of freedom of a Chern-Simons field, µ is the chemical potential, and the coefficient ϑ is 
chosen so that the electrons are coupled to an even number of "internal" magnetic fluxes, and 
hence refered to as "composite" electrons (Schakel 2008, pg. 349).  Technically, this description 
entails that, in the presence of a strong external magnetic field, the electrons experience the 
quantum Hall effect.  This occurs when the conductivity σ of the system becomes quantized in 
units of e
2
/h; i.e., σ = ν(e2/h), where ν is called the "filling factor".  The Integer Quantum Hall 
Effect (IQHE) occurs for integer values of ν and the Fractional Quantum Hall Effect (FQHE) 
occurs for values of ν given by simple fractions.  Both the IQHE and the FQHE are characterized 
by incompressibility and disipationless transport, properties associated with superconductors.  
This suggests that these effects characterize a state of matter distinct from the conductor and 
refered to as a quantum Hall liquid.
4
 
 
The properties of a quantum Hall liquid can be derived from the high-energy theory (3) by 
integrating out the electron degrees of freedom.  The remaining degrees of freedom of the bulk 
liquid can then be identified with two Chern-Simons fields, aµ, (Αµ + aµ), described by a "pure" 
Chern-Simons effective Lagrangian density, 
 
 Leff = ϑε
µνλaµ∂νaλ + ϑ'ε
µνλ(Aµ + aµ)∂ν(Aλ + aλ) (4) 
 
where the coefficient on the last Chern-Simons term is chosen to produce the integer QHE for 
the second CS field (Schakel 2008, pg. 349).  This is an example of a topological quantum field 
theory (i.e., a QFT encoded in a Lagrangian density in which a spacetime metric does not 
explicitly appear). 
 
In this example, the high-energy Lagrangian density (3) is formally distinct from the effective 
Lagrangian density (4):  (3) encodes a non-relativistic quantum field theory (QFT), whereas (4) 
encodes a topological QFT.  This suggests that the laws of the EFT are not deducible 
consequences of the laws of the high-energy theory (failure of law-like deducibility); and that the 
EFT is dynamically distinct from the high-energy theory.  Dynamical distinctness, coupled with 
the formal distinction between the field ψ that encodes the degrees of freedom of the high-energy 
                                                
4
 The IQHE can be explained by reference to the discrete spacing between the energy levels of the system.  The 
filling factor is given by ν = (#of electrons)/ (# of states per energy level).  At integer values of ν, the first ν energy 
levels are full, and this entails incompressibility in the sense that no further electrons can be excited without a large 
cost in energy.  The FQHE can be explained by noting that attaching an even number of fluxes to each electron 
cancels just enough of the external magnetic field to change the filling factor back to an integer value.  Thus (in this 
description), the FQHE is the IQHE for composite electrons (Schakel 2008, pg. 343). 
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theory and the fields aµ, (Αµ + aµ) that encode the degrees of freedom of the EFT, suggest that the 
later characterizes physical systems (i.e., two topological Chern-Simons fields) that are 
ontologically distinct from those characterized by the former (i.e., non-relativistic composite 
electrons).  Finally, the fact that the degrees of freedom of (4) are exactly the low-energy degrees 
of freedom of (3) suggests that the physical systems described by (4) are ontologically dependent 
on those characerized by (3).  In particular, the bulk quantum Hall liquid characterized by the 
topological fields aµ, (Αµ + aµ) ultimately consists of non-relativistic composite electrons. 
 
 
Example 2.  A "Bottom-Up" EFT for General Relativity. 
Recall that a bottom-up EFT is constructed in the absence of a high-energy theory by first 
identifying the relevant symmetries of the phenomenon in question and then constructing an 
effective Lagrangian density as a local operator expansion (2) that includes all possible 
interactions consistent with these symmetries.  In the case of general relativity, these symmetries 
are general covariance and local Lorentz invariance.  If one assumes that the metric gµν encodes 
low-energy degrees of freedom of an unkown high-energy theory, then an effective Lagrangian 
density corresponding to (2) can be given by, 
 
 
 
L
eff
= g{! + c
1
R + c
2
R2 + c
3
R
µ"
Rµ" + ...+L
matter
} (5) 
 
where g = det(gµν), R, Rµν are the Ricci scalar and Ricci tensor, the ci are coupling constants, and 
the elipses refer to higher-order terms (Donoghue 1995, pg. 7).  The Euler-Lagrange equations of 
motion generated by the first two terms are the Einstein equations with cosmological constant λ, 
and one can argue that the effect of higher-order terms is beyond current tests of general 
relativity. 
 
In this example, since a high-energy theory is not known, the EFT is trivially characterized by 
the failure of law-like deducibility and ontological distinctness.  Ontological dependence is 
secured by the assumption that the field variable gµν encodes the low-energy degrees of freedom 
of the unknown high-energy theory. 
 
 
4.  Emergence in EFTs 
The philosophical literature typically distinguishes between two senses of emergence.  The first 
views emergence as descriptive of the ontology (i.e., entities or properties) associated with a 
physical system with respect to another.  To say phenomena associated with an EFT are 
emergent in this ontological sense is to say the entities or properties described by the EFT 
emerge from those described by a high-energy theory.  A second sense of emergence views it as 
a formal relation between theories.  To say phenomena associated with an EFT are emergent in 
this sense is to say the EFT stands in a certain formal relation to a high-energy theory. 
 
Note that an EFT does not stand in a precise mathematical relation to a high-energy theory.  As 
outlined in Section 2, Step (I) in the construction of an EFT requires both a choice of cutoff and a 
choice of low-energy degrees of freedom with respect to the latter.  These choices typically will 
be dictated by the specific context of the problem at hand, as opposed to being products of a 
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formal procedure.  Similarly, the local operator expansion in Step (II) requires a context-specific 
identification of the symmetries of the high-energy theory (when it exists) or of the phenomena 
under investigation.  This suggests that a purely formal concept of emergence for EFTs may not 
be appropriate.  The approach adopted in this section will be to extract an ontological concept of 
emergence from the interpretation of EFTs suggested in Section 3.  This interpretation motivates 
the following desiderata. 
 
(i) First, the emergent system should ultimately be composed of microphysical systems that 
comprise the fundamental system and that obey the fundamental system's laws. 
 
(ii) Second, the properties of the emergent system should not be deducible from the properties 
of the fundamental system. 
 
I will follow Mainwood (2006, pg. 20) in refering to these desiderata as microphysicalism and 
novelty, respectively.  They are underwritten in the EFT context by the elimination of degrees of 
freedom in the construction of an EFT.  In particular, one might tell the following story about 
how the properties (and/or entities) of a system described by an EFT, encoded in an effective 
Lagrangian density Leff, emerge from a fundamental system described by a high-energy theory 
encoded in a Lagrangian density L: 
 
(i) First, the high-energy degrees of freedom are identified and integrated out of L.  This 
entails that the degrees of freedom of Leff are exactly the low-energy degrees of freedom of 
L.  Thus is microphysicalism secured. 
 
(ii) Second, the elimination of degrees of freedom also entails that the solution Leff of the path 
integral (1) is dynamically distinct from L, and is a functional of field variables that do not 
appear in L.  Dynamical distinctness suggests a failure of law-like deducibility from L of 
the properties described by Leff, and a difference in field variables suggests the properties 
and entities described by Leff and L are ontologically distinct.  Thus is novelty secured. 
 
 
5.  Other Notions of Emergence 
To further flesh out the above notion of emergence for EFTs, it will be helpful to compare it with 
other accounts in the philosophical literature. 
 
 
5.1.  "New Emergentism", Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking, and Universality. 
Mainwood (2006, pg. 20) characterizes the "new emergentism" of prominent condensed matter 
physicists (e.g., Anderson 1972, Laughlin and Pines 2000) in terms of microphysicalism and 
novelty, as described above, underwritten by a physical mechanism.  According to Mainwood, 
the specification of the latter is essential to avoid trivializing the concept of emergence:  
"...emergent properties are not a panacea, to be appealed to whenever we are puzzled by the 
properties of large systems.  In each case, we must produce a detailed physical mechanism for 
emergence, which rigorously explains the qualitative difference that we see with the 
microphysical" (pg. 284).  Such a mechanism plays both an explanatory and a formal role.  First, 
it explains how novelty arises:  New Emergentists "...follow a strategy of first exhibiting 
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evidence for emergence:  the novel and unexpected character of certain systemic properties, and 
only then presenting a physical process - a 'mechanism' - that explains how such novelty can 
arise" (pg. 87).  Second, formally, it underwrites the elimination of degrees of freedom from a 
constituative system, resulting in a system characterized by fewer degrees of freedom and 
exhibiting emergent phenomena.  For Mainwood, the physical mechanism of most interest that 
accomplishes these tasks is spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB):  "The claim of the New 
Emergentists is that in the phenomenon of symmetry-breaking we have a mechanism by which 
the set of 'good coordinates' of the whole can be entirely different from the sets of good 
coordinates which apply to the constituent parts when in isolation or in other wholes" (pg. 107).  
However, Mainwood is careful to note that, in addition to SSB, the New Emergentists identify 
other mechanisms including renormalization, the integer and fractional quatum Hall effects, and 
localization (pg. 93), as well as universality (pg. 116). 
 
SSB is the mechanism associated with the Landau-Ginzburg theory of phase changes in 
condensed matter systems, and its extension by renormalization group (RG) techniques.  These 
theoretical frameworks associate phases with internal orders characterized by symmetries, and 
phase transitions with symmetry breaking.  In the RG approach, phase transitions are analyzed 
by observing the behavior of a theory as its parameters are rescaled.  Such rescaling generates a 
flow in the theory's abstract parameter space.  A fixed point of such a flow is a point at which the 
values of the parameters remain unchanged under further rescaling; i.e., they become scale 
invariant.  This occurs at a critical point corresponding to a phase transition.  Thus phase 
transitions are characterized by scale independence:  the properties associated with a phase 
transition are independent of the micro-scale properties of the system.  In general, there can be 
many distinct RG flows that terminate at a given fixed point.  A fixed point x thus defines a 
universality class insofar as the theory defined by x is independent of the microphysical details 
of any theory on an RG flow that terminates at x. 
 
Both SSB and universality play essential roles in two other recent discussions of emergence in 
physics.  These accounts view universality as underwriting the ontological non-reductivism they 
deem necessary in descriptions of emergent phenomena, but differ on the significance of SSB.  
On the one hand, Batterman (2011, pg. 1034) has suggested that the notion of a protectorate (i.e., 
a universality class) underwrites a concept of emergence "...that goes beyond mere claims to the 
effect that symmetry breaking occurs."  According to Batterman (2011, pg. 1038), "It seems 
hardly satisfactory to appeal to symmetry breaking as an organizing principle independent of 
microdetails when we have such a profoundly successful story about why the microdetails in fact 
are largely independent or irrelevant."  On the other hand, Morrison (2012, pg. 157) focuses 
explicitly on SSB as essential to the concept of emergence:  "Although the RG provides an 
explanatory framework that shows why microphysical details can be ignored, it does not give us 
the kind of physical dynamics required for the production of emergent phenomena.  For that we 
need symmetry breaking and the accompanying phase transitions".  Morrison (2012, pg. 147) 
moreover suggests that "understanding emergent phenomena in terms of symmetry breaking -- a 
structural dynamical feature of physical systems... -- clarifies both how and why emergent 
phenoemena are independent of any specific configuration of their microphysical base."  To 
support this claim, Morrison (2012, pp. 153-155) discusses an example due to Weinberg (1986) 
in which the essential properties of a superconductor are derived, not from a theory of its 
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microconstituents (i.e., Cooper pairs), but by imposing symmetry constraints directly on a 
Lagrangian density. 
 
Weinberg's example is instructive in the context of this essay insofar as it is an example of a 
bottom-up EFT.  This raises two questions:  First, how are SSB and universality related to EFTs, 
and second, if we agree with the above authors in their insistence on identifying a mechanism to 
underwrite a nontrivial concept of emergence, what is the nature of this mechanism in the EFT 
context? 
 
The answer to the first question is explicit in the two examples discussed in Section 3:  neither 
involves SSB or universality, at least as the latter is usually defined.  Example 1 involves a phase 
transition from a less ordered conductor state to a more ordered quantum Hall liquid state; 
however, the orders cannot be distinguished by their symmetries.  Wenn (1995, 2004) has 
developed a theory of "topological orders" that characterize the states associated with quantum 
Hall liquids, and argues that such liquids cannot be described by the standard Landau-Ginzburg 
theory of phase changes governed by SSB.
5
  Moreover, while quantum Hall liquids may be 
described in terms of a concept of universality, assumedly it will not involve the same technical 
description as that provided by the RG analysis of fixed points.
6
  In this broader sense, SSB is 
sufficient, but not necessary for universality.  Example 2 also is not characterized by SSB or 
universality.  In general, while the expansion point in the local operator expansion (2) of an 
effective Lagrangian density is defined by a fixed point (and hence a universality class)
7
, an EFT 
itself need not be identified with a fixed point, nor, necessarily, with a point on an RG flow that 
terminates at a fixed point.  Both of the latter correspond to renormalizable theories, whereas 
EFTs in general need not be renormalizable.
8
  This suggests that a concept of emergence based 
on universality is too narrow for the EFT context.  (It also suggests that a concept of emergence 
based on universality will have to include as emergent those phenomena associated with 
renormalizable theories; in particular, all the phenomena associated with the Standard Model 
would count as emergent.) 
 
A concept of emergence appropriate for EFTs should thus be broader than a concept 
underwritten by SSB and/or universality.  In Section 4 I suggested that emergence in EFTs be 
                                                
5
 Wenn (1995, pg. 408) observes that the ground-state degeneracy that characterizes a quatum Hall liquid is not a 
consequence of the symmetry of the corresponding Hamiltonian, but rather depends on spatial topology.  This fact, 
together with the fact that the ground-state degeneracy is robust under perturbations, suggests to Wenn that it be 
associated with a notion of universality characterized, not by symmetries and RG fixed points, but by topological 
order. 
6
 Mainwood (2006, pg. 264, f.n. 3) acknowledges that the general concept of a universality class as used by New 
Emergentists "...is clearly meant to also extend beyond areas in which the RG techniques are usually applied". 
7
 For weak interactions, the point of expansion L0 is taken to be a Gaussian fixed point in the parameter space of the 
high-energy theory, but any fixed point will serve this purpose.  In general, the terms in the local operator expansion 
(2) are characterized by their behavior with respect to a fixed point (they can either increase, decrease, or remain the 
same as the RG flow approaches the fixed point), and this characterization is essential to the behavior of the EFT. 
8
 A fixed point corresponds to a renormalized theory; i.e., a theory that is energy scale-independent.  A point on an 
RG flow that terminates at a fixed point corresponds to a non-renormalized renormalizable theory; i.e., a "bare" 
theory that is capable of being made energy scale-independent, but whose parameters have not yet been rescaled to 
make this so.  The most general form (2) of an EFT encompasses both of these theory types, but also a theory 
represented by a point on an RG flow that passes through a neighborhood of a fixed point, but does not intersect it.  
Such a theory is non-renormalizable. 
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characterized in terms of microphysicalism and novelty, and that these characteristics are 
underwritten simply by the elimination of degrees of freedom in the construction of an EFT.  
Both Mainwood and Morrison require a causal/mechanical explanation of emergent phenomena 
in terms of a physical dynamical process like SSB (Batterman, on the other hand, is content with 
a unifying explanation based on the renormalization group).  Morrison (2012, pg. 160), in 
particular, views an appeal to the elimination of degrees of freedom as not enough:  "[t]he 
important issue...is not just the elimination of irrelevant degrees of freedom; rather it is the 
existence or emergence of cooperative behavior and the nature of the order parameter (associated 
with symmetry breaking) that characterizes the different kinds of systems."  In response, I would 
agree that, by itself, an appeal to the elimination of degrees of freedom does not explain the 
existence of cooperative behavior, nor does it explain the existence and novel nature of emergent 
phenomena.  On the other hand, the particular emergent phenomena associated with EFTs are not 
essentially characterized by cooperative behavior:  while some examples are (quantum Hall 
liquids as described by EFTs), others are not (general relativity as described by an EFT).  
Moreover, within the interpretive framework suggested in Section 3, the elimination of degrees 
of freedom in an EFT does fulfill a causal/mechanistic explanatory role.  In particular, the 
elimination of degrees of freedom in an EFT explains the existence and novel nature of low-
energy emergent phenomena by explaining how they are related to high-energy phenomena by a 
failure of law-like deducibility, and by ontological distinctness tempered by ontological 
dependence.  Thus I would argue that the particular type of elimination of degrees of freedom in 
an EFT, coupled with an appropriate intepretation of EFTs, succeeds in doing the explanatory 
work deemed necessary by Mainwood and Morrison for a nontrivial concept of emergence. 
 
 
5.2.  "Weak Ontological Emergence". 
An approach to a concept of emergence that stresses the importance of the elimination of degrees 
of freedom is given by Wilson (2010), who refers to this concept as "weak ontological 
emergence".
9
  The elimination of degrees of freedom in a theory in physics, according to Wilson, 
involves the imposition of constraints that eliminate functional dependences between system 
properties and some subset of degrees of freedom (pg. 284).
10
  Wilson takes the following to be 
examples of this: 
 
1. The electric field of a spherical conductor, which depends only on the degrees of freedom of 
the charges on its boundary (pp. 285-286). 
 
2. Statistical mechanical aggregates:  "[S]uccessful applications of the RG method to certain 
composed entities indicate that such entities have DOF [degrees of freedom] that are 
eliminated relative to systems consisting of their composing [parts]" (pg. 288). 
 
3. Quantum degrees of freedom in the classical limit (pp. 288-290). 
 
                                                
9
 Wilson (2010, pg. 280) takes "weak ontological emergence" to be compatible with physicalism, as opposed to 
"strong ontological emergence", which is not. 
10
 Wilson (2010, pg. 282) considers a more general notion of a degree of freedom that the one adopted in Section 2, 
allowing that it need not necessarily figure into a state description that underwrites a dynamics. 
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These examples arise in different contexts, none of which is appropriate for EFTs.  Example 1 
arises in the context of a single theory by the imposition of boundary conditions on the theory's 
equations of motion; thus it does not apply to the EFT context which involves two formally and 
dynamically distinct theories.  Example 2 is drawn from discussions in Batterman (2002) and 
elsewhere and arises in the context of two theories (statistical mechanics and thermodynamics) 
related by a limiting relation.  Arguably, this example also does not apply in general to the EFT 
context:  Briefly, the procedure involved in constructing an EFT, as outlined in Section 2 above, 
does not produce a limiting relation between the EFT and its high-energy theory (see Bain 2012, 
pp. 28-32, for further discussion of Batterman's (2002) notion of emergence in the context of 
EFTs).  Finally, Example 3 also seems to arise from an assumed limiting relation between two 
theories (classical and quantum mechanics), and thus is not applicable to EFTs.  (The nature of 
the limiting relation in Example 3 is a bit more controversial than in Example 2, insofar as more 
than one dynamically distinct quantization of a given classical system can be constructed). 
 
In the construction of an EFT, the elimination of degrees of freedom is not characterized by a 
limiting relation between theories, nor by the imposition of constraints on a set of equations of 
motion.  Rather, it is characterized by the imposition of a constraint (in the form of a boundary 
condition that imposes an energy, or minimum length, cutoff) directly on the degrees of freedom 
of a Lagrangian density, as opposed to its equations of motion.  This yields a formally distinct 
effective Lagrangian density with a distinct set of equations of motion.  This formal distinctness 
severs functional dependences between the remaining low-energy degrees of freedom and the 
dynamics of the high-energy theory. 
 
This type of elimination of degrees of freedom in an EFT does not appear to be what Wilson has 
in mind.  Wilson takes the sort of elimination of degrees of freedom that underwrites ("weak 
ontological") emergence to play two roles.  First, it establishes the physical acceptability of an 
emergent entity by securing the law-like deducibility of its behavior from its composing parts.  
This is taken to partially underwrite a concept of physicalism:
11
 
 
...so long as a given special science treats only of entities E whose characterization requires the 
same or fewer DOF [degrees of freedom] as their composing ei, the special science is 
appropriately seen as extracted from the more fundamental science treating the ei, such that the 
laws of the special science (expressing, in particular, the properties and behavior of E) are 
deducible consequences of the laws of the more fundamental science (expressing, in particular, 
the properties and behavior of the ei). This is the case, in particular, with the special sciences 
(statistical and classical mechanics) treating entities satisfying Weak ontological emergence 
(Wilson 2010, pg. 295). 
 
                                                
11
 For Wilson, physicalism in the context of weak ontological emergence is also underwritten by the claim that 
"...the law-governed properties and behavior of [an emergent entity] are completely determined by the law-governed 
properties and behavior of the [composing entities]..." (2010, pg. 280).  If "completely determined" refers to an 
ontological notion of dependence between the emergent and fundamental entities, then this amounts to the notion of 
microphysicalism in Section 4.  But if "completely determined" refers to a formal characteristic of a set of equations 
of motion, then I would argue that it is too strong a criterion on which to base a notion of physicalism.  In particular, 
it fails in the context of typical EFTs. 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -56-
  12 
Second, according to Wilson, the elimination of degrees of freedom entails that an emergent 
entity is characterized by different law-governed properties and behavior than those of its 
composing parts.  This is taken to underwrite a failure of ontological reductionism: 
 
The line of thought appeals to the laws that scientists take to govern an entity of a given type, 
as providing an appropriate basis for identifying the DOF associated with that entity... [The 
argument] concludes that [the emergent entity] E is not identical to [its composing parts] er, on 
grounds that there are scientific reasons for associating E with certain laws, such that 
specifying E's law-governed properties and behavior requires certain DOF; and for associating 
er with certain laws, such that specifying er's law-governed properties and behavior requires 
certain DOF different from those required to characterize E  (Wilson 2010, pg. 301). 
 
This failure of ontological reductionism might charitably be associated with a notion of novelty, 
and this, coupled with physicalism might suggest a similarity between Wilson's weak 
onotological emergence and the sense of emergence in EFTs expounded in Section 4 above.  
However, again, the elimination of degrees of freedom that underwrites Wilson's physicalism 
and the failure of ontological reductionism is decidedly different from that which underwrites 
microphysicalism and novelty in EFTs:  Where Wilson suggests elimination of degrees of 
freedom secures the law-like deducibility of an emergent entity from its composing parts, I've 
suggested that elimination of degrees of freedom in an EFT is characterized, in part, by a failure 
of law-like deducibility, and take this to underwrite novelty (in the sense of dynamical and 
ontological distinctness).  I've also suggested that elimination of degrees of freedom in an EFT is 
also characterized by the retention, in the EFT, of the low-energy degrees of freedom of the high-
energy theory, and it is this fact that underwrites a concept of (micro)physicalism (as opposed to 
a relation of law-like deducibility).  Thus, while Wilson's concept of emergence may be 
applicable to some subset of physical systems described by theories in physics, it is not 
applicable to EFTs, under the interpretation suggested in Section 3. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This essay suggests that emergence in an EFT can be characterized by novelty and 
microphysicalism underwritten by the elimination of degrees of freedom from a high-energy 
theory.  This is an elimination of degrees of freedom imposed directly on a high-energy 
Lagrangian density, as opposed to a set of equations of motion.  It results in an effective 
Lagrangian density that can be interpreted as describing novel phenomena in the sense of being 
dynamically independent of, and thus not deducible from, the phenomena associated with a high-
energy theory.  These novel phenomena can be said to ultimately be composed of the phenomena 
that are constitutive of a high-energy theory, insofar as the degrees of freedom exhibited by the 
former are exactly the low-energy degrees of freedom exhibited by the latter.  Finally it was 
argued in Section 5 that this concept of emergence in EFTs is more general than concepts of 
emergence based on spontaneous symmetry breaking and/or universality, but more narrow that a 
concept based simply on the elimination of degrees of freedom.  
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Deep Conventionalism about Evolutionary Groups 
Matthew J. Barker, Concordia University 
Joel D. Velasco, California Institute of Technology 
 
Concepts of evolutionary groups are some of the most important concepts in biology 
and  its  philosophy.  These  groups  include  often‐cited  players  in  evolutionary 
processes, such as populations, species, biological races, and lineages of various sorts. 
In  a  broad  sense,  certain  products  of  evolution  are  also  considered  evolutionary 
groups, including clades of species, of populations, of organisms, and of gene families. 
Assumptions  about  evolutionary  groups  feature  in  nearly  every  biological  study, 
whether  explicitly  evolutionary,  molecular,  or  otherwise.  And  philosophers  have 
exported  views  about  evolutionary  groups  as  far  afield  as  debates  about  how  we 
should organize and fund science in democratic societies.1  
 
The widespread importance of concepts of evolutionary groups helps make disputes 
about them important. But it makes perhaps even more important a rare consensus. 
The consensus is a form of objectivism about what determines which collections are 
evolutionary groups. It allows that our research interests may help determine which 
group concept is best in a given case. But it says that on any single prevailing group 
concept, we as minded agents do not help  fix or determine which candidate groups 
are  indeed  evolutionary  groups  under  that  concept;  instead,  objective  facts  alone 
suffice  for  that.  Although  a mix  of  biological,  chemical,  psychological,  physical  facts 
and  so  on  may  be  recognized  among  these  objective  facts,  it  is  harmless  in  this 
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context  to  use  “biological  facts”  to  refer  them.  What  is  important  is  that  this  set 
includes  only mind  independent  facts.  It  excludes  by  definition  those  facts  that  are 
instead  fully  or  partially  mind  dependent,  e.g.,  facts  about  our  research  interests, 
perceptual abilities, general values, and so on. Given these terms, the consensus view 
says objective biological facts alone suffice—we as minded agents are not needed—to 
determine whether a candidate group is in fact a kind of evolutionary group.  
 
Explicit  statements  of  objectivism  about  evolutionary  groups  in  biology  literatures 
are  typically  each  about  one  or  another  specific  kind  of  evolutionary  group.  And 
fellow  biologists  seldom  challenge  these.  When  molecular  phylogeneticists  and 
developmental botanists argue that  the AGL6‐like  family of genes  is a clade that has 
existed for at  least 300 million years, colleagues may dispute whether the AGL6‐like 
group really is a clade.2 But the vast majority on either side of any such dispute will 
agree that it is the biological facts alone that determine whether the AGL6‐like group 
satisfies the notion of clade that they all (let us suppose) are using. In another chapter 
of  the  objectivist  consensus,  evolutionary  ecologists  argue  that  many  a  biological 
taxon  has  objective  cohesion  owing  to  gene  flow  between  but  not  beyond  the 
populations  constituting  it.3 Again,  any  disputes  about  this  will  very  probably  not 
indict  objectivism.  Indeed,  objectivism  about  evolutionary  groups  is  typically  taken 
for granted without explicit statement. And when stated, authors happily  leave  it as 
an assumption.4 What could be more obvious than, say,  that a clade of plants would 
be a clade even were we never here to discover that?  
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Philosophers have more explicitly treated or adopted objectivism about evolutionary 
groups  as  a  general  consensus,  rather  than  dwelling  only  on  more  specific 
objectivisms  about  this  or  that  kind  of  group.  For  example,  Dupré,  Ereshefsky,  and 
Kitcher  clarify  that  their  respective  pluralisms  about  biological  classification  are 
consistent with  objectivism  about many  kinds  of  evolutionary  groups  (though  they 
may disagree on some kinds of groups).5 But their discussions do not aim for, and so 
understandably  do  not  provide,  close  scrutiny  or  detailed  defense  of  objectivism 
about  evolutionary  groups.  The  basic  and  assumed  idea  is  that  many  different 
evolutionary  groups  are,  despite  their  differences,  similarly  objective  because  the 
evolutionary processes that involve and produce such groups operate objectively.  
 
The sway  the consensus holds  in both  local  chapters and as a whole  is  remarkable. 
Objectivism about clades lies behind the common view that there is a single universal 
tree of life. Objectivism about taxonomic groups prevails among even non‐objectivists 
about taxonomic ranks, and is part of the idea that any one species concept univocally 
classifies  organisms  (barring  vagueness)  despite  competing  species  concepts 
ambiguously  cross‐classifying  them. 6  Authors  working  on  the  Human  Genome 
Diversity  Project  have  used  population  objectivism  to  justify  decisions  about  what 
kind of  informed  consent  to  acquire  and when,  and  about which  research methods 
and  data  to  use.7 And  the  objectivist  consensus  has  motivated  attempts  in  more 
general philosophy of science to retain a form of scientific realism despite recognizing 
an  increasing  number  of  ways  in  which  values  (in  a  general  sense)  must  shape 
scientific inquiry.8  
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Despite  its  dominance,  we  will  argue  that  this  consensus  is  mistaken  because 
objectivism about many and perhaps all commonly recognized kinds of evolutionary 
groups is mistaken. This paper aims to displace the consensus with a new view, Deep 
Conventionalism. 
 
This  new  view  consists  of  two  parts.  The  first  is  a  pluralism  that  is  deeper  than 
familiar  pluralist  views  attributed  to  Dupré,  Kitcher,  and  Ereshefsky.  Unlike  their 
pluralisms, ours undermines the objectivism of the consensus. The second part of our 
view  fills  this  void  with  a  conventionalism  that  applies  to  a  wide  variety  of 
evolutionary  groups.  This  conventionalism  says  that  even  given any  single,  specific 
evolutionary  grouping  concept,  typically  something  more  than  the  objective 
biological facts must determine or fix which things are such groups. The “something 
more”  is  a mix of  facts about us. The mix  includes various  conventions of ours, but 
also our research interests, values, abilities, and so on. We use “conventionalism” for 
short. 
 
To  proceed,  we  first  situate  Deep  Conventionalism  among  related  views.  This 
positions  us  to  clarify  a  key  notion  of  suppressed  variables  and  the  deep  pluralism 
associated  with  these.  We  then  undertake  the  central  task  of  showing  how  such 
variables ensure that our view holds for a variety of evolutionary grouping concepts, 
using  cohesive  functional  units,  populations,  and  clades  as  exemplars.  Finally,  we 
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discuss  potential  objections  and  highlight  implications  for  a  range  of  important 
positions. 
 
1. Situating Deep Conventionalism 
What is an evolutionary group? An innocuous answer is that an evolutionary group is 
any  group  of  things  that  have  certain  evolutionarily  salient  relations  that  set  them 
apart  from  other  things.  Exactly  when  things  enjoy  such  relations,  they  make  an 
evolutionary  group  out  of  what  would  otherwise  have  been,  from  an  evolutionary 
perspective, a mere group or collection.  
 
The  category  of  “evolutionary  group”  divides  into  distinct  kinds  of  evolutionary 
groups.  Authors  recognize  these  with  definitions  and  elaborations  of  different 
evolutionary  grouping  concepts,  distinguished  by  appeal  to  different  evolutionarily 
salient  relations.  For  instance,  “species”  is  said  to  name  one  kind  of  evolutionary 
group, and “population” another. Definitions of the species concept typically attempt 
to  identify  the evolutionarily  salient  relations between organisms and/or groups of 
them  in  virtue  of  which  those  things  together  form  a  species.  Definitions  of 
“population” typically attempt to  identify  the relations  in virtue of which organisms 
form a population.  
 
Sometimes a dispute about a group concept is about which definition of it is “correct”, 
“best”  or  “legitimate”—about  which  identified  relations  are  the  ones  that  make  a 
group  a  species,  or  a  population,  etc.  This  is  sometimes  further  understood  as 
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competition between more specific concepts, each vying to be the specification of the 
broader  concept  under  dispute,  the  one  that  objectively  does  or  does  not  apply  to 
each  candidate  group.  Someone with  this  understanding  sees  the biological  species 
concept, phylogenetic species concepts, and ecological species concepts battling to be 
the objective species concept. 
 
What we will call pluralistic objectivism is an increasingly popular way of interpreting 
these sorts of disputes differently, a way of qualifying or even eliminating some of the 
dispute  in  each  case  while  still  conforming  to  the  objectivist  consensus. 9  This 
pluralism and how  it  differs  from our own  is most  easily  seen by drawing  from  its 
application in the species concepts literature, though when later arguing for our own 
view  we  will  only  treat  species  concepts  implicitly,  through  discussions  of  other 
related important kinds of evolutionary groups.  
 
Pluralistic objectivism has two noteworthy features. First, it claims that the concept in 
question  either  subsumes  or  should  be  eliminated  in  favor  of  two  or  more—a 
plurality—of finer‐grained concepts, each of which is legitimate. This pluralism about 
legitimacy  allows  that  two  concepts  thought  to  be  competing  for  legitimacy  are 
instead  each  legitimate  for  distinct  purposes.  For  example,  the  biological  species 
concept is said to be legitimate (or the best, or the correct concept to use) for some 
purposes,  phylogenetic  species  concepts  for  others,  and  ecological  ones  for  still 
others. Our interests help determine which finer‐grained concept of a given broader 
type is best in which case.  
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Second, pluralistic objectivism says that for each finer‐grained concept it is objective 
facts alone that suffice to determine how a set of things divides into groups under that 
concept.  So  our  interests  help determine which  of  these  concepts  to  use  in  a  given 
case, but the objective facts have already determined what the groups are under each 
of the concepts our interests are choosing between.  
 
More precisely, take the set of organisms, S, consisting of two populations of organism 
on opposites sides of a mountain, population North and population South. According 
to  pluralistic  objectivism,  objective  facts  suffice  to  determine  whether  and  how  S 
divides  into  biological  species  groups,  or  just  biological  groups  when  these  are 
deemed objective but  their  assignment  to  the  species  rank  is not,  and whether and 
how  it divides  into ecological  species groups, or  just ecological groups.  Suppose  the 
pluralistic  objectivist  believes  that  objective  facts  determine  that  North  and  South 
together form one biological species group, while objective facts also determine that 
North  is one ecological  species group, and South another. That  is, one  finer‐grained 
concept lumps North and South, the other splits them. Then, in (say) a research study 
or classification project involving S, our interests enter the picture, helping determine 
whether  it  is  best  or  legitimate  for  us  to  recognize  the  lumping  divisions  of  the 
biological  species  concept,  or  the  splitting  divisions  of  ecological  ones,  or  both,  or 
neither. Independently of us, the divisions are there. 
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In typical empirical conditions our view disagrees with the objectivism in pluralistic 
objectivism.  There  are many ways  to  convey  this,  with  some ways  useful  to  some 
people  and  others  to  others.  Our  view  says  that  conventions—facts  about  our 
interests,  values,  abilities,  and  so  on—help  determine  not  only  which  concept  is 
relevant or legitimate in a given case, but also to which candidate groups it applies in 
that case. Our conventions are needed along with objective facts to fix the extensions 
of  evolutionary  group  concepts.  Conventions  are  needed  to  determine  whether  a 
collection  of  organisms  is  a  population,  clade,  give  type  of  species,  etc.  How many 
biological species are  in a given set of organisms is not  fully  fixed by objective facts 
across  all  research  contexts;  in  some  research  contexts  facts  about  us  pair  with 
objective facts to give one count, in other research contexts they pair to give others. 
Conventions help determine not only significance but also accuracy of group identify 
(and associated taxonomic) claims. In typical empirical conditions, the biological facts 
cannot determine whether North and South form distinct ecological species, let alone 
species simpliciter. 
 
As we will  clarify  near  the  end of  the paper when discussing  concept  splitters,  our 
conventionalism  about  grouping  concepts,  including  finer‐grained  ones,  should  not 
motivate pluralistic objectivists to simply split their finer‐grained concepts into even 
finer‐grained  ones  in  the  hope  of  reaffirming  objectivity  at  still  finer  conceptual 
levels.  We  are  stuck  with  our  conventionalism  and  should  abandon  pluralistic 
objectivism.  Our  reasoning  begins  in  the  next  section  by  clarifying  what  we  call 
Indeterminacy  Pluralism.  This  is  pluralism  with  respect  to  the  values  that  can  be 
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taken by the suppressed variables associated with any single prevailing evolutionary 
grouping  concept,  not  pluralism  about  multiple  concepts  being  legitimate.  To 
understand suppressed variables, we start with a non‐biological,  linguistic example. 
But  we  stress  that  this  is  only  to  intuitively  convey  the  form  that  Indeterminacy 
Pluralism takes, and how it can mandate conventionalism. We will then have to show 
that the biological cases take this form. Distant views in philosophy of language do no 
work in any of this.  
 
2. Suppressed Variables 
Suppose Charles is at a large picnic with much of Alfred’s extended family. Alfred is in 
a  small  group of  people  around  a  punch bowl,  and  Charles, walking  towards  them, 
senses that the small group is not enjoying the live country music. But the rest of the 
people at the picnic love the music. Charles asks, “So is this small group of you unified 
in your response to country music?”  
 
Alfred answers “yes.” But this is correct only by drawing on context to further specify 
the  question.  Alfred  gathers  that  Charles  asked  his  question  with  certain  kinds  of 
responses in mind, and certain kinds of country music. Without explicitly or implicitly 
choosing  particular  values  for  these  variables,  there  is  no  correct  answer  to  the 
question. And on other values of the variables, we can imagine that the relevant facts 
ensure that Alfred’s answer is instead not correct.  
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Take  the  case  in  which  the  small  punch  bowl  group  includes  just  Alfred  and  his 
brother  and  sister.  For  the  kinds  of  response  variable,  choose  the  “emotional 
response”  value.  For  the  kinds  of  country  music  variable,  choose  the  “pop‐country 
music”  value. Then,  given  facts  about his  family, Alfred  can  assure  you  that  he was 
correct to affirm that the small punch bowl group is unified in its response to country 
music. He and his siblings each react with disgust to pop‐country music, and more so 
than any of the attending extended family does. However, now change the value of the 
kinds  of  country  music  variable  to  “alt‐country  music.”  Then  Alfred’s  affirmative 
answer  to Charles’s question  switches  to not  correct. Alfred  likes  alt‐country music 
and his brother loves it. But his sister detests it, more than any people in the extended 
family.  Changing  the  other  variable,  from  “emotional  response”  to  “sensory‐motor 
response,” may also make Alfred’s affirmative answer incorrect.  
 
In  cases  like  the  picnic  scenario,  semantic  facts  about  the meaning  of  “response  to 
country  music”  leave  many  variables  open.  Short  of  further  inputs,  there  is  no 
semantic  fact  of  the matter  about whether  the  kinds of  response  variable  takes  the 
“emotional  response”  value  or  “sensory‐motor  response”  value.  Given  that  such 
variables do often get fixed in the face of these factual shortfalls, something else must 
add to the semantic facts to fix the variable values.  
 
In  the  picnic  case,  that  “something  else”  is  pretty  clearly  our  conventions  about 
contextual  information.  Suppose  that  at  the  picnic  it  is  pop‐country  music,  in 
particular,  that  is playing when Charles asks his question. Then very probably, both 
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he  and  Alfred  have  in  mind  the  “pop‐country  music”  value  of  the  kinds  of  country 
music  variable.  And  this  is  most  likely  because  both  of  them  are  following  a 
reasonable convention, which here implies:  if  it  is pop‐country music that is playing 
at the picnic, then presume that the kind of country music that the question is about is 
pop‐country  music.  Indeed,  it  seems  that  in  cases  with  conditions  like  this  case, 
conventions must help with any fixing of variable values.  
 
The relevant biological variables, not just linguistic ones, are also of this kind and lead 
to  similar  results.  To  see  this,  first  consider  that  in  the  picnic  case  we  have 
Indeterminacy  Pluralism  consisting  in  two  conditions.  One:  whether  a  group  of 
people is unified in its response to country music depends on variables that can each 
take one of a plurality of values that are all  included among the facts.  In fact, Alfred 
emotionally responds to alt‐country music in one way, and to pop‐country in another. 
Two: for some or all of these variables some different available values would on their 
own  lead  to  incompatible  results,  e.g.,  to  the  punch  bowl  group  having  a  unified 
response on some variable values but not on others. So the facts independent of our 
contributions  leave  it  indeterminate whether  the punch bowl group  is unified  in  its 
response  to  country  music.  Given  that  indeterminacy  in  some  cases  like  this  is 
overcome, our contributions are needed to make up those indeterminacy shortfalls.  
 
Analogously  for prevailing kinds of evolutionary groups,  Indeterminacy Pluralism is 
true and concerns the plurality of values that are available for variables of being an 
evolutionary  group  of  the  given  kind.  Regardless  of whether  there  is  a  plurality  of 
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legitimate species concepts as familiar pluralisms claim, the above two conditions are 
typically met when using any one of these or any other prevailing evolutionary group 
concepts. And again we must make up this shortfall conventionally. To make good on 
these claims, the next three sections discuss prominent examples of forward looking 
evolutionary  groups  and  then  backward  looking  evolutionary  groups;  for  brevity, 
general objections are discussed after these sections rather than repeated in each. 
 
3. Functional Units and Cohesion  
Many  evolutionary  groups  are what Baum  calls  “functional  units”,  characterized by 
“cohesion  or  causal  efficacy”  that  allows  them  to  be  “players”  or  forward  looking 
groups in ongoing evolutionary processes (op. cit., p. 74). Although authors, including 
Baum, typically have species in mind when discussing these units, some note that the 
cohesion  that  is  supposed  to  make  species  functional  units  is  also  had  to  greater 
degrees by  some non‐species groups,  such as populations,  and  to  lesser degrees by 
other  non‐species  groups,  such  as  multi‐species  syngameons  and  perhaps  some 
higher taxa.10 We dwell first on the species grade of this cohesion: species cohesion. 
 
Species  cohesion has been  important  in many articulations of  the nature of  species 
since  the Modern  Synthesis.11 This  is  explicit  in  some  species  concepts,  such  as  the 
evolutionary species concepts of Wiley and Simpson, and  implicit  in others,  such as 
Mayr’s  biological  species  concept.12 Species  cohesion  is  also  important  to  various 
interventional and field studies, e.g., attempts to explain why conspecific populations 
together  trace  a  distinct  trajectory  through  the  space  of  evolutionary  pressures, 
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including various forms of natural selection. Some such projects attempt to discover 
and  mathematically  represent  relationships  between  effective  population  sizes, 
population subdivision, migration, and species cohesion. For instance, a traditionally 
recognized  relationship  is  that  the  effective  number  of  migrants,  Nem,  from  one 
population  to  another must  be  ≥  1  for  “maintaining  species  cohesion”  across  those 
populations.13 Studies  of  evolutionary  forces  attempt  to  refine  this  view.14 Although 
the  importance  of  species  cohesion  and  similar  sorts  of  functional  cohesion  differ 
from the importance of the clades in phylogenetics, many phylogeneticists insist that 
species are special precisely because of their functional cohesion.15  
 
The question for us is whether species cohesion is a conventional sort of unity due to 
featuring suppressed variables. Only recently have authors provided the clarification 
of  “species  cohesion”  required  to  answer  this.16  Species  cohesion  is  a  grade  of 
evolutionary  response  cohesion  that  involves  organisms or populations  responding 
similarly to evolutionary pressures. Importantly, whether a group responds in such a 
way  depends  partially  on  the  contrast  class.  Take  a  collection  of  populations.  It 
manifests  evolutionary  response  cohesion  exactly  when  the  responses  of  its 
populations  to  evolutionary  pressures  are  more  similar  to  each  other  than  to  any 
outside  the  collection.  This  is  for  a  collection  to  be  exclusive,  in  at  least  one  way, 
among others. Without this particular relativization to things outside the collection, it 
is hard  to  see how  the collection could have  the cohesion  that  is  supposed  to set  it 
apart from other things – give it functional unity.  
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Once  it  is  clear  that  evolutionary  response  cohesion  distinguishes  evolutionary 
groups that we call functional units, it is easy to see that being such a unit depends on 
the  values  that  suppressed  variables  take.  These  are  variables  of  evolutionary 
response cohesion. Recall populations North and South, flanking the mountain. They 
will  face  many  evolutionary  pressures,  often  concurrently:  a  drought,  a  nutrient 
deficiency,  emergence  of  an  advantageous  mutation.  And  there  are  different 
responses they can have to any one pressure: this  trait declines  in  frequency in one 
population  and  increases  in  the  other;  that  trait  increases  in  both  populations. 
Minimally then, two suppressed variables of evolutionary response cohesion (of any 
grade) that can take many values are which evolutionary pressures and which aspects 
of response.  
 
In typical cases, there will be an enormous number of values these variables can take 
because  organisms  and  populations  have  many  traits  and  face  many  evolutionary 
pressures.  On  many  combinations  of  these  values  the  two  mountain  populations 
would  count  as  having  evolutionary  response  cohesion while  on many others,  they 
would  not.  Suppose  that  in  each  population,  just  1%  of  organisms  have  a  suite  of 
genes  that,  during  depressed  humidity,  contribute  to  their  retaining  moisture  far 
better  than  the  other  99%  of  organisms.  Then  there  is  a  series  of  devastating 
droughts. The suite of genes increases to 35% representation in both populations. In 
organisms  of  other  nearby  populations,  genes  involved  in  moisture  retention  are 
quite  variable,  resulting  in  no  pattern  of  frequency  response  during  the  droughts. 
Choosing  “moisture  retention genes”  for  the which aspects of response  variable,  and 
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“series  of  droughts”  for  the which evolutionary pressures  variable,  along with many 
other values of these variables that similarly relate the populations, would count the 
two mountain populations as having associated evolutionary response cohesion. The 
responses of moisture retention genes in those two populations are more similar to 
each other than to any responses in other populations.  
 
At  the  same  time,  in  North,  and  in  all  populations  nearby  except  South,  a  new 
sequence  at  a  genetic  locus  has  emerged  that  dramatically  helps  utilize  increased 
sunlight  hours  for  energy  production.  Spikes  in  sunlight  hours  accompany  the 
droughts.  Selection  then  facilitates  a  spike  in  population  frequencies  of  the  new 
sunlight  utilization  sequence—except  in  South,  which  does  not  yet  enjoy  that 
sequence.  If  we  change  the  value  of  the  which  aspects  of  response  variable,  from 
“water retention genes,” to “sunlight utilization locus” plus other aspects of response 
that  similarly  relate  all  the  populations,  then  the  two mountain  populations would 
not count as having evolutionary response cohesion.  
 
This  clarifies how  functional units distinguished by evolutionary  response cohesion 
will  typically  satisfy  the  two  conditions  of  Indeterminacy  Pluralism.  To  help  verify 
that this is typically so, most any study of population differentiation will do. Barbará 
et al. (op. cit.) recently described a nice model for studying population differentiation 
across continental radiations. The model involves populations of Alcantarea species, 
perennial plants in Brazil that grow on large granite outcrops (similar to Ayers Rock, 
aka  Uluru).  Populations  in  these  species  made  a  useful  model  partly  because 
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measurements  suggested  that  factors  known  to  complicate  some  population 
differentiation  studies  (e.g.,  populations  diverging  markedly  from  Hardy‐Weinberg 
and  selection/drift  equilibriums) were  absent,  or  otherwise would not  significantly 
distort assessments of these populations.  
 
Highly  varied  traits  characterized  organisms  in  these  populations.  For  example,  all 
eight  microsatellite  loci  investigated  in  populations  of  one  species,  Alcantarea 
imperialis, “were polymorphic, with up to 14 alleles per locus” (ibid., p. 1985). And the 
scattering  of  populations  across  granite  outcrops  suggests  varied  evolutionary 
pressures  across  those  populations.  Together  these  points  indicate  there  are many 
values  that  the  variables  responses  to  evolutionary  pressures  and  which  aspects  of 
response  will  take  across  the  studied  populations  of  Alcantarea  imperialis  (first 
condition of Indeterminacy Pluralism). Also, evidence suggested that for at least some 
of  these  variables  some  different  available  values  would  on  their  own  lead  to 
incompatible verdicts on whether the populations of the Alcantarea imperialis jointly 
manifest  the  species  grade  of  evolutionary  response  cohesion  (second  condition  of 
Indeterminacy  Pluralism).  Genetic  distances  between  populations  of  Alcantarea 
imperialis, for example, were sometimes nearly as large as between that species and 
another Alcantarea species (ibid., p. 1986). Genetic variance, too, between conspecific 
populations  was  near  what  it  was  between  the  species  (ibid.,  p.  1988),  and  many 
researchers believe  that  in many cases variance between conspecific populations  is 
even  greater  than  that  between  species.  These  statistical measures  of  distance  and 
variance  strongly  suggest  that  many  particular  genetic  responses  to  evolutionary 
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pressures  are  more  similar  between  populations  of  distinct  species  than  between 
conspecific populations.  
 
Generally  across  functional  unit  candidates, many  of  the  biological  values  available 
for  suppressed  variables  of  evolutionary  response  cohesion  would  count  the 
candidate  as  being  a  functional  unit.  Many  other  available  biological  values  would 
have the opposite result. Both results cannot obtain. And the biological  facts do not 
choose which of all the biological values are taken by the variables. We must do that. 
Species  cohesion and other grades of  evolutionary  response  cohesion are  therefore 
conventional  sorts  of  unity  in  light  of  the  Indeterminacy  Pluralism  that  is  true  of 
them.  This  entails  conventionalism  about  functional  units  distinguished  by  such 
cohesion.  
 
4. Populations and Interaction Rate Exclusivity 
Not  all  forward  looking  functional  units  are  distinguished  by  some  grade  of 
evolutionary response cohesion. For others, it is how they causally interact with each 
other, rather than how they causally respond to shared evolutionary pressures, that 
makes  them  functional  units  of  an  evolutionary  kind.17 Populations  are  the  prime 
example. 
 
 Millstein  usefully  compares  prevailing  distinct  population  concepts  in  terms  of 
permissiveness.18 Some  are  astonishingly  permissive,  recognizing  any  collection  of 
organisms within a species as a population (ibid., p. 61). For our purposes it would be 
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most  convincing  to  show  that  the  least  permissive,  or  most  specific,  population 
concept  that  is  common  in  evolutionary  studies  features  Indeterminacy  Pluralism. 
Millstein,  following  in  the wake  of  others,  refines  the  definition  of  such  a  concept. 
Roughly, “the causal interactionist population concept” says that a population is any 
group  of  multiple  conspecific  organisms  that  is  the  largest  group  for  which  the 
internal  rates of  survival and reproduction  interactions are much higher within  the 
group than outside it (ibid., p. 67).  
 
As  with  evolutionary  response  cohesion,  the  evolutionary  group‐making  property 
that this definition picks out is a kind of unity or exclusivity property. It is relativized 
to  things  outside  candidate  populations,  as  you would  expect  of  a  property  that  is 
supposed to unify and set apart a group from other things. In this case, it is survival 
and reproduction interaction rates that are supposed to be distinctive between group 
members,  relative  to  outsiders.  Effectively  these  interaction  rates  are  to  be  greater 
between group members than between them and outsiders.  
 
This  property  also  features  Indeterminacy Pluralism due  to  variables  that  can  take 
many values, some  large sets of which would suggest a group has  the property and 
other  large  sets  of  which would  imply  otherwise. We  find  these  variables  at more 
than one level. At a first level, there is a variable that is not suppressed at all, the kind 
of  interaction  variable.  It  is  not  suppressed  because  two  values  of  this  variable  – 
“survival interaction” and “reproduction interaction” – are explicitly referenced in the 
description  of  the  definitive  property.  These  two  values  can  pull  in  opposite 
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directions.  Many  organisms  frequently  interact  with  others  in  a  way  that  changes 
their life expectancy (e.g., negatively in the case of direct or indirect competition, and 
positively in the case of cooperation), without changing their expected reproductive 
output  (ibid.).  The  situation  escalates  if  we  omit  the  stipulated  restriction  of  a 
population  to  members  of  the  same  species,  as  Godfrey‐Smith  suggests  we  do  to 
properly understand natural selection, and as one must (on pain of circularity) if one 
defines “species” in terms of populations.19 Highest rates of reproductive interactions 
for  some plant  in my garden might  connect  it with pollinators and seed dispersers, 
while  highest  rates  of  survival  interactions  might  connect  it  with  other  plants 
crowding it for soil and sun.  
 
One  level  down we  find  two  suppressed  variables: kinds of  survival  interaction  and 
kinds  of  reproductive  interaction.  These  can  take  several  values,  indicated  when 
Millstein  notes  there  are  several  different  kinds  of  survival  and  reproductive 
interactions, respectively (op. cit., pp. 67‐68). Among the reproductive kind, she cites 
successful  matings,  unsuccessful  matings,  and  different  offspring  rearing  activities. 
Survival  interactions  include  direct  competition,  indirect  competition,  and 
cooperation.  Values  for  each  of  these  will  often  simultaneously  pull  in  opposite 
directions with  respect  to  a  candidate  group’s  being  “interaction  rate  exclusive.”  A 
tree  in  Mauro’s  backyard  has  perennially  poor  fruit.  The  local  deer  nearly  always 
choose the neighbor’s tree fruit instead. Furthermore, most of the fruit from Mauro’s 
tree  rots  below  it,  leaving  seeds  to  struggle  for  the  little  light  penetrating  through 
other  crowding  trees  of Mauro’s.  The  struggling  seeds  of Mauro’s  tree  involve  that 
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tree in frequent (unfavorable) reproductive interactions with Mauro’s other trees; the 
fruit of  that  tree  involve  it  in  frequent  (unfavorable) reproductive  interactions with 
the  neighbor’s  tree.  Many  organisms  frequently  each  have  many  reproductive 
interactions,  some  of  which  suggest  connections  to  one  group,  some  to  another, 
others to another still, and so on. Likewise for their survival interactions.  
 
Suppose we  accept  that  for many  a  candidate  population  in  the popular  sense  that 
Millstein refines, many values for the variables we have discussed would imply that 
the  candidate  has  the  exclusivity  or  unity  that marks  such  populations.  And many 
other values would imply the candidate does not have this property. Then we again 
have  Indeterminacy  Pluralism,  and  many  population  boundaries  must  be  ones  we 
help fix. Populations popularly conceived are then conventional in our sense. 
 
5. Clades, Splitting and Genealogical Exclusivity  
In many areas of biology the central evolutionary grouping concept is that of a clade 
or a monophyletic group. Clades are evolutionary groups because they feature a kind 
of evolutionary unity  ‐  they are united by a shared common ancestry, which makes 
them backward looking groups. Relative recency of common ancestry often explains 
why members of a clade share the traits that they do, grounds a variety of inferences 
about  the past,  and provides  evidence  about what unseen  traits  in members of  the 
group  will  be  like.  Such  features  make  clades  so  important  in  taxonomy  that  a 
common view of biological taxa is that they must be clades. The importance extends 
far  beyond  taxonomy.  Phylogenetic  trees  are  recognized  as  the  background 
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information required for a huge number of inferences and explanations. But trees are 
simply a representation of which groups under examination form clades that do the 
real  explanatory  work.  Essentially  any  question  in  evolutionary  biology,  or  other 
branches of biology that make evolutionary assumptions, depends on history and so 
on clades.20  
 
But  in  fact  there  is  no  single  “common  ancestry”  relationship  that  grounds  clade 
groupings.  A  standard  definition  of  “clade”  is  that  it  is  some  species  and  all  of  its 
descendants. Yet it is not clear at all which groups are species. (Nor clear if there are 
any  species.21)  Further,  some of  the most popular  views  about  species  require  that 
they are clades, and so at least those views cannot define “clade” in terms of species. 
For these reasons, it is now common to see clades defined directly in terms of groups 
of  populations  or  organisms  and  their  relationships. 22  But  there  are  different, 
incompatible  ways  of  understanding  the  history  of  populations  and  of  organisms. 
Take these in turn. 
 
Defenses of phylogenetic concepts of species often talk about trees of populations, to 
argue  that  all  taxa  (including  species)  should  be  monophyletic  groups  of 
populations.23 That  is,  a  clade  should  be  some  ancestral  population  and  all  of  its 
descendants. This maneuver avoids talking about ancestral species, and avoids having 
delineation of clades depend on delineation of speciation events. But we then replace 
the  avoided  problem  with  the  problem  of  delineating  populations  and  population 
lineage splits. Velasco argues  that  lineage splits are context‐dependent.24 One rough 
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argument  for  this  is  that  lineage splits represent a  loss of cohesion between groups 
and  the  introduction  of  distinct  evolutionary  paths.  However  for  certain  kinds  of 
traits  a  group may  still  be  cohesive, while  for  others,  the  very  same  group may  be 
broken up into independent trajectories. Only the context and associated conventions 
can  determine  which  kinds  of  traits  are  of  interest  and  so  must  help  determine 
whether a lineage split has occurred. 
 
The  history  of  populations  is  naturally  “loose”  in  a  way  that  allows  for  some 
reticulation  between  groups.  The  very  idea  of  migration  dictates  that  it  must  be 
possible  to  have  some  gene  flow  between  distinct  populations  without  thereby 
collapsing  them. How much reticulation  is  allowed  is precisely what  is  at  issue and 
what drives the point that lineage‐splitting (and so cladehood) is context‐dependent. 
Grant  and Grant  talk  about distinct  clades of Darwin’s  finches  and place  them on a 
phylogenetic tree, but  later discuss hybridization between these groups.25 There are 
many  reasons  to  treat  sister  species  of  Darwin’s  finches  as  distinct  clades.  But 
whether  the  relevant  lineages  should  be  considered  separate  at  all  depends  on 
context and convention.  
 
This  brings  us  to  the  history  of  organisms,  because  for  some  purposes,  in  some 
contexts,  we  want  to  be  strict,  and  then  it  is  important  to  think  of  clades  as 
genealogically  exclusive  groups  of  organisms.  That  is:  a  group  of  organisms,  all  of 
which are more closely related to each other than to any organisms outside the group, 
with  no  exceptions  such  as  hybrids.  De  Queiroz  and  Donoghue  introduced  this 
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concept of  exclusivity  to  the  taxonomic  literature  to  separate  it  from monophyly  in 
reticulating  groups  (such  as  organisms  within  a  single  species).26 But  there  are 
different ways of understanding how organisms are related to one another. Baum and 
Shaw  first  carefully  spelled  out  exclusivity  in  terms  of  genetic  concordance,  but 
Velasco defines it in terms of organismal parent‐offspring relationships.27 These two 
kinds of  group  are  incompatible, with  some biological  projects  concerned with one 
and different projects the other.28  
 
Thus when we ask whether a group is genealogically exclusive, there is a suppressed 
variable  that we might  call kind of genealogical exclusivity.  It  can  take  (at  least)  the 
values  “recency of  organismal  common ancestry” or  “genetic  concordance.” But  the 
biology alone does not determine which of these values the variable takes. So long as 
the  available  values  are  objectively  incompatible  as  these  two  often  are,  any 
determination  of  whether  a  candidate  group  is  genealogically  exclusive  is 
determination that we help with. This is because in such a typical case, our research 
interests,  conventions,  and  so  on,  are  involved  in  selecting  among  the  available 
variable  values.  These  contributions  of  ours must  help  select,  if  variable  values  are 
taken at  all. Genealogical  exclusivity  is  therefore  conventional  in our broad  sense – 
determined  by  biology  plus  by  us.  When  being  a  clade  is  being  genealogically 
exclusive, we also help determine whether something is a clade. 
 
We  do  not  always  want  our  understanding  of  common  ancestry  to  be  as  strict  as 
genealogical  exclusivity,  even  though  that  exclusivity  represents  a  kind  of  shared 
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ancestry  that  can  ground  many  kinds  of  inferences.  After  all,  a  small  number  of 
hybrids between two different clades destroys either kind of genealogical exclusivity 
just described. And often we want  to understand  the distribution of  some  “broader 
level” feature such as biogeography, in which case it seems appropriate to think of the 
history of whole populations as determined by population lineage splits. But in these 
cases conventions help fix the variable value “distinct population lineage” in place of 
“being  genealogically  exclusive.”  And we  saw  that  this  fixed  value  itself  has  deeper 
suppressed  variables,  because  population  splits  depend  on  contexts  that  have 
incompatible outcomes and which the biological  facts alone do not choose between. 
So at multiple levels there is Indeterminacy Pluralism and conventionalism.  
 
The general  source of  this  is  that different parts of a  taxon have different histories. 
Which parts we care about varies across contexts. Our research interests help decide 
between  the  looser  “population  lineage”  definition  of  clade  or  the  more  strict 
“genealogical exclusive group of organisms” idea. What is important to see is that on 
either of these readings, there are still further suppressed variables whose objective 
values  would  incompatibly  dictate  which  things  are  population  level  lineages  or 
which organisms are most closely related to each other. And the biological facts leave 
us with a plurality of possible values that lead to incompatible grouping of organisms 
into clades. Further details are needed for any determination of cladehood.  
 
This is most obvious in extreme cases like Thermotogales. While much of the group’s 
history remains uncertain, ribosomal RNA and other “core” operational genes give us 
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strong  reason  to  believe  that  the  Thermotogales  are  a  bacterial  group  that  share  a 
“cellular” history with the bacteria Aquifilales; however, the majority of their genome 
indicates some other phylogenetic position – including many genes which are clearly 
of  archaeal  origins.29 Context  combined  with  various  conventions  helps  determine 
whether Thermotogales is a clade of Bacteria, a clade of Archaea, or not a clade at all. 
While Thermotogales is among the most extreme cases we know, this kind of context 
dependence  is  unavoidable.  There  is  then  is  no  unique  objective  grouping  of 
organisms into clades and so no uniquely correct tree of life. 
 
6. Lumpers and Splitters 
For  splitters,  those with  a  preference  for  finer‐grained  concepts,  an  objection  now 
quickly comes to mind. Just as Dupré, Ereshefsky and Kitcher have split “species” into 
“genealogical  species”  and  “interbreeding  species”  and  others,  objectivists  can  split 
the concept of  “clade”  into  “population  level clade” and “organism  level clade”. This 
may  concede  conventionalism  about  “clade”,  but  relocates  objectivism  to  the  finer‐
grained concepts that the splitting of “clade” produces. Perhaps this splitter strategy 
can be applied to “functional cohesive unit” and “population” too. 
 
Our  above  discussion  indicates  that  the  “clade”  splitter’s  first  division,  between 
“population  level  clade”  and  “organism  level  clade,”  will  only  confront  the  further 
suppressed  variables  we  have  uncovered  for  each  of  these.  Can  the  splitter  then 
simply  try  and  split  yet  again?  Technically,  yes.  But  consider  the  kinds  of  concepts 
that result: 
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• “population  level clade” as clarified by a strict‐but‐not‐too‐strict “with 
<1 incoming migrant per generation per population” 
• “organism  level  clade  as  defined  by  being  an  exclusive  group  due  to 
being a clade on the plurality of the genome tree with respect to all genes and 
all organisms” 
Putative objectivism about  these  concepts  faces  two problems. The  first  is  that  key 
components of these are also conventional. It is doubtful that biological facts alone fix 
what counts as a generation or a migrant, for example, much less what it takes to fix 
what counts as an organism or a population.  
 
The  second  and  more  decisive  problem  is  that  these  concepts,  and  the  additional 
splitting  that  produced  them,  are  theoretical  dead  ends.  These  concepts  are  not 
evolutionary  grouping  concepts  at  all.  They  are  ad  hoc  constructions  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  being  objective  and would play  no  role  in  biological  theorizing.  Being  a 
clade  is  important.  If we want to know what a clade  is, we should  focus on the role 
that the term “clade” plays in biological theory. But if we do this, it is clear that being 
a  clade  is  tied up with many different kinds of processes, patterns,  and methods of 
detection,  and  is  fundamentally  intertwined  and  interdefined with  other  “problem” 
concepts like lineage, species, and population. Being overly precise in defining “clade” 
robs the term of its power to play the large number of roles that it is expected to play.  
 
This problem is even clearer for splitting “functional cohesive unit,” which would give 
way to concepts such as: 
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• “functionally cohesive group with respect to trait T1 and pressure P1”  
• “functionally cohesive group with respect to trait T2 and pressure P2,” 
and...   
If one of these applies to a group,  it will typically apply to only that group—the one 
featuring T1 that is subject to P1, for example. Such concepts do not pick out kinds to 
which  many  member  groups  belong  and  over  which  theoretically  interesting 
generalizations  and  predictions  hold.  Splitting  “population”  yields  similarly  vapid 
concepts: 
• “population due to rate exclusivity with respect to survival interactions 
S1 and reproductive interactions R1” 
• “population due to rate exclusivity with respect to survival interactions 
S2 and reproductive interactions R2” 
The  theoretical  reasons  for caring about  the kinds of groups we have  focused on  in 
this  paper  are  absent  for  those  produced  when  avoiding  our  conventionalism  by 
splitting.  Better  to  not  split  and  retain  conventional  concepts  that  are  theoretically 
important.  In  other  words,  the  utility  of  evolutionary  group  concepts  depends  on 
their flexibility in application. Empirical facts about the organization and diversity of 
the  biological  world  dictate  that  our  grouping  concepts  allow  for  flexibility  in 
application in distinct contexts. It would be a mistake to conclude that this diversity 
requires  instead  a  tremendous  explosion  in  the  number  of  evolutionary  grouping 
concepts that we must use. 
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Lumpers will agree  that splitting buys objectivity at  too high a  theoretical cost, and 
that we should retain instead the theoretically important concepts we have analyzed. 
But  many  lumpers  will  keep  their  agreement  with  us  short,  insisting  that  these 
unsplit  concepts  can  objectively  apply  with  theoretical  significance  across  many 
contexts.  For  example,  of  course  we  would  allow  that  in  one  context  a  group  of 
populations is a functional cohesive unit if all their trait responses to all evolutionary 
pressures  are  more  similar  to  each  other  than  to  any  other  populations.  But  the 
lumper argues  that we also need  to allow  that a different group of populations  can 
have the same property of being a functional cohesive unit with just 80% of their trait 
responses to all evolutionary pressures being more similar to each other than to any 
other population. In another context, 75% may suffice if this includes the right traits. 
In  still  others  the difference may  concern percentage of  pressures  instead of  traits, 
but  we  still  have  a  cohesive  functional  unit.  We  may  need  to  recognize  similar 
flexibility to being a population: in one context, exclusivity with respect to large sets 
or certain reproductive and survival interactions suffices, in another a smaller set of a 
different but especially salient mating interactions is enough. Perhaps a similar kind 
of  consideration  could  apply  to  the  different  kinds  of  genealogical  connections 
relevant to being a clade. 
 
Effectively,  these  suggestions  indicate  that  the  unsplit  concepts  of  “functional 
cohesive unit,” Millstein’s  “population” and  “clade” are all  cluster concepts.30 This  is 
regardless  of  whether  a  particular  group  that  one  of  these  concepts  picks  out  is  a 
natural kind, an individual, or something else—in each case, the concepts are defined 
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by  disjunctive  clusters  of  conditions;  no  one  of  these  conditions  is  necessary  for 
application of the concept, but a variety of combinations of them is each sufficient.  
 
There  are  two  candidate ways  to  claim biological  facts  alone determine when  such 
concepts  apply.  One  is  by  putatively  objective  weighting  schemes.  Such  a  scheme 
hopes to tell us how much different factors matter in different cases. Notice that the 
weighting  scheme  that  says  that  all  factors  matter  equally  across  all  cases  in  all 
contexts is still a weighting scheme (it is a strictly equitable one). The problem with 
any  of  these  schemes  is  not  that  they  are  hopeless;  they  can  be  quite  useful.  The 
problem  is  for  an  objectivist  reading  of  them.  Thinking  that  biological  facts  alone 
determine which traits matter to what degree in what context  is hopeless. Using the 
language of suppressed variables, our arguments in this paper have already implied 
these weightings are conventionally determined.  
 
This  fact  inspires  the  second  candidate  way  to  claim  that  biological  facts  alone 
determine when  cluster  concepts  apply  in  particular  cases.  The  idea  is  that  cluster 
grouping concepts cannot be defined in terms of the relative similarities or kinds of 
interactions  between  things  that  groups  comprise.  Granted,  the  disjunctive 
specifications of conditions above may be epistemic guides—they may help  indicate 
whether a given concept applies to a group. But these conditions obtaining between 
things  grouped  are  not  what makes  those  groups  evolutionary  ones.  Instead,  the 
groups themselves have ontological priority as real units, whether as individuals (the 
populations  of  Millstein)  or  natural  kinds  (the  species  taxa  of  Boyd,  op.  cit.,  and 
San Diego, CA -87-
  30 
Wilson, Barker and Brigandt, op. cit.). Reductive definitions of them are then bound to 
fail and the ontologies of evolutionary groups resist deeper specification.  
 
This “groups first” view may seem a desperate way for the objectivist lumper to avoid 
the conventionalism of weighting schemes. But it is a difficult view to refute. We think 
it  becomes  more  plausible  when  elements  of  it  are  retained  in  a  conventionalist 
framework.  In  that  framework, we  appeal  to  biological  facts,  but  also  draw  on  our 
research  interests,  abilities,  values,  and  so  on,  to  conventionally  determine  which 
things are evolutionary individuals or kinds. Indeed, the least strained descriptions of 
biological practice accord with this. After conventional “group first” delineations pick 
out  the  groups,  epistemically  useful  cluster  specifications  can  be  given  and  explain 
why  these  groups,  rather  than  other  possible  groupings,  fall  under  the  relevant 
concept. 
 
7. Conclusion and Broader Issue 
Our chief conclusion is that evolutionary grouping concepts, such as those of clades, 
functional  cohesive  units,  and populations,  do  not  objectively  delineate  groups,  but 
rather, when they do apply to some collection or organisms, they must do so with the 
help  of  our  conventions.  More  specifically,  facts  about  the  context  and  our 
conventions,  interests,  and  values  combine  with  the  biological  facts  to  determine 
whether  some  collection  of  organisms  is  a  group  of  a  particular  kind.  The  central 
reason  for  this  concerns  the  suppressed  variables  built  into  these  concepts.  The 
concepts  apply  only when  the  variables  take  values.  But  the  variables  cannot  take 
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values  independently of context. And without our conventions helping to determine 
which values are taken, there is simply no fact of the matter about which collections 
are  groups  according  to  that  concept.    For  just  a  flavor  of  how  this  conclusion  is 
relevant not only to discussions of evolutionary groups, but also connects to a range 
of other issues, we finish with snapshots of broader implications.  
 
The  common  assumption  that  the  evolutionary  groups  we  study  form  objectively 
determined branches on a single objective tree of all life is false. Prevailing taxonomic 
concepts each do not unambiguously divide sets of organisms into taxa when taking 
only objective biological facts as inputs. Instead, in different contexts, different groups 
are properly regarded as taxa. 
 
Biological  taxonomies  have  featured  as  case  studies  in  broad  “science  and  values” 
debates about whether and how our conventions and interests do or must attach to 
such taxonomies. Some objectivists concede that our conventions and interests help 
determine  the  significance  of  taxonomies,  but  we  now  see  this  is  not  a  sufficient 
concession.  Conventions  and  interests  also  help  determine  the  accuracy  of  those 
taxonomies, because conventions and interests help fix the groups taxonomized.  
 
Objectivity  of  evolutionary  groups  is  often  thought  to  contribute  to  or  feature  as  a 
part  of  policy  justifications.  For  instance,  to  help  justify  the  conservation of  certain 
caribou  groups,  the  Committee  on  the  Status  of  Endangered  Wildlife  in  Canada 
(COSEWIC) can be understood as appealing to normative principles of the following 
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sort:  if  a  described  group  of  organisms  objectively  satisfies  the  definition  of  an 
evolutionary group concept (even a definition arbitrarily chosen among competitors), 
then  the  group  is  a  unit  of  diversity  that  should  be  protected  or  conserved  when 
endangered. 31  Even  though  the  justification  of  this  principle  will  probably  be 
normative, it applies to any given group only if that group is objective. Policy makers, 
including  COSEWIC,  often  suggest  that  the  only  or main  obstacle  to  satisfying  this 
objectivity  condition  on  the  application  of  the  normative  principle  is  a  lack  of 
empirical  data  (ibid.,  p.  9).  But  our  conclusion  implies  the  obstacle  is  greater—that 
the objectivity condition cannot be met, nor the principle applied, no matter the state 
of empirical data.  
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Time and Fitness in Evolutionary Transitions in Individuality 
Abstract 
It is striking that the concept of fitness although fundamental in evolutionary theory, still remains 
ambiguous. I argue here that time, although usually neglected, is an important parameter in 
regards to the concept of fitness. I will show some of the benefits of taking it seriously using the 
example of recent debates over evolutionary transitions in individuality. I start from Okasha’s 
assertion that once an evolutionary transition in individuality is completed an ontologically new 
level of selection emerges from lower levels of organization. I argue that Okasha’s claim to have 
identified two ontologically distinct levels of selection is an artifact created by an undeserved 
comparison between the fitness of the collective level and the fitness of its constituents. Once 
fitness is assessed over the same period of time at the two levels of organization it becomes clear 
that only one, unique process of selection is acting upon both levels.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Yes, fitness is the central concept of evolutionary biology, but it 
is an elusive concept. Almost everyone who looks at it seriously 
comes out in a different place.  
Leigh Van Valen 1989,2-3 
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It is striking that the concept of fitness, although fundamental in Darwinian Theory, is not yet 
unified, and after more than 150 years still remains ambiguous. Is fitness an ecological descriptor 
or a mathematical predictor? Do species have a fitness, and if they do, how shall we measure it? 
Should fitness be measured over short or long periods of time? All these questions are still 
without clear answers. In this article, I have two aims. First, I will clarify the concept of fitness 
by arguing that time is an important parameter of this concept. Discussions over the concept of 
fitness are numerous and I will not be able to cover them all. Rather, I will concentrate on 
particular benefits that pairing the concept of fitness with time can bring to one contemporary 
discussion over the levels of selection, namely evolutionary transition in individuality (ETI). I 
will demonstrate, and this will be my second aim, that the model of ETIs developed by Okasha 
(2006), relying on Michod and colleagues‟ work, faces a serious problem. This problem, I will 
argue, comes precisely from the fact that in his model Okasha does not sufficiently take time into 
account when measuring fitness at different levels of organization. 
ETIs are events in the course of evolution that lead to the formation of new higher level 
individuals due to the cooperation of two or more individuals at a lower level of organization 
(Michod 2011). One example of ETI is the transition from uni- to multicellular organisms. A 
number of other ETIs have been proposed, among them the transitions from prokaryote to 
eukaryote cells, from unicellular to multicellular organisms, and from multicellular organisms to 
integrated colonies such as colonies of ants or honeybees. One of the most accomplished models 
of ETI is the one suggested by Michod and colleagues. In a number of articles and books 
(Michod 1999, 2005; Michod, Nedelcu, & Roze 2003; Michod, Viossat, Solari, Hurand, & 
Nedelcu 2006) they propose a number of conditions for ETIs to occur. Okasha (2006, 2011) 
recently set Michod and colleagues‟ work in the framework of Multilevel Level Selection 1 
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(MLS1)/ Multi Level Selection 2 (MLS2), which was initially developed by Damuth and Heisler 
(1988). 
Okasha‟s and Michod‟s models of ETIs are committed to a concept of fitness which is 
measured by the ability of a given entity to survive and reproduce in its environment. According 
to this definition, the higher the survival and reproductive rate of this entity, the higher its fitness 
is. Although such definition is somewhat restrictive and does not cover the whole range of 
possibilities which can be embraced by the concept of fitness, I will accept it as common ground 
for the development of my arguments, which will run as follows. In Section 2, I will briefly 
review Michod and colleagues‟ as well as Okasha‟s models of ETIs in regards to fitness. I will 
present two specific claims defended by both authors: (1) that during the last stage of an ETI, 
once a division of labor is in place, the fitness of the components constituting the newly emerged 
individual reaches zero; (2) that there are two fundamentally distinct processes of selection, 
namely multilevel selection 1 (MSL1) and multilevel selection 2 (MLS2), occurring alternately 
at the different stages of an ETI. Claims (1) and (2) are slightly different versions of what is 
called the export-of-fitness view on ETI. Claim (1) has been recently criticized by Godfrey-
Smith (2011, 77-78) for its metaphorical nature. Although this criticism deserves a more 
thorough examination, that will not be done in this article. In Section 3, I turn to claim (2) and 
demonstrate that if fitness is assessed over the same period of time at the collective level and at 
the level of its constituents, then there is commensurability between these two models of 
selection. For that reason, they cannot represent two ontologically distinct processes of selection, 
but are ways to describe the same process from the perspective of two spatial and two temporal 
scales. However, I do not deny the epistemological value of describing ETIs within the 
MLS1/MLS2 framework and will examine the reasons for this. 
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2. Michod and Okasha on evolutionary transitions in individuality 
Michod and colleagues propose the following model of ETI. For new individuals at a higher 
level (“collective” level) to emerge from a lower level (“particle level”)1, e.g. for multicellular 
organisms to emerge from unicellular organisms, two things must happen. First, conflicts 
between members of the collective need to be eliminated. Conflicts can be resolved in different 
ways such as for instance policing mechanisms and developmental bottlenecks, to name two of 
them. They both promote genetic homogeneity and consequently reduce competition between the 
different members of a group. However, even if genetic homogeneity is reached between the 
different members of the same group, this will not necessarily lead to the emergence of a higher 
individual. For an ETI to take place, Michod and colleagues propose that there must be a division 
of labor between germ and soma (or its equivalent in ETIs other than from uni- to multicellular 
organisms), since without it, the collective fitness will be proportional to the average particle 
fitness. As such, the collective will not be an individual with its own fitness (Michod 2005, 569); 
its fitness will merely be a cross level by-product of  its particles‟ fitness.  
 
Claim 1 
As I noted earlier, Michod and colleagues define the fitness of an entity (whether particle or 
collective) as the product of its viability and fecundity, which is often done in life-history 
models. In the cases of transition from unicellular to multicellular organisms with full separation 
                                                             
1
 The distinction between particle and collective comes from Okasha (2006, 4)  
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of germ and soma, if a cell does not specialize, it will invest its resources in both the viability 
and fecundity components of fitness. As a result its fitness will be positive. However, Michod 
(2005, 2011) and Okasha (2009) both generalize this argument over other ETIs and propose that: 
(1) If a particle invests everything in the somatic (or germ) function (or its equivalent) of the 
future collective individual, it will have a fitness equal to 0, since although its viability 
(or fecundity) component of fitness will be positive, its fecundity (or viability) 
component and consequently the product of viability and fecundity will be nil.  
However, when the two types of particles combine their investment in both components of 
fitness (one investing everything in the soma and the other everything in the germ function) a 
new collective individual emerges with its own fitness. This reasoning leads Michod and 
colleagues to claim that during an ETI transfer of fitness from the particle to the collective level.  
 
Claim 2 
Okasha (2006) and Michod (2005, 2011), mostly relying on Okasha‟s analysis, both link this 
work to the two concepts of multilevel selection distinguished by Damuth and Heisler (1988), 
namely MLS1 and MLS2. In the MLS1 framework, the focal unit of selection is the particle. For 
that reason fitness is expressed in a number of particles produced. For example, a group of 
particles will have a higher fitness than another if ceteris paribus it produces more particles. In 
MLS1, the fitness of the collective is merely a “by-product” of the different fitnesses of the 
particles composing this collective. In the MLS2 framework, the focal units of selection are both 
the particle and the collective. Fitnesses of the collective and of the particle are measured in 
different units. The fitness of a collective is expressed in number of new groups it produces 
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independently of the number of particles each group is composed of, while the fitness of a 
particle is simply expressed in number of particles it produces. During an ETI, Okasha (2006, 
237-238) argues, there are three stages for which MLS1 and MLS2 are alternately more relevant 
to describe the selection process and propose that: 
(2)  MLS1 and MLS2 are two distinct causal processes of selection as opposed to two 
conventional ways of expressing selection (2006, 59; 2011, 243). During an ETI, they 
represent a transition in processes of selection. Not only MLS1 and MSL2 are alternately 
more relevant at the different stages of an ETI, they are alternately the only way to 
describe accurately the process of selection. 
In the first stage of an ETI, the particles of the future collective start to aggregate and cooperate. 
The fitness of this newly formed collective is merely the average of the particles‟ fitness, hence 
MLS1 is the relevant type of selection occurring. During the second stage, the fitness of the 
collective is not defined in terms of the particles any more, but is proportional to the average 
fitness of the particles. At that stage, although MLS2 framework can be applied, so can MLS1. 
There is a “grey area between MLS1 and MSL2”, in Okasha‟s words (2006, 237). However, the 
collective lacks individuality, since its fitness is a cross-level byproduct of the particles‟ fitness. 
During the third stage, when the transition is complete, the fitness of the collective cannot be 
expressed as the average fitness of the particles any more. The collective is now an individual on 
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its own and its fitness is not proportional to the fitness of the particles; both fitnesses are now 
incommensurable2.  
 
3. When time makes a difference  
Where does the incommensurability between particle and collective fitnesses come from? To 
this question there is no clear answer and it is not clear how there could be one even in principle. 
It is in fact hard to imagine that collectives could exhibit variations in fitness, without their 
constitutive parts exhibiting a form of variation with consequences on their own fitness. Yet 
Okasha believes that such scenarios exist (Okasha 2006, 106) and that they materialize when 
MLS2 is the framework of choice, for MLS2 framework, he claims, fits two causally distinct 
processes of natural selection happening in nature (Okasha 2006, 59; 2011, 243). Recall that in 
MLS2 framework, the fitness of the collective can be defined as a quantity “that bears no 
necessary relation to average particle fitnesses alone” (2006, 136, my emphasis). Yet, in the 
same sentence Okasha surprisingly asserts that “it is impossible that the resulting evolutionary 
change could be expressed in terms of particle ﬁtnesses alone,” Okasha (2006, 136, my 
emphasis). Beyond, the fact that the consequence does not follow from the premise (Okasha 
should have used “sometimes impossible” instead of “impossible”), I propose one important 
reason why we should doubt this claim in any case. I will not argue here either against the MLS2 
framework itself since it is obviously mathematically true. Rather, I will argue against the claim 
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 Michod and colleagues use the word „decoupling‟ to refer to this phenomenon. By decoupling 
they mean that the fitness at the collective level becomes expressed in a different currency than 
fitness at the particle level and that it is not translatable into fitness at that level 
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that there is incommensurability between the particle and collective fitnesses in any real cases of 
evolution by natural selection. The reason I will give is based on purely methodological grounds 
linked to time, fitness and levels of organization and will be illustrated with one of Okasha‟s own 
example of MLS2.  
In chapter 7 Okasha (2006) deals with species selection, the paradigmatic case of MLS2 in 
the literature on the subject, and embraces Vrba‟s „acid test‟ (1989, 155) to detect true species 
selection (and more generally MLS2) from mere by-products of selection at lower levels, as in 
MLS1. Vrba proposes that there is true species selection when the outcome of selection at the 
species level cannot be explained from the perspective of the organism. One stringent way to 
know when this happens is to seek different directions of selection at the different levels of 
organization. For instance, species selection, if truly independent, could in principle counteract 
selection at the organism level. Vrba‟s test will however be inconclusive when both selection 
processes push in the same direction, but the most reasonable attitude to adopt in such case will 
be to consider that selection only really occurs at the lower level, unless one would be able to 
display that the force at the species level has different value from the force at the organism level. 
Okasha claims that one example of true species selection satisfying Vrba‟s test is involved in the 
evolution/maintenance of sexual reproduction. He asserts that asexuality is advantageous at the 
organism level, because of the two-fold cost of producing males (Maynard Smith 1978), but that 
sexuality is advantageous at the species level because it allows faster evolutionary responses to 
rapid changes in environmental conditions. According to this reasoning, sexual lineages would 
be selected via species selection as a distinct process of natural selection different from selection 
at the organism level which favors asexual organisms.  
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One fundamental principle of the scientific method in experiments is to change only one 
variable at a time while the other are kept unchanged or controlled. To reach this goal, if one is 
interested in measuring the influence of X (a drug, for instance) on a population P, the 
experimenter will need to control the effect of X on P with another population (let us call it P‟ or 
Control) which was not administered X but which is as similar to P as possible in all other 
respects. Hence, if a difference is observed between the two populations, it will only be 
attributable to X because no other variable will be different. However, if P and P‟ are not strictly 
identical in all respects but X, then any observed difference could be attributable to X or any of 
the other different variable between the two populations and which could have the same effect 
than X. Such variables are called confounding variables. How is that relevant to our problem of 
species selection and Vrba‟s test? Vrba‟s test is not a scientific experiment per se, but it shares 
with them the necessity to be controlled. Unless all the variables relevant to selection are strictly 
identical at both levels in the test, the detection of a different direction of selection at those levels 
could be attributed either to a different process of selection at each level or to any other variable 
with different values at each level and with some relevance to selection. Just like any scientific 
experiment, Vrba‟s test requires that only one variable at a time is changed while all the other are 
kept unchanged.  
We noted earlier that Okasha claims that the evolution/maintenance of sexual reproduction is 
a true case of species selection. He justifies this assertion using Vrba‟s test. Because, he argues, 
the test shows that selection pushes in two opposite directions (i.e. sexuality at the species level 
and asexuality at the organism level), a process of selection ontologically different from the 
process of selection at the organism level, must exist at the species level. But does Okasha‟s 
comparison eliminate all possible confounding variables, which would render his conclusion 
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spurious? In other words, is selection at the organism level assessed in the exact same way at the 
species level? The answer to this question is that it is not; a confounding variable does exist.  
To detect this confounding variable, let us consider two types of organisms, one asexual and 
one sexual, under the same selection pressures. To reproduce, sexual organisms spend energy 
both to look for a partner and to produce gametes during meiosis, while only half of their genes 
will be represented at the next generation. On the contrary, asexual organisms will be able to 
reproduce genetically identical offspring, without any cost from meiosis or courtship and mating. 
Hence if the two types of organisms are in competition, the asexual ones should quickly out-
compete the sexual ones, because of the supplementary costs associated to sexual reproduction. 
At that point, it is thus extremely tempting to claim that the fitness of an asexual organism is 
higher than the fitness of a sexual organism. But, if formulated as such, this claim would be 
incomplete and would have to be relativized over a period of time (e.g. one generation). 
 Why is that? First, because the fitness of an organism cannot be directly measured as, for 
instance, the mass of an object can be; measures of fitness are only proxies for fitness. Second, 
because different proxies for fitness can lead to different answers. Hence, the information about 
the way fitness is measured is always relevant. In fact, the reproductive output after one 
generation of an organism represents only one proxy for its fitness among an infinite number. 
There is no “best” period of time over which one can measure fitness. This type of problems 
leads Beatty & Finsen (1989) and Sober (2002) to propose a distinction between short-term and 
long-term fitness. In most cases the short-term reproductive output of an entity is a good proxy 
for fitness to grasp the evolutionary dynamics of interest. But at other times it might be 
insufficient, and we will need a proxy measuring the reproductive output over a longer period of 
time. One famous case, proposed by Fisher (1930) on sex ratio, makes the reproductive output 
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two generations ahead a much better proxy for fitness than one generation. More generally, 
proxies of fitness over long periods of time should be preferred if one is interested in 
evolutionary problems involving changes in the environment, as it is the case with the evolution 
and maintenance of sexual reproduction. This is because long term environmental changes and 
their consequences on selection pressures will be invisible to a proxy for fitness based on the 
short term reproductive output. Yet, many evolutionary problems do not involve such changes 
and measuring fitness as the reproductive output over one generation is fine because the 
environment usually does not change or changes very little over one generation. This is the case 
for instance if one wants to know what phenotype is optimal in a constant environment.  
The confounding variable in Okasha‟s comparison becomes now obvious. It is the time over 
which fitness is assessed, which is itself a proxy for environmental changes. At the organism 
level, fitness is usually measured as the reproductive output after one organism‟s generation. At 
the species level, fitness is measured as the rate of extinction or speciation over much longer 
periods of time, sometimes many millions of years. But commensurability necessarily exists 
between fitness of species and fitness of organisms. Speciation and extinction events are 
ultimately composed of the deaths, survivals and reproductions of organisms over many 
generations, since the former events supervene on the latter ones. Thus, when Okasha applies 
Vrba‟s test over the maintenance/evolution of sex, he compares the fitness of organisms over one 
generation at the organism level with the fitness of organisms over a much higher number of 
generations 3 . Performed as such, Vrba‟s test remains inconclusive. Indeed, the difference 
observed could be either due to two processes of selection pushing in two opposite direction or to 
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 In virtue of the supervenience of speciation and extinction events at the species level on death, 
survival and reproduction events at the organism level 
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two measures of one and the same process of selection over two different periods of time, 
pushing in one direction over the short term and in the other over the long term. In the rest of the 
article, I defend the latter possibility. 
To see why, let us now perform Vrba‟s test while controlling the period of time over which 
fitness is measured. Controlling time could be done in two ways: (a) by measuring fitnesses at 
both the species level and the organism level over one organism generation and compare them 
over this period of time; (b) by measuring the two fitnesses over the period time that would 
normally be used to measure species‟ fitness, that is, a period long enough to detect events of 
speciation or extinction. Both alternatives seem to be doomed in practice, since we are neither 
able to measure the fitness of species over short periods of time, nor able to measure the fitness 
of organisms over periods of time longer than a few generations. But if we were able to do so, 
we would certainly find that ceteribis paribus asexual organisms and asexual species have a 
higher short-term fitness as measured by (a) than sexual organisms and sexual species, but have a 
lower long-term fitness as measured by (b). The reason for that is not mysterious. Asexual 
organisms and asexual species on average do better when the conditions are stable (as it is 
usually the case over one generation) while sexual organisms and sexual species do better when 
new environmental conditions arise (which certainly occur over several millions of years). In 
other words, both selection at the organism and the species level would go in the same direction 
once the test is controlled for the period of time over which fitness is measured.  
Thus, Okasha‟s claim that the evolution/maintenance of sexual reproduction occurs as a 
result of species selection is inexact. If we follow his reasoning using time as a constant over 
fitness (itself as a proxy for the stability of the environment), we predict no difference between a 
measure of selection made at the level of the organism and another one made at the level of the 
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species. The most natural implication is that these different measures represent one and the same 
process of natural selection, but expressed in different terms and over different periods of time.  
There is no logical barrier to extending this argument to all the other cases for which MLS2 
has been the framework of choice. In each case, if fitness could be determined over the same 
period of time or in the same constant environment at each level, what seems to be ontologically 
different levels of selection could in principle be unified under one and the same process. Does it 
mean that MLS2 framework should be abandoned and always replaced by MLS1? I claim that it 
should not, unless one has the full availability, at any point in time, of the selection pressures on 
the particles under consideration. I can only see multilevel models as satisfying these criteria. In 
any real case, the complete list of selection pressures will be most of the time unknown or they 
will be constantly changing (e.g. frequency dependent selection) making thus the particle 
fitnesses extremely complex to determine over long period of time. When both particle and 
collective fitnesses are available, and that the question at stake is about the collective, I propose 
that the MLS2 framework should be privileged. There are two further reasons for this choice. 
First, the complex task of measuring fitness of all the particles within a collective (with all the 
non-linear relations it implies) and over many particles‟ generations will often materialize at the 
collective level into a single and easily measurable parameter: the collective‟s reproductive 
output. Second, keeping fitness of the particles and fitness of the collectives independent, as it is 
done in MLS2 framework, can bring different, yet relevant, information about the selection since 
they are measured over different periods of time.  
After these general consideration on MLS2 what does the distinction MLS1/MLS2 become 
in the context of ETIs and especially during their last stage? Would it be, in principle, possible, 
at the last stage, to describe the fitness of a collective in terms of the fitnesses of its particles, 
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contra Okasha? Following the reasoning I used in the case of the evolution/maintenance of sex, 
as in any case of MLS2, I see nothing that would prevent it. During an ETI, if the fitness of the 
particles seems incommensurable with the fitness of the collective, it is most probably due to the 
fact that, during the last stage, both fitnesses are not measured over the same period of time 
anymore and that the interactions between particles become so complex that tracking back their 
fitness over longer periods of time than one or two generation appears in practice impossible. 
What becomes decoupled in the two levels is not fitness per se but generations or life cycles. 
Because Michod‟s proxy for fitness depends on reproductive output after one generation, if “one 
generation” does not mean the same thing at the particle and the collective level, it is not 
surprising that collective and particle fitnesses seem decoupled from each other. But this is an 
artifact created by the measure. That does not mean that MLS2 represents an ontologically 
distinct process of selection from MLS1. Rather, it suggests that MLS2 is very useful means to 
carve one single processes of natural selection both in time and space and becomes especially 
useful once an ETI is completed. This echoes a recent criticism made by Waters (2011) about 
Okasha‟s fundamentalism over the distinction between MLS1/MLS2 in which he claimed that 
MLS1 and MSL2 frameworks were conventional rather than fundamental. Okasha (Okasha 
2011, 243) held his ground, restating that they were fundamental. I have provided evidence here 
that they clearly were conventional and it became apparent once measures of fitness were 
controlled over time. 
 
4. Conclusion 
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I have demonstrated that time is an extremely important parameter to take into account in 
regards to the concept of fitness. I argued for its relevance in ETIs and, more generally, in the 
levels of selection debate. I used the evolution/maintenance of sexual reproduction as a case 
study to establish that if different proxies of fitness reflecting different time scales are used at the 
organism and species levels, this will have the consequence of measuring selection pressures 
over two different time scales. This can lead one to confound the existence of one unique process 
of selection over two different periods of time with two ontologically distinct processes of 
selection, one for each level. I applied the same reasoning to ETIs and argued that they were not 
transitions in processes of selection, but rather events for which MLS1 and MLS2 were, although 
ultimately formally equivalent, alternately more relevant. The claim that distinction between 
collective selection and particle selection is conventional is not new (e.g. : Dugatkin & Reeve 
1994; Sterelny 1996) and Kerr & Godfrey-Smith (2002) have formalized this equivalence. Yet, 
as Okasha (2006, 136) rightly points out, this formalism has been made solely in the context of 
MLS1. Taking time as an important variable in measures of fitness represents one important step 
towards a formalism in which events of selection normally described under the MLS2 
framework, such as the last stage of ETIs, could also be, described under the MLS1 framework.  
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Presentism as an empirical hypothesis 
 
 
 
Abstract Within philosophy of physics it is broadly accepted that presentism as an empirical hypothesis 
has been falsified by the development of special relativity. In this paper, I identify and reject an 
assumption common to both presentists and advocates of the block universe, and then offer an 
alternative version of presentism that does not begin from spatiotemporal structure, which is an 
empirical hypothesis, and which has yet to be falsified. I fear that labelling it “presentism” dooms the 
view, but I don’t know what else to call it.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Here are two premises: 
 
(P1) All and only things that exist now are real. 
(P2) Special relativity is a complete account of spatiotemporal structure. 
 
The first is a version of so-called “presentism”. It says that what is real is what exists right now: this is 
what there is. Things in the past aren’t real (they don’t exist any more); things in the future aren’t real 
(they don’t exist yet). What there is, is what is present. “Now” bears a lot of ontological weight. The 
second says that there are no good reasons for adding anything to the account of space and time found in 
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Einstein’s special theory of relativity: it’s complete. The problem for people attracted to presentism is 
that (P2) seems to be incompatible with (P1), for reasons that I’ll come to below. The dominant view 
amongst philosophers of physics is that we should therefore reject (P1) and adopt the so-called “block 
universe”, a four-dimensional structure where everything that has ever existed, and ever will exist, is all 
equally real. There is no “now” of any ontological significance, there’s just the whole four-dimensional 
shebang. That’s what there is. What Einstein showed in developing special relativity is that, even if there 
is such a thing as “the present”, we have no empirical access to it. If there is any evidence for 
presentism, then it does not come from empirical experience.There is nothing in empirical experience 
that supports this concept; there is no empirically well-grounded concept of “the present”. Presentism, if 
treated as the hypothesis that there is such a concept, is false.  
 For philosophers of physics such as myself, this “block universe” is the default position, the 
“well yeah, of course” point of view, according to which anyone who’s a presentist hasn’t learned the 
hard-won lessons from physics properly. End of story. 
 However, in this paper I argue for an alternative empirical approach to “the present”, equally 
well founded in physics as Einstein’s treatment of simultaneity, according to which the dispute between 
presentists and block universe people remains an open empirical question, not decided by special 
relativity. In other words, even if you endorse (P2), there’s a form of presentism that remains a live 
option. I was sufficiently surprised to find myself reaching this conclusion that I decided I should write 
it down. 
 
2. Why presentism is false 
 
Let’s go back to the two premises above, (P1) and (P2), and remind ourselves why they appear not to 
work very well together. According to Howard Stein (in a 1968 paper responding to Putnam’s 1967 
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paper on special relativity), adopting both (P1) and (P2) leads to “the interesting result that special 
relativity implies a peculiarly extreme (but pluralistic) form of solipsism.” The reason for this is familiar 
from the literature on space and time. Given an event e1 in spacetime, e1 is “now” relative to itself, but 
there is nothing within the structure of special relativistic spacetime that determines which events 
spatiotemporally distant from e1 are also “now” relative to e1. There’s no preferred way to join the dots 
and say these two events are both “now”. You can conclude this directly from conventionality of 
simultaneity, in which case any “joining of the dots” in planes of simultaneity is an addition, going 
beyond the content of special relativity. Or you can get there via relativity of simultaneity: adopt the 
Einstein synchrony convention, note that different planes of simultaneity make different determinations 
of which events are “now” relative to e1 and which are not, note that picking one of these – a preferred 
plane of simultaneity – goes beyond the content of special relativity, and so conclude that no other 
events are determinately “now” with respect to e1. Either way, the conclusion is that there’s no preferred 
way to join the dots. 
 If we focus our attention on (P2), and ignore (P1), this argument typically leads to endorsing the 
block universe. What special relativity gives us is just the entire set of events, arranged in a four-
dimensional block.  
 But if we want to have (P1) as well as (P2), we get a different conclusion. If no other events are 
determinately “now” with respect to e1, then, by (P1), no other events are determinately “real” with 
respect to e1. Add to that the claim that everything that is real must be determinately so, and we get our 
conclusion: nothing is real with respect to e1 except e1 itself (hence the extreme solipsism), although 
each event is real with respect to itself (hence the pluralism). This is Stein’s pluralistic extreme 
solipsism.  
 “Pluralistic extreme solipsism” is what you get if you hang on to presentism as expressed in (P1), 
and to (P2). So far as I know, the view hasn’t attracted many adherents, and I suppose that’s not very 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -114-
4 
 
surprising. Instead, the standard moves in the interpretation of special relativity reject either (P1) or (P2). 
On the one hand, there are those who suggest that “taking our experience of time seriously” requires us 
to reject, or supplement, special relativity. So we accept (P1), and in an effort to avoid the slide towards 
extreme solipsism, we reject (P2), perhaps trying to stay as close as possible to special relativity but 
adding a preferred foliation so that we get a unique, global “now”. On the other hand there are those 
who suggest that “taking special relativity seriously” requires us to give up presentism. We endorse (P2) 
and straightfowardly reject -- throw out -- (P1). We adopt the four-dimensional “block universe”. And 
we characterize our presentist opponents as intellectual cowards, clinging to their unfounded pre-critical 
intuitions in the face of overwhelming evidence from the conceptual developments wrought by science. 
There are lots of variations, lots of ways of trying to finesse things, but those are the basic moves.  
 I am in agreement with the proponents of the “block universe” in this dispute, as I have set it up. 
I don’t think there is some “every day” concept of time that we can make use of philosophically and 
that’s independent of the scientific concept. Science starts from everyday experience and investigates 
those very concepts, clarifying and changing them along the way. DiSalle makes this point very 
beautifully in his book Understanding spacetime. The book is about the engagement of physics with our 
concepts of space and time: the way that developments in physics have brought about developments in 
those very concepts, and how there’s no “other” concept of time that’s independent of these 
developments and somehow left standing untouched by them. 
 Presentism as expressed by (P1), and in appropriately similar versions, as an empirical 
hypothesis is false. 
 
3. A shared assumption  
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Below, I argue for an alternative formulation of presentism, as an empirical hypothesis, such that the 
considerations of simultaneity just discussed in section 2 do not lead to the conclusion that presentism is 
false. I will not do this on the basis of our “experience of time”. Rather, I will make the argument from 
within physics itself. I endorse (P2): special relativity gives us a complete account of spatiotemporal 
structure. I will not add a preferred foliation or anything like that; I think that’s entirely misguided. 
Instead what we need to do is investigate the conceptual development that has taken place, with 
philosophy and physics taken together, working hand-in-hand, and when we do that we see that there is 
a presentist alternative available, and one which will not be “pluralistic extreme solipsism”.  
 The reason why I reject “pluralistic extreme solipsism” is not just distaste, but because there is 
an assumption in the interpretation of special relativity that’s common to both the “block universe” and 
the presentist positions characterized above, which I think the presentist should reject. The reason why 
“pluralistic extreme solipsism” follows from adopting both (P1) and (P2) is that space-time is being used 
by both of the block universe people and the presentists as a principle of ontological unity. This is the 
“shared assumption” to be rejected, and it is a familiar claim according to which space and time provide 
the ontological framework within which everything that is material exists. Or, to put it another way, 
spacetime is the ground of the unity of the world: what makes this material universe one universe is the 
shared space and time framework within which the matter is located.  
 For those of us interested in modern science, this approach to the unity of the world has a 
venerable pedigree. In Newton’s physics, space and time can be understood as playing just such a role.  
 With this assumption explicitly on the table, let us revisit (P1). (P1) attempts to ground the unity 
of what exists, of what is real, in simultaneity. All and only things that exist now are real. If the “now” 
of a given real thing extends to other things, then those other things are also real. The unity of the real is 
grounded in their simultaneity. That’s okay, if there’s absolute simultaneity. But if “now” is not spatially 
extended, then what is real – given P(1) – is not spatially extended either. As discussed above, special 
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relativity doesn’t underwrite a spatial extension of “now” via absolute simultaneity and so, given a 
commitment to special relativity as asserted by (P2), we arrive at pluralistic extreme solipsism. 
 What’s gone wrong is that we bought into the proposal that spacetime is the ontological ground 
of the unity of what there is. My argument begins from the observation that we don’t have to use 
spacetime to play this role. In what follows, I reject the shared assumption and develop an alternative 
formulation of presentism accordingly. 
 
4. An alternative ontological principle of unity 
 
Something that I won’t argue for in this paper, but will simply state, is that Newton’s physics contains 
alternatives to space and time as the ontological ground of the unity of what there is. One of these 
grounds unity in the three laws of motion. According to this approach, we begin not with space and 
time, but with the laws, which are viewed as providing a principle of unity. The proposal is that we don’t 
begin with the physical entities, as given unities, and then ask about the laws that they satisfy. Rather, 
the laws themselves play a constitutive role in constituting the very entities that are their subject-matter, 
and in constituting them as genuine unities. Thus, to be a physical thing, be it simple or composite, is (in 
part) to conserve total quantity of motion (when isolated from other physical things), this being required 
by Newton’s laws. Moreover, the laws also play a constitutive role with respect to the parts of a 
composite physical entity. Consider, for example, a collision between two billiard balls: not only is the 
total quantity of motion conserved (so the composite is a genuine unity), but that quantity is 
redistributed determinately, and from the law-constitutive perpective this is what makes the billiard balls 
themselves genuine unities throughout the process. The unity of the whole, and the unity of each part, is 
grounded in the laws. I cannot argue for this view here, for that would be another paper in itself. I make 
use of the view in what follows, in discussing presentism, and in so doing will further elaborate it 
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somewhat. One important aspect of the view will be its treatment of change. Changes in the state of a 
component are determined by the laws, so the laws provide an account of what it is for a genuine unity 
(the part) to undergo change whilst remaining the very same thing. Saying the same thing another way: 
the laws provide an account of what it is for a unity to persist through change: that is, to retain its 
numerical identity whilst not its qualitative identity. It does this without appeal to either essential 
properties or to haecceities. It offers us an alternative and one which, I am going to argue, favors a 
version presentism that is an empirical claim, but one which is distinct from that explored by Einstein in 
his 1905 paper on special relativity. For now, I am simply making a claim: there is in Newton’s physics 
an alternative option for a principle of unity, based on the laws, and this should be on the table as 
something that we discuss and evaluate. 
 
5. Change  
 
What is it for an object to persist through change? The prima facie puzzle here is as old as it is familiar. 
How can a thing – by which we mean a genuine unity – remain the very same thing and yet undergo 
change? In particular, if F and G are inconsistent properties (e.g. being 5 inches long and being 7 inches 
long), then (1) Fa, (2) Gb, and (3) a=b cannot all be true (something cannot be both 5 and 7 inches long). 
How might one respond?  
 On the one hand, one might hold fast to the principle that no genuine unity can have inconsistent 
properties, and conclude that no genuine unity in fact persists through change at all. No numerical 
identity without qualitative identity. Thus, we make the distinction between enduring unities and 
perduring unities, and insist that objects persist in virtue of perduring (through a succession of 
momentary genuine unities appropriately related to one another), not in virtue of enduring. 
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 On the other hand, we might take seriously the idea that time is doing some important work here, 
and allow that while a genuine unity cannot have inconsistent properties at any one time, having 
inconsistent properties at different times might be tolerated somehow (in a way that is to be explicitly 
specified). So, we allow for the possibility of numerical identity in the absence of qualitative identity. 
Since numercal unity cannot be grounded in qualitative identity on this route, we must ground it in 
something else, and there are two prominent options. One might restrict the class of properties that are 
required to remain the same in order for the numerical identity of the thing to be preserved: the essential 
properties do not change, no object has associated with it a set of inconsistent essential properties, not 
even over time. As for the accidental properties, we require that these are consistent at any one time, but 
we do not to care whether they contain inconsistencies over time. Alternatively, one might claim that 
numerical identity over time is independent of sameness of properties over time: we appeal to 
haecceities to ground  numerical identity over time, and we don’t care about any inconsistencies in 
properties over time (although we continue to require that an object’s properties be consistent at any one 
time). This allows for genuine unities which persist in virtue of enduring. 
 There are good reasons for philosophers of physics to be sceptical about both essentialism and 
haecceitism, which appears to leave “no numerical identity without qualitative identity” as a feature of 
our account of unity, and consequently perdurantism as our account of change, as the only option. But 
the law-constitutive approach reveals an alternative. The law-constitutive approach offers a principle of 
unity in virtue of which a thing remains the very same thing over time and through change of properties. 
It does so not by appeal to haecceities, nor by appeal to essential properties, but by specifying the 
relations that must hold between the states of the thing at different times. You might think: okay, but this 
view is compatible with both perdurantism and endurantism: for the perdurantist the laws specify the 
relationship between the successive momentary genuine unities for the endurantist the laws specify the 
relationship between successive states of a single genuine unity. But this isn’t right. Here’s the crucial 
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question: what are the perdurantist’s “momentary genuine unities” that are supposedly tied together by 
the laws? In virtue of what are these – the things that are tied together – themselves genuine unities? If 
the genuine unity is grounded in qualitative identity, give me an argument why I should accept this 
view. If it’s grounded in something else, tell me what. In the absence of an answer to this, I think that 
the law-constitutive approach gives us an argument in favor of endurantism as against perdurantism, 
because according to the law-constitutive person the very principle that grounds the unity of a thing has 
as one of its consequences rules by which such a unity can undergo qualitative change.  
 This is a key point, and for that reason I want to emphasize it a little further. In generating the 
prima facie puzzle about change, we had to write down “a=b”. But in order to write this down, we have 
to presuppose that our things labelled by “a” and “b” are genuine unities, and we need an account of 
what grounds that unity. We can’t take unity as brute, at least not without saying why the worries of the 
seventeenth century philosophers were misplaced.1
                                               
1
 In our theorizing about the world, objects should not be taken as primitives. As Saunders (2003) argues, we have access (at 
least in physics) first of all not to objects, but to their properties and relations, and (for the purposes of physics at least) 
identity of objects needs to be defined in these terms, not taken as primitive. For example, Della Rocca (forthcoming) 
diagnoses an apparent stand-off between endurantism and perdurantism, and then argues against endurantism on the grounds 
that the endurantist must take persistence as primitive. The implicit assumption Della Rocca makes is that objects are to be 
taken as primitives: in the law-constitutive approach, objects are not primitive, and neither is persistence. Thus, endurantism 
escapes Della Rocca’s argument. 
 So, in the absence of a principle of unity, suitably 
argued for, the perdurantist is at a disadvantage as compared to the endurantist. The law-constitutive 
approach offers a principle of unity which provides numerical identity without qualitative identity, and it 
provides an account of what it is for a genuine unity to undergo change. It’s an approach that arose 
within attempts to construct a physics and a metaphysics of things by two giants of this enterprise: 
Descartes and Newton. What it gives us is a reason to prefer endurantism, and from here it is perhaps a 
short step to presentism, for while both endurantism and perdurantism are compatible with both 
presentism and four-dimensionalism, most metaphysicians think there is a more natural fit between 
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endurantism and presentism and between perdurantism and four-dimensionalism. If that’s right, then the 
law-constitutive approach to unity and change favors presentism. 
 This leaves us with a tension. On the one hand, considerations arising out of space-time theory 
push strongly towards the block universe. On the other hand, consideration arising out of Newton’s 
physics lead to a form of presentism. In the final sections of my paper I attempt to remove this tension, 
and in so doing I further elaborate the alternative form of presentism that I take to be both (a) an 
empirical hypothesis, and (b) compatible with special relativity. 
  
6.  Space and time as an epistemic principle of unity 
 
At the end of section 3, I claimed that we don’t have to use spacetime to play the role of an ontological 
principle of unity. In section 4 I offered a sketch of an alternative, and in section 5 I showed how this 
alternative favors a version of presentism. If we are to take this route (and I fully concede that it stands 
in great need of significant further elaboration), then we should re-visit the status of spacetime.  If it no 
longer serves as a principle of ontological unity, what role does it play? Why do we set out a big arena 
of space and time when we’re doing physics? The answer, I think, is that spacetime plays the role of an 
epistemic principle of unity, as follows. In mechanics, we want to know what the outcome of a collision 
will be, before it happens, based on knowledge of events prior to the collision. Quite generally, one 
thing we’re doing is trying to extend our knowledge of events to times and places distant from the here 
and now. Space&time play a theoretical role, as we try to extend our epistemic reach beyond the here-
now, stitching our predictions together into a single whole. Thinking of things in this way, space&time 
provide an epistemic principle of unity: they provide the framework in which we organize our 
knowledge of the not-here and/or not-now. 
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 There is no necessary inference from this epistemic role for spacetime to the view that spacetime 
is an ontological principle of unity. Thus, if we take this route, we should revise our understanding of 
(P2). In being committed to special relativity as a complete account of spatiotemporal structure, we do 
not thereby automatically ontologize this structure: we recognize its epistemic status and we do not 
make any direct inference from that to any ontological commitments. 
 Instead, we adopt the approach sketched in section 4, according to which the laws provide the 
principle of ontological unity. Thus, whatever spatiotemporal ontological commitments we have must 
come from paying attention to the details of the dynamical laws of matter. Matter is spatiotemporal, but 
it’s not in space and time in the sense that space and time provide an ontological principle of unity for 
what there is.2
 According to this approach, the dynamical laws ground the unity of a thing, and the 
spatiotemporal extent of that thing is whatever size it needs to be in order to sustain the dynamically 
characterized thing in question. Once this approach is adopted, (P2) means two things: 
 
(1) We take special relativity seriously as an epistemic principle of unity: this is the best way of 
organizing our knowledge that reaches beyond the here-now. 
(2) Ontologically, what there is is grounded in the dynamical laws, and these include the spatiotemporal 
characteristics of things. If things are spatiotemporally extended, then special relativity tells us that 
within that spacetime region there are no purely spatial or purely temporal relations. Things “occupy” 
time just as they “occupy” space: by existing as a unity that is spatiotemporally extended. Notice that the 
spatiotemporal extent of the sufficient dynamical ground of a given unity might turn out to be much, 
much smaller than the abstract spatiotemporal structure within which the evolution of that unity is 
                                               
2
 Ontologically, space and time are not independent of bodies. But this is not relationism either,  
so we move immediately to a middle way between ab space and time versus relationism. (This is a second reason for the 
superiority of the dynamical approach.) 
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completely described, or it might be the size of the block universe.3
 
 This is an empirical matter, 
something to be settled by the progress of science. I will return to this point in a moment. 
7. An alternative “presentism” 
 
What becomes of presentism on this view? (P1) will need to be re-written. The reason is that, on the 
approach being developed here, we are not going to start from Minkowkski spacetime when we do 
ontology. Hence, the presentist should not use “now” as the grounds of what is real: she should use 
dynamics instead. The present is a spatiotemporal region of whatever size is necessary to sustain the 
dynamical system in question.4
 It might turn out that, for whatever system we try to consider, the size of the spatiotemporal 
region necessary to sustain it is the entire history of the universe, encompassing all that ever has been 
and ever will be. In other words, the only dynamical system that there is, is this entirety, and there are no 
genuine subsystems of the universe. If that turns out to be the case, then this version of presentism is 
defeated and the block universe triumphs. But notice that this is an empirical matter, something to be 
decided by consideration of the details of physics, and perhaps science more generally. Quantum 
entanglement might give us good reason to think that this is true, but if these consideration lead to the 
 If we take this route, then we will not be driven by our considerations of 
the structure of Minkowski spacetime to the conclusion that the present is merely a point in Minkowski 
spacetime, and that therefore this is all that is real. In other words, since we are not using a “now” 
derived from the structure of Minkowksi spacetime to ground what is real, we don’t end up at pluralistic 
extreme solipsism. 
                                               
3
 I can be made of things whose dynamically sustained regions of spacetime and much smaller than mine, so they come into 
and go out of existence on much shorter timescales than I do. That seems fine to me. (There’s always something existing 
whenever I exist – it’s hard to say this right, I can see this is going to be an interesting challenge to express this thesis!) 
 
4
 There are no determinate ontological spatial or temporal relations within that region, and that system stands in no 
determinate ontological spatial or temporal relations to any other system. All the ontology is carried by the dynamics, and we 
frame the dynamics spatiotemporally, but ontologically the dynamics requires no such spatiotemporal underpinning. 
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defeat of presentism then they do so via a different route than Einstein’s treatment of simultaneity. 
Notice also, however, that this issue is not yet settled. 
 So let’s begin from the position that there are genuine subsystems. This means that the size of the 
spatiotemporal region required to sustain the system is less than the entire block universe, and so the 
present is (at least in the first instance) local, not global. This “local now” does not lead to solipsism, 
however, because it is not the ground of what is real. The grounds of what is real is the dynamics, and 
we belong to the same world as whatever we interact with, and the rest of that world is as real as we are. 
The dynamics grounds the unity of what there is, both of the parts and of the whole (consisiting of 
interacting parts), and this is what prevents the presentist from becoming a solipsist. Does my son exist 
relative to me, when he is in London and I am here? Of course. There are plenty of interactions going on 
that link us. Is there a determinate fact of the matter about what he is doing right now? No. 
 Clearly, there is a lot of work to be done in filling out exactly what this position says. But one 
thing we can do straight away is reformulate presentism such that it doesn’t ground the reality of what 
exists in spacetime. Here’s an attempt at a better (P1): 
 
(P1*) For each and every thing, that thing exists only presently, where the spatiotemporal extent of that 
“present” is dependent on dynamics, and it is something to be determined empirically 
 
This is a version of presentism that endorses (P2).  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
That we can systematize things in a global spatiotemporal framework is surely an interesting fact, and 
you might want to ontologize the overall framework above and beyond the dynamics. You can if you 
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want to. My point has been that you don’t have to, and that if you’re going to you need to say why 
adopting spacetime as the ground of ontological unity is better than using the dynamical laws. Should 
you choose to adopt dynamical laws as the ground of unity, an alternative version of presentism 
emerges, and one which (unlike the version grounded in spacetime structure) has yet to be empirically 
falsified. A great deal rests on whether there are genuine subsystems of the universe, and that’s 
something that we can find out only through empirical enquiry. 
 
References 
 
Della Rocca, Michael. Forthcoming. 
DiSalle, Robert. 2006. Understanding Space-Time: The philosophical development of physics from 
Newton to Einstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Saunders, Simon. 2003. Physics and Leibniz's Principles. Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical 
Reflections, K. Brading and E. Castellani, eds., Cambridge University Press. 
Stein, Howard. 1968. On Einstein-Minkowski Space-Time. Journal of Philosophy 65(1):5-23. 
 
 
 
 
4,380 words 
San Diego, CA -125-
Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and
Inductive Risk
Matthew J. Brown
Center for Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology
The University of Texas at Dallas
mattbrown@utdallas.edu
July 12, 2012
Abstract
The thesis that the practice and evaluation of science requires social value-
judgment, that good science is not value-free or value-neutral but value-laden,
has been gaining acceptance among philosophers of science. The main pro-
ponents of the value-ladenness of science rely on either arguments from the
underdetermination of theory by evidence or arguments from inductive risk.
Both arguments share the premise that we should only consider values once
the evidence runs out, or where it leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion
of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical pri-
ority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather
than good evidence. The problem of wishful thinking is indeed real—it would
be an egregious error to adopt beliefs about the world because they comport
with how one would prefer the world to be. I will argue, however, that giving
lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake, and unnec-
essary for adequately avoiding the problem of wishful thinking. Values have a
deeper role to play in science than proponents of the underdetermination and
inductive risk arguments have suggested.
1 Introduction
This paper is part of the larger project of trying to understand the structure of
values in science, i.e., the role of values in the logic of scientific practice. This is
1
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distinct from the project of strategic arguments that try to establish that science
is value-laden while assuming premises of the defenders of the value-free ideal of
science. It is becoming increasingly hard to deny that values play a role in scientific
practice—specifically non-epistemic, non-cognitive, or contextual values, e.g., moral,
political, and aesthetic values (I will use the term “social values” to refer to such
values in general). What is less clear is what parts of scientific practice require
values or value-judgments. This is not primarily a historical or sociological question,
though historical and sociological data is frequently brought to bear. Ultimately it is
a normative question about the role that value-judgments ought to play in science; it
is a question about the proper ideal of scientific practice. As such, we must consider
both ethical questions about how the responsible conduct of science requires value-
judgment and epistemological questions about how the objectivity and reliability of
science is to be preserved.
There are a number of phases of inquiry where values might play a role: (1) in
determing the value of science itself and (2) the research agenda to be pursued, (3) in
framing the problem under investigation and (4) the methods of data collection and
characterization, (5) in choosing the hypothesis, explanation, or solution to propose,
(6) in the testing or certification of a proposed solution, and (7) in choices about
application and dissemination of results. Various accounts have allowed values in
some stages while excluding it in others, or have argued for specific limits on the
role for values at each stage. In this paper, I will focus on the testing phase, where
theories are compared with evidence and certified (or not) as knowledge, as this is
the most central arena for discussion value-free vs. value-laden science. Traditionally,
philosophers of science have accepted a role for values in practice because it could be
marginalized into the “context of discovery,” while the “context of justification” could
be treated as epistemically pure. Once we turn from the logical context of justification
to the actual context of certification1 in practice, the testing of hypotheses within
concrete inquiries conducted by particular scientists, we can no longer ignore the role
of value-judgments.
There are two main arguments in the literature for this claim: the error argument
from inductive risk and the gap argument from the underdetermination of theory by
evidence. While both of these arguments have been historically very important and
have successfully established important roles for values in science, they share a flawed
1I use “context of certification” following Kitcher (2011), as referring to actual practices of accep-
tance. While I won’t emphasize it in this paper, I also follow Kitcher in thinking that certification
is a social practice that results in accepting a result as part of public knowledge (as opposed to
merely individual belief).
2
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premise, the lexical priority of evidence over values.2 While this premise serves an
important aim, that of avoiding the problem of wishful thinking, I will argue that
there are several problems with this premise. We should seek an alternative ideal for
science that provides a role for values at a more fundamental level and broader scope,
but nevertheless preserves an important feature of science: the ability to surprise us
with new information beyond or contrary to what we already hope or believe to be
true.
2 Underdetermination: The Gap Argument
Underdetermination arguments for the value-ladenness of science extend Duhem’s
and Quine’s thoughts about testing and certification. The starting point for this ar-
gument may be the so-called Duhem-Quine Thesis (or Duhem-Neurath-Quine Thesis
(Rutte, 1991, p. 87)) that no hypothesis can be tested in isolation because of the need
for auxiliary assumptions in order for theories to generate testable hypotheses. This
is generally taken to imply that no theory can be definitively falsified by evidence,
as the choice between rejecting the theory, altering the background assumptions,
or even (though more controversially) rejecting the new evidence itself as faulty is
underdetermined by each new item of evidence—call this “holist underdetermina-
tion”(Stanford, 2009).
Another form of underdetermination—“contrastive underdetermination” (ibid.)—
depends on the choice between identically confirmed rival hypotheses. As all of the
evidence available equally supports either hypothesis in such cases, that choice is
underdetermined by the evidence. If the evidence we’re talking about is just all the
evidence we have available to us at present, then we have transient underdetermina-
tion, which might be relatively temporary or might be a recurrent problem. If instead
the choice is underdetermined by all possible evidence, we have permanent under-
determination and the competing theories or hypotheses are empirically equivalent.
The global underdetermination thesis holds that permanent underdetermination is
ubiquitous in science, applying to all theories and hypotheses.3
The many forms of underdetermination argument have in common the idea that
some form of gap exists between theory and observation. Feminists, pragmatists,
2Strictly speaking, both arguments can be taken as strategic arguments, compatible with any
positive approach to the role of values in scientific inquiry. For the purposes of this paper, I will
instead take the arguments as attempts to articulate a positive ideal. The gap and error arguments
are perfectly serviceable as strategic arguments.
3For discussion of forms of underdetermination, see Kitcher (2001); Magnus (2003); Stanford
(2009); Intemann (2005); Biddle (2011).
3
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -128-
and others have sought to fill that gap with social values, or to argue that doing
so does not violate rational prescriptions on scientific inference. Call this the gap
argument for value-laden science (Intemann, 2005; Elliott, 2011). Kitcher (2001)
has argued that permanent or global underdetermination is needed to defeat the
value-free ideal of science, and these forms of underdetermination are much more
controversial. Transient underdetermination, on the other hand, is “familiar and
unthreatening,” even “mundane”(Kitcher, 2001, p. 30-1)
Kitcher is wrong on this point; transient underdetermination is sufficient to es-
tablish the value-ladenness of scientific practice (Biddle, 2011). What matters are
decisions made in practice by actual scientists, and at least in many areas of cutting
edge and policy-relevant science, transient underdetermination is pervasive. Perhaps
it is the case that in the long run of science (in an imagined Peircean “end of inquiry”)
all value-judgments would wash out. But as the cliche´ goes, in the long run we’re
all dead; for the purposes of this discussion, what we’re concerned with is decisions
made now, in the actual course of scientific practices, where the decision to accept or
reject a hypothesis has pressing consequences. In such cases, we cannot wait for the
end of inquiry for scientists to accept or reject a hypothesis, we cannot depend on
anyone else to do it, and we must contend with uncertainty and underdetermination.
Actual scientific practice supports this—scientists find themselves in the business of
accepting and rejecting hypotheses in such conditions.
So what is the role for social values under conditions of transient underdetermi-
nation? Once the existing evidence is in, a gap remains in definitively determining
how it bears on the hypothesis (holist case) or which competing hypothesis to ac-
cept (contrastive case). In this case, it can be legitimate to fill the gap with social
values. For example, among the competing hypotheses still compatible with all the
evidence, one might accept the one whose acceptance is likely to do the most good
or the least harm. E.g., in social science work involving gender or race, this might
be the hypothesis compatible with egalitarianism.
A common response is that despite the existence of the gap, we should ensure
that no social values enter into decisions about how to make the underdetermined
choice (e.g., whether or not to accept a hypothesis). Instead, we might fill the gap
with more complex inferential criteria (Norton, 2008) or with so-called “epistemic”
or “cognitive” values (Kuhn, 1977; Laudan, 1984). Proponents of the gap argu-
ment have argued that this at best pushes the question back one level, as choices
of epistemic criteria or cognitive values (Longino, 2002, p. 185), and application of
cognitive values itself may not be entirely determinate (Kuhn, 1977). Ensuring that
no values actually enter into decisions to accept or reject hypotheses under condi-
tions of transient underdetermination may turn out to be impossible (Biddle, 2011).
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Another attempt to avoid a role for social value-judgments—withholding judgment
until transient underdetermination can be overcome or resolved by application of
cognitive factors along—is unreasonable or irresponsible in many cases, e.g. where
urgent action requires commitment to one or another option (ibid.).4
What distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate uses of values to fill the gap is a
matter of controversy, sometimes left unspecified. With some exceptions,5 underde-
terminationists insist that values only come into play in filling the gap (e.g., Longino,
1990, p. 52, 2002, p. 127; Kourany, 2003).
3 Inductive Risk: The Error Argument
While underdeterminationist arguments for values in science are probably more well
known, and may have a history going back a paper of Neurath’s from 1913 (Howard,
2006), the inductive risk argument for values in science is older still, going back to
William James’ (1896) article “The Will to Believe.”6 Heather Douglas has revived
Rudner’s (1953) and Hempel’s (1965) version of the argument for the value-ladenness
of science. In simplified form, the argument goes like this:
In accepting or rejecting hypotheses, scientists can never have complete certainty
that they are making the right choice—uncertainty is endemic to ampliative infer-
ence. So, inquirers must decide whether there is enough evidence to accept or reject
the hypothesis. What counts as enough should be determined by how important the
question is, i.e., the seriousness of making a mistake. That importance or seriousness
is generally (in part) an ethical question, dependent on the ethical evaluation of the
consequences of error. Call this argument for the use of value-judgments in science
from the existence of inductive risk the error argument (Elliott, 2011).
According to the error argument, the main role for values in certification of sci-
entific hypotheses has to do with how much uncertainty to accept, or how strict to
make your standards for acceptance. In statistical contexts, we can think of this as
the trade-off between type I and type II error. Once we have a fixed sample size (and
assuming we have no control over the effect size), the only way we can decrease the
probability that we wrongly reject the null hypothesis is to increase the probability
4Proponents of the inductive risk argument make a similar point.
5These exceptions either use a somewhat different sort of appeal to underdetermination than the
gap argument, or they use the gap argument as a strategic argument. One example is the extension
of the Quinean web of belief to include value-judgments (Nelson, 1990), discussed in more detail
below.
6This connection is due to P.D. Magnus (2012), who refers to the inductive risk argument as the
“James-Rudner-Douglas or JRD thesis” for reasons that will become immediately apparent.
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that we wrongly accept the null hypothesis (or, perhaps more carefully, that we fail
to reject the null hypothesis when it is in fact false), and vice versa. Suppose we are
looking for a causal link between a certain chemical compound and liver cancers in
rats,7 and you take H0 to be no link whatsoever. If you want to be absolutely sure
that you don’t say that the chemical is safe when it in fact is not (because you value
safety, precaution, welfare of potential third parties), you should decrease your rate
of type II errors, and thus increase your statistical significance factor and your rate
of type I errors. If you want to avoid “crying wolf” and asserting a link where none
exists (because you value economic benefits that come with avoiding overregulation),
you should do the reverse.
Douglas emphasizes at length that values (neither social nor cognitive values)
should not be taken as reasons for accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, reasons on a
par with or having the same sort of role as evidence in testing.8 This is an impermis-
sible direct role for values. In their permissible indirect role, values help determine
the rules of scientific method, e.g., decisions about how many false positives or false
negatives to accept. Values are not reasons guiding belief or acceptance; they instead
guide decisions about how to manage uncertainty.9
Rudner (1953) anticipated the objection that scientists should not be in the busi-
ness of accepting or rejecting hypothesis, but rather just indicating their probability
(and thus not having to make the decision described above). This response wrongly
assumes that inductive risk only occurs at the final step of certification; in reality,
this gambit only pushes the inductive risk back a step to the determination of prob-
abilities. Furthermore, the pragmatic signal that accompanies a refusal to assent
or deny a claim in practical or policy circumstances may be that the claim is far
more questionable that the probabilities support. Simply ignoring the consequences
of error—by refusing to accept or reject, by relying only on cognitive values, or by
choosing purely conventional levels for error—may be irresponsible, as scientists like
anyone else have the moral responsibility to consider the foreseeable consequences of
their action.
7Douglas (2000) considers the actual research on this link with dioxin.
8Strictly speaking, this is an extension of the error argument, and not all who accept the argu-
ment (especially for strategic purposes) need accept this addition.
9In Toulmin’s (1958) terms, values cannot work as grounds for claims, but they can work as
backing for warrants.
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4 A Shared Premise
These two arguments against the value-free ideal of science share a common premise.
The gap argument holds that values can play a role in the space fixed by the ev-
idence; if the gap narrows (as it would with transient underdetermination), there
are fewer ways in which values can play a role, and if the gap could ever be close,
the conclusion would be value-free. (An exception are those views that add values
into the radically holistic interpretation of Quine’s web of belief, such that values,
theories, and evidence are all equally revisable in the light of new evidence.) The
inductive risk argument allows values to play a role in decisions about how to man-
age uncertainty—not directly by telling us which option to pick, but indirectly in
determining how much uncertainty is acceptable.
Both arguments begin from a situation where the evidence is fixed and take
values to play a role in the space that is left over. The reason that values must
play a role is that uncertainty remains once the evidence is in. In a relatively weak
version of this argument, social values fill in the space between evidence and theory
because something has to, so it might as well be (and often is) social values. In more
sophisticated versions, we must use social values to fill the gap because of our general
moral obligation to consider the foreseeable consequences of our actions, including
the action of accepting a hypothesis. The arguments of these two general forms all
assume the lexical priority of evidence over values. The premise of lexical priority
guarantees that even in value-laden science, values do not compete with evidence
when the two conflict. This is often defended as an important guarantor of the
objectivity or reliability of the science in question.
5 Why Priority?
Why do proponents of value-laden science tend to be attracted to such a strict
priority of evidence over values? Perhaps some such restriction is required in order
to guarantee the objectivity of science. In order for our science to be as objective as
possible, maybe it has to be as value-free as possible (though this may not be very
value-free at all). That is, we want as much as possible to base our science on the
evidence because evidence lends objectivity and values detract from it. Even if this
view of objectivity were right, however, it would be a problematic justification for
opponents of the value-free ideal of science to adopt. With arguments like the gap
and inductive risk arguments, they mean to argue that values and objectivity are not
in conflict as such. It would thus create a serious tension in their view if one premise
depended on such a conflict. If it is really objectivity that is at stake in adopting
7
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lexical priority, we need a more nuanced approach.
I think the central concern concern is that value judgments might “drive inquiry
to a predetermined conclusion”(Anderson, 2004, p. 11), that inquirers might rig the
game in favor of their preferred values. As Douglas (2009) puts it, “Values are not
evidence; wishing does not make it so”(p. 87). In other words, a core value of science
is its ability to surprise us, to force us to revise our thinking. Call the threat of
values interfering with this process the problem of wishful thinking.
Lexical priority avoids this problem insofar as what we value (which involves
the way we desire the world to be) is only a consideration after we take all of the
evidence (which fixes the way the world is) into account. In Douglas’s more nuanced
approach, even once the evidence is in, social values (and even most cognitive values)
are not allowed to be taken directly as reasons to believe anything; they only act as
reasons for accepting a certain amount of evidence as “enough.”
An alternative explanation may be that the adoption of lexical priority has rhetor-
ical value.10 Suppose, along with the defenders of the value-free ideal, that there is
such a thing as objective evidence which constrains belief. Even so, there is (at least
transient) underdetermination, and a gap that must bridged by social values. Thus
not only is the value-free ideal impossible to realize, it may lead to unreasonable and
irresponsible avoidance of the role for values in filling the gap. Such an argument
can undermine the value-free ideal and establish that there is a major role for values
in science, and in the context of these goals, I freely admit that this can be a worth-
while strategy. But as we turn instead to the positive project of determining more
precisely the role(s) of values in the logic of scientific practice, the premises of such
an immanent critique are unfit ground for further development. We no longer need
to take the premises of our opponents on board, and we may find that they lead us
astray.
While following the basic contours of my argument so far, one might object to
characterizing of evidence as “prior” to values.11 What the gap and inductive risk
arguments purport to show is that there is always some uncertainty in scientific
inference (perhaps, for even more basic reasons, in all ampliative inference), and
so there will always be value-judgments to be made about when we have enough
evidence, or which among equally supported hypotheses we wish to accept, etc. The
pervasive need for such judgments means that value-freedom does not even make
sense as a limiting case; both values and evidence play a role, and neither is prior to
the other. This mistakes the sense of “priority” at work, however. Where priority
matters is what happens when values and evidence conflict; in such circumstances,
10Note redacted for purposes of anonymous review.
11Note redacted for purposes of anonymous review.
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lexical priority means that evidence will always trump values. In Douglas’s stronger
version of lexical priority, values allow you to determined what level of evidence you
need to accept a hypothesis (p = 0.05 or p = 0.01 or. . . ), but they cannot give you
a reason to reject the hypothesis,12 no matter what.
6 Problems with Priority
The versions of the gap and inductive risk arguments that presuppose the lexical
priority of evidence make two related mistakes. First, they require a relatively un-
critical stance towards the status of evidence within the context of certification.13
The lexical priority principle assumes that in testing, we ask: given the evidence,
what should we make of our hypothesis? Frame this way, values only play a role at
the margins of the process.
This is a mistake, since evidence can turn out to be bad in all sorts of ways: un-
reliable, unrepresentative, noisy, laden with unsuitable concepts and interpretations,
or irrelevant for the question at hand; the experimental apparatus could even have
a cord loose. More importantly, we may be totally unaware of why the evidence is
bad; after all, it took a great deal of ingenuity on the part of Galileo to show why
the tower experiment didn’t refute Copernicus, and it took much longer to deal with
the problem of the “missing” stellar parallax. While some epistemologists stick to an
abstract conception of evidence according to which evidence is itself unquestionable,
reflection on cases like this has lead many philosophers of science to recognize that
we can be skeptical about particular pieces or sets of evidence based on its clash with
hypotheses, theories, or background assumptions that we have other good reasons
to hold on to. As critics of strict falsificationism and empiricism have shown, we
already have reason to adopt a more egalitarian account of the process of testing and
certification, independent of the question about the role of values. We might get off
to a better start if we thought about how to fit values into this sort of picture of
testing.
12It seems possible that we could use our extreme aversion to some hypothesis to raise the required
level of certainty so high as to be at least practically unsatisfiable by human inquirers, and so in
effect rule out the hypothesis on the basis of values alone while remaining in the indirect role. While
it isn’t clear how to do it, it seems to be that Douglas means to rule this sort of case out as well.
13As Douglas (2009) makes clear, she does not take the status of evidence as unproblematic as
such. But any issues with the evidence are to be taken into account by prior consideration of values
in selection of methods and characterization of data. It would seem that value judgments in the
context of certification cannot be a reason to challenge the evidence itself. The following points are
intended to show that this restriction is unreasonable.
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Second, the attitude about values that lexical priority takes reduces the idea of
value judgment to merely expression of preferences rather than judgment properly so
called—in effect, they deny that we can have good reasons for our value judgments. It
is crucial to distinguish between values or valuing and value judgments or evaluations
(Dewey, 1915, 1939; Welchman, 2002; Anderson, 2010). Valuing may be the mere
expression of a preference, but value judgments are reflective decisions about values,
and properly speaking must be made on the basis of reasons (and judgments can
be better or worse because they are made on the basis of good and bad reasons).
Value judgments may even be open to a certain sort of empirical test, because they
hypothesize relationships between a state or course of action to prefer and pursue
and the desirability or value of the consequences of pursuing and attaining them
(Dewey, 1915; Anderson, 2010). Value judgments say something like “try it, you’ll
like it”—a testable hypothesis (Anderson, 2010). The evidence by which we test
value judgments may include the emotional experiences that follow on adopting those
values (Anderson, 2004).
If value judgments are judgments properly so called, adopted for good reasons,
subject to certain sorts of tests, then it is unreasonable to treat them in the manner
required by the lexical priority of evidence. Just as the good (partly empirical)
reasons for adopting a theory, hypothesis, or background assumption can give us
good reasons to reinterpret, reject, or maybe even ignore evidence apparently in
conflict with them (under certain conditions), so too with a good value judgment.
If evidence and values pull in opposite directions on the acceptance of a hypothesis,
then we should not always be forced to follow the (putative) evidence.
7 Avoiding Wishful Thinking without Priority
If we reject the lexical priority assumption and adopt a more egalitarian model of
testing, we need to adopt an alternative approach that can avoid the problem of
wishful thinking.
(An alternative principle to lexical priority is the joint necessity of evidence and
values, which requires joint satisfaction of epistemic criteria and social values. This
is the approach taken by Kourany (2010). On such a view, neither evidence nor
values takes priority, but this principle leaves open the question of what to do when
evidence and values clash. One option is to remain dogmatic about both epistemic
criteria and social values, and to regard any solution which flouts either as a failure,
which appears to be Kourany’s response.
Alternatively, we can adopt the rational revisability of evidence and values
in addition to joint necessity and revisit and refine our evidence or values. On this
10
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principle, both the production of evidence and value formation are recognized as
rational but fallible processes, open to revision. Such a view might include the radical
version of Quinean holism which inserts values into the web of belief. The adoption
of these two principles alone does not prevent wishful thinking, but adding some
basic principles like minimal mutilation may overcome the problem. (cf. Kitcher,
2011)
Instead of Quinean holism, we might instead adopt a form of pragmatist func-
tionalism about inquiry (Brown, 2012) which differentiates the functional roles of
evidence, theory, and values in inquiry. This retains the idea that all three have to
be coordinated and that each is revisable in the face of new experience, while intro-
ducing further structure into their interactions and According to such an account,
not only must evidence, theory, and values fit together fit together in their functional
roles, they must do so in a way that actually resolves the problem that spurred the
inquiry.
8 Conclusion
The lexical priority of evidence over values is an undesirable commitment, and un-
necessary for solving the problem it was intended to solve. The key to the problem
of wishful thinking is that we not predetermine the conclusion of inquiry, that we
leave ourself open to surprise. The real problem is not the insertion of values, but
dogmatism about values (Anderson 2004). Rather than being the best way to avoid
dogmatism, the lexical priority of evidence over values coheres best with a dogmatic
picture of value judgments, and so encourages the illegitimate use of values. A better
account is one where values and evidence are treated as mutually necessary, func-
tionally differentiated, and rationally revisable components of certification. Such an
account would allow that evidence may be rejected because of lack of fit with a
favored hypothesis and compelling value-judgments, but only so long as one is still
able to effectively solve the problem of inquiry.
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 POPPER’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
STUDY OF   ARTIFACTS
1. Introduction
Research on the nature and function of artifacts  has provided one of the richest areas of 
discussion in contemporary philosophy of technology as can be witnessed most notably in, 
for  instance,  the works of  Don Ihde (1990),  Peter-Paul  Verbeek (2005),  Peter  Kroes and 
Anthony Meijers (2006). Some promising developments regarding the philosophical study of 
artifacts can be noted outside of this field as well. Signs of an emerging interest in artifacts 
are visible in fields like philosophy of science (Hacking 1983; Ihde 1991) and contemporary 
metaphysics.  Quite  interestingly,  one  of  the  most  striking  features  about  discussions  of 
artifacts in recent metaphysics (van Inwagen 1990; Wiggins 2001; Elder 2004) is the tacit 
denial  of their  existence on various  grounds.   Important  exceptions  to  this  contemporary 
‘eliminativist’ trend include Randall Dipert’s (1993) study of artifacts, the works of Baker 
(2004, 2007) and Thomasson (2003, 2009).
This  increasing  numbers  of  research  publications  notwithstanding,  a  detailed  systematic, 
critical  study  of  artifacts  is  still  in  its  infancy.  Philosophers  generally  prefer  to  occupy 
themselves with words and ideas and do not tend to devote serious attention to various tools, 
appliances,  or  other  technological devices.  Quite  predictably,  at  the  level  of  theory  and 
reflection these  technological products have been relatively neglected by the philosophers.1 
However, if the task of philosophy, as is commonly understood, is to help us make sense of 
the human world and to deal with the most fundamental traits of reality (which includes not 
only the objects of natural sciences but indeed of those studied by the social,  human and 
technological  sciences  as  well),  then  the  question  of  how  to  secure  the  significance  of 
artifacts in philosophical investigation is more pressing than ever.
The principal motivation behind this inquiry is to display the versatility of Popper’s thesis of 
three worlds (1972, 1977, 1979, and 1982) in the analysis of issues related to the ontological 
status and character of artifacts. Strange to say, despite being discussed over years and hit 
with numerous criticisms (Carr 1977; Currie 1978; Cohen 1980), it is still little known that 
Popper’s thesis has an important bearing on the philosophical characterization of technical 
1This,  however,  does  not  imply that  material  things have been  totally neglected by the  human and social 
sciences. An interest in things has its own long tradition, including the history of art, archaeology and what is 
often referred to as ‘classical philosophy of technology’. 
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artifacts2.  In  consequence,  his  key perspectives  on the  reality,  autonomy,  and ontological 
status of artifacts are rarely taken into consideration by scholars known to be engaged in the 
study of artifacts.3 In this paper I intend to address this unfortunate oversight. 
This paper consists  of two main sections.   The first  section attempts to present a critical 
exposition  of  Popper’s  account  of  reality  and  (partial)  autonomy  of  artifacts.  Recent 
discussions  about  the  longstanding  distinction  between  natural  objects4 and  artifacts  are 
brought up and the relevance of Popper’s pluralistic thesis to this debate is pointed out. In 
addition, attention is drawn towards how to read his notion of the autonomy of artifacts. The 
primary emphasis of the second section is the ontological position of artifacts. Two separate 
arguments  are  posed  to  challenge  the  dual  ontological  status  of  what  Popper  called 
‘embodied’ artifacts.  The  first  argument  is  concerned  with  the  material  composition  and 
characteristic features of artifacts. The second one addresses the creative and epistemic value 
of these artificial products.
2. Popper on the natural-artificial division and the partial autonomy of artifacts
The age-old philosophical debate about the natural and the artificial, the origin of which can 
be safely traced back to Aristotle, assumes that natural objects which exist, persist, have their 
nature  and  are  classified  independent  of  human  beliefs,  representations,  experience, 
knowledge and practices are clearly different from artifacts which seem to depend for their 
existence, nature and classification on human beliefs, intentions, representations, knowledge 
and  practices.  Inverted,  this  assumption  implies  that  artifacts  do  not  figure  among  the 
‘furniture  of  the  world’ since  they do not  possess  purely mind-independent  discoverable 
natures. This apparent mind-dependence of artifacts continues to raise doubts about their real  
existence and the natural-artificial distinction is still a matter of intense dispute as can be 
witnessed in a series of articles published in APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers  
(2008).
2 By ‘artifact’ I understand any product of human intellectual and physical activities consciously conceived, 
manufactured or modified in response to some need, want or desire to produce an intended result. The term 
‘technical’ is often used to differentiate artifacts designed mainly for practical purposes from aesthetic objects. 
For details see Kroes and Meijers (2006).
3See, for instance, the writings of Baker (2004, 2007, 2008),  Thomasson (2003, 2008, 2009),  Elder (1978,  
2004), Verbeek (2005), Kroes and Vermaas (2008).
4By ‘natural object’ I mean that which is produced or developed by natural processes without minimal human 
intervention.
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Lynne  Baker  (2008,  pp.2-5),  for  instance,   referring  to  the  works  of  Wiggins  (2001), 
questions the standard ways of  singling out ontologically genuine substances and reasons 
that  the  mind-dependency  of   artifacts  does  not  make  them  ontologically  deficient  as 
compared to natural objects.  The alleged difference between natural objects and artifacts, she 
says rather pointedly, is steadily shrinking anyway because modern technology is creating 
products  like  digital  organisms  or  bacterial  batteries  that  are  difficult  to  classify 
unambiguously as artifacts or natural objects. Beth Preston (2008, pp.26-28), on the contrary, 
argues  that  there  never  really  was  a  sharp  divide  between  natural  objects  and  artifacts. 
Drawing attention to those ancient methods of domesticating plants or animals and primitive 
use of fermentation (which have nothing to do with advances in modern technology) she 
asserts that the natural-artificial divide was always blurry. On account of this she challenges 
the  perceived  significance  of  the  more  general  distinction  between  mind-dependent  and 
mind-independent objects that is often used to support the orthodox view of artifacts being 
ontologically deficient entities. Picking up on what is being debated for long Peter Kroes and 
Pieter Vermaas (2008, pp. 28-31) take Preston’s side to argue that it is not due to modern 
technology that the difference appears fuzzy; it began to pose problems the moment human 
beings started using and modifying natural objects to meet their ends. But no matter how 
problematic this distinction appears, Kroes and Vermaas claim, there are some clear cut cases 
where the difference makes sense and is of great philosophical and pragmatic significance.
All  these  contemporary  thinkers,  regardless  of  their  conflicting  views,  team  up  for 
challenging the almost unquestioned assumption underlying the natural-artificial distinction, 
namely,  that  objects  existing,  persisting,  and  being  classified  independent  of  human 
experience and knowledge are only to be considered as real. Baker has been highly applauded 
by others  for  breaking free  of  the  traditional  position  and  asserting  that  though artifacts 
depend on human minds or intentions in ways that natural objects do not, this does not imply 
any ontological deficiency in artifacts. Genuinely and objectively artifacts do qualify as real 
constituents of our world even if they are brought into being by our intellectual and physical 
activities, and in some sense ‘up to us’. The appreciation of this crucial point that mind-
dependence  or  intention-dependence5 does  not  necessarily  indicate  ontological  inferiority 
stimulates in turn the need to seek a broader image of reality that will enable us to grant  
artifacts a proper position in metaphysical schemes. 
5 Here I assume no difference between mind-dependence and intention-dependence.
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A possible solution to this appeal to a more comprehensive picture of reality can be found in 
Popper’s theory (1972, 1977, 1979, 1982) of three ontologically distinct worlds, (namely, 
World 1, World 2, and World 3) acting upon and partially overlapping each other. This theory 
separates World 1 (the world of physical states, events, laws, animate and inanimate objects) 
from World  3  (the  world  of  human  creations,  including  artifacts)  on  the  one  hand  and 
emphasizes the reality, objectivity, and partial autonomy of these World 3 products on the 
other.  True,  artifacts  such  as  tools  and  machines  do  not  hold  center  stage  in  Popper’s 
exposition of the elements of World 3,  seeing that theories, propositions,  the abstract yet 
objective  contents  of  scientific,  mathematical  or  poetic  thoughts,  problem-situations  and 
critical arguments are held by him as the ‘most fertile’ World 3 citizens (Popper 1972/1978, 
p.138).  Nevertheless,  this  distinct world of human creation includes works of art,  ethical 
values, social institutions and artifacts or what Popper (1979) calls, ‘feats of engineering’ 
such as, tools, machines, aircrafts, computers and scientific instruments as well. Drawing on 
the richness and diversity of the contents of this World 3, it would not be too difficult to 
extract an account of artifacts.
If artifacts are described as products of human minds, then on the face of it, they are mind-
dependent entities. One can spot at least two different senses in which artifacts seem to be 
mind-dependent. The first sense of dependence is a simple causal matter; individual artifacts, 
such as, tables, chairs, books or computers are existentially dependent on human intentions as 
the intentional activities of humans are causally responsible for the creation of these entities. 
The  other  sense  of  mind-dependence  is  purely  conceptual.  Artifacts  are  conceptually 
dependent on human minds in the sense that it is ‘metaphysically necessary’ (Baker 2007) for 
something to be an artifact (as opposed to, say, a tree or a stone) that there be intentional 
human activities. Unlike garbage or pollution, artifacts, strictly speaking, are not merely the 
products of human activities, but the intended products of human activities (Hilpinen 1992, 
p.60). This very idea of mind-dependence of artifacts often makes metaphysicians hesitant to 
acknowledge their  existence as it  tends to suggest that human thought and intentions are 
sufficient to bring new entities into existence, like a rabbit in a hat by an element of magic or 
by  a  ‘conjuring  trick.’ What  lies  behind  the  objections  to  artifacts  on  grounds  of  their 
(alleged) mind-dependence is basically this kind of worry. However, it does not in the least 
affect  Popper  for  he  never  ever  suggested  that  artifacts,  like  imaginary  objects,  can  be 
brought into existence by human thought, intentions, beliefs or imagination alone.  That the 
production  of  artifacts  such  as  bridges  or  buildings  essentially  involves  human  physical 
activities was quite obvious to him (Popper 1972/1978, p.166). What is more important, this 
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mind-dependence of artifacts was in no way taken by Popper to interfere with their reality or 
(partial) autonomy. He neither doubted the reality (and partial autonomy) of these human 
products,  nor did he ever hold them to be ontologically inferior to natural objects in any 
sense. 
Possessing discoverable mind-independent natures (about which everyone may be turn out to 
be in error) is traditionally held to be the central criterion for treating entities as ‘real’ or 
genuine parts of our world (Schwartz 1978, Elder 1989). The implication is understandable: 
artifacts generally viewed as not having mind-independent natures accessible to scientific 
examination, are not real parts of the world. This traditional assumption often dubbed as the 
‘Aristotelian view of artifacts’ has been challenged from two different perspectives. On the 
one hand, contemporary scholars advocate the necessity of questioning mind-independence 
as  the criterion of real existence. For instance, Thomasson (2008, p. 25) argues, the very 
thought that to be real artifacts must have mind-independently discoverable natures is based 
on ‘illegitimately generalizing from the case of scientific entities’. Hence this general, across-
the  board  criterion  of  mind-independence  as  the criterion  for  the  existence  of  ‘anything 
whatsoever’, she insists, should be given up. The criteria for existence may vary for different 
entities.
The other (relatively older) point of view (Simon 1969; Kornblith 1980; Losonsky 1990) 
upholds that although artifacts are our creations, they still may have intrinsic natures every bit 
as open to error or scientific discovery as the natures of chemical or biological kinds are. The 
popular proposal along these lines (Kornblith 1980) is that artifactual natures are at least 
largely distinguished by sameness of function rather than by sameness of chemical or genetic 
structure. But given the fragmentary nature of the existing philosophical accounts of artifact 
function6 and the acknowledged limitations of this suggestion7 I would like to limit myself to 
the submissions of Simon (1969) and Losonsky (1990). 
Taking a closer look at one of the most extensively studied artifacts, namely, the clock, Simon 
(1969, pp.6-9) pointed out that the purposeful aspect of any artifact involves a relation among 
three terms, namely,  the purpose or goal, the inner character of the artifact and the outer 
environment in which the artifact performs. The advantage of separating inner from outer 
environment in studying any artifact is that from knowledge of its purpose (or goal) and its 
6 For a discussion on the philosophical theories of artifact function see Preston (2009).
7 Baker (2006) and Thomasson (2009) stand out among those who have been critical of this view.
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outer  environment  its  behavior  can often be predicted.  The clock will  serve its  intended 
purpose  only if  its  ‘inner  environment’ (say,  for  example,  the  arrangement  of  gears,  the 
application  of  the  forces  of  springs  or  gravity  operating  on  a  weight  or  pendulum)  is 
appropriate to the ‘outer’ environment, the surroundings in which it is to be used. Sundials, 
for example, perform as clocks in sunny climates but are of no use at all during the Artic 
winter. Evidently, natural science impinges on an artifact through two these three terms of the 
relation that characterizes it: the inner structure of the artifact itself and the outer environment 
in which it will operate.8 
Almost two decades later Losonsky (1990, pp.81-88) cited the same example of the clock to 
prove  his  point  against  the  Aristotlelian  view of  artifacts.  Artifacts,  he  argued,  do  have 
discoverable natures, and these natures underlie the changes artifacts undergo. One important 
feature  of  an  artifact’s  nature  is  its  internal  form or  structure,  which  contributes  to  its 
permanence and its reproduction. In addition to its inner structure, two more features, namely, 
the purposes for which it is used and how it is used for those purposes, also belong to its  
nature. Simply knowing how to use a clock, for instance, does not presuppose any familiarity 
with its internal nature.  Since these three features (internal structure, purpose and manner of 
use) belong to the intrinsic nature of artifacts, Losonsky noted, it is no longer possible to 
believe that this nature is not worthy of scientific investigation or that this intrinsic nature 
does not underlie the ways in which artifacts develop and affect their environment.  
In the circumstances, a careful scrutiny of Popper’s pluralistic theory is worth-undertaking 
because it argues for a novel  way of regarding artifacts as ontologically respectable aspects 
of  reality without  ignoring the fact  of their  mind-dependency and what  is  more,  without 
entailing  the  requirement  of  having  discoverable  mind-independent  natures.  Two  crucial 
claims regarding the ontological status of artifacts can be found in Popper much before they 
have been put  forward  by present-day philosophers.  The claims are:  first,  artifacts  being 
products of human creation are ontologically different from but not necessarily ontologically 
inferior to natural (that is, World 1) objects; second, the ‘kickability’ of artifacts, that is, the 
fact that they can be kicked and can, in principle kick back (Popper 1982, p.116) is to be 
taken as evidence to substantiate their reality and (partial) autonomy. In what follows, I will 
examine these claims one by one.
8This division between inner and outer environments, can be found to a greater or lesser degree, in all large and 
complex systems, whether they are natural or artificial (Simon 1969, p.7).
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Popper presented his thesis of three worlds against the then fashionable monistic materialism 
or the dualistic view of the universe. His argument for introducing an ontologically distinct 
World 3 rested primarily on the division he made between thought in the subjective sense 
(that is  still  a part  of us) and thought  in the objective sense (that  is,  thought formulated 
linguistically);  in simple words, between World 2  thought processes and World 3  thought  
contents, a division neglected in traditional epistemology. Once formulated in language, any 
thought becomes an object outside ourselves and hence liable for inter-subjective criticism 
and evaluation. These objective contents of human thought possess various properties and 
relationships independently of any person’s awareness of them. For instance, any scientific 
theory possesses (in a non-trivial sense) infinitely many logical consequences, yet the number 
of these consequences of which we can be aware of at any time is necessarily finite. Facts 
like this mean that the World 3 of objective contents must be distinguished both from World 2 
(which consists of the various kinds of awareness we have of these objective contents) and 
from World 1(which consists of various forms of expressions of these objective contents) and 
therefore need to be classified into a separate class of things. 
What makes any item an inmate of World 3, on Popper’s view, is not as much the fact of its 
being a product of human creation as the fact that it can be grasped, known, deciphered or 
criticized inter-subjectively. Though originally generated by us, these World 3 objects, unlike 
ideas and thoughts (in the subjective World 2 sense), can be detached from the psychological 
processes of production and hence are potentially knowable, graspable, and analyzable. In 
other  words,  the  very characteristic  of  World 3 objects  is  that  they can be improved by 
cooperative criticism and criticism can come from people who had nothing to do with the 
original idea. The relevance of Popper’s pluralistic thesis thus lies not only in his emphasis on 
the ontologically distinct character of these World 3 products but in his firm conviction that 
the question of  the reality of these human creations can be addressed regardless of their 
psychological origin, or mind-dependency. This key Popperian insight exposes at once the 
insignificance of the mind-independence/mind-dependence question for the ontological status 
of any object. The wide-spread view that mind-dependency entails ontological deficiency, it 
is  important  to  note,  had been rejected by Popper  decades  before contemporary scholars 
wanted  to  get  rid  of  it.  What  seems  really  at  stake  here  is  a  problem that  is  of  wider 
significance than the mind-(in) dependency issue, namely, the issue about the chief criterion 
for  ‘real’ existence.  This  leads  us  straight  into the other  important  claim put  forward by 
Popper.
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Something exists or is real, Popper taught us, if and only if, it can interact with members of  
World 1, with hard physical bodies. He (1979) took his cue from the physicalist’s idea of 
reality. The physicalists more often than not were certain about the reality of medium sized 
physical objects that even a child can handle. Starting from this primitive idea of reality and 
then adopting the method of generalization they arrived at the idea of real physical existence 
by including very large and very small  sized objects and also by including whatever can 
causally act upon things, such as magnetic and electrical attraction and repulsion, fields of 
forces as well as radiation, for example X-rays, because they can causally act upon bodies, 
say, photographic plates. Popper was thus led to the idea that what is real, is whatever, may 
directly or indirectly, have a causal effect upon physical bodies, and especially upon those 
physical bodies that can be easily handled.  World 3 objects, he observed, do in fact strongly 
interact with the physical World 1 through the indispensable intervention of the subjective 
World 2 processes  or  the  human mind.9 Hence,  the  reality of  those World 3 products  is 
evident from the impact they make upon World 1 (via World 2), from their ability to have a 
profound feedback effect upon us by influencing our World 2 thought processes decisively, 
and from the impact any of us can make upon them. In short, the World 3 objects are real in 
the sense that they may have a causal effect upon our World 2 experiences, and further upon 
our brains belonging to World 1, and thus upon physical bodies.
The  more  noteworthy  point  regarding  the  contents  of  World  3  concerns  their  (partial) 
autonomous character. Once formulated in language or embodied materially these World 3 
objects,  pace Popper,  begin  to  cause  their  own  problems,  to  bring  forth  unintended, 
unforeseen consequences. In short, they express an autonomous aspect which is also real in 
the sense that  it  can interact  with World 2 (as World 3 objects can have a strong causal 
influence upon our thought processes) and also, via World 2, with World 1. Popper’s standard 
argument in support of this (partial) autonomy of World 3 comes in form of the following two 
thought experiments (Popper 1972/1978, pp.107-108; emphasis in original):
Experiment (1): All our machines and tools are destroyed, and all our subjective learning, 
including  our  subjective  knowledge  of  machines  and  tools,  and  how  to  use  them.  But 
libraries  and our capacity  to learn from them  survive.  Clearly,  after  much suffering,  our 
world may get going again.
9 In order that  Special Relativity theory could have its influence upon the construction of the atom bomb, 
several physicists, Popper (1979) pointed out,  have to get interested in the theory, work out its consequences, 
and  grasp these consequences. This  grasping  or human  understanding  and thus the human mind seem to be 
quite indispensable.
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Experiment (2): As before, machines and tools are destroyed, and all our subjective learning, 
including our subjective knowledge of machines and tools, and how to use them. But this 
time, all  libraries  are destroyed also,  so  that  our  capacity to  learn from books becomes 
useless.
Popper conjectured that ‘machines and tools,’ in the absence of libraries, cannot help the 
reemergence of our civilization for many millennia. He seems optimistic about a civilization 
that has had its ‘material infrastructure’ destroyed, but still retains libraries and our ‘capacity 
to learn from them’. Although it is not exactly clear from his writings quoted above whether 
his argument here is intended to devalue the (epistemic) importance of ‘machines and tools’ 
or  whether  it  simply  reflects  his  utter  indifference  to  our  capacity  to  learn  from  our 
experiences  and uses  of machinery,  the epistemological  merit  of  ideas,  theories,  or  other 
linguistic products of human creation are noticeably more appreciated by him than the ‘feats 
of  engineering’.10 One  might  here  criticize  Popper  for  failing  to  recognize  the  epistemic 
importance of the material  products of human manufacture,  but his  point on the (partial) 
autonomy of World 3 products (including artifacts) deserves  attention.  
The notion of ‘autonomy’ seems to be a problematic one and philosophers concerned with 
technology and technological products, are arguing over this concept for quite some time. 
Tenner’s (2006) classification of an enormous number of technologies which end up having 
disastrous or unpredictable consequences is quite well known. Such examples lead right to 
the question: do technical artifacts have a life of its own? Drawing on the old Greek idea that 
artificiality implies controllability,  Pitt  (2011, pp.73-83) reasons that for technology to be 
autonomous, it  must be uncontrollable. Since we do control,  challenge, change, and even 
reject technology including the large-scale ones (though not all of it, not all the time), the 
very question of technology being autonomous is not to be entertained.
Popper’s  idea  of  autonomy,  however,  appears  very  different  from  what  Pitt  and  others 
understand by this term. Artifacts (and all other World 3 contents) despite being products of 
the workings of innumerable minds do have a life more independent of human intention and 
endeavor as they bring forth unintended, unforeseen consequences. It is in this sense, Popper 
understood,  they  are  to  a  considerable  extent  autonomous.  Unfortunately  the  examples 
discussed by Popper are taken mostly from mathematics and except for a few comments on 
the impact of nuclear reactors or atom bombs on humanity he did not ponder much on the 
10 In his Tanner Lectures (Popper 1979) he admitted openly that scientific conjectures can exert a much 
stronger effect (via World 2) upon physical things than technical artifacts such as scissors and screwdrivers. 
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autonomous  character  of  artifacts.  Nevertheless,  the  real  significance  of  his  argument  in 
defense of the (partial) autonomy of World 3 creations comes to light as soon as one reflects 
on the nature of our dynamic relationships with artifacts. A closer look  into Ihde’s (1979) 
phenomenological analysis of how technical artifacts ‘mediate’ human-world relations seems 
most suitable for understanding Popper’s notion of  autonomy.
One of the most interesting examples provided by Ihde (1979, pp.18-23) is that of a dentist 
using  her  probe  to  gather  information  about  our  teeth.  Certain  features  of  the  dentist’s 
experience are to be noted. The finely tipped probe exists ‘between’ the dentist and what is 
experienced  and  in  this  sense  is  the  ‘means’ of  her  experience  of  the  texture,  hardness, 
softness, or holes of our tooth. The dentist feels the hardness or softness ‘at the end of the 
probe’. She discerns that as she experiences the tooth through the probe, the probe is being 
taken into her ‘self-experiencing’. This has an interesting implication, namely, that here touch 
is ‘at a distance’, and touch at a distance calls for some material embodiment. However, one 
also needs to note the converse side of the sense of touch at a distance. Simultaneous to the 
awareness  of  the  tooth  as  the  focal  object  of  her  experience,  there  is  the  ‘relative 
disappearance’ of the probe as such.11 
This disappearance or withdrawal is the way the instrument becomes the ‘means’ by which ‘I’ 
can be extended beyond my bodily limit.  It may thus be spoken of as a withdrawal into my 
now extended ‘self-experience’. The probe genuinely extends the dentist’s awareness of the 
world, it allows her to be embodied at a distance, and it amplifies certain characteristics of the 
tooth as well. It gives her what, compared to ‘in the flesh’ experience, are micro- features of 
the tooth’s surface. But at the same time that the probe extends and amplifies, it reduces  
another dimension of the tooth experience. With her finger the dentist can sense the warmth 
or wetness of the tooth, aspects which she does not get through the probe at all. The probe, 
precisely in giving her a finer discrimination related to the micro-features, reduced the full 
range of other features sensed in her finger’s touch. The dentist experiences the tooth through 
the probe, but it is equally clear that what is experienced is in some ways transformed and 
quite different from ‘in the flesh’ experiences.
We just  saw how a  simple  stainless  steel  probe  transforms direct  perceptual  experience. 
Artifacts,  therefore,  are  not  ‘neutral  intermediaries’  between  humans  and  world,  but 
11 It was Heidegger (1927/1962) who first observed this peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand. He 
pointed out that in order to be ready-to-hand it must quite authentically withdraw (zurueckzuziehen).
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‘mediators’; they actively ‘mediate’ this relation.12 This, what Ihde calls, ‘non-neutrality’ of 
artifacts  can  be  seen  as  expressive  of  what  Popper  refers  to  as  their  (partial)  autonomy. 
Though artifacts are our products, creations of our intellectual and physical efforts, they are 
to a large extent autonomous in this particular sense that they have the potential to transform 
our experience, to affect our actions, our everyday dealings with the world, in unanticipated 
or  unintended ways.  As they become part  of  our  self-experience  and self-expression  we, 
Popper (1972/78, pp.146-150) felt, are able to transcend ourselves (that is, our talents, our 
gifts)  through  our  dynamic  and  incessant  interaction  with  our  own  creations.  Probably 
because  of  our  obsession  with  representation  and  theory  at  the  expense  of  action  and 
intervention  that  such  dynamic  autonomous  character  of  artifacts  is  scarcely  noticed  in 
mainstream philosophical discussions.
3. Popper on the ontological status of artifacts
Popper  (1977/1995,  1982)  drew  an  interesting  distinction  between  ‘embodied’ and  ‘un-
embodied’ World 3 objects that is, between products of human mind that are linguistically 
formulated or materially constituted and those that are not yet so constituted or formulated. 
An un-embodied  World  3  product,  for  instance,  may be  any hitherto  unexplored  logical 
problem situation, or hitherto undiscovered logical relations between existing theories. This 
distinction between embodied and un-embodied World 3 products is not to be confused with 
the general division of artifacts into categories of ‘material’ and ‘abstract.’ Dasgupta (1996, 
pp.  9-12)  classifies  architectures,  plans,  designs,  etc.  (which are rendered visible  through 
symbol structures) as abstract artifacts, because though they are artificial products intended to 
serve certain human purposes, they are materially intangible in form.13 Important to note, 
while the architectural plan of a building (symbolically formulated) is an ‘abstract’ artifact for 
Dasgupta, Popper classified it as an ‘embodied’ World 3 product.
Some embodied  objects  like  books,  paintings,  or  sculptures,  Popper  argued,  have a  dual 
(ontological) status. Let us consider his favorite example of a book. As a tangible physical 
entity it belongs to World 1, but in so far as it has a content that remains invariant through 
various  editions  and  can  be  examined  for  matters  like  logical  consistency,  it  belongs 
simultaneously to World 3. Similarly, sculptures, paintings etc. being receptacles of objective 
12Not all experiences with artifacts, however, are of this type. For a detailed view see Ihde (1979). 
13 The way one can touch a material artifact say, a building, the architectural plan of it cannot be touched in the 
same way.
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content are inmates both of World 1 and World 3. Dasgupta (1996), Eccles (1974) and Baird 
(2004)  stand  out  among  those  for  whom this  pluralistic  (Popperain)  thesis  advanced  to 
challenge  the  traditional  Cartesian  categorization  of  the  universe  into  objective  physical 
reality and subjective mental events holds great promise. However, neither of them approves 
this  dual-status  of  embodied  objects.  Whereas  Dasgupta  (1996)  and  Eccles  (1974)  place 
materially  constituted  artifacts  directly  in  World  1,  Baird  (2004)  suggests  that  material 
artifacts, though not linguistically built, should belong exclusively to World 3.
Until and unless one could spell out what difference there is, if any, between regular World 1 
objects and those material structures which being possessors of objective contents of thought 
belong simultaneously to  World 3,  this  proposal  of the dual-status  of embodied World 3 
products seems to leave a lot to be desired. In what follows, I try to offer two arguments to 
question this dual ontological status of embodied artifacts and to reinforce Baird’s (2004) 
suggestion that artifacts should belong exclusively to World 3, a distinct world of human 
creation.  The  views  of  Eccles  (1974)  and  Dasgupta  (1996)  regarding  the  (ontological) 
categorization of material artifacts in World 1 are rejected by implication. 
First and foremost, I would like to argue, that artifacts, despite their physical-chemical make-
up  cannot,  strictly  speaking,  be  inhabitants  of  World  1  since  the  internal  substance  and 
organization of any artifact (materially constituted),  in contrast  to a natural object (in the 
sense clarified in footnote 4) is an ‘engineered’ or ‘designed’ structure that bears clear traits 
of  human  involvement14 and  not  simply  a  given  assemblage  of  raw  materials.  The 
components of any material artifact, say a pencil, are not ‘raw’ in the sense that naturally 
occurring materials like clay or wood are raw, rather they are skillfully and carefully selected, 
organized,  modified,  processed  or  in  part  refurbished,  demonstrating  signs  of  human 
interference all over. To cite another example, though a rubber ball is immediately made of 
rubber, it is not to be identified with the part of rubber of which it is composed. That part of 
rubber may have been synthesized before being formed into a spherical shape to create the 
ball, and certainly the part of rubber could continue to exist (in some sense) even if the ball  
were to be destroyed.15  As this inner (physical-chemical) structure of any material artifact, in 
virtue of which it is generally thought to belong to World 1, is an engineered or designed 
structure, artifacts, it seems safe to hold, are clearly different from natural objects and do not 
belong to the ‘given’, natural  World 1.
14Even the pre-historic stone tools (axes, hammers etc.) were made by chipping and flaking techniques that  
required skilled human labor.
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More notably, artifacts are generally characterized by a certain ‘for-ness’, that is, they have a 
functional or purposeful aspect.16 However,  though they are products designed for human 
purposes, their purposeful or functional nature is neither wholly determined by the physical 
properties  of  the  constituents  nor  by external  physical  factors  (such  as  physical  laws  or 
forces) and also cannot be explained in complete isolation from the socio-cultural context of 
their use.17 In short, the fulfillment of purpose or the realization of function does not wholly 
depend on the inner physical structure of the artifact in any important sense. The main reason 
being,  artifact  functions  are typically  multiply  realizable,  that  is,  they are realizable in  a 
variety of materials and/or forms, provided some general constraints are satisfied. As Preston 
(2009) illustrates, spoons have to be made out of a relatively rigid material and have a form 
that includes a handle attached to a bowl. But other than that form and material are very 
variable. Since a given artifact function is realizable in a range of forms and materials, it is no 
wonder that it can also be performed by other artifacts originally designed to fulfill different 
functions. Therefore artifacts are  multiply utilizable; typically they serve several functions, 
often simultaneously. For example, an umbrella designed specifically to ward off rain or to be 
used as a sunshade, can also be used as a weapon, as a lampshade, as a handy extension of the 
arm for reaching and retrieving things.18 Hence the mere possession of a tangible structure or 
certain physical-chemical-geometrical properties cannot be a sufficient ground for placing 
15I do not raise the problem of coinciding objects here for the following reason. The most popular view often 
referred to as the ‘standard account’ (Lowe 1995) embraces the conclusion that numerically distinct objects, (for  
instance, a certain wooden table and the lump of wood which composes it) can exist in the same place at the  
same time. The underlying assumption is: all that needs to be done to a lump of wood in order to make it into a  
table  is  to  merely  change  its  shape  in  an  appropriate  way.  Considering  contemporary  philosophical  and 
engineering research on the design and manufacture of artifacts (Bucciarelli 1994; Vermaas et al. 2008) I find 
this assumption too simple to go entirely unquestioned.  
16 It has recently been argued that technical artifacts have a dual-nature: they are designed physical structures,  
which realize functions that  refer  to  human intentionality (Kroes and Meijers  2006).  Artifact  functions are  
commonly believed to be directly and exhaustively determined by individual and/or collective human intentions. 
Though there are scholars (Preston 2009) who doubt whether functions of artifacts are dependent on human 
intentions  in  any  relevant  sense,  at  least  this  much  is  admitted  on  all  hands  that  human  intentions  have  
something to do with the functions of artifacts.
17 For a detailed view on the relevance of socio-cultural  factors see,  for  instance,  Basalla  (1988),  Preston 
(2006), Priemus & Kroes (2008).
18 No doubt artifacts have standardized forms and uses that are (relatively) stable for years or even generations. 
What needs to be emphasized is that they are only relatively stable.
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artifacts in World 1. Compositionally and characteristically they differ from natural objects, 
the inmates of World 1.
Before  presenting  the  second  argument  it  is  important  to  recall  the  Popperain  notion  of 
objective  knowledge  which  consists  of  ideas,  problems,  theories,  arguments  –  coded 
symbolically in the actual material structures serving as vehicles for this knowledge so that 
their  objective existence in  ensured and in fact  can continue independently of  anybody’s 
claim to know them or know about them.  Popper’s pluralistic thesis implies an ontological 
division  between  the  ‘material  structure’  of  an  artifact  and  the  ‘objective  content  or 
knowledge’ that this structure is a carrier of. For example, the material structure of a book 
made  out  of  paper,  glue,  thread  etc.  is  ontologically  distinct  from  its  abstract  content 
possessing  certain  semantic  and  syntactic  properties.  This  division  clearly  rests  on  the 
assumption  that  the  three-dimensional  material  structure  is  simply a  carrier  of  objective 
content or knowledge and hence cannot be a part of World 3. Two reasons can be offered to 
contest this underlying assumption.
First of all, Popper seems to overlook the fact that the material structure is as much a product 
of  creative  imagination,  rational  thinking  and  inter-subjective  criticism as  the  content  it 
embodies.  The act  of  conceptualizing  and manufacturing  the structural  forms of  artifacts 
intended  to  meet  given  human  requirements  is  technically  known  as  design.  Design  is 
typically conceived of as a purposeful, goal-directed activity, a process of making something 
that has never existed before.  Such a task-specific process would only be initiated if there is 
no existing artifact that perfectly fulfills the given requirements. As novelty or originality, 
even in the most modest sense, is a condition needed for the process of design to begin, the 
design-process  is  widely viewed as  a  creative process.19 In saying this  I  do not  mean to 
endorse  the  traditional  hylomorphic  model  of  creation  which  entails  the  idea  of  form 
(morphe) to be imposed by an agent with a specific goal in mind on passive and inert matter 
(hyle).  I  am quite aware that in contemporary discussions in fields ranging from artifact-
design (Franssen 2008; Ihde 2008) to material culture studies (Ingold 2007) a tendency to 
counteract this widespread view is already visible. Designers are no longer seen as having a 
great  deal  of  control  over  the  design-process  and the  roles  played  by historical  choices, 
19This, however, is not to suggest that every act of design counts as a creative act in the most elevated sense of 
the term. A closer look into Dasgupta’s (1996, pp.53-65) analysis of different levels of creativity would be very  
helpful at this point. 
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cultural assumptions and social contingencies in the creative process of artifact-design are 
being seriously considered. 
On the other hand, it is presently argued (Ingold 2007) that the material world is not passively 
subservient to human designs; the forms of things cannot be imposed from without upon an 
inert substrate of matter as matter is always in flux, in variation. In the generation of things 
the materials  with various and variable properties enlivened by the forces of the cosmos 
actually meld with one another. Therefore, the creativity of the work is to be seen in the 
forward movement that gives rise to things, in joining with and following the forces and 
flows of materials as they unfold and bring the novel form into being. Here the processes of  
genesis and growth that bring about forms in the world are viewed as more important than the 
finished forms themselves.
Whether one should assign primacy to processes of formation as against their final products 
is  too big a question to be discussed at this  point.  In the hylomorphic model of creation 
creativity is to be read backwards, starting from an outcome in the form of a novel object and 
tracing it, through a sequence of antecedent conditions, to an unprecedented idea in the mind 
of an agent or designer. The new alternative, on the contrary, puts more emphasis on the 
processes of form-giving than on the finished forms themselves and spots creativity in this 
forward movement that generates things. Irrespective of the view one chooses to hold up, the 
fact remains that material structures or forms of artifacts brought forth by the processes of 
design  are  products  of  human ingenuity and not  elements  of  the  ‘given’ physical  world. 
Hence they should belong to World 3, the world of human creation.
The  second  reason  concerns  the  epistemological  merit  of  materially  constituted  artifacts 
completely neglected by Popper. The material form or structure of any artifact (say a book or 
a  microscope),  it  has  recently been shown (Baird  2004),  is  not  only instrumental  to  the 
articulation of knowledge expressed in  words but is  a  specimen or token of knowledge20 
itself.  Although  this  idea  of  ‘thing-knowledge’ has  been  explicitly  pointed  out  by Baird 
(2004) lately, the germ of this idea that technical devices, their pictures and drawings  can 
convey  a  vast  body  of  characteristically  non-verbal  knowledge  can  be  traced  back  to 
Ferguson (1977). One might also be tempted to ask how material artifacts could represent 
knowledge when, as we are accustomed to believe, knowledge requires semantic content and 
20 The term ‘knowledge’ is used here in the objective sense as discussed by Popper (1972). In the objective 
sense knowledge can be understood as an evolutionary product of human (intellectual and physical) activities 
that can be detached from its psychological origin, can be criticized and modified inter-subjectively, and can 
improve our active adaptation to the world. 
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hence must be propositional in nature. In sharp contrast to our traditional attitude of thinking 
about knowledge in propositional terms, and of considering theories as the primary means for 
expressing knowledge, Baird (2004) advances a ‘materialist epistemology’. This materialist 
epistemology  focuses  on  technical  artifacts  (like  instruments  for  scientific  experiments, 
observation or measurement) not simply because of their role in the generation, articulation 
or  justification  of  knowledge  (expressed  linguistically)  but  because  they bear  knowledge 
themselves, on a par with the words we speak and hence are epistemologically valuable in 
their own right. The knowledge borne by things is typically different from knowledge that our 
theories  bear,  and  cannot  obviously  be  described  as  ‘justified  true  belief’.  Baird  (2004) 
discusses three different kinds of knowledge, namely, model knowledge, working knowledge, 
and encapsulated knowledge, borne by scientific instruments in order to demonstrate that 
they  do  have  epistemic  content  and  understanding  that  content  is  important  to  a  more 
comprehensive account of science.
While Baird considers mainly scientific instruments like Faraday’s first electric motor, and 
direct reading spectrometers, etc. to illustrate his thesis, I intend to suggest that not only high-
profile  scientific  instruments  but  such  seemingly  simple  everyday artifacts  like  pins  and 
paperclips are instances of knowledge too. Each artifact itself is a unique manifestation of 
human  imagination,  workmanship  and  of  quite  a  rich  combination  of  knowledge.  The 
knowledge embodied by these material artifacts is notably heterogeneous in nature. It may 
include, formal engineering knowledge (generally called technological theory), mathematics, 
knowledge  of  the  sciences,  theoretical  tools  (e.g.  calculation  methods  for  forces  in  a 
construction), and most importantly what Polanyi (1962) called knowledge of ‘operational 
principles’21 that often remains tacit. Drawing on Petroski’s (1992) painstaking research on 
the evolution of everyday artifacts I try to indicate in what way a simple and mundane paper 
clip  can  be  seen  as  a  (non-verbal)  expression  of  knowledge  and  as  epistemologically 
important in its own right. 
A paper clip (successfully working) is usually made with a steel wire that wants to spring 
back to its original shape after being bent, but only up to a point, for otherwise the paper clip 
could not be formed into the object it is. The paper clip works because its loops can be spread 
apart just enough to get it around some papers and, when released, can spring back to grab 
21Inspired  by  Polanyi,  Dasgupta  (1996,  p.158)  defines  an  operational  principle  as  any  proposition,  rule, 
procedure, or conceptual frame of reference about artifactual properties that facilitate action for the creation, 
manipulation, and modification of artifactual forms and their implementation. 
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the papers and hold them tight. This springing action, more than its shape per se, is what 
makes the paper clip work.22 Robert Hooke discovered the nature of this spring force in 1660 
and published his observation about the elasticity or springiness of materials in 1668.  There 
must be the ‘right spring’ to the paper clip wire, and to try to make clips with too stiff or too 
soft a wire is tantamount to trying to break Hooke’s Law.23 A paper clip then encapsulates in 
its  material  form  the  knowledge  of  the  characteristic  springiness  of  materials  and  the 
knowledge  of  how to  apply the  ‘right  spring’ to  the  paper  clip  wire.  The former  is  the 
scientific  knowledge  of  the  fundamental  behavior  of  materials,  while  the  latter  is  an 
operational principle. As an instance or non-verbal expression of (objective) knowledge itself 
the  paperclip  should  reasonably  belong  to  World  3.  This  seems  to  hold  true  for  other 
materially constituted  artifacts  as  well.  The Popperian suggestion  of  the dual  ontological 
status of embodied World 3 products thus needs to be dropped. 
Since artifacts too like ideas and theories are (non-verbal)  expressions of knowledge, the 
traditional questions of the character and growth of knowledge need to be reconfigured in the 
light of new questions concerning the things we make. For instance, to consider technical 
artifacts  as  instances  of  knowledge  amounts  to  questioning  the  basic  postulation  of  the 
traditional philosophical theory (of knowledge),  namely,  that knowledge consists of those 
beliefs which can be justified. In addition this involves a rethinking of the notions of truth 
and justification which are tied to the concept of knowledge but seem hard to fit  around 
artifacts.24 It is high time philosophers of science and technology ought to be concerned with 
the ways human knowledge is embedded in such technological products.
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Abstract
There has been a long-standing and sometimes passionate debate between physicists over
whether a dynamical framework for quantum systems should incorporate not completely
positive (NCP) maps in addition to completely positive (CP) maps. Despite the
reasonableness of the arguments for complete positivity, we argue that NCP maps should
be allowed, with a qualification: these should be understood, not as reflecting ‘not
completely positive’ evolution, but as linear extensions, to a system’s entire state space,
of CP maps that are only partially defined. Beyond the domain of definition of a
partial-CP map, we argue, much may be permitted.
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom has it that any evolution of a quantum system can be represented by a
family of completely positive (CP) maps on its state space. Moreover, there seem to be good
arguments that evolutions outside this class must be regarded as unphysical. But orthodoxy is
not without dissent; several authors have argued for considering evolutions represented by
maps that are not completely positive (NCP).
The debate has implications that have the potential to go deep. The possibility of
incorporating NCP maps into our quantum dynamical framework may illuminate much
regarding the nature of and relation between quantum entanglement and other types of
quantum correlations (Devi et al., 2011). If the use of NCP maps is illegitimate however, such
investigations must be dismissed without further ado.
In the following, we will argue for the proposition that NCP maps should be allowed—but
we will add a caveat: one should not regard NCP dynamical maps as descriptions of the ‘not
completely positive evolution’ of quantum systems. An ‘NCP map’, properly understood, is a
linear extension, to a system’s entire state space, of a CP map that is only defined on a subset
of this state space. In fact, as we will see, not much constrains the extension of a partially
defined CP map. Depending on the characteristics of the state preparation, such extensions
may be not completely positive, inconsistent,1 or even nonlinear.
The paper will proceed as follows: in Section 2 we review the essential aspects of the theory
of open quantum systems and in Section 3 we present the standard argument for complete
positivity. In Section 4 we consider the issues involved in the debate over NCP maps and in
1Strictly speaking, when an inconsistent map is used this should not be seen as an
extension but as a change of state space. This will be clarified below.
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Section 5 we present our interpretation of the debate and what we believe to be its resolution.
2 Evolution of a Quantum System
Consider a quantum system S that is initially in a state ρ0S , represented by a density operator
ρˆ0S . If the system is isolated, its evolution will be given by a one-parameter family of unitary
operators {U t}, via
ρˆtS = U
t ρˆ0S U
†t. (1)
Suppose, now, that the system interacts with another system R, which may include some
piece of experimental apparatus. We take R to include everything with which S interacts.
Suppose that S is prepared in a state that is uncorrelated with the state of R (though it may be
entangled with some other system, with which it doesn’t interact), so that the initial state of
the composite system S +R is
ρˆ0SR = ρˆ
0
S ⊗ ρˆ
0
R. (2)
The composite system will evolve unitarily:
ρˆtSR = U
t ρˆ0SR U
†t, (3)
where now {U t} is a family of operators operating on the Hilbert space HS ⊗HR of the
composite system. It is easy to show (see, e.g., Nielsen and Chuang 2000, §8.2.3) that, for
each t, there will be a set {Wi(t)} of operators, which depend on the evolution operators {U t}
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and the initial state of R, such that
ρˆtS =
∑
iWi(t) ρˆ
0
S W
†
i (t);
∑
iW
†
i (t)Wi(t) = I.
(4)
This is all in the Schrödinger picture, in which we represent a change of state by a change in
the density operator used. We can also use the Heisenberg picture, which represents a state
change via a transformation of the algebra of operators used to represent observables:
ρtS(A) = ρ
0
S(A
t), (5)
where
At =
∑
i
Wi(t)A
0W †i (t). (6)
In addition to unitary evolution of an undisturbed system, we also associate state changes
with measurements, via the collapse postulate. In the case of a von Neumann measurement,
there is a complete set {Pi} of projections onto the eigenspaces of the observable measured,
and the state undergoes one of the state transitions Ti given by
Tiρˆ =
Pi ρˆ P i
Tr(Pi ρˆ)
, (7)
The probability that the state transition will be Ti is Tr(Pi ρˆ). When a measurement has been
performed, and we don’t yet know the result, the state that represents our state of knowledge
of the system is
T ρˆ =
∑
i
Pi ρˆ Pi. (8)
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Note that this, also, has the form (4).
One can also consider selective operations, that is, operations that take as input a state and
yield a transformed state, not with certainty, but with some probability less than one, and fail,
otherwise. One such operation is the procedure of performing a measurement and keeping the
result only if the outcome lies in a specified set (for example, we could do a spin measurement
and select only ‘+’ outcomes); the operation fails (does not count as preparing a state at all) if
the measurement yields some other result. A selective operation is represented by a
transformation of the state space that does not preserve norm. A selective operation T ,
applied to state ρ, produces a final state T ρ with probability T ρ(I), and no result otherwise.
Unitary evolution, evolution of a system interacting with an environment with which it is
initially correlated, and measurement-induced collapse can all be represented in the form (4).
The class of state transformations that can be represented in this form is precisely the class of
completely positive transformations of the system’s state space, to be discussed in the next
section.
3 Completely Positive Maps
We will want to consider, not just transformations of a single system’s state space, but also
mappings from one state space to another. The operation of forming a reduced state by tracing
out the degrees of freedom of a subsystem is one such mapping; as we will see below,
assignment maps used in the theory of open systems are another.
We associate with any quantum system a C∗-algebra whose self-adjoint elements represent
the observables of the system. For any C∗-algebra A, let A∗ be its dual space, that is, the set
of bounded linear functionals on A. The state space of A, K(A), is the subset of A∗
consisting of positive linear functionals of unit norm.
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For any linear mapping T : A → B, there is a dual map T ∗ : A∗ → B∗, defined by
T ∗µ(A) = ρ(T A) for all A ∈ A. (9)
If T is positive and unital, then T ∗ maps states on A to states on B. Similarly, for any
mapping of the state space of one algebra into the state space of another, there is a
corresponding dual map on the algebras.
For any n, let Wn be an n-state system that doesn’t interact with our system S, though it
may be entangled with S. Given a transformation T of the state space of S, with associated
transformation T of S’s algebra, we can extend this transformation to one on the state space
of the composite system S +Wn, by stipulating that the transformation act trivially on
observables of Wn.
(T ∗ ⊗ In)ρ(A⊗B) = ρ(T (A)⊗B). (10)
A mapping T ∗ is n-positive if T ∗ ⊗ In is positive, and completely positive if it is n-positive
for all n. If S is a k-state system, a transformation of S’s state space is completely positive if
it is k-positive.
It can be shown (Nielsen and Chuang, 2000, §8.2.4) that, for any completely positive map
T ∗ : K(A)→ K(B), there are operators Wi : HA →HB such that
T ∗ρ(A) = ρ(
∑
iW
†
i AWi);
∑
iW
†
i Wi ≤ I.
(11)
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This is equivalent to a transformation of density operators representing the states,
ρˆ→ ρˆ′ =
∑
i
Wi ρˆ W
†
i . (12)
The standard argument that any physically realisable operation on the state of a system S
must be completely positive goes as follows. We should be able to apply the operation T ∗ to
S regardless of its initial state, and the effect on the state of S will be the same whether or not
S is entangled with a “witness” system Wn. Since S does not interact with the witness,
applying operation T ∗ to S is equivalent to applying T ∗ ⊗ In to the composite system
S +Wn. Thus, we require each mapping T ∗ ⊗ In to be a positive mapping, and this is
equivalent to the requirement that T ∗ be completely positive.
To see what goes wrong if the transformation applied to S is positive but not completely
positive, consider the simplest case, in which S is a qubit. Suppose that we could apply a
transformation ρ0S → ρ1S that left the expectation values of σx and σy unchanged, while
flipping the sign of the expectation value of σz.
ρ1S(σx) = ρ
0
S(σx); ρ
1
S(σy) = ρ
0
S(σy); ρ
1
S(σz) = −ρ
0
S(σz). (13)
Suppose that S is initially entangled with another qubit, in, e.g., the singlet state, so that
ρ0SW (σx ⊗ σx) = ρ
0
SW (σy ⊗ σy) = ρ
0
SW (σz ⊗ σz) = −1. (14)
If we could apply the transformation (13) to S when it is initially in a singlet state with W ,
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this would result in a state ρ1SW of S +W satisfying,
ρ1SW (σx ⊗ σx) = ρ
1
SW (σy ⊗ σy) = −1; ρ
1
SW (σz ⊗ σz) = +1. (15)
This is disastrous. Suppose we do a Bell-state measurement. One of the possible outcomes is
the state |Ψ+〉, and the projection onto this state is
|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| =
1
4
(I + σx ⊗ σx + σy ⊗ σy − σz ⊗ σz) . (16)
A state satisfying (15) would assign an expectation value of −1/2 to this projection operator,
rendering it impossible to interpret this expectation value as the probability of a Bell-state
measurement resulting in |Ψ+〉.
Note that the set-up envisaged in the argument is one in which it is presumed that we can
prepare the system S in a state that is uncorrelated with the active part of its environment R.
This set-up includes the typical laboratory set-up, in which system and apparatus are prepared
independently in initial states; it also includes situations in which we prepare a system in an
initial state and then put it into interaction with an environment, such as a heat bath, that has
been prepared independently.
4 The Debate Concerning Not Completely Positive Dynamical Maps
The early pioneering work of Sudarshan et al. (1961), and Jordan and Sudarshan (1961), did
not assume complete positivity, but instead characterised the most general dynamical
framework for quantum systems in terms of linear maps of density matrices. After the
important work of, for instance, Choi (1972) and Kraus (1983), however, it became
increasingly generally accepted that complete positivity should be imposed as an additional
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requirement. Yet despite the reasonableness of the arguments for complete positivity, the
imposition of this additional requirement was not universally accepted. Indeed, the issue of
whether the more general or the more restricted framework should be employed remains
controversial among physicists. At times, the debate has been quite passionate (e.g.,
Simmons, Jr. and Park, 1981; Raggio and Primas, 1982; Simmons, Jr. and Park, 1982).
The issues involved in the debate were substantially clarified by an exchange between
Pechukas and Alicki which appeared in a series of papers between 1994 and 1995. Pechukas
and Alicki analysed the dynamical map, Λ, for a system into three separate components: an
‘assignment map’, a unitary on the combined state space, and a trace over the environment:
ρS → ΛρS = trR(UΦρSU †), (17)
with S,R representing the system of interest and the environment (the ‘reservoir’)
respectively, and the assignment map, Φ, given by
ρS → ΦρS = ρSR. (18)
Since the unitary and the partial trace map are both CP, whether or not Λ itself is CP is
solely determined by the properties of Φ, the assignment map. Φ represents an assignment of
‘initial conditions’ to the combined system: it assigns a single state, ρSR, to each state ρS . My
use of inverted commas here reflects the fact that such a unique assignment cannot be made in
general, since in general the state of the reservoir will be unknown. It will make sense to use
such a map in some cases, however; for instance if there is a class Γ of possible initial states
S +R that is such that, within this class, ρS uniquely determines ρSR. Or it might be that,
even though there are distinct possible initial states in Γ that yield the same reduced state ρS ,
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the evolution of ρS is (at least approximately) insensitive to which of these initial states is the
actual initial conditions.
When Φ is linear:
Φ(λρ1 + (1− λ)ρ2) = λΦ(ρ1) + (1− λ)Φ(ρ2), (19)
consistent:
trR(ΦρS) = ρS, (20)
and of product form, one can show that Φ is of necessity CP as well. Pechukas (1994)
inquired into what follows from the assumption that Φ is linear, consistent, and positive.
Pechukas showed that if Φ is defined everywhere on the state space, and is linear, consistent,
and positive, it must be a product map: ρS
Φ
−→ ρSR = ρS ⊗ ρR, with ρR a fixed density
operator on the state space of the reservoir (i.e., all ρS’s are assigned the same ρR). This is
undesirable as there are situations in which we would like to describe the open dynamics of
systems that do not begin in a product state with their environment. For instance, consider a
multi-partite entangled state of some number of qubits representing the initial conditions of a
quantum computer, with one of the qubits representing a ‘register’ and playing the role of S,
and the rest playing the role of the reservoir R. If we are restricted to maps that are CP on the
system’s entire state space then it seems we cannot describe the evolution of such a system.
Pechukas went on to show that when one allows correlated initial conditions, Λ, interpreted
as a dynamical map defined on the entire state space of S, may be NCP. In order to avoid the
ensuing negative probabilities, one can define a ‘compatibility domain’ for this NCP map; i.e.,
one stipulates that Λ is defined only for the subset of states of S for which ΛρS ≥ 0 (or
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equivalently, ΦρS ≥ 0). He writes:
The operator Λ is defined, via reduction from unitary S +R dynamics, only on a
subset of all possible ρS’s. Λ may be extended—trivially, by linearity—to the set
of all ρS , but the motions ρS → ΛρS so defined may not be physically realizable
... Forget complete positivity; Λ, extended to all ρS , may not even be positive
(1994).
In his response to Pechukas, Alicki (1995) conceded that the only initial conditions
appropriate to an assignment map satisfying all three “natural” requirements—of linearity,
consistency, and complete positivity—are product initial conditions. However, he rejected
Pechukas’s suggestion that in order to describe the evolution of systems coupled to their
environments one must forego the requirement that Λ be CP on S’s entire state space. Alicki
calls this the “fundamental positivity condition.” Regarding Pechukas’s suggestion that one
may use an NCP map with a restricted compatibility domain, Alicki writes:
... Pechukas proposed to restrict ourselves to such initial density matrices for
which ΦρS ≥ 0. Unfortunately, it is impossible to specify such a domain of
positivity for a general case, and moreover there exists no physical motivation in
terms of operational prescription which would lead to [an NCP assignment of
initial conditions] (Alicki, 1995).
It is not clear exactly what is meant by Alicki’s assertion that it is impossible to specify the
domain of positivity of such a map in general, for does not the condition ΦρS ≥ 0 itself
constitute a specification of this domain? Most plausibly, what Alicki intends is that
determining the compatibility domain will be exceedingly difficult for the general case. We
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will return to this question in the next section, as well as to the question of the physical
motivation for utilising NCP maps.
In any case, rather than abandoning the fundamental positivity condition, Alicki submits
that in situations where the system and environment are initially correlated one should relax
either consistency or linearity. Alicki attempts to motivate this by arguing that in certain
situations the preparation process may induce an instantaneous perturbation of S. One may
then define an inconsistent or nonlinear, but still completely positive, assignment map in
which this perturbation is represented.
According to Pechukas (1995), however, there is an important sense in which one should
not give up the consistency condition. Consider an inconsistent linear assignment map that
takes the state space of S to a convex subset of the state space of S +R. Via the partial trace it
maps back to the state space of S, but since the map is not necessarily consistent, the traced
out state, ρ′S , will not in general be the same as ρS; i.e.,
ρS
Φ
−→ ΦρS
trR−−→ ρ′S 6= ρS. (21)
Now each assignment of initial conditions, ΦρS , will generate a trajectory in the system’s
state space which we can regard as a sequence of CP transformations of the form:
ρS(t) = trR(UtΦρSU
†
t ). (22)
At t = 0, however, the trajectory begins from ρ′S , not ρS . ρS , in fact, is a fixed point that lies
off the trajectory. This may not be completely obvious, prima facie, for is it not the case, the
sceptical reader might object, that we can describe the system as evolving from ρS to ρSR via
the assignment map and then via the unitary transformation to its final state? While this much
San Diego, CA -173-
may be true, it is important to remember that Φ is supposed to represent an assignment of
initial conditions to S. On this picture the evolution through time of ΦρS is a proxy for the
evolution of ρS . When Φ is consistent, trR(UΦρSU †) = trR(UρSRU †) and there is no issue;
however when Φ is inconsistent, trR(UΦρSU †) 6= trR(UρSRU †), and we can no longer claim
to be describing the evolution of ρS through time but only the evolution of the distinct state
tr(ΦρS) = ρ′S . And while the evolution described by the dynamical map ρ′S(0)
Λ
−→ ρ′S(t) is
completely positive, it has not been shown that the transformation ρS(0)
Λ
−→ ρS(t) must
always be so.
What of Alicki’s suggestion to drop the linearity condition on the assignment map? It is
unclear that this can be successfully physically motivated, for it is prima facie unclear just
what it would mean to accept nonlinearity as a feature of reduced dynamics. Bluntly put,
quantum mechanics is linear in its standard formulation: the Schrödinger evolution of the
quantum-mechanical wave-function is linear evolution. Commenting on the debate,
Rodríguez-Rosario et al. (2010) write: “giving up linearity is not desirable: it would disrupt
quantum theory in a way that is not experimentally supported.”
5 Linearity, Consistency, and Complete Positivity
We saw in the last section that there are good reasons to be sceptical with respect to the
legitimacy of violating any of the three natural conditions on assignment maps. We will now
argue that there are nevertheless, in many situations, good, physically motivated, reasons to
violate these conditions.
Let us begin with the CP requirement. Pace Alicki, one finds a clear physical motivation for
violating complete positivity if one notes, as Shaji and Sudarshan (2005) do, that if the system
S is initially entangled with R, then not all initial states of S are allowed—for instance,
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ρS = trRρSR cannot be a pure state, since the marginal of an entangled state is always a mixed
state. Such states will be mapped to negative matrices by a linear, consistent, NCP map. On
the other hand the map will be positive for all of the valid states of S; this is the so-called
compatibility domain of of the map: the subset of states of S that are compatible with Λ.
In light of this we believe it unfortunate that such maps have come to be referred to as NCP
maps, for strictly speaking it is not the map Λ but its linear extension to the entire state space
of S that is NCP. Λ is indeed CP within its compatibility domain. In fact this misuse of
terminology is in our view at least partly responsible for the sometimes acrid tone of the
debate. From the fact that the linear extension of a partially defined CP map is NCP, it does
not follow that “reduced dynamics need not be completely positive.”2 Alicki and others are
right to object to this latter proposition, for given the arguments for complete positivity it is
right to demand of a dynamical map that it be CP on the domain within which it is defined.
On the other hand it is not appropriate to insist with Alicki that a dynamical map must be CP
on the entire state space of the system of interest—come what may—for negative probabilities
will only result from states that cannot be the initial state of the system. Thus we believe that
‘NCP maps’—or more appropriately: Partial-CP maps with NCP linear extensions—can and
should be allowed within a quantum dynamical framework.
What of Alicki’s charge that the compatibility domain is impossible to “specify” in
general? In fact, the determination of the compatibility domain is a well-posed problem (cf.
Jordan et al., 2004); however, as Alicki alludes to, there may be situations in which actually
determining the compatibility domain will be computationally exceedingly difficult. But in
other cases3—when computing the compatibility domain is feasible—we see no reason why
2This is the title of Pechukas’s 1994 article.
3For examples, see Jordan et al. (2004); Shaji and Sudarshan (2005).
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one should bar the researcher from using a Partial-CP map whose linear extension is NCP if it
is useful for her to do so. Indeed, given the clear physical motivation for it, this seems like the
most sensible thing to do in these situations.
There may, on the other hand, be other situations where proceeding in this way will be
inappropriate. For instance, consider a correlated bipartite system S +R with the following
possible initial states:
x+ ⊗ ψ+, x− ⊗ ψ−, z+ ⊗ φ+, z− ⊗ φ−. (23)
The domain of definition of Φ consists of the four states {x+, x−, z+, z−}. Suppose we want
to extend Φ so that it is defined on all mixtures of these states, and is linear. The totally mixed
state of S can be written as an equally weighted mixture of x+ and x−, and also as an equally
weighted mixture of z+ and z−.
1
2
I =
1
2
x+ +
1
2
x− =
1
2
z+ +
1
2
z−. (24)
If Φ is defined on this state, and is required to be a linear function, we must have
Φ(
1
2
I) =
1
2
Φ(x+) +
1
2
Φ(x−)
=
1
2
x+ ⊗ ψ+ +
1
2
x− ⊗ ψ−, (25)
Φ(
1
2
I) =
1
2
Φ(z+) +
1
2
Φ(z−)
=
1
2
z+ ⊗ φ+ +
1
2
z− ⊗ φ−, (26)
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from which it follows that
1
2
x+ ⊗ ψ+ +
1
2
x− ⊗ ψ− =
1
2
z+ ⊗ φ+ +
1
2
z− ⊗ φ−, (27)
which in turn entails that
ψ+ = ψ− = φ+ = φ−, (28)
so Φ cannot be extended to a linear map on the entire state space of S unless it is a product
map.
It would be misleading to say that assignment maps such as these violate linearity, for much
the same reason as it would be misleading to say that Partial-CP maps with NCP linear
extensions violate complete positivity. It is not that these maps are defined on a convex
domain, and are nonlinear on that domain; rather, there are mixtures of elements of the
domain on which the function is undefined. But since we cannot be said to have violated
linearity, then pace Rodríguez-Rosario et al., in such situations we see no reason to bar the
researcher from utilising these ‘nonlinear’ maps, for properly understood, they are
partial-linear maps with nonlinear extensions.
Pace Pechukas, there may even be situations in which it is appropriate to use an inconsistent
assignment map. Unlike the previous cases, in this case the assignment map will be defined on
the system’s entire state space. This will have the disadvantage, of course, that our description
of the subsequent evolution will not be a description of the true evolution of the system, but in
many situations one can imagine that the description will be “close enough,” i.e., that
trR(UtρSRU
†
t ) ≈ trR(Utρ
′
SRU
†
t ). (29)
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6 Conclusion
Bohr warned us long ago against extending our concepts, however fundamental, beyond their
domain of applicability. The case we have just looked at is an illustration of this important
point. The debate over the properties one should ascribe to the extension of a partially-defined
description is a debate over the properties one should ascribe to a phantom.
Whether or not we must use a map whose extension is nonlinear, or a map whose linear
extension is NCP, or an inconsistent map, is not a decision that can be made a priori or that
can be shown to follow from fundamental physical principles. The decision will depend on
the particular situation and on the particular state preparation we are dealing with.
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -178-
References
Alicki, Robert. “Comment on ‘Reduced Dynamics Need Not Be Completely Positive’.”
Physical Review Letters 75 (1995): 3020.
Choi, Man-Duen. “Positive Linear Maps on C*-Algebras.” Canadian Journal of Mathematics
24 (1972): 520–529.
Devi, A. R. Usha, A. K. Rajagopal, and Sudha. “Quantumness of Correlations and
Entanglement.” International Journal of Quantum Information 9 (2011): 1757–1771.
Jordan, Thomas F., Anil Shaji, and E. C. G. Sudarshan. “Dynamics of Initially Entangled
Open Quantum Systems.” Physical Review A 70 (2004): 052,110.
Jordan, Thomas F., and E. C. G. Sudarshan. “Dynamical Mappings of Density Operators in
Quantum Mechanics.” Journal of Mathematical Physics 2 (1961): 772–775.
Kraus, Karl. States, Effects, and Operators. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1983.
Nielsen, Michael A., and Isaac L. Chuang. Quantum Computation and Quantum Information.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Pechukas, Philip. “Reduced Dynamics Need Not Be Completely Positive.” Physical Review
Letters 73 (1994): 1060–1062.
. “Pechukas Replies.” Physical Review Letters 75 (1995): 3021.
Raggio, G.A., and H. Primas. “Remarks on “On Completely Positive Maps in Generalized
Quantum Dynamics”.” Foundations of Physics 12 (1982): 433–435.
San Diego, CA -179-
Rodríguez-Rosario, César A., Kavan Modi, and Alán Aspuru-Guzik. “Linear Assignment
Maps for Correlated System-Environment States.” Physical Review A 81 (2010): 012,313.
Shaji, Anal, and E. C. G. Sudarshan. “Who’s Afraid of Not Completely Positive Maps?”
Physics Letters A 341 (2005): 48–54.
Simmons, Ralph F., Jr., and James L. Park. “On Completely Positive Maps in Generalized
Quantum Dynamics.” Foundations of Physics 11 (1981): 47–55.
. “Another Look at Complete Positivity in Generalized Quantum Dynamics: Reply to
Raggio and Primas.” Foundations of Physics 12 (1982): 437–439.
Sudarshan, E. C. G., P. M. Mathews, and Jayaseetha Rau. “Stochastic Dynamics of
Quantum-Mechanical Systems.” Physical Review 121 (1961): 920–924.
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -180-
 
1 
 
Narratives & Mechanisms 
Abstract 
Historical scientists are frequently concerned with narrative explanations targeting single cases. I show 
that two distinct explanatory strategies are employed in narratives, simple and complex. A simple 
narrative has minimal causal detail and is embedded in a general regularity, whereas a complex 
narrative is more detailed and not embedded. This distinction͛s iŵpoƌtaŶĐe is illustrated in reference to 
ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ eǆplaŶatioŶ. I ĐoŶsideƌ ͚liďeƌal͛ aĐĐouŶts of ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ explanation, which expand the 
traditional picture to accommodate less mechanistic sciences. Simple narratives warrant a mechanistic 
treatment, while some complex narratives do not.  
Introduction 
Scientists examining the past are taken to be primarily concerned with narrative explanations which 
account for single events
1
. A meteor exterminated the dinosaurs; Neǁ )ealaŶd͛s lake Taupo ǁas foƌŵed 
by an enormous volcanic eruption; the introduction of small-pox killed millions in the Americas. Of 
course, historical scientists are not narrowly concerned with narrative explanation. As Kosso (2001) and 
Jeffares (2008) discuss, they sometime target middle-range theories which connect contemporary 
phenomena to past events (see also Turner 2009). Moreover, much historical enquiry targets patterns 
and regularities in deep time. Paleobiological work covering the nature of mass extinction events (Raup 
1991) the nature of speciation (Eldredge & Gould 1972), the role of selection and adaptationist 
explanations in macro-level patterns (Gould et al 1977, Huss 2009), are all concerned  with regularities in 
life͛s shape, Ŷot the eǆplaŶatioŶ of a siŵple eǀeŶt. Hoǁeǀeƌ, at least ŵuĐh of the tiŵe their explanatory 
interests are geared towards the particular rather than the general. This paper shows that historical 
explanation, understood as narrative, is disunified: at least two distinct explanatory strategies are 
employed. Simple narratives explain particular cases as instances of regularities – the explanandum is 
subsumed by a general model. Complex narratives do not account for explananda in terms of 
regularities or models.  
I argue that simple narratives have more in common with the population-level explanations furnished by 
economists and ecologists than complex narratives. This is demonstrated by comparing narrative 
explanations with mechanistic models. Both population-level and simple narratives are amenable to 
                                                          
1
 For example, Kitcher 1993, Cleland 2011, Hempel 1965 and Hull 1975 appear to agree that historical enquiry is 
primarily narrative 
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mechanistic gloss. However, in complex cases scientists are not typically mechanists. Faced with a 
complex world, they employ characteristically non-mechanistic explanations. 
The paper is in three parts. In the first, two case-studies illustrate the distinction between simple and 
complex narratives. Part two discusses mechanistic explanation, sketching the view and introducing 
liberalism – the view that most or all scientific explanation is mechanistic. The third part examines 
narrative explanation in light of mechanistic explanation, arguing that simple narratives are 
characteristically mechanistic, while some complex narratives are not.  
1. Narrative Explanations 
Narrative explanations account for particular events
2
 via causal sequences concluding with the 
explanandum. The causal sequence makes the explanandum likely. Narrative explanations are taken to 
be distinctively historiographical (at least ďǇ Heŵpel aŶd HullͿ due to theiƌ ͚stoƌǇ-like͛ stƌuĐtuƌe aŶd laĐk 
of appeal to laws. The treaties at the close of the First World War led inevitably to the Second; the 
extraterrestrial impact which caused the Chicxulub crater was sufficient to exterminate the dinosaurs; 
and so on. There is more than one way to account for an event, however. Some causal sequences stand 
alone: even if oŶlǇ oŶe eǆtiŶĐtioŶ eǀeŶt ǁas Đaused ďǇ aŶ iŵpaĐt, ǁe ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŶǀiŶĐed of the iŵpaĐt͛s 
causal sufficiency. Or we might explain an event as an instance of a general model: perhaps all wars 
have common causes, and the Second World War can be explained in terms of those commonalities. 
I will be agnostic as to whether all narratives in fact reference regularities, and whether this is 
pƌoďleŵatiĐ. Heŵpel͛s pƌiŵaƌǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ aďout histoƌiogƌaphiĐ eǆplaŶatioŶ is the laĐk of ŶoŵologiĐal 
appeals and I (in part) share the suspicion that particular events can be satisfactorily explained without 
recourse to regularities (c.f Tucker 1998) but my claim of the disjunctive nature of narratives holds 
regardless of this. 
Hopefully it is clear that narrative explanations are surely not restricted to historiographical inquiry – 
there is nothing stopping a chemist explaining a single event in terms of some causal sequence (perhaps 
even without explicit mention of laws) - and therefore the claims I make about narrative explanation will 
most likely not be restricted to the geological and paleontological cases I focus on. Whether the 
distinctions and lessons I draw are extendable to other sciences I leave for future work: given that 
                                                          
2
 I will speak in terms of past events, but historical enquiry also covers historical processes, entities and states of 
affairs. The claims made about events carry over to those other types of targets. 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -182-
 
3 
 
narrative explanation is paradigmatically the business of historical inquiry, it is the obvious place to 
center philosophical investigations 
 And so narrative explanations (1) account for some particular explanandum in terms of some causal 
sequence; (2) may or may not appeal explicitly to laws or generalizations; (3) are paradigmatically, but 
not exclusively, historical. I argue that there are two explanatory strategies which historical scientists 
employ in providing narratives. 
1.1 Snowball Earth 
There were glaciers in the tropics at least twice during the Neoproterozoic (roughly 1000 – 542 million 
years ago). Towards the end of the period there was synchronous, ubiquitous glaciation: the entire earth 
covered in permafrost cut through by rivers of ice. This presents a series of geological and 
palaeoclimatological challenges. What could have caused this scenario? How did it thaw? Why are such 
events rare? The most popular explanation of these glacial events is Joseph Kirschvink͛s SŶoǁďall Eaƌth 
Theory (Schopf & Klein 1992, Hoffman & Schrag 2002).  
The late Neoproterozoic was a time of continental dispersal: the supercontinent Rodinia broke up and 
the megacontinent Gondwana began to form. During glacial periods most continents clustered at the 
middle and lower latitudes. Kirshvink proposed that this clustering was responsible for the global freeze. 
Both land and ice-caps have high albedo – theǇ ƌefleĐt ŵoƌe of the suŶ͛s eŶeƌgǇ thaŶ ǁater. Tropical 
landmasses have high albedo because more sunlight reaches the equator. Their warm, moist climate 
also increases silicate weathering (the absorption of C02). Land clustering around the tropics, then, 
increases albedo and decreases gƌeeŶhouse gases. This ǁould loǁeƌ the eaƌth͛s teŵpeƌatuƌe – 
particularly at the poles where the growth of ice sheets would lead to a freezing feedback loop: 
If more than about half of the Eaƌth͛s suƌfaĐe aƌea ǁeƌe to ďeĐoŵe iĐe Đoǀeƌed, the alďedo 
feedďaĐk ǁould ďe uŶstoppaďle… suƌfaĐe teŵpeƌatuƌes ǁould pluŵŵet, aŶd paĐk iĐe ǁould 
quickly envelope the tropical oceans (Hoffman & Schrag pp 135) 
The explanation can be presented in a simple flowchart: 
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Landmass Clustering Thinner Atmosphere
Higher Albedo Lower Temperatures
Increased Icepack
 
Figure 1: Snowball Earth 
Landmass clustering in the tropics lowers temperature by increasing albedo and thinning the 
atmosphere. Lower temperatures increase icepack cover, creating a feedback loop between lowering 
temperatures, larger icecaps, and higher albedo. Earth freezes over. As we shall see, Snowball Earth is a 
paƌadigŵ ͚siŵple͛ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe: an event is explained by a general model with reference to minimal causal 
factors. 
1.2 Sauropod Gigantism 
Despite public perception, most dinosaurs fit comfortably in the familiar mammalian size-range. The 
sauropods were different: not merely big, but puzzlingly so. Some were the largest land animals to have 
ever lived: Sauroposeidon and Argentinosaurus are estimated to have weighed between 50 and 70 tons, 
rivaling baleen whales in length. By contrast, the largest known terrestrial mammal was 
Paraceratherium, thought to be 12 meters long and weighing 20 tons at most. How did sauropods 
manage such sizes? Why was it unique? How was gigantism physiologically and evolutionarily possible?  
As Sander, Christian et al (2011) review, sauropod gigantism was the result of myriad causes (see also 
Klein et al 2011). Sauropods were the right lineage, in the right place, at the right time. They had specific 
primitive characteristics which removed size limitations. Early sauropods were oviparous – egg-laying 
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allows for fast population recovery, mitigating the small population size engendered by gigantism. They 
did not masticate, increasing food intake. They had a distinctive small-head-and-long-neck 
morphological structure, which maximizes grazing range while minimizing movement. 
These primitive characteristics were supplemented by new adaptations. Gigantism itself protected 
against the increasingly sophisticated predators of the Jurassic, and accommodated the enormous 
digestive system mitigating the lack of mastication and gastric mill. Their basal metabolic rate increased 
to accommodate the speedy growth required.  Sauropods evolved a distinctive pneumatized skeleton, a 
signal of a bird-like respiratory system, which increases the efficiency of oxygen dispersal and 
accommodates the growth rate required to reach gigantic size. 
The road to gigantism was open to sauropods due to their distinctive primitive characteristics. The road 
was followed due to the evolution of particular adaptations in response to particular evolutionary 
pressures. The explanation of sauropod gigantism is a complex narrative: there is no appeal to a general 
model in explanation, but rather a unique, detailed causal sequence is employed. 
1.3 Simple & Complex Narratives 
In explaining snowball earth and sauropod gigantism historical scientists follow two distinct explanatory 
strategies. Both are narrative explanations: their explananda are individual cases, accounted for via 
particular causal sequences. However, snowball earth is explained as an extreme case of a general 
model. Sauropod gigantism is not. Moreover, the Snowball Earth contains less causal detail than 
sauropod gigantism. The geological case is simple, while the paleobiological case is complex
3
. Two 
features, an explanatioŶ͛s detail and embeddedness, are characteristic of simple and complex narratives. 
It is worth reiterating that these distinctions may well illuminate sciences not typically considered 
histoƌiĐal, oƌ dealiŶg ǁith Ŷaƌƌatiǀes. It is ďeǇoŶd this papeƌ͛s sĐope to disĐuss suĐh Đases, ďut I take it 
that if simple and complex explanations of particular events occur in ahistorical sciences, this only 
strengthens the importance of the distinction. 
Detail 
A striking difference between the two explanations is the level of detail required. Detail is a measure of 
the specificity, complexity and diffusion of the explanans required for explanatory adequacy. Snowball 
                                                          
3
 The distinction between complex and simple is similar iŶ spiƌit to ͚aĐtual seƋueŶĐe͛ aŶd ͚ƌoďust pƌoĐess͛ 
explanations (Sterelny 1996, Jackson & Pettit 1992), although is not cashed out in overtly modal terms.   
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earth is low- detail: few factors and a single difference-maker are required. General facts about global 
albedo, temperature, atmosphere and icepack work in tandem with particular facts about landmass 
clustering to produce the explanandum. Sauropod gigantism, by contrast, requires a more detailed 
explanation. Adequacy requires many explanans, quite disparate in nature. Important explanatory 
details are spread through time: from deeply primitive characteristics such as oviparity, to highly derived 
ones like pneumatization. Explanans are also spread across grain: oviparity is important because it 
mitigates evolutionary, population-level concerns while pneumatization solves individual-level, 
physiological concerns.  
Detail, then, tracks the complexity required for explanatory adequacy, and its nature depends in part on 
the explanandum. In the snowball earth case, the world cooperates in granting sufficiency to low detail 
explanations while for sauropod gigantism the distended, messy nature of the explanandum demands a 
more detailed, messy explanation. 
Embeddedness 
A narrative explanation is embedded when the explanandum is accounted for as a token of a type of 
process; an instance of a regularity. The relative simplicity of the snowball earth explanation allows it to 
be represented by a single climatological model. The hypothesis is an extreme case of run of the mill 
dynamics between ice cover, geography, climate and atmosphere. In explaining why the earth froze, I 
tell you about those general dynamics and how the scenario would arise given particular states of 
affairs. Sauropod gigantism, by contrast, is an exquisite corpse: birds provide a model for respiratory 
systems; giraffes, swans and structural morphology tell us something about possible sauropod stances; 
elephants and large lizards about possible metabolism.  There is no single unifying regularity which can 
be appealed to. In explaining gigantism, I refer to particular facts about the sauropod lineage and the 
environment in which it evolved.  
I have mentioned that some philosophers take narrative explanations as problematic insofar as they do 
not appeal to regularities, and that I will not take a stance on this here. With embeddedness on the 
table, I can clarify this. Clearly embedded explanations appeal to regularities: the interesting question is 
whether non-embedded explanations do, or must. I am inclined to see non-embedded explanations as 
leaning on a patchwork of regularities. For instance, models of structural morphology, population 
genetics and metabolism are all appealed to in explanations of sauropod gigantism. However, it is open 
for others to argue that such appeals are not always required. 
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Embeddedness, then, tells us whether an explanandum is accounted for as an instance of a general 
model, or as an individual event. 
Simple & Complex 
Call an explanation which is high in detail, and not embedded, a complex narrative. Call an explanation 
with is low in detail and embedded a simple narrative. Complex and simple narratives are two distinct 
explanatory strategies employed by historical scientists. 
To drive the distinction home, compare the explanation of gigantism in sauropods to cases of island 
gigantism. The six-foot, tree climbing, predatory Fossa of Madagascar, for instance, evolved from much 
smaller mongoose-like ancestors. Because islands are isolated and tend to lack diversity, diminutive 
lineages are likely to form founder populations and radiate into unusual niches. This can lead to island 
gigantism: a lack of predation, and selection pressure to fill empty niches, drives size increase. The Fossa 
are gigantic because the isolation of Madagascar set up the preconditions for island gigantism. Fossa are 
amenable to a simple explanation: embedded in general explanations of island biogeography and 
requiring minimal detail. To explain fossa gigantism, I need only explain the general model of island 
gigaŶtisŵ, aŶd theŶ shoǁ hoǁ fossa ŵet the ŵodel͛s ĐoŶditioŶs foƌ eǀolǀiŶg laƌge size. Sauropod 
gigantism, by contrast, begs a complex explanation: more detail is required and there is no general 
regularity to subsume the explanandum. 
Detail and embeddedness come apart in principle, but in practice tend to be coupled. Embedded 
explanations tend to be low in detail as explanatory sufficiency is determined by the strictures of the 
model. To get the Snowball Earth explanation, I show that the antecedent conditions of the model were 
met – and this only requires reference to causal factors from that model. This allows many causal details 
to be ignored, making for a low-detail explanation. Non-embedded explanations tend to require more 
detail as they cannot rely on general regularities to discount causal factors. In the Sauropod case, we 
require separate convincing of each step in the explanation. There may be cases of embedded, high 
detail explanations as well as low detail, unembedded explanations, but these are rare. 
A simple narrative explanation, then, does not require a detailed treatment as the explanandum is 
represented in a general model. A complex narrative requires specific details unique to the case at hand 
and is not subsumed under a particular model. 
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This distinction is important. First, it explains two divergent approaches to understanding the 
explanatory unity of Ŷaƌƌatiǀes. IŶ Hull͛s tƌeatŵeŶts ;ϭ975, 1989) narrative explanations owe their unity 
in part to the integrity of the historical entity they target. ͞The ƌole of the ĐeŶtƌal suďjeĐt is to foƌŵ the 
ŵaiŶ stƌaŶd aƌouŶd ǁhiĐh the histoƌiĐal Ŷaƌƌatiǀe is ǁoǀeŶ ;Ϯ55Ϳ.͟ AĐĐoƌdiŶg to Hull, aĐĐouŶts of 
sauropod gigantism and snowball earth are explanatory in virtue of picking out central subjects (spatio-
temporally distended objects), and providing a coherent narrative about that subject. 
By contrast, Glennan (2010) argues that narrative explanations operate through ephemeral mechanisms. 
By his lights, historical scientists explain states of affairs by showing that the preconditions for a general 
mechanism are in place. Such mechanisms are unusual due to their contiŶgeŶt ;heŶĐe ͚epheŵeƌal͛) 
nature, but still deliver robust results given that arrangement. The characteristics of early sauropods, or 
the continental arrangement of the Neoproterozoic, are highly contingent states of affairs. But given 
those states of affairs, we get general results: gigantism and a general freeze (see Gallie 1959 for a 
similar view). 
For Hull then, part of a narrative͛s explanatory unity is due to their central subject. For Glennan, unity is 
owed to regularities. This disagreement is resolved when we see that narrative explanations take two 
different forms. In simple cases, historical scientists appeal to general models which subsume the target 
case as Glennan envisions. In complex cases, explanatory force might be supplied by historical entities as 
Hull sees it. 
Second, the distinction shows that historical scientists are not unified in their approach to explanation. 
They pursue two distinct strategies which require separate philosophical treatments. I illustrate this in 
reference to mechanistic explanation. It turns out that simple narratives can receive a mechanistic gloss, 
while some complex narratives are not mechanistic. Showing this is the task of the second half of the 
paper. 
2. Mechanistic explanation 
Mechanistic explanation has proven an illuminating account of actual scientific practice (see Bechtel & 
Richardson 1993, Glennan 2002, Craver 2007, Woodward 2002, Machamer, Darden et al 2000) In this 
section I sketch the account, then discuss how it may be extended to cover population-level explanation. 
Discussing narrative explanation in the context of mechanistic explanation will show that 1) simple 
narrative explanations are unified with population-level explanations (but not with complex narrative 
explanations) and 2) not all scientific explanations are mechanistic (as some complex narratives are not). 
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There are reasons to compare mechanistic and narrative explanation. First, there is a tension between 
historical explanation and models of explanations referring to hierarchical structure, such as reduction. 
TƌaditioŶal ŵodels of ƌeduĐtioŶ ƌeƋuiƌe eǆplaŶatioŶ to ƌefeƌ to geŶeƌal laǁs ǁhiĐh aƌe ƌealized at ͚ŵoƌe 
fuŶdaŵeŶtal͛ leǀels of description than the explanandum. Such laws are not overtly appealed to in 
historical explanation. Mechanistic explanation is intended to replace reductive models (Craver 2005, 
Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005), retaining their advantages but avoiding imperialistic and nomological 
pitfalls. If mechanistic explanation is such a replacement, we might wonder whether the tension 
between historical and structural explanation is retained. 
Second, as 2.2 covers, there is interest in the limits of mechanistic explanation. Is mechanistic 
explanation a general account of scientific explanation, or is it one of many explanatory strategies 
scientists might follow? 
As we shall see, the tension between historical and structural explanation is retained in some complex 
narratives. In such cases scientists do not attempt mechanistic explanations because the unembedded, 
high-detail nature of the explanation undermines the utility of a mechanistic approach. And for the 
same reason mechanistic explanation has limited scope: scientists are not just in the mechanism 
business, sometimes they are in the complex narrative business. 
Third, understanding the nature of historical explanation is a worthy philosophical task and its 
relationship to mechanistic accounts is illuminating. I have already shown that narrative explanation is 
disjunctive between simple and complex strategies. As we shall see, simple narratives are unified with 
population-level explanations via theiƌ ĐoŵŵoŶ ͚ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ͛ Ŷatuƌe, ǁhile complex narratives are the 
odd ones out. 
2.1 A sketch 
In this section I aim to provide a minimal set of conditions required for any explanation to be presented 
mechanistically. In explaining a mechanism I must identify the phenomenon I am concerned with, break 
it iŶto ĐoŵpoŶeŶts, aŶd eǆplaiŶ the pheŶoŵeŶoŶ͛s ďehaǀioƌ iŶ teƌŵs of the Đausal and organizational 
properties of the components.  For the purposes of this paper, I will take an explanation to be 
mechanistic if it meets the following criteria: 
1) Localization: the phenomenon is a discrete system with discrete components 
2) Constitution: systems are constitutively explained in terms of components 
San Diego, CA -189-
 
10 
 
3) Nested Causation: behaviors of systems are explained in terms of the causal and relational 
properties of components 
This sketch is certainly not exhaustive of all that is important and distinctive about mechanistic 
explanation. However, it is a minimal set of conditions which I hope mechanists of all stripes would 
agree with and are all I need for present purposes. It is clear that more needs to be said about 
loĐalizatioŶ: ǁhat is ŵeaŶt ďǇ ͚disĐƌete͛, aŶd hoǁ does it ƌestƌiĐt the sĐope of ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ eǆplaŶatioŶs? 
I will put this question aside until 2.2. 
Many sciences are characteristically mechanistic. Cytologists understand cells as discrete parcels 
composed of a cellular anatomy which determines behavior. Neuroscientists identify neural networks as 
systems fulfilling particular functions governed by activation patterns within them. Molecular geneticists 
identify genes with particular DNA sequences which code for proteins given the right inputs and 
organization. Chemists explain phase-transitions as the result of the interaction between kinetic energy 
and chemical bonds in a system. All follow mechanistiĐ eǆplaŶatioŶ͛s distiŶĐtiǀe patteƌŶ. 
However, some scientific endeavors look different. Ecologists, economists and evolutionary biologists 
use abstract models to explain the behavior of populations. Paleontologists, geologists and 
archaeologists construct narrative explanations of events in the deep past. Using abstract models to 
explain population-level phenomena and using causal sequences to explain past states of affairs appear 
very different from the explanations mechanists examine. In the next section, we see whether 
mechanistic explanation can account for these as well. 
2.2 ͚Liďeƌalisŵ͛ aďout ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ eǆplaŶatioŶ 
Consider two views on the scope of mechanistic explanation. By a conservative view the model has thin 
scope - it is true of some, but not all, scientific explanations.  A liberal view takes the model to have wide 
scope – most, perhaps all, scientific explanations are mechanistic. Liberalism involves showing that 
various explanatory schema are subsumed by mechanistic accounts, and this may involve tweaking the 
conditions sketched above.  
Let͛s staƌt ǁith tǁo eǆaŵples. BeĐhtel ;ϮϬ11) argues that mechanistic explanation must include dynamic 
causal streams to capture biological phenomena which display non-linear behavior, such as cellular self-
repair. It is not obvious that mechanists ever intended their models to be rigidly linear, and moreover 
eǆpaŶdiŶg the aĐĐouŶt to iŶĐlude dǇŶaŵiĐ ŵeĐhaŶisŵs doesŶ͛t seeŵ to ĐoŶfliĐt ǁith aŶǇthiŶg esseŶtial 
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to the sketch above. By contrast, Rusanen and Lappi (2007) argue that some cognitive phenomena are 
beyond the scope of mechanistic models as they require top-down explanation. This clashes with 
constitution: instead of the phenomenon being explained in terms of its parts, the parts are explained 
via the phenomenon. If they are right, mechanists have a choice between the conservative move of 
taking some cognitive explanations non-mechanistically, or the liberal move of altering the requirement 
of constitution. Some cases, then, are more or less challenging to the model.  
A liberal move pertinent to comparing narrative and mechanistic explanation is discussed by 
Matthewson & Calcott (2011). They argue that explanations of population-level phenomena, such as 
market cycles and predator/prey dynamics, can be understood mechanistically. I argue that simple 
narrative explanations can be understood in the same way. 
Matthewson & Calcott distinguish between mechanisms and mechanistic models. A mechanism is a 
concrete object with localizable, discrete components. A mechanistic model takes the structure of 
mechanistic explanation and applies it to non-mechanisms. It is not clear whether economies, ecologies 
or cities are mechanisms, but we may successfully explain them as if they were. In explaining their 
target, modelers entertain the fiction (Godfrey-Smith 2009) or the idealization (Weisberg 2007) that it is 
a mechanism, enabling them to employ mechanistic explanation. 
 
Take an evolutionary explanation of a shift in the proportion of some trait, t, in a population across two 
subsequent generations, G1 and G2. In G1 t is less common than it is in G2. To explain this change, a 
biologist might refer to a model which considers the population in terms of various traits with various 
fitness-values. The makeup of the population at one generation is determined by the fitness values of 
the traits present in the generation before. Because of t͛s fitŶess ǀalue, it outpeƌfoƌŵed soŵe otheƌ 
traits in reproducing between G1 and G2 and was thus more common in the later generation. Whether 
this is a mechanistic explanation depends upon its interaction with the conditions I outlined above. 
 
The explanation is mechanistic, with a tweak. First, it involves decomposition: the population is 
understood as comprising either individuals or traits with fitness-values. Second, it involves nested 
causation
4
: the change between the two generations is explained as the result of the interacting fitness 
                                                          
4
 This example is meant to be illustrative, and skates over some difficult issues in biology. Some philosophers 
(Walsh, Lewens & Arieu 2002; Walsh 2010) deny that fitness is truly causal, insisting that only the particular life-
events of individuals in the population are the proper locus of causal power – aŶd thus ĐalliŶg this ͚Ŷested 
ĐausatioŶ͛ is a mistake. Fair enough, but I think this perspective is in fact amenable to the story I am telling. First, 
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values of the components. However, the phenomenon does not appear to be a discrete system. Few 
real-world biological populations have discrete, non-overlapping generations and even fewer have 
populations as discrete as the model represents. And yet the system is treated as if it were a discrete, 
localizable system. Matthewson & Calcott can retain the first tenet by allowing for idealized, or 
metaphorical localization. Something like: 
 
Localization*: the phenomena either is a discrete system, or may be treated like a discrete 
system 
 
UŶtil Ŷoǁ I haǀe aǀoided eǆpliĐit disĐussioŶ of ǁhat is ŵeaŶt ďǇ ͚disĐƌeteŶess͛, ďut it is tiŵe to dƌaǁ this 
out. A discrete system is not necessarily such in virtue of spatio-temporal location, but rather the causal 
integration of its parts. It has discrete components insofar as they are modular: they perform particular, 
identifiable and perhaps extractable functions in the context of that system (this account is meant to be 
ďƌoadlǇ aligŶed ǁith Wiŵsatt͛s ;2007)).   A clockwork machine can be a paradigmatically discrete 
system. It is discrete in terms of causal integration: the behaviors of clockwork (keeping time, say) 
depend upon the interaction of a specific set of contained parts. Moreover, the components are 
modular: the various cogs and wheels can be removed from the system and play identifiable roles within 
it. When Matthewson & Calcott argue that population-level explanations are capturable by mechanistic 
models, they simply idealize from a paradigmatically discrete system, to a less clear case. 
 
͚DisĐƌeteŶess͛, as I uŶdeƌstand it, is clearly graded; and this should make localization* unproblematic for 
mechanists – most accounts of mechanistic explanation already commit to something like this. Indeed, 
discussion of mechanistic explanation is rife with discussion of idealization. And so a clockwork machine 
is quite discrete. A neural network is less so: although neuroscientists individuate networks via 
examining neuroanatomy and firing patterns, complex overlapping and interrelation exists between the 
entities in the system. The more the example diverges from an ideally discrete system, the more 
metaphorical in character the mechanistic explanation of it becomes. This has consequences for the 
pƌoĐess of loĐalizatioŶ applied iŶ diffeƌeŶt Đases. Foƌ ŵoƌe ͚ŵaĐhiŶe-like͛ Đases, such as clockwork, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
one might claim that non-causal factors are here presented as if theǇ ǁeƌe Đausal, aŶd so ͚Ŷested ĐausatioŶ͛ is, like 
localization, receiving a fictionalist tƌeatŵeŶt. SeĐoŶd, oŶe Đould Đlaiŵ that ͚fitŶess͛ iŶ the this ĐoŶteǆt is ŵeƌelǇ a 
term of art meant to unite whatever truly causal factors in fact lead to the births and deaths which occur within 
the population. Moreover, the main concern of such philosophers is whether explanations appealing to fitness 
should be read as mathematical explanations – and discussion of the relationship between mathematical and 
mechanistic explanations is beyond the scope of this essay. 
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aƌe ŵoƌe aďle to ͚ƌead͛ the sǇsteŵ fƌoŵ the ǁoƌld. The ĐoŵpoŶeŶts of the ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ ŵodel ŵap oŶto 
ĐoŵpoŶeŶts iŶ the ǁoƌld. IŶ less ͚ŵaĐhiŶe-like͛ Đases, a pƌoĐess of siŵplifiĐatioŶ, aďstƌaĐtioŶ oƌ 
idealizatioŶ is ƌeƋuiƌed. The ͚fitŶess ǀalue͛ of soŵe tƌait, foƌ instance, does not obviously (if at all) map 
onto components in the real world system. They rather pick out explanatorily salient features of the 
target. Representing population-level phenomena as discrete systems requires that we ignore certain 
causal factors. This is not, of course, an original claim – indeed I think it is necessary for understanding 
mechanistic explanations, but it is worth restating for as we shall see, although such idealizations occur 
in simple narrative explanations, they do not in many complex cases. 
 
And so Matthewson & Calcott are able to present many of the explanations in population-level science 
as mechanistic insofar as they accept a ͚fictionalist͛ turn in localization. Given that many paradigm 
examples of mechanistic explanation (neural networks, gene sequences) are themselves only ideally 
discrete this change is not too problematic. However, the process of localization changes depending on 
the disĐƌeteŶess of the sǇsteŵ: foƌ ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐallǇ ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ pheŶoŵeŶa the sǇsteŵ ĐaŶ ďe ͚ƌead 
off͛ the ǁoƌld, foƌ otheƌ Đases a pƌoĐess of siŵplifiĐatioŶ is ƌeƋuiƌed. The final section brings this liberal 
account of mechanistic explanation together with narrative explanation. 
 
3. Mechanistic Narratives? 
 
Let͛s take stoĐk. Narrative explanations, which explain individual events via causal sequences, take two 
distinct strategies: 
 
Simple narratives, which 1) explain an event as a state of a general model, 2) contain minimal detail; 
 
Complex narratives, which 1) explain the event via a unique causal sequence, 2) are highly detailed. 
 
To be mechanistic, an explanation must meet three criteria: localization, constitution and nested 
causation. Via a fictionalist tweak to localization, population-level explanations can be seen as 
mechanistic. 
 
This section argues that 1) simple narrative explanations are mechanistic in the same sense as 
population-level explanations as they are an instance of the same explanatory strategy; 2) some 
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complex narratives are not mechanistic. The upshot of these two points is that liberalism about 
mechanisms is restricted (as there are scientific explanations which are not mechanistic) and that simple 
narratives have more in common with non-historical explanations (such as those from economics, 
sociology and ecology) than complex narratives. 
 
3.1 Simple Narratives as Mechanistic Models 
 
Population-level explanations and simple narrative explanations are unified. The economist treats real 
world markets as if they were discrete mechanisms, the evolutionary biologist imagines an island eco-
system as constituted by various ecological roles waiting to be filled by genealogical actors. My exemplar 
simple narrative, Snowball Earth, is also an exemplar mechanistic model. 
 
An explanatory model is mechanistic when it meets the three criteria, with the fictionalist turn described 
in 2.2. The phenomenon must be treated as if it were a discrete system with discrete components. It 
must be described constitutively. Its behavior must be explained as the result of interactions between its 
components. Consider the explanation sketched in 1.1. Presumably the real-world interrelation between 
ice-cover, atmosphere and global temperatures are extremely complex. The explanation, however, is 
straightforward: paleoclimatologists are able to abstract from the details and present a simple model of 
the interactions. The highly interrelated, complex system is treated as if it were a simple, discrete 
system. Localization holds. This idealized system is constituted by various components, namely: global 
temperature, icepack cover, the locations of landmasses and global albedo. Constitution holds. And the 
system͛s behavior is ruled by the causal relationships between those components. As albedo increases 
and the atmosphere thins due to landmasses clustering around the equator, a feedback involving 
decreasing temperature, increasing ice cover, and increasing albedo leads to a snowball earth scenario. 
Nested causation holds. 
 
Although simple narratives and population-level models are both instances of the same explanatory 
strategy, it does not follow that scientists concerned with discovering historical facts face identical 
epistemic challenges, or use the same methods, as sciences concerned with population-level facts. It 
ŵaǇ ďe that eĐologists aŶd eĐoŶoŵists eŵploǇ the ŵodeleƌ͛s stƌategǇ to deal ǁith the oǀeƌ-abundance 
of facts pertaining to their explananda, while historical scientists use it to gain access to the scarcity of 
traces available from the past. My point is about the unity of explanatory strategies. 
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3.2 Complex Narratives are not Mechanistic 
 
Scientists providing complex narratives do not attempt to embed their explanations in an overarching 
system, but rather provide a causal sequence which reasonably leads to the state of affairs in question.  
Typically, scientists providing complex narratives do not describe a localized system and do not take the 
explanans as system-components. They are not mechanistic.  
 
Sauropod gigantism could in principle ďe eǆplaiŶed ǀia a ͚gigaŶtisŵ ŵeĐhaŶisŵ͛ ǁheƌeďǇ a diŵiŶutiǀe 
lineage is fed into a massively complicated idealized machine, outputted as giants millions of years later. 
But scientists do not explain them in those terms. Rather the history of a particular lineage is explained 
in reference to various causal factors interacting with it. Geologists explain Snowball Earth by 
representing the target as a mechanistic model. It is simplified to a localized system. There is less 
simplification in the sauropod case: scientists do not see the lineage as a system. After all, what would 
such a system look like? The explanans paleobiologists appeal to are at many temporary and hierarchical 
grains, and it is not obvious whether such a disparate group is amenable to unified representation. 
Moreover, there is a difference between a unified model and a conjunction of different (perhaps 
incommensurable) models. EǆplaŶaŶs aƌe Ŷot ͚ĐoŵpoŶeŶts͛ ďut ƌatheƌ Đausal faĐtoƌs ǁhiĐh iŶflueŶĐed 
the particular pathway the lineage took. 
 
The point is this: even if the explanation can be described in mechanistic terms, that is not the 
eǆplaŶatioŶ͛s foƌŵ. 
 
Why not? The process of localization is opaque for complex narratives due to a tension between 
providing a simple, tractable model and meeting the high-detail requirements of the explanation. 
Mechanistic approaches are attractive when the world cooperates: either the explanandum is a discrete, 
decomposable system or it is simple and unified enough to be helpfully treated as such. In at least some 
complex narratives, the requirement for high detail and the unavailability of a general regularity 
conspire to undermine the utility of a mechanistic conception. 
 
Historical scientists, then, are not always mechanists. Faced with a complex, messy world they 
sometimes respond with complex, messy explanations. 
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 Conclusion 
 
I have argued that historical scientists follow two distinct explanatory strategies. Simple narratives 
typically idealize and abstract away from their target and are amenable to a mechanistic gloss. Complex 
narratives are different: some do not admit of mechanistic treatments. When providing complex 
narratives, historical scientists are not mechanists. This points to a host of new questions. Are there 
situations when simple or complex approaches are more appropriate? I have suggested that the nature 
of explananda play an important role in applicability, but much more remains to be said. Ought we 
prefer simple or complex narratives? I have said nothing about the value such explanations have. I am 
inclined to think of the strategies as geared towards different explanatory interests and kinds of 
explananda, and so validity turns on context. However, the floor is still open for those who prefer one 
over the other. Historically philosophers have preferred the kind of unified explanations offered by 
simple narratives but in some cases complex narratives may be more testable. As Kim Sterelny has 
pointed out to me (personal communication), a detailed narrative will have more points of empirical 
contact with the world, and so may have more opportunities for testing. 
 
Finally, do other sciences have similar divisions? I have presented a unified picture of some of the 
explanations furnished by ecologists and economists on the one hand, and paleontologists and 
geologists on the other. It will be interesting to see whether some population-level explanations diverge 
from this pattern, and whether other areas of science can be carved up along similar lines. Moreover, I 
have not claimed that narrative explanations are unique to historical science (although they may be 
paradigmatic of them), and an investigation into whether the distinction between complex and simple 
narratives is useful outside of that context is also in the offing. 
 
 Attending to the different strategies historical scientists employ in their explanations illuminates 
important philosophical issues, and helps us understand the nature of their work. 
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Abstract
I examine Carrier’s and Ladyman’s structural realist (‘SR’) explanation of the predictive 
success of phlogiston chemistry.  On their account, it succeeds because phlogiston chemists 
grasped that there is some common unobservable structure of relations underlying 
combustion, calcification, and respiration.  I argue that this SR account depends on assuming 
the truth of current chemical theory of oxidation and reduction, which provides a better 
explanation of the success of phlogiston theory than SR provides.  I defend an alternative 
version of inference-to-the-best-explanation scientific realism which I call ‘Best Current 
Theory Realism’ (BCTR) and argue that it can answer the pessimistic meta-induction. 
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(1) Introduction
Scientific realists are committed to the view that some scientific theories—those 
which exhibit an appropriate degree of empirical success—make claims about unobservable 
phenomena that are approximately true.  Many hold that inference-to-the-best-explanation 
can confirm the realist view, in conjunction with the claim that the best explanation of the 
success of scientific theories is the realist view that they, or some components of them, are 
true.  The central difficulty with the explanationist argument is the existence of many 
scientific theories which were successful in their time but are now rejected as false in light if 
the emergence of better theories (Laudan, 1981, 1984). Theory change seems to provide 
counter-evidence to the realist claim that the truth of successful theories is what best explains 
their success.
Realists have responded by tightening the criteria of successful theories (e.g. 
requiring ‘novel’ predictions), restricting the claim of truth to components of theories 
essential to their success and defending a continuity of reference across change in the 
ontological posits of theories (Psillos, 1999). But the problems inherent in these realist 
strategies motivate structural realism (SR) —which limits the realist commitment to the truth 
of mathematical equations and relations preserved across theory-change, independently of 
‘theory’ claims concerning the unobservable entities and mechanisms referred to in such 
equations.
My aim is to evaluate the ability of SR to explain the success of theories.  I argue that 
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the plausibility of SR depends on assuming the truth of our best current theories and their 
substantive claims concerning unobservable entities and processes. I argue that the 
plausibility of SR’s explanation of the success of superseded theories depends on an 
antithetical view I call ‘Best Current Theory Realism’ (or BCTR).  BCTR limits the realists’ 
commitment to the truth of our best current theories, and thus rejects the continuity-of-true-
components hypothesis central to SR, and standard versions of realism.  I defend BCTR as 
offering the best explanation of both (1) the success of superseded and ‘falsified’ theories and 
(2) the success of our best current theories.  
I evaluate SR’s ability to explain success through an examination of Ladyman’s and 
Carrier’s SR account(s) of the success of phlogiston chemistry.  But we set the stage by 
starting with Worrall’s well-known SR account of Fresnel’s theory of light and some 
criticisms of it advanced by Psillos.  My aim is to clarify what SR needs to explain in order to 
‘explain success’.
(2) Fresnel and the Motivation for SR
 Fresnel’s account of the propagation of light in an ethereal medium was successful in 
predicting and explaining a wide range of observed features of the diffusion of light (Worrall, 
1989, 1989c, 1990, 1994).  It made novel predictions such as the observation of an 
antecedently unlikely white spot in the center of the shadow of an illuminated circular screen. 
The theory qualifies as a genuine empirical success, on stringent realist criteria.  Yet its 
claims concerning the nature of light are false.  Its explanations and predictions rest on the 
false claims that a luminiferous ether of molecules is the medium that carries light waves; 
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that the amplitude of light waves correlates with the velocity of the displacements of ether 
molecules; that the transverse vibrations of light rays is proportional to the oscillations of 
ether molecules.  All of these hypotheses are abandoned by Maxwell’s theory of the 
electromagnetic field.  This situation motivates the realist’s desire to find another account of 
Fresnel’s success, one that identifies true components of the theory that do not involve its 
ontological claims about unobservable entities and processes.  The realist’s continuity 
hypothesis requires that such true components are preserved by Maxwell’s theory.  For SR, 
the solution is the mathematical structure of relations captured by the equations of Fresnel’s 
theory and preserved by Maxwell, whose theory of the electromagnetic field extends 
Fresnel’s equations to describe electric and magnetic phenomena, in addition to the 
propagation of light.  So although Fresnel’s substantive theoretical claims about light are 
rejected by Maxwell’s theory, “there is nonetheless a structural, mathematical continuity 
between the two theories” (Worrall, 1990a, 21).  Thus the best explanation of the success of 
Fresnel’s theory, and that of Maxwell’s as well, is that the equations of both are accurate 
representations of the unobservable structure of relations underlying electromagnetic 
phenomena. 
SR strips down a theory’s source of success to its ‘uninterpreted’ equations.  Critics 
wonder whether such stripped-down mathematical equations can explain theories’ empirical 
success. Some philosophers have simply assumed that a theory’s empirical success includes 
its explanatory power, not just its predictive success. It is doubtful that SR’s bare-bones 
equations can explain a theory’s empirical success, because its explanatory power depends 
on its substantive ontological claims concerning the unobservable entities and processes. 
The ability of Fresnel’s theory to explain phenomena involving the diffusion of light depends 
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on the substantive hypothesis that a luminiferous ether of molecules is the carrier of light 
waves.  Clearly, it would be a considerable epistemic virtue of IBE realism if it could account 
for theories’ explanatory success.  Nonetheless, SR can hold that IBE realism is well enough 
confirmed if it can explain theories’ predictive success. 
For these reasons, I will assume that IBE realism, and thus SR, is confirmed if it can 
provide the best explanation of theories’ predictive success.  So the issue is whether a 
theory’s bare-bones uninterpreted equations can explain its predictive success.  Psillos has 
given a provocative argument in the negative (Psillos 1999, 153-159).  Against SR, a 
theory’s uninterpreted equations alone do not explain its predictive success, because other 
components of the theory are required by its power to yield any predictions whatsoever.  For 
example, the predictions provided by Fresnel’s theory of light require substantive theoretical 
claims about the conservation of energy, the geometric arrangement of light rays where two 
media meet, the relation of the amplitude of light waves to the velocity of the displacement 
of ether molecules, etc.  A theory’s predictive success will depend on its substantive 
hypotheses concerning unobservables, background knowledge, auxiliary assumptions, bridge 
laws, etc.  If this is so, IBE realism’s attempt to explain theories’ predictive success will also 
founder on the problem of theory change.  The uninterpreted equations on which SR relies 
will not suffice to explain theories’ predictive success.
But Psillos’ challenge rests on the assumption that an explanation of a theory’s 
predictive success must provide an account of its power to make the predictions that succeed. 
SR can reject this assumption and insist that it only needs to explain why theories’ 
predictions succeed—that is, come true. The truth of the equations of a theory, by 
themselves, may explain why its predictions succeed, which is all SR will need.  For SR, a 
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theory’s predictions succeed because its equations accurately represent the structural 
relations between unobservable entities, quite apart from the way these entities or their 
properties are identified and characterized by the theory. A theory is successful because it 
gets something right concerning the structure of relations in nature causally responsible for 
the phenomena that the theory predicts.
This is a perfectly intelligible SR-based explanation of theories’ predictive success. 
But is it a plausible explanation, or the best explanation?  Skeptics may worry whether 
equations can be true apart from the entities and processes they describe, or whether relations 
in themselves have causal powers, independently of the entities and mechanisms that bear 
these relations.  Skeptics may worry about the whole distinction between descriptions of 
entities or their properties, on the one hand, and descriptions of their ‘relations’ on the other. 
I will circumvent these issues which are murky.  Rather, I will examine the structural realist 
accounts of phlogiston theory’s success provided by Carrier and Ladyman.  I will argue that 
the plausibility of their accounts tacitly depends on assuming the truth of current chemical 
theory and that this claim opens the way onto a better explanation of the success of theories 
which I call ‘Best Current Theory Realism’, or BCTR.  But why phlogiston theory?  Does it 
provide a useful or telling ‘test-case’ for SR?
(3) The Phlogiston Theory as a Test-Case for SR
The example of Fresnel’s theory of light and Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory 
provides a paradigm of SR because mathematical structure is so obviously retained in this 
case of theory-change and clearly has a central role in their empirical success.  This case 
San Diego, CA -205-
raises the issue of whether SR can provide plausible accounts of cases where mathematical 
equations are not central to theories’ success.  Phlogiston theory is one such case. There are 
several first-rate treatments of this case (Musgrave 1976, Pyle 2000).  These case-studies 
provide strong evidence, marshaled by Ladyman and Carrier, that phlogiston theory enjoyed 
substantial empirical success on stringent realist criteria like ‘novel predictions’ (Carrier 
2004, Ladyman 2008).  So, realists should be able to handle it.  No scientific realist holds 
that the term ‘phlogiston’ genuinely refers to anything, or that the theory’s claims about it are 
true, despite its substantial empirical success.  Thus is provides an excellent opportunity for 
SR to show that it can succeed, despite the problem of theory-change, and for a case in which 
equations do not do the work required by its notion of structure.  SR does not stand or fall on 
the basis of its account of phlogiston chemistry, given the large number of theories it may 
handle better than rival versions of realism.  Nonetheless, I argue that the way Carrier and 
Ladyman explain success in this case may be symptomatic of some general weaknesses in 
SR itself, and motivate the rival view BCTR.
The empirical successes of phlogiston chemists are persuasively set out by Ladyman 
and Carrier.  These chemists [e..g Becher, Stahl, Priestly, Scheel, among others] 
demonstrated the existence of empirical regularities concerning the process of combustion, 
calcination, and respiration, and the effects of these processes [now known as oxidation and 
reduction] on the properties and weight of wood, calxes, metals, and other substances. 
Furthermore, their hypotheses concerning the attributes and causal powers of phlogiston 
generated a unifying explanatory and predictive account of these phenomena.  Thus the 
theory could account for combustion and calcination as the release of phlogiston from the 
objects into the air, generating the ‘phlogistication’ of the air and the ‘dephlogistication’ of 
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the objects.  Both sorts of observable processes could be understood as the result of the 
behavior of phlogiston.  Furthermore, the theory provided a unifying account of other salient 
phenomena.  Why do calxes and metals exhibit different sensible properties?  Because all 
metals contain phlogiston, which generate their metallic properties, while calxes lack 
phlogiston.  Why do substances such as wood and coal end up weighing less as the result of 
combustion?  Because they lose phlogiston.  When objects undergo combustion in a confined 
space, why does the combustion terminate more rapidly in the presence of animals than it 
does in the presence of plants?  Because animal respiration fills the surrounding air with 
phlogiston, inhibiting the release of phlogiston from an object undergoing combustion, and 
thus the combustion itself.  Plants, on the other hand, absorb phlogiston from the air, 
generating a more favorable environment for combustion, the release of an object’s 
phlogiston into the surrounding air.  Phlogiston theorists also made “novel” predictions, 
employing the theory to both predict and explain ‘new’ phenomena—either unknown or 
ignored at the point when the theory is elaborated to accommodate its central problems and 
phenomena.  Scheel used the theory to correctly predict that new acids (e.g. formic acid, 
lactic acid, etc.) would be discovered down the road [Ladyman 2008].  Priestly accurately 
predicted that pure metals would result from heating certain calxs in inflammable 
(‘phlogisticated’) air [Carrier 2004].
On the account given by Ladyman and Carrier, phlogiston chemists owed their 
predictive success to the fact that they got something importantly right about the structure of 
chemical reactions—namely that there is a common unobservable structure of relations 
underlying combustion, calcification, and respiration, making them the same kind of process. 
In current chemistry, this structure is identified as the inverse processes of oxidation and 
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reduction.  Thus phlogiston theory succeeded in unifying three different classes of observable 
phenomena as the result of the same unobservable structure of relations.  As Ladyman puts it, 
phlogiston theory “captured one great truth retained by Lavoisier in his oxygen theory, 
namely that combustion, respiration, and calcification are all the same kind of reaction (viz. 
‘oxidation’) and that these reactions have an inverse, namely reduction” (Ladyman, 2008). 
In Carrier’s terms, SR is committed to a “natural kind realism” because it explains the strong 
success of theories, such as the phlogiston case, as a result of the fact that they posit some 
unobservable mechanism(s) which show that apparently different sorts of phenomena are 
really “equal in kind” (Carrier 2004).
This account of the case contains a powerful insight into the achievements of 
phlogiston chemistry.  The issue is whether this account supports SR.  To begin with, notice 
that the evident plausibility of Ladyman’s formulation of the ‘one great truth’ discovered by 
phlogiston theorists, and preserved by Lavoisier, assumes the truth of current chemistry’s 
claims concerning oxidation and reduction.  We know combustion, respiration, and 
calcification are all the same kind of reaction on the basis of post-Lavoisier chemical 
knowledge of the nature of oxidation and reduction, and of the entities and mechanisms 
involved in these processes.  But structural realists cannot avail themselves of the substantive 
ontological claims of any theory, including our best current theories—without abandoning 
SR in favor of BCTR.
Can we formulate the ‘one great truth’ uncovered by phlogiston theory, responsible 
for its predictive success, without assuming our current knowledge of oxidation and 
reduction?  Phlogiston chemists were committed to a relation of unity or sameness between 
three kinds of observable phenomena.  Perhaps this conviction constitutes the one great truth 
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responsible for the success of the theory and preserved in its successors.  What SR needs, 
however, is some unobservable and underlying structure of relations which is supposed to 
explain the predictive success of phlogiston theory.  What is it?  What truths describe it?  The 
truth ‘that combustion, respiration, and calcification are all the same kind of reaction’ does 
not describe any underlying structure of relations, so how can it provide an explanation of 
anything?  The case is different for mathematical theories like that of Fresnel and Maxwell, 
where SR can appeal to their equations to describe the structural relations and true 
components that do the work for realism.
(4) Motivating the Move from SR to BCTR
This brings us to the nub of the issue.  SR can hold that the one great truth discovered 
by phlogiston theory is simply that there is some unobservable structure of relations 
underlying combustion, respiration, and calcination which make them the same kind of 
reaction.  The question is whether this true component of the theory provides an adequate 
explanation of its predictive success.  It seems like a weak explanation, but that poses no 
problem for SR if it is the only and thus the best realist explanation that is not vulnerable to 
the problem of theory-change.  My argument is that it does not provide the best realist 
explanation.  If we avail ourselves of the insights of post-Lavoisier chemical theory, the 
result is a much better realist explanation of the success of phlogiston chemistry than the 
‘stand-alone’ structural account; though admittedly an explanation based on current chemical 
knowledge cannot be better if it succumbs to the problem of theory-change and the 
pessimistic meta-induction (which is addressed below).  
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Why does current chemical theory provide a better realist explanation?  The SR 
account explains the predictive success of phlogiston theory as the result of its insight that 
there is some unobservable structure of relations responsible for all three sets of observable 
reactions.  But it is current chemical knowledge of oxidation and reduction which provides 
compelling evidence that there is indeed such an unobservable structure of relations, 
correctly identifies the structure, and explains how it generates and unifies the phenomena of 
combustion, respiration, and calcination.  
Scientific realists typically hold that the success of a superseded theory in a field is 
best explained by components of the theory that are preserved by the more successful current 
theories in that field.  My claim is that the plausibility of this backward-looking realist 
strategy tacitly depends on using our best current theories to identify the truthful components 
of superseded theories.  Furthermore the realist conviction that these truthful components can 
explain the superseded theory’s success derives from its plausibility from the fact that our 
best current theories—with their full range of hypotheses concerning unobservable entities 
and processes—also employ some modified version of these components in achieving the 
greater empirical success of our current theories.  To illustrate my argument, consider the SR 
conviction that the predictive success of Fresnel’s theory of light is explained by the accuracy 
of its equations, the fact that they capture the structure of relations underlying the 
propagation of light.  The explanation only works with the benefit of hindsight.  The triumph 
of Maxwell’s theory of the electromagnetic field utilizes these equations to account for the 
phenomena of light, electricity, and magnetism successfully treated as field dynamics.  We 
thus rely on the truth of our best current theory to identify what Fresnel got right and to fix its 
role in generating the phenomena he successfully predicted.  So, my argument is that the 
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truth of Maxwell’s theory provides the best explanation of Fresnel’s success.  It is this 
explanation which is required to confirm the role of his equations in that success, a role 
dependent on knowledge of the electromagnetic field.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that our best current theories provide the best 
explanation of the success of superseded and ‘falsified’ theories.  The result is a form of 
inference-to-the-best-explanation realism, or BCTR.  BCTR departs in a sharp way from SR, 
and more standard forms of realism, by rejecting the need to provide an explanation of the 
empirical success of every theory solely in terms of its truthful components (structural or 
otherwise).  Realists may identify this move to break the inferential connection between the 
success of theories and their truth, or true components, as the abandonment of scientific 
realism itself.  But BCTR does not break the inferential connection between success and 
truth.  Rather BCTR reinterprets this inferential connection as one which holds between (1) 
the success of theories in a scientific field and (2) the truth of our best current theories in that 
field on the ground that (2) provides the best explanation of (1).
But SR has a powerful rejoinder to my argument for BCTR so far.  SR defends its 
structural account of the success of theories as the best realist explanation of success which 
does not fall prey to the problem of theory-change and the pessimistic meta-induction to the 
conclusion that all theories are probably false—at least in their claims concerning 
unobservable entities and processes.  If BCTR is undermined by the problem of theory-
change then it does not provide the best explanation of successful theories, and SR may claim 
that title.
(5) Is BCTR Undone by the Problem of Theory-Change?
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The problem of theory-change is often taken to support a pessimistic meta-induction 
to the probable falsity of all scientific theories.  But there is a paradox here which lends some 
support to BCTR.  In itself the problem of theory-change starts with the observation that 
there are many theories in the history of science which were successful but later discovered 
to be false.  This observation is taken to support an inductive inference to the conclusion that 
in all likelihood, our most successful current theories are also false.  The paradox arises from 
the fact that the premise of the pessimistic induction—the existence of many successful-but-
false theories—depends on the assumption that our best current theories are true, which 
contradicts the conclusion we are supposed to draw from the inductive inference, or that 
these current theories are most likely false.  Without the assumption that our best current 
theories are true, there would be no ground for taking successful-but-superseded to be false. 
They are falsified by subsequent and current theories, on the assumption that the latter are 
true!  But this is precisely the realist claim concerning our best current theories defended by 
BCTR.  Without this realist claim, the only inductive argument that remains is one from the 
fact that past theories were successful but rejected or superseded, to the likelihood that our 
most successful current theories will also be rejected.  But mere theory-change does not bear 
on the truth or falsity of any of these theories or on the claims of scientific realism.  Indeed, 
even the conclusion of the pessimistic induction that our best current theories are probably 
false depends on a realist hypothesis that they will be falsified by new more successful 
theories that we will know to be true.  Ironically, the pessimistic induction turns into an 
optimistic induction concerning the future emergence of true theories.
Nevertheless, BCTR requires an independent defense of its realist claim that our best 
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current theories are true and it is reasonable to regard them as such.  As a form of inference-
to-the-best-explanation realism, BCTR needs to establish that the truth of our best current 
theories provides the best explanation of the predictive success of science.  In the above 
critique of SR, I have argued that taking our best current theories to be true yields the best 
explanation of the success of their superseded or ‘falsified’ predecessors, and in any case, a 
better explanation than the ‘stand-alone’ structural explanation provided by SR.  So BCTR 
preserves the realist’s desired inferential connection between success and truth, but 
reinterprets the connection as one that holds between the success of superseded theories in a 
field and the truth of the best current theory in that field.  This inferential connection 
provides some confirmation for BCTR.
The confirmation of BCTR can be strengthened if it can be shown that the truth of the 
best current theories also provides the best explanation for their success, as well as that of 
their predecessors.  But at this point, the problem of theory-change raises its ugly head once 
again to challenge BCTR in the very manner that SR escapes, which may make it superior to 
BCTR.  The fact that many theories were successful but false (in their claims concerning 
unobservable entities and processes) seems to undermine the inferential connection between 
success and truth.  Why should the success of the best current theories be any different, 
calling into question the inference from their success to their truth, and an appeal to their 
truth, to explain their success.  The answer given so far in this essay is meant to support the 
inference from the success of superseded theories in a field to the truth of the best current 
theories in that field—on the ground that it provides the best explanation of the success of 
their predecessors.  But can it also be shown that the truth of our best current theories 
provides the best explanation of their success as well, strengthening the case for BCTR? 
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Why should it, if superseded theories were successful but false?
The key to an answer is to identify a property of the best current theories lacking in 
their predecessors and justifying the realist explanation.  Our best current theories enjoy a 
measure and quality of predictive success unique in the history of the whole scientific field. 
They are unique in that they alone realize the highest standards of empirical success and 
confirmation in the field and thus often raise its standards of accuracy, scope, consilience, 
completeness, unification, and simplicity.  This is a fact about the best current theories which 
distinguishes them from their predecessors.  If the question is posed of why the best current 
theories stand at the apex of empirical success, the hypothesis that it is because they are true 
provides a plausible— and perhaps the best—explanation.
On this basis, BCTR also has the resources to break the pessimistic meta-induction. 
For if (1) our best current theories attain a unique empirical success absent in (2) their 
predecessors, this difference between (1) and (2) undermines the inference from the falsity of 
(2) to the likelihood that (1) are also false.  Yet defenders of the pessimistic meta-induction 
will not be convinced that the best current theories possess the unique property of attaining a 
distinctive empirical success at the pinnacle of confirmational virtues.  They may argue that 
this fails to be a unique property because superseded theories also exhibited this property in 
their time and place.  So the scientific realist would have been committed to the truth of these 
theories at the time and in the context where they stood at the height of empirical success.
True enough, but this move fails to save the pessimistic meta-induction because it 
misconstrues the status of scientific realism as an empirical hypothesis bound to explain the 
body of evidence available to us.  For BCTR, the fact to be explained is that our best current 
theories succeed in realizing the most demanding standards of success in the whole history of 
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their fields—and their predecessors do not:  This is the evidence which scientific realism 
wants to explain.  If, as I argue, the best explanation of this fact is (1) that these current 
theories are true while (2) their predecessors are false, then this inference-to-the-best-
explanation trumps the inductive inference from the falsity of (2) to the falsity of (1). 
Bringing the argument together, the pessimistic induction is undermined if the truth of our 
best current theories provides the best explanation of their success, and also that of their 
falsified predecessors.
But there is yet another challenge to BCTR posed by the problem of theory-change, 
and induction from the fate of theories in science.  Successful theories are generally 
superseded by more successful ones, making it highly probable that our best current theories 
will sooner or later be displaced by others that satisfy yet higher standards of predictive 
success.  Call this ‘the optimistic meta-induction’.  Does this induction cast doubt on BCTR 
and its commitment to the truth of our best current theories?  BCTR, as an empirical 
hypothesis, must rest on available evidence and is fallible in light of new evidence.  If and 
when our best current theories give way to yet more successful theories, this would not refute 
BCTR, but it would transform what the realist has to explain, and which theories are taken to 
be true.  BCTR is committed to the truth of our best theories because that provides the best 
explanation of the success of science.  Given our present evidence, our best current theories 
are the best theories and ground a realist commitment to them.  This is all that BCTR 
requires, and is thus not threatened by the possibility or likelihood that what count as the best 
theories will alter in time.  If and when more successful theories arise, then the realist 
commitment to their truth may provide the best explanation of the success of science.  In this 
way, BCTR saves scientific realism from pessimistic and optimistic inductions concerning 
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the future of science.  For realists, inference-to-the-best-explanation trumps inductive 
inference in the determination of which scientific theories it is reasonable to regard as true!
My conclusion is that BCTR is not undone by the problem of theory-change, and may 
thus stand as a better explanation of the predictive success of science than SR.
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Abstract   (100   words):  
Traditionally, the cognitive values have been thought to be a collective pool of 
considerations in science that frequently trade against each other.  I argue here that a finer 
grained account of the value of cognitive values can help reduce such tensions.  I separate 
the values into three groups, minimal epistemic criteria, pragmatic considerations, and 
genuine epistemic assurance, based in part on the distinction between values that describe 
theories per se and values that describe theory-evidence relationships.  This allows us to 
clarify why these values are central to science and what role they should play, while 
reducing the tensions among them.
Introduction
The value of cognitive values (also called theoretical virtues or epistemic values) has 
been underdeveloped in philosophy of science.  They have largely been considered 
together in one group, and when examined in this light, they seem to trade off against one 
another, creating as much tension as guidance for scientific inference.  Although some 
work has examined a particular value in greater depth and attempted to ground a 
justification for its importance in an epistemic argument (e.g. Forster & Sober 1994), for 
the most part, the values have been justified collectively and historically, i.e., that some 
set of values is (by and large) what has been important to scientists in their practice, and 
that that should be good enough for philosophers of science (e.g., Kuhn 1977).  
This paper will attempt a more robust justification.  Through the tactic of organizing the 
conceptual terrain of cognitive values, I will argue that there are at least three distinct 
groups of values that normally get lumped together.  Once the values are divided into 
these groups, it is clearer why the values are important and what their value to science 
and to scientists is.  Justifications, clarifying the value of cognitive values, then follow. 
Creating these divisions requires finer grained appraisals of the values than has been 
customary.  For example, internal consistency will be considered distinct from external 
consistency.  Simplicity has two distinct aspects as well, as does scope.  This paper does 
not make the claim that the terrain mapped here provides a complete account of these 
values, but the kind of complexity presented can be a starting point for further 
discussions and amendments.  
Another benefit of clarifying the terrain is that the supposed tensions among the values 
prove to be far less common and problematic than is often presumed.  Once the bases for 
the values becomes clearer, their functions in science become clearer, and thus which 
should be important when is clarified.  In addition, as we will see, the values within a 
group are shown to often pull together rather than against each other.
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Finally, organizing the terrain and mapping the value of cognitive values will also enable 
us to address the criticisms raised concerning the canonical distinction between 
epistemic/cognitive and non-epistemic/non-cognitive values (e.g. Rooney 1992) and 
criticisms over what should count as a cognitive/epistemic value (e.g. Longino 1996).
First, I will provide a brief overview of how the standard view on cognitive values 
developed.  Then, I will offer a more nuanced terrain for those values than has been 
traditionally offered.  I will proceed to show how both tensions among the values are 
reduced (albeit not eliminated) and how the justifications for the various values are 
clarified.  Finally, I will draw implications from this re-organization of the terrain.
A Brief History of Cognitive Values
Philosophers of science have long referred to and discussed various qualities of scientific 
claims deemed important in science.  In the 20th century, philosophers such as Duhem 
(e.g., 1906, 171, 217), Popper (e.g., 1935, 61-73, 122-128) and Levi (1960, 354; 1962, 
49) famously described a range of qualities (and sometimes provided reasons for the 
importance of those qualities).  But it was not until Kuhn’s 1977 paper that these qualities 
became widely known as values, and the discussion was framed in terms of values 
internal to science.  For Kuhn (1977), McMullin (1983), Laudan (1984), and Lacey 
(1999), the values were a collective (if evolving) set.  And there were clear tensions and 
tradeoffs among the various values or virtues thought relevant at any given time.  One 
might gain scope in a theory, but lose precision.  One might gain simplicity, but lose 
scope.  Understanding the history of science meant understanding how scientists made 
those trade-offs (or shifted their interpretation of those values) in the course of scientific 
debate.
But the collective pool of these values turns into a problematic swamp when one attempts 
to find a grounding for the values.  This problem was worsened by the tendency of 
philosophers, in an attempt to make the values appear less overwhelming, to collapse 
various attributes together.  Thus, although some distinguished internal consistency 
(minimal logical consistency of a theory) from external consistency (broader 
considerations of whether a theory fit with prevailing scientific views), other 
philosophers collapsed the two, and considered consistency tout court (e.g., Kuhn 1977, 
357 vs. McMullin 1983, 15)  This makes it harder to see how to justify consistency. 
While internal consistency can be viewed as a minimal requirement of empiricism 
(Duhem 1906, 220; Popper 1935, 72), external consistency is nothing of the sort, and is 
valuable only insofar as one’s confidence in the rest of scientific theory is high.   Or 
consider how explanatory power can be viewed either as an ability of a theory to 
elucidate particular pieces of evidence with great detail or as an ability of a theory to 
bring under one conceptual umbrella multiple disparate areas (which can also be 
conflated with scope).  Both are clearly valuable, but for quite different purposes and 
reasons.
It is time to extricate ourselves from this swamp.  Laudan (2004) made the first steps in 
this direction when he divided theoretical virtues into those that were genuinely epistemic 
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(truth indicative) and those that were cognitive (valued by scientists for other reasons). 
He suggested that few of the traditional theoretical virtues  (construed as the swampy 
collective described above) have genuine epistemic (that is, truth-indicative) merit.  Two 
that did (on his view) were internal consistency and empirical adequacy.  Laudan’s 
distinction is a good start on the problem, but I will go further here, dividing up the 
terrain of cognitive values further in an attempt to elucidate their strengths, their 
purposes, and their justifications.
The Terrain of Cognitive Values
Two distinctions will help further our project.  First, following both Laudan (2004) and 
Douglas (2009), we can distinguish between ideal desiderata and minimal criteria.  We 
might prefer one grand, simple, unified theory of great scope that explains everything, but 
in practice we are willing to settle for less.  (Indeed, some arguments for pluralism 
suggest we should be happy with a complex plurality of perspectives.  See, e.g., Kellert, 
Longino & Waters 2006; Mitchell 2009.)  In contrast, there are some virtues or values 
that any acceptable scientific theory must instantiate (e.g. internal consistency).  We 
might accept a theory that falls short on these criteria out of shear desperation, but we 
would know something was wrong and work furiously to correct it.  
Second, it is important to note that in discussing the set of cognitive values, philosophers 
have lumped together two different kinds of things in science to which cognitive values 
can apply.  By “apply”, I mean that which the values are thought to describe, or the object 
of instantiation for the value (i.e., what has the value).   The object of instantiation can 
either be a theory per se or the theory in relation to the evidence thought to be relevant to 
it.   There are thus two different directions for assessment when using cognitive values: 
are we describing the theory itself or the theory in relation to the available evidence?
To see how crucial these two different targets for cognitive values can be, consider the 
value of scope.  If we are talking about a theory with scope (and just the theory), the 
theory might have the potential to apply to lots of different terrain or to wide swaths of 
the natural world (i.e. the claims it makes are of broad scope), but whether it in fact does 
so successfully can still be up in the air.  Any proposed grand unified theory can be 
considered to have scope in this sense—it has broad scope, but not in relation to any 
actual evidence yet gathered under that scope.  Contrast that with a theory that already 
does explain a wide range of evidence and phenomena—so that the scope applies to a 
theory in relation to broadly based evidence (e.g. evidence from different phenomena or 
evidence gathered in different ways).  Here the value of the cognitive value is quite 
different, and brings with it an epistemic assurance from the diversity of evidence 
supporting the theory.   
A similar point can be made with regards to simplicity.  A simple theory (that is, just a 
simple theory, and not where simplicity is describing a relation to evidence) might be 
prima facia attractive, but unless we think the world actually is simple, we have little 
reason to think it true.  A simpler theory, all other things being equal, is not more likely 
to be true.  Contrast this with a theory that is simple with respect to the complex and 
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diverse evidence that it captures.  The simpler theory, in relation to the evidence it 
explains, is more likely to not be overfit to the evidence and thus more likely to be 
predictively accurate.  (Forster & Sober 1994)  In such a case, simplicity has genuine 
epistemic import. 
With these two distinctions in mind—1) what we want our values for (minimal criteria 
vs. ideal desiderata) and 2) to what the value applies (the theory per se vs. the theory with 
respect to evidence)—we can turn to the terrain for such values.  There are three groups 
into which we can divide the cognitive value terrain:  
Group   1:    Values that are minimal criteria for adequate science 
There are values that are genuinely truth assuring, in the minimal sense that their absence 
indicates a clear epistemic problem.  If a claim or theory lacks these values, we know that 
something is wrong with our empirical claim.  Thus, these are truly minimal criteria, 
values that must be present if we are to be assured we are on the right track.  These values 
include internal consistency (which is about the theory per se) and empirical adequacy 
(as measured against existing evidence, not all possible evidence, and thus is about the 
theory with respect to evidence).  Philosophers as diverse as Duhem (1906), Popper 
(1935), Laudan (2004), and Douglas (2009) have noted these values as minimal criteria. 
This group could be divided along the lines of Group 2 and 3 below using the second 
distinction (regarding the instantiation of the value), but because it is so small, I leave 
them together here.  Because both of these minimal criteria have clear epistemic import 
(theories failing these criteria are not good candidates for our beliefs), keeping them in 
the same group helps clarify their function.  
Group   2:    Values that are desiderata when applied to theories alone 
There are values that, when instantiated solely by the theory or claim of interest, give no 
assurance as to whether the claims which instantiate them are true, but give us assurance 
that we are more likely to hone in on the truth with the presence of these values than in 
their absence.  As such, these might be considered strategic or pragmatic values.  Douglas 
(2009) emphasizes the term cognitive values, as an aid to thinking; Dan Steel has called 
them extrinsic epistemic values (2010).  These include scope, simplicity, and (potential) 
explanatory power.  When theories (or explanations or hypotheses) instantiate these 
values, they are easier to work with.  Simpler claims are easier to follow through to their 
implications.  Broadly scoped claims have more arenas (and more diverse areas) of 
application to see whether they hold.  Theories with potential explanatory power have a 
wide range of possible evidential relations.  (I say potential because if the theory has 
actual, known explanatory power, that implies that evidence is already gathered under its 
umbrella and this would bring us to the next category of values.)  It is easier to find flaws 
in the claims and theories that instantiate these values.  It is easier to gather potentially 
challenging (and thus potentially strongly supporting) evidence for them.  In this sense, 
all of these values fall under the rubric of the fruitfulness of the theory.
Group   3:     Values that are desiderata when applied to theories in relation to evidence 
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Finally, we should consider values that might sound similar to pragmatic cognitive values 
(group 2), but because they qualify the relationship between theory and evidence, rather 
than just theory itself, they provide a different kind of assurance.  Whereas group 1 
assured us that we have a viable scientific theory (genuine epistemic assurance), and 
group 2 assured us that if we were on the wrong track, we should find out sooner than 
otherwise, group 3 provides a particular kind of genuine epistemic assurance.  It provides 
assurance against ad hocery, and thus assures us that we are not making a particular kind 
of mistake.   One of our most central concerns in science is that we have made up a 
theory that looks good for a particular area, but all we have done is make something that 
fits a narrow range of evidence.  If our theories are ad hoc in this way, they will have 
little long term reliability or traction moving forward.  Instantiation of these values in the 
relation between the theory and the evidence that supports it provides assurance that we 
have not just made something up.  If a diverse range of evidence can be explained, or the 
theory fits well with other areas of science (and, crucially, the evidence that supports 
them), or the theory makes successful novel predictions, we gain precisely the assurance 
we need.  For this reason, these values have genuine positive epistemic import.  These 
values include unification (in terms of explanatory scope, simplicity, external 
consistency, and coherence), novel prediction, and, modifying these values with an 
additional layer, precision.  (I discuss this group further below.)
What does this map of the terrain clarify?  First, with this map we can see that the values 
do have justifications independent of scientists’ historical reliance on them.  We can 
articulate reasons why a scientist should care about these values and clarify what they are 
good for.  There are clear epistemic reasons (independent of any particular objectives of 
science at any particular period) for demanding that scientific theories be internally 
consistent and empirically competent.  And there are good epistemic reasons for 
preferring scientific theories which have a broad range of evidence that support them or 
that instantiate other values in group 3 (more on this below).  Finally, there are good 
pragmatic reasons for scientists to run with a simpler, broader, or more fruitful theory 
first (group 2) if one is trying to decide where to put research effort next.
Second, as I will argue below, the idea that the values are in a collective pool and pull 
against each other is misguided.  Having this map makes it clearer what the purposes of 
the values are, and shows that the tensions among the values are not as acute or 
problematic as they appear when they considered as a collective pool.  
Reducing the Tensions among the Values
There are two possible sources of tensions within the terrain I have mapped above.  The 
first arises from tensions among the groups of values.  The second arises from tensions 
within each group.  I will address each of these in turn as I argue that tensions with this 
map have been reduced, albeit not eliminated.
Among the groups, one reduction in tension should be immediately clear.
Minimal criteria do not (or at least, should not) pull against pragmatic fruitfulness 
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concerns of group 2 or the epistemic assurance concerns of group 3.  Minimal criteria 
come first, and both must be met.  Indeed, one cannot tell whether one has an empirically 
competent theory without minimal internal consistency.  Now, in practice, scientists may 
still choose to pursue the development of a theory with characteristics of group 2 even in 
the face of failings in group 1 (minimal criteria).  But this must be done with the full 
acknowledgement that the theory is inadequate as it stands, and that it must be corrected 
to meet the minimum requirements as quickly as possible.  Although philosophers like to 
quip that every scientific theory is “born falsified,” no scientist should be happy about it.
Once the remaining values are divided into the pragmatic cognitive values (instantiated 
by theories only—group 2) and the epistemic anti-ad hocery assuring values (instantiated 
by the relations between theories and evidence—group 3), the two groups have less 
problematic tension within each than has been generally thought.
Consider the possible tensions within the pragmatic cognitive values—group 2.  Recall 
that within this group, the values describe theories or claims on their own, independent of 
the evidence which may or may not support them.  In this group, all of these values are 
ultimately about the fruitfulness of the theory, the ease with which scientists will be able 
to use the theory in new contexts (not necessarily successfully), to devise new tests for 
the theory, and thus refine, revise, or if need be overhaul completely, the theory.  It is true 
that some scientists will find scope an easier handle with which to further test a theory, as 
they will find it more amenable to apply the theory in a new arena to which the broadly 
scoped theory is applicable, and some scientists will find simplicity an easier handle with 
which to devise further tests.  So some tensions may remain around the issue of what will 
be fruitful for different scientists.  But this need not create any epistemic worries, for 
three reasons.  First, the proof will be in the pudding for fruitfulness, and the pudding is 
relatively straightforward to assess.  If the theory cannot be used to devise additional 
tests, if the scientists are unable to use the aspects of the theory that instantiate the value 
they prefer, then the value is of no further use in that case.  We will be able to tell readily 
if the instantiation of a pragmatic-based value in fact proves its worth.  Second, because 
this category of values does not provide direct epistemic warrant, but is instead focused 
on the pragmatic issue of the fruitfulness of a theory, there is little reason to be concerned 
about divergent scientific perspectives on these values.  None of these pragmatic values 
provides a reason to accept a theory as well-supported or true or reliable at the moment. 
Group 2 values are simply not epistemic.  Third, social epistemological approaches to 
science (e.g. Solomon 2001, Longino 2002) have made it quite clear that having diverse 
efforts in scientific research is a good thing for science.   It has been argued that diversity 
of efforts in science is crucial for the eventual generation of reliable knowledge.  So 
having diverse views about what makes a theory fruitful is likely to be good for science. 
In sum, the values in this group are pragmatic, they are easily assessable by external 
criteria (are more new tests being produced?), their diversity supports a diversity of 
epistemic effort, and yet, they do not have direct epistemic import.   Whatever tensions 
arise here can play out in diverse efforts of scientific practice.
Consider next the possible tensions within group 3.  Because these values do have 
genuine epistemic import, tensions among them would be central to the problem of 
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scientific inference and the epistemic assessment of scientific theories.  But when 
examining these values as instantiated by the relation between theories and the evidence 
that supports them, there is less tension among these values than might be initially 
supposed.  For example, while simplicity, scope, and explanatory power are often thought 
to pull against each other when considering theories alone (group 2), they pull together 
when considering a theory in relation to evidence (group 3).  A theory that has broad 
scope over diverse evidence is also simple with respect to that diverse evidence, unifies 
that diverse evidence, and has explanatory power over that evidence.  Indeed, it is this set 
of relations that Paul Thagard has formalized under his conception of “coherence.” 
(Thagard 2000)  Scientists might disagree over which evidence is more important to 
unify or explain under a particular rubric, either because of different purposes or because 
of different views on the reliability of the evidence under consideration.  But that is a 
disagreement over which instantiation of a cognitive value is more important, not a 
disagreement based on tensions among values.
Yet there are still some tensions in group 3.  For example, predictive accuracy (or the 
value of the novel prediction) might pull against the considerations captured by 
coherence.  And indeed, when faced with such a tension, scientists can legitimately 
disagree, some scientists finding greater epistemic assurance in the successful novel 
prediction and other scientists finding greater epistemic assurance in the successful 
unification of evidence or the explanatory power/coherence of a theory.  When we have 
both together, both successful explanation of the available evidence and a surprising 
prediction (use novel or temporally novel), we have Whewell’s consilience (Fisch 1985), 
which is perhaps the strongest epistemic assurance we have available to us.  When 
consilience is on the table, it is hard for other theories to compete.  But we are not always 
so lucky.  Hence genuine epistemic tension is possible here.
There is an additional qualifier for the value considerations of group 3.  Whether we are 
considering the relation between theory and evidence that is some form of coherence or 
some form of prediction, the precision or tightness of fit between the theory and evidence 
also matters.  The more precise the explanatory relations between theory and evidence, or 
the more precise the prediction and the evidence that tests it (having just one or the other 
is not helpful), the more we gain the epistemic assurance of group 3.  This assurance is 
that we have not just made our theories up, that they have some empirical grip on the 
world—they are fundamentally anti-ad hocery assurance.  The more precision we have in 
the relations between theory and evidence, the more assurance we get.  The more 
successful predictions we have, the more assurance we get.  The more coherence or 
explanatory power over diverse evidence we have, the more assurance we get.  Because 
there are these different sources of this kind of assurance, there will be tensions among 
them in practice.  But hopefully why these tensions arise, and what should be done about 
them, will be clearer.
So what of tensions between the values of group 2 and group 3?  These two groups aim at 
different purposes, and thus any apparent conflict can be managed.  It is particularly 
important to note that group 2, the pragmatic cognitive values, have no bearing on what 
should be thought of as our best supported scientific knowledge at the moment.  Just 
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because a theory looks fruitful (whether because of its innate simplicity, scope, or 
potential explanatory power) is no reason to think it more reliable now than any other 
narrower or more complex theory.  If one needs epistemic assurance, particularly for an 
assessment of our best available knowledge at the moment, group 3 is where one should 
look (after the requirements of group 1 are met).  When one needs to figure out what 
should be said about the state of knowledge now, pragmatic fruitfulness (group 2) 
concerns have no bearing.  When one wants to justify future research endeavors, such 
pragmatic concerns are central.  
In sum, there are no tensions among the groups:  group 1 trumps groups 2 & 3, and 
groups 2 & 3 have different purposes.  Within the groups, there are no tensions within 
group 1, there are productive tensions within group 2, and there remain some tensions 
within group 3.  Thus, while tensions among values remain, they are much reduced from 
the traditional view.  With a clearer account of the bases for such values, we can see their 
function more clearly, and thus their purposes.  
 Implications
In earlier accounts of the theoretical virtues, the tensions among them were thought to 
explain how scientists at any given moment could rationally disagree with each other—
different scientists focused on different virtues.  Does my organization of the theoretical 
virtues dissolve this ready-made explanation for rational disagreement?  No-- there are 
still resources we can draw upon to explain disagreement.  So, for example, one can still 
see a tension between the explanatory scope of a theory (with respect to available 
evidence—group 3) and the predictive precision of its competitor.  Such a tension will 
likely continually arise in scientific practice.  Or, consider the tension between a well-
supported theory (with group 3 values supporting it) and an underdeveloped theory (with 
lots of group 2 values and thus lots of potential).  The explanations of divergent choices 
that we give, scientists being risk-takers with new theories or with staying with the older, 
more developed theories, still hold in the account given here, but with a sharper 
understanding of the source of the divergent choices.  Indeed, we should help scientists 
distinguish an epistemic assessment from a pragmatic fruitfulness assessment in their 
commitments to scientific theories.   Finally, one could also use the account of the place 
of social and ethical values given in Douglas 2009 to show how concerns over the 
sufficiency of evidence (driven by social or ethical values) could generate rational 
disagreement among scientists (as Douglas argues ethical values in the assessment of 
evidential sufficiency is a rational role for those values).  
So what has been gained by organizing and explicating the various values of cognitive 
values?  First, we can see more clearly where and why such values are indeed valuable. 
The justification need no longer rest on the contingency of the history of science 
(although it is certainly illuminated by the history of science).  This allows us to note why 
these values have seemed so central.  Groups 1 & 3 have genuine epistemic import, and 
thus do not bleed across the epistemic/non-epistemic boundary (although their 
instantiation depends on the available evidence which does depend on cultural values). 
The pragmatic group 2 can have clear cultural influences on it.  Rooney’s concerns 
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(1992) are thus illuminated.  It also allows us to assess proposals for alternative sets of 
values (e.g., Longino 1996).  We can consider alternative values under the groups 
proposed and see if they assist us in reaching our goals.  
Second, we can now address the reference often made to these values in other debates 
with greater conceptual clarity.  For example, when critics of the value of prediction (as 
opposed to accommodation) (e.g., Harker 2008, Collins 1994) attempt to reduce the value 
of novel prediction to accommodation plus a theoretical virtue (such as unification or 
explanatory power), we can see both what might motivate such an attempt (they are 
drawn to the power of group 3) and why it is misguided (the value of novel prediction 
can be in tension with the value of unification).  Finally, if this is indeed a step forward in 
the clarity of the terrain, there is perhaps hope for a renewed effort in a qualitative theory 
of scientific inference.  But that work must await another paper.
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1 Introduction
Entangled states of quantum systems have played an important role in debates on the
metaphysics of contemporary science. Teller (1986), French (1989), Maudlin (1998) and
Esfeld (2004) all base metaphysical claims on the quantum mechanical description of
entangled two-particle states. Glossing over the substantial differences between these
accounts, their general thrust is that quantum mechanics pushes us away from a meta-
physics of individual things towards a metaphysics of relations, relations which do not
supervene on the intrinsic properties of their relata. Of course, such arguments presup-
pose that what appears as the description of an entangled state in the quantum formal-
ism actually represents a real relation in the world. This presupposition derives support
from the fact that measurements on entangled states exhibit significant correlations, as
demonstrated, for example, in experimental tests of Bell’s inequality. Furthermore, the
flourishing of quantum information theory in the last two decades has resulted in a rather
dramatic shift of attitude towards entanglement: While it was once considered a bizarre
consequence of the quantum formalism with little importance outside of philosophical
debates, entanglement has now come to be recognized as a physical resource which can
be experimentally manipulated in various ways.1
In the present paper, I will investigate whether this manipulability really supports a
realist stance on entanglement relations. More specifically, I will focus on one partic-
ular kind of such manipulations, namely entanglement swapping. In this process, two
pairs (A,B) and (C,D) of entangled particles are created by two independent sources.
If one then performs the right kind of joint measurement on particles B and C, the pair
(A,D) enters into an entangled state even though A and D have never interacted with
each other. Interestingly, this phenomenon has given rise to contradicting ontological
conclusions. On the one hand, Clifton (2002, S163) takes it to support a realistic view of
entanglement: “It appears that there is sufficient substantiality to entanglement that it
can be swapped from one pair of particles to another”. On the other hand, Healey (forth-
coming, sec. 4) studies an entanglement-swapping experiment in which the measurement
1For an extensive review of this development and the current state of play, see Horodecki et al. (2009).
1
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on B and C is performed after A and D have been detected. Since this seems to imply
that entanglement can be transferred to a pair of particles which no longer exists, Healey
concludes:
The delayed-choice entanglement-swapping experiment reinforces the lesson that quan-
tum states are neither descriptions nor representations of physical reality. In
particular, it undermines the idea that ascribing an entangled state to quan-
tum systems is a way of representing some new, non-classical, physical rela-
tion between them.2
Obviously, the “delayed-choice” clause plays a central role here. I will therefore be-
gin my investigation with a brief reminder of the simple and well-known delayed-choice
double-slit experiment, assessing its impact on realism about the state of the quantum
system (section 2). A more sophisticated (and more radical) version of delayed choice,
the so-called quantum eraser, will be discussed in section 3. The case of the quantum
eraser is important because it introduces the idea of sorting experimental results into
different subensembles, thus raising the question whether these subensembles correspond
to real properties of the system. In section 4, I will apply these considerations to the
entanglement-swapping experiment and show that if the experiment is carried out in a
delayed-choice setting, no actual entanglement swapping occurs. This will, in section 5,
lead to the conclusion that delayed-choice entanglement swapping does not undermine
realism about entanglement relations.
2 Delayed Choice in the Double-Slit Experiment
The double-slit experiment is probably the best known illustration of the basic mystery of
quantum mechanics. If quantum particles (e.g., electrons) are sent through a double slit,
a characteristic interference pattern appears on the screen behind the two slits. However,
this pattern disappears as soon as one tries to detect through which of the two slits each
electron passed. It thus seems that the electrons either behave as waves (passing through
both slits and producing an interference pattern) or as particles (passing only through
one slit and displaying no interference), depending on the kind of experiment we choose
to perform. (In the following, I will refer to the two kinds of experimental arrangements
as “DS” (for “double slit”) and “WW” (for “which way”), respectively.) This is already
puzzling enough, but further puzzlement is added by the insight that the decision to
perform either a DS or a WW experiment can be taken after the electron has passed
through the double slit. It was Wheeler (1978) who introduced this idea of a delayed
choice, and he took it to imply that “the past has no existence except as it is recorded in
the present”, and that “[t]he universe does not ‘exist, out there,’ independent of all acts
of observation” (41).
2 Healey advances this argument in the context of his pragmatist approach to quantum theory, which
I will not discuss here. Neither will I discuss the positions of those who take quantum information
theory to support an epistemic or informational (as opposed to metaphysical) view of the quantum
state. See Timpson (2010) for a critique of these approaches.
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It is not hard to see how delayed-choice experiments can lead to such anti-realistic
conclusions. If we think of the electron as traveling from the source to the double slit and
then to the screen where it is detected, a natural question to ask is whether the electron
behaved as a wave or as a particle at the time it travelled through the double slit. (That
electrons are disposed to behave in either of the two ways is already known from DS
and WW experiments without delayed choice.) Now if the type of experiment (DS or
WW) is fixed in advance, this determines the behavior of the electron, and a unique story
about its wave- or particle-like nature can be told for each type of experimental setup.
However, in the delayed-choice case, the experiment-type is not yet fixed at the time the
electron is at the double slit, so it seems that there is simply no fact of the matter as to
whether the electron passes through both slits (as waves do) or through only one slit (as
particles do).
It is thus clearly impossible to tell a simple realistic story about what happens at the
double slit in a delayed-choice experiment. More sophisticated realistic stories remain, of
course, possible, but they do not come without a cost. In the next section, I will argue
for such a story, based on the formalism of standard quantum mechanics. I will therefore
not have much to say about non-standard quantum theories, such as Bohmian mechanics
or the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory. But I conclude the present section with
some brief remarks about these two theories, in order to illustrate to what extent the
delayed-choice double slit complicates the realist’s ontological commitments.
At first sight, it seems that Bohmian mechanics has a straightforward answer to the
question of what happens at the double slit: Being a particle theory, Bohmian mechanics
clearly tells us that each electron goes only through one slit. But it also tells us that the
movement of the particle is determined by the wave function, and this raises the tricky
question of the ontological status of the latter. Some versions of the theory interpret the
wave function as a physical entity which literally guides the particles, or they introduce a
so-called quantum potential which gives rise to non-classical forces acting on them. But
due to some problems of these interpretations, there is now a tendency among Bohmians
to regard the wave function no longer as a physical entity, but merely as a component
of the law according to which the particles move (Dürr et al. 1997). However, in their
detailed analysis of delayed choice experiments from a Bohmian perspective, Hiley and
Callaghan (2006a) manage to avoid a commitment to very bizarre particle trajectories
only by relying explicitly on the physical reality of the wave function and the quantum
potential, so there is reason to doubt that these entities can really be cut off from the
ontology of Bohmian mechanics without a loss.
An alternative way to tell a realistic story about the double slit is given by the GRW
theory, which adds spontaneous collapses of the wave function to the Schrödinger evolu-
tion. But, as argued by Allori et al. (2008; see also Maudlin 2011, 229-238), this theory
is also ambiguous in its ontological commitments. In one version, the wave function de-
scribes a matter density in space. Again, this seems to suggest a straightforward solution
to our problem: The matter density, being a spatially extended field, (almost) always
passes through both slits and collapses to a particle-like object only upon interaction
with the detecting screen. The fact that the experimental setup can be chosen after
the matter wave has passed the double slit then poses no particular problem. However,
3
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according to this story, the result of a WW experiment must be regarded as outright
illusory: Even though it looks as if the electron went only through one slit (the experi-
ment telling us which one), the fact is that it went through both. An even more severe
illusion takes place according to the second version of the GRW theory, which is merely
committed to the existence of some events in space-time (the flashes), corresponding to
the spontaneous collapses of the wave function. In this picture, contrary to what we
might take as an unquestionable truth about any double-slit experiment, nothing at all
travels from the source to the screen.
3 The Quantum Eraser
In the experiments discussed so far, the DS/WW decision is taken after the electron has
passed through the double slit, but it obviously has to be taken before the electron is
detected. Using a quantum eraser (Scully and Drühl 1982), even this restriction can be
removed. Consider the thought experiment by Scully et al. (1991) depicted in figure 1:
In a double-slit experiment with atoms, we place a micromaser cavity in front of each
slit. The cavities are designed such that excited atoms passing through them inevitably
decay into the ground state by emitting a photon. So for each atom, the corresponding
photon emitted in one of the cavities provides us with WW information. However, this
information can be “erased” by opening the shutters which separate the two cavities
from a thin-film photodetector placed between them. Since this “detector wall” does not
discriminate between photons coming from one or the other cavity, the WW information
is lost and a DS configuration is reestablished. So the experimenter has two options:
He can either leave the shutters in place and detect which of the cavities contains the
photon, thereby obtaining WW information, or he can open the shutters, allowing the
photon to interact with the detector wall without yielding WW information. Note that
he can (in principle) decide between these two options after the atom is detected at the
screen.
But one might ask how this can really be a choice between a DS and a WW scenario,
given that the two scenarios should lead to radically different distributions of atoms on
the screen (displaying interference fringes in one case but not in the other). Surely the
pattern on the screen can not be changed retroactively? Well, in a certain sense, it can.
To see how, a closer look at the quantum mechanical description of the atom-photon-
system is necessary.3 If we denote the photon state by |1〉 or |2〉, depending on whether
the photon is in cavity 1 or 2, and the spatial wave function of an atom coming through
one of the two slits by ψ1(x) and ψ2(x), respectively, the state of the system after the
atom has passed the slits is
|Ψ〉(x) = 1√
2
[|1〉ψ1(x) + |2〉ψ2(x)]. (1)
The probability density ‖Ψ(x)‖2 associated with this state has vanishing interference
terms, because |1〉 and |2〉 are orthogonal to each other. Therefore, the distribution of
3For the following, I adopt the notation of Englert et al. (1999).
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Figure 1: The quantum eraser thought experiment (Scully et al. 1991, 115).
atoms on the screen shows no interference fringes, which is what we expect for a WW
experiment. Now let us see what happens if the shutters are opened to erase the WW
information. As mentioned above, the detector wall does not discriminate between the
|1〉 and the |2〉 state. However, it does (maximally) discriminate between the symmetric
and the antisymmetric superposition states
|+〉 = 1√
2
[|1〉+ |2〉] and |−〉 = 1√
2
[|1〉 − |2〉].
As a consequence, the detector records only photons in the |+〉 state and ignores photons
in the |−〉 state. Introducing the corresponding symmetric and antisymmetric states of
the atom
ψ±(x) =
1√
2
[ψ1(x)± ψ2(x)],
we can rewrite (1) as
|Ψ〉(x) = 1√
2
[|+〉ψ+(x) + |−〉ψ−(x)]. (2)
Since this is just another way of expressing the same state |Ψ〉(x), the probability distri-
bution ‖Ψ(x)‖2 is still the one corresponding to the WW setup. But if we restrict our
attention to those atoms for which the photodetector records a photon, the contribution
from |−〉ψ−(x) vanishes and the probability distribution becomes
P+(x) = |ψ+(x)|2 = 1
2
|ψ1(x) + ψ2(x)|2,
5
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which simply corresponds to the result of a DS experiment, displaying the usual inter-
ference fringes. Conversely, selecting atoms for which the detector does not record a
photon yields P−(x) = |ψ−(x)|2, which corresponds to the complementary “anti-fringe”
interference pattern (see figure 1b). So each atom can be assigned to one of the four
subensembles “1”, “2”, “+” and “−” in the following way: By measuring the photons in
the WW configuration (shutters closed) we classify the atoms into the subensembles 1
and 2, by measuring the photons in the DS configuration (shutters open), we carry out
a +/− classification.
To assess the metaphysical significance of delayed choice in this context, we now need
to ask to what physical property (if any) the sorting into subensembles corresponds.
Focussing for the moment on subensembles 1 and 2, the answer seems obvious: All
atoms in subensemble 1 went through the first slit, the atoms in subensemble 2 through
the second one. Englert et al. (1999, 328) endorse this view, but they add an antirealistic
twist: “The ‘. . .went through . . . ’ is not a statement about the atom’s past”. This
reinterpretation of everyday language is motivated by their “minimalistic interpretation”
of the quantum state, which I will not further discuss (see footnote 2 above). In a closely
related proposal, Mohrhoff (1999) invokes a kind of retrocausation, according to which
the present determines the past of the atoms. (Notice the similarity to Wheeler’s above-
mentioned view that the past’s existence depends on its being recorded in the present.)
This commitment to retrocausation renders Mohrhoff’s “reality-of-phenomena point of
view” rather unattractive, but one might be willing to accept this consequence. What
one should not accept is Mohrhoff’s claim that “retrocausation is a necessary feature of
any realistic interpretation of the quantum formalism” (332). He reaches this conclusion
by (allegedly) showing that the alternative “reality-of-states point of view" is not viable.
Here is his argument:
Adherents to the reality-of-states view thus find themselves faced with a
dilemma. If they . . . deny the possibility of retrocausation, they must insist
that it is only as if the atom had traveled through the first cavity or only
as if it had been retroactively furnished with a definite phase relation. They
cannot say that the atom really was in the state ψ1 (or ψ2, or ψ+, or ψ−,
as the case may be). And so they find themselves compelled to foreswear
realism and embrace operationalism. And if they stick to realism, they will
have to drop the as if ’s and accept the reality of retrocausation.
But the first thing a reality-of-states view should take seriously is the fact that |Ψ〉 in (1)
and (2) is an entangled state of the atom-photon system, so it is clear from the start that
none of the four (pure) ψ-states can be ascribed to the atom alone, as long as the system
is in state |Ψ〉. It is true that this commits the realist to Mohrhoff’s as-if -statements
(compare my remarks on the matter-density version of GRW in section 2), but to say that
reality differs from what measurements seem to reveal is very different from saying (as the
operationalist would) that there is no reality beyond measurements. The second thing a
reality-of-states view should take seriously is state reduction. After a measurement on one
of the two particles, standard quantum mechanics4 no longer describes the atom-photon
4As is well known, there is no satisfying characterization of “measurement” within standard quantum
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system by |Ψ〉, but by a separable state. A realistic view of the quantum state suggests
that this change of description corresponds to a real physical change. This implies that
the metaphysical significance of the sorting of atoms into subensembles depends on the
temporal ordering of the measurements.5 If the photon is measured prior to the atom’s
arrival at the screen, the subensembles correspond to real properties, because the photon
measurement brings about the state reduction
|Ψ〉(x)→ |i〉ψi(x), i ∈ {1, 2,+,−}, (3)
so that each atom actually is in one of the ψi states prior to its hitting the screen. But
if the time order of the two measurements is reversed, the atom never is in any one of
these states, because (3) does not occur. Instead, the atom’s arrival at the screen (at a
location x0) results in a state reduction of the form
|Ψ〉(x)→ [α|1〉+ β|2〉]φx0(x), (4)
where φx0(x) is a spatial wave function well localized at x0.
6 In this case, assigning
the atom to a subensemble depending on the result of the photon measurement implies
nothing about the physical state of the atom, whether past or present.7
But then, isn’t the appearance of definite (WW or DS) patterns within the subensem-
bles somewhat miraculous? I do not think so. Given that the atom and the photon
formed an entangled system up to the moment of the atom’s detection, it is not so sur-
prising that we can obtain interesting patterns by correlating the location of the atom’s
detection with the result of a posterior photon measurement. But this correlating is
something the experimenter needs to do; the correlation is no longer “there”, once the
transition (4) has occurred.
4 Delayed-Choice Entanglement Swapping
We can now apply the foregoing considerations to the process of entanglement swapping,
first proposed by Yurke and Stoler (1992). In the simplest case, this involves entangled
mechanics (Bell 1990). The reality-of-states view presented here is compatible with different solutions
to this problem, e.g., the GRW theory or an Everett-type approach. In the latter case, state reduction
is to be understood as a splitting of worlds due to environment-induced decoherence.
5This becomes problematic in relativistic settings, testifying to the unsolved problem of reconciling
quantum non-locality with relativity (Maudlin 2011). I am here only interested in the non-relativistic
case.
6For details about the coefficients α and β, see Englert et al. (1999, eq. 8). Of course, we could equally
well express the photon state in the |+〉, |−〉 basis.
7Although I have derived this result within a view that takes state reductions as real events, it is
interesting to note that the result is not peculiar to such a view. Hiley and Callaghan (2006b)
analyze the situation from a Bohmian perspective, which does not regard state reductions as real,
but instead assigns a definite trajectory to each atom. Their conclusion is analogous to mine, namely
that the retrospective sorting into subensembles does not correspond to differences in the trajectories
of the atoms.
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pairs of two-state systems, which can be conveniently described by introducing the four
so-called Bell states:
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉|1〉 ± |1〉|0〉], |φ±〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉|0〉 ± |1〉|1〉].
Now consider two independent sources, each one emitting a particle pair in the state
|ψ−〉. Denoting the two pairs by (A,B) and (C,D) respectively, the state of the complete
system is given by
|Ψ〉 = |ψ−〉AB|ψ−〉CD. (5)
This is obviously a separable state, reflecting the fact that the two pairs are mutually
independent. But now suppose that particles B and C are sent to the same location,
where a Bell measurement is performed on them, such that their joint state is projected
onto one of the four Bell states |ψ±〉BC , |φ±〉BC .8 To see how this affects particles A and
D, we rewrite equation (5) by expressing |Ψ〉 in the basis given by the Bell states of the
pairs (A,D) and (B,C):
|Ψ〉 = 1
2
[|ψ+〉AD|ψ+〉BC − |ψ−〉AD|ψ−〉BC − |φ+〉AD|φ+〉BC + |φ−〉AD|φ−〉BC
]
. (6)
Since the Bell states are orthogonal to each other, the Bell measurement on the (B,C)
pair projects the state |Ψ〉 onto an entangled state of the (A,D) pair, for example:
〈ψ+|BC |Ψ〉 = 1
2
|ψ+〉AD,
and analogously for the other Bell states. Thus particles A and D emerge as an entangled
pair, although they never interacted with each other.
As Peres (2000) points out, this procedure can be carried out in a delayed-choice mode,
such that the decision to perform a Bell measurement on the (B,C) pair may take place
after any measurements on the (A,D) pair. But since particles A and D only become
entangled with each other if the (B,C) measurement is actually performed, it seems that
“entanglement is produced a posteriori, after the entangled particles have been measured
and may no longer exist” (Peres 2000, 139). We have seen in the introduction that Healey
takes this to undermine the idea that entanglement is a physical relation. To support his
view, he offers the following reductio ad absurdum:
To hold onto that idea in the context of this experiment would require one
to maintain not only that which entanglement relation obtains between a pair
of photons at some time, but also whether any such relation then obtains be-
tween them, depends on what happens to other independent systems later,
after the pair has been absorbed into the environment. (Healey forthcoming,
24)
8This is an idealized description. In practice, a Bell measurement is unable to identify all of the four
Bell states. For technical reasons, experiments usually focus on the singlet state |ψ−〉 (Pan et al.
1998; Jennewein et al. 2002).
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There is a clear parallel between this argument and the discussion in section 3, and this
might seem to force me into accepting Healey’s conclusion. In section 3, my unwillingness
to accept retrocausation led me to reject the claim that the atom really went through
either one of the slits (even if a WW measurement seems to tell us so). Should it then
not also lead me to reject the claim that the (A,D) pair really either was or was not in
an entangled state prior to the (B,C) measurement? But such an indefiniteness seems
incompatible with the view that entanglement relations are real. This result would be
particularly troubling in view of the fact that the notion of an entangled state played a
crucial role in the account I defended in section 3.
Yet, a closer look reveals that the parallels between the two cases do not threaten
realism about entanglement. Rather, they can be exploited to refute Healey’s argument.
In section 3, I showed that a delayed measurement of the photon results in a sorting of
atoms into subensembles which do not correspond to any physical properties of the atoms.
Precisely the same thing can happen in entanglement swapping: The Bell measurement
on the (B,C) pair allows us to sort the (A,D) pairs into four subensembles corresponding
to the four Bell states. Without delayed choice, this has physical significance, because
each (A,D) pair actually is in such a state after the (B,C) measurement. But if the
(A,D) measurements precede the (B,C) measurement, the (A,D) pair never is in any
of these states. This is entirely compatible with the fact that evaluating the (A,D)
measurements within a certain subensemble shows Bell-type correlations, just as the
subensembles in section 3 showed interference or WW patterns.
Therefore, far from being committed to any indeterminism about entanglement (or
any backward-in-time influences), a realistic view of the quantum state yields a perfectly
clear assessment of what happens in entanglement swapping: If the (B,C) measurement
occurs at a time the complete system is still in state |Ψ〉, it confers entanglement on the
(A,D) pair, if it occurs at a later time, it does not.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that delayed-choice experiments do not undermine a realistic view of the
quantum state. In the case of the double slit, we saw that they merely undermine a
simplistic realism which unreflectively identifies the result of a WW experiment with a
statement about which slit the particle went through. The quantum eraser and the case
of delayed-choice entanglement swapping required a more careful treatment, because one
needs to get clear about the metaphysical significance of the subensembles appearing in
these experiments. Once this is achieved, a straightforward reality-of-states story can be
told for these seemingly troubling cases.
This does, of course, not exclude non-realism about the quantum state. But it seems
to me that the empirical success of quantum mechanics gives us at least some prima facie
reason to view quantum states as describing an independent reality. The non-realist then
needs an argument for the claim that this is a mistake. Wheeler, Scully et al., Mohrhoff
and Healey all think that delayed-choice experiments furnish such an argument. This I
have shown not to be the case.
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The same dialectic applies, more specifically, to the metaphysics of entanglement. The
various things physicists can do with entanglement support the intuition that there must
be some reality to it. Against this, Healey argues that delayed-choice entanglement swap-
ping implies an indeterminism about entanglement which is incompatible with realism.
Having shown that the realist can avoid such an indeterminism, I do not see any reason
to give up the realist intuition about entanglement.
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Title: What is the “Paradox of Phase Transitions?”  
Abstract: 
I present a novel approach to the recent scholarly debate that has arisen with respect to the   
philosophical import one should infer from scientific accounts of “Phase Transitions,” by 
appealing to a distinction between “representation” understood as “denotation,” and “faithful 
representation” understood as a type of “guide to ontology.” It is argued that the entire debate of 
phase transitions is misguided for it stems from a pseudo-paradox that does not license the type 
of claims made by scholars, and that what is really interesting about phase transition is the 
manner by which they force us to rethink issues regarding scientific representation. 
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1. Introduction. 
“Phase Transitions” (PT) include a wide variety of common and not so common phenomena in 
which the qualitative macroscopic properties of a system or a substance change abruptly. Such 
phenomena include, among others, water freezing into ice or boiling into air, iron magnetizing, 
graphite spontaneously converting into diamond and a semi-conductor transitioning into a 
superconductor.  There exists a flourishing scholarly debate with respect to the philosophical 
import one should infer from the scientific accounts of phase transitions, in particular the 
accounts’ appeal to the “thermodynamic limit” (TDL), and regarding how the nature of PT is 
best understood. It has become standard practice to quote the authoritative physicist, Leo P. 
Kadanoff, who is responsible for much of the advances in real-space Renormalization Group and 
in understanding PT, in order to better ground the puzzlement associated with PT: 
The existence of a phase transition requires an infinite system. No phase transitions occur 
in systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom. (Kadanoff 2000, 238) 
If we add to the above that observations of boiling kettles confirm that finite systems do undergo 
PT, we conclude that rather odd paradox arises: PT do and do not occur in finite, and thus 
concrete and physical, systems. The above is taken as a basis for warranting such scholarly 
claims to the effect that PT are irreducible emergent phenomena (e.g. Lebowitz 1999, S346; Liu 
1999, S92; Morrison 2012, 143; Prigogine 1997, 45), which necessitate the development of new 
physical theory (Callender 2001, 550), and inducing a wide array of literature that argues to the 
contrary (e.g. Bangu 2009; Batterman 2005, 2011; Butterfield 2011; Menon and Callender 2011; 
Norton 2011; Wayne 2009). 
 In this paper I would like to build on the works of Mainwood (2006) and Jones (2006) to 
further investigate what exactly is the “paradox” of PT, which is meant to license the type of 
scholarly conclusions and discussions noted above. It seems to me that a natural condition of 
adequacy for the particular claim that PT are emergent phenomena, as well as the more general 
debate that arises, is that there really be a bona fide paradox associated with PT. In other words, 
it really must be the case that a phase transition “is emergent precisely because it is a property of 
finite systems and yet only reducible to micro-properties of infinite systems,” or more recently, 
that “the phenomenon of a phase transition, as described by classic thermodynamics cannot be 
derived unless one assumes that the system under study is infinite” (Lui 1999, S104; Bangu 
2009, 488). Accordingly, in Section 2 I describe the paradox and suggest that much of the debate 
revolving around PT stems from it. In doing so, I appeal to Contessa’s (2007, 52-55) distinction 
between “representation” understood as “denotation,” and “faithful representation” understood as 
a type of “guide to ontology” (Sklar 2003, 427). Afterwards, I will continue to argue for a 
negative and a positive thesis. My negative thesis is that there really is no paradox of phase 
transitions and that in order to get a bona fide paradox, i.e. a contradiction, one must undertake 
substantial philosophical work and ground a type of “Indispensability Argument,” akin to the 
kind appearing within the context of the Philosophy of Mathematics. Since none of the 
proponents of the PT debate undertake such work, and since indispensability arguments are 
highly controversial, I claim that the entirety of the debate, insofar as it is grounded in the 
paradox of PT, is utterly misguided and that the philosophical import that has been extracted 
from the case study of PT with regard to emergence, reduction, explanation, etc., is not 
warranted.  
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However, I also have a positive thesis. In Sub-section 2.1 I show how the paradox can be 
generalized and arises whenever a scientific account appeals to an “Essential Idealization”1 
(EI)—roughly, when a scientific account of some concrete physical phenomena appeals to an 
idealization in which, in principle, one cannot attain a more successful account of said 
phenomena by “de-idealizing” the idealization and producing a more realistic idealization. In 
doing so, I suggest in Section 3 that what is really interesting about phase transitions is the 
manner by which they illustrate the “Essential Idealization Problem,” which is tightly connected 
to issues arising in the context of scientific representation and scientific realism. The upshot is 
that, insofar as proponents of the phase transition debate have been contributing to the EIP, 
certain aspects of the debate have been fruitful. Consequently, I outline various possible 
solutions to the EIP and the paradox of PT, which have been extracted from Butterfield (2011) 
and Norton (2011). I suggest that, although such solutions pave the road for further work to be 
done, it is questionable whether they are conclusive and exhaustive. 
2. What is the “Paradox of Phase Transitions?” 
In his 2001 paper, “Taking Thermodynamic Too Seriously,” Craig Callender presents several 
allegedly true propositions that jointly induce a paradox concerning PT―that concrete systems 
can and cannot undergo PT:2 
1. Concrete systems are composed of finite many particles �. 
2. Concrete systems display PT. 
3. PT occur when the partition function � has a discontinuity. 
4. The partition function � of a system with finite many particles � can only display a 
discontinuity by appealing to the TDL. 
5. A system in the TDL has infinitely many particles.3 
 
Tenets 1-2 imply that concrete and finite systems display phase transitions while tenets 3-5 imply 
that only infinite systems can undergo a phase transitions. However, contra Bangu (2009), 
Callender (2001), Mainwood (2006), Jones (2006) and others, I contend that no contradiction 
arises by conjoining tenets 1-5. To see this, we must first distinguish between “concrete” phase 
transitions, on the one hand, and “abstract mathematical representations” of them, on the other 
hand.4 To be clear, a “concrete system” would include a physical thermal system of type we find 
in the world or in a lab, while “abstract mathematical” just refers to pieces of math, e.g. a set 
with function defined on it. Also, I take the term “representation” here to be stipulated denotation 
                                                          
1
 Butterfield (2011) and Mainwood (2006) use the term “Indispensible,” Jones (2006) uses 
“Ineliminable,” and Batterman (2005, 2011) uses “Essential.” 
2
 The paradox of PT presented here in not the exact version presented in Callender (2001, 549). 
Instead, I present the paradox in a manner that is more relevant to my discussion. Several 
authors, such as Mainwood (2006, 223) and Jones (2006, 114-7), have undertaken a similar 
approach.  
3
 For precise characterization of various forms of the TDL, see Norton (2011, sections 3 and 4) 
and reference therein. 
4
 The distinction between concrete and abstract objects is a well-known. Abstract objects differ 
from concrete ones in the sense that they are non-spatiotemporal and causally inefficacious. 
Paradigm examples include mathematical objects and universals. Cf. Rosen (2001). 
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that is agreed upon by convention.5 For instance, the notation “�” represents “the number of 
particles” (in a given system) in the sense that it denotes the number of particles. Second, notice 
that there are ambiguities with regards to whether the terms “PT” and “partition function” (“�”) 
in tenets 3 and 4 refer to concrete objects, or abstracts mathematical representations of them. As 
concrete objects, PT are concrete phenomena or processes that arise within concrete systems, 
while � is some sort of concrete property of such systems. As abstract mathematical 
representations, both PT and Z are just pieces of mathematics that allegedly denote concrete 
objects. To avoid confusion, note that by “abstract PT” I only mean PT in the sense that an 
abstract � displays a discontinuity. In the same manner, there is a clear ambiguity concerning the 
physical interpretation, i.e. the concreteness or abstractness, of the TDL. Thus, for example, if 
“PT” and “�” in tenets 3 and 4 refer to abstract mathematical representations, as opposed to 
concrete objects, then there is no paradox: Concrete and finite systems display PT while abstract 
and finite ones do not. Just because abstract mathematical representations of concrete systems 
with finite N do not display PT, does not mean that concrete finite systems do not display PT. 
Alternatively, if “PT” in tenets 3 and 4 do refer to concrete PT, it also does not immediately 
follow that there is a paradox. Rather, what follows is that concrete PT “occur” when abstract 
representations of them display various abstract properties, such as a discontinuity in � and an 
appeal to the TDL. One might wonder what explains this particular correlation between 
discontinuities in abstract representational partition function and concrete phase transitions. 
However, prima facie, there is no paradox. 
 The point is that without adding additional tenets that make a claim about the relation 
between, one the one hand, concrete PT occurring in physical systems and, on the other hand, the 
abstract mathematical representation of concrete PT, which arise in scientific accounts of PT, no 
paradox arises.  In the following sub-section I will add such additional tenets in hope to further 
shed light on the central philosophical issue that arises in the context of PT. To end, it is worth 
noting that, if my claim about there being no paradox is sound, then the entire the debate 
revolving around PT, insofar as it is grounded in the paradox of PT as it is stated above, is 
unmotivated and utterly misguided. In particular, notice that the various positions expressed with 
regards to the debate can be delineated by identifying which tenet of the paradox a particular 
proponent denies or embraces. Authors such as Lebowitz (1999, S346), Liu (1999, S92), 
Morrison (2012, 143) and Prigogine (1997, 45) can be read as embracing tenet 3 and identifying 
PT as a kind of non-reductive emergent phenomena. Contrasting attitudes have been voiced by 
Wayne (2009), where Callender (2001) and Menon and Callender (2011) explicitly deny that 
phase transitions are irreducible and emergent phenomena by rejecting tenet 3. Butterfield (2011) 
can be read as both denying and embracing tenet 3, in an effort to reconcile reduction and 
emergence. Norton (2011) can be understood as denying tenet 5. I refer the reader to Mainwood 
(2006, 223-237), who presents an exposition of this type of delineation―i.e. a classification of 
scholarly attitudes to the nature of phase transition grounded in the paradox. For my purposes 
what is important is to identify that the large majority, if not all, of the phase transition debate 
stems from the phase transition paradox. 
2.1 The bona fide Paradox of Phase Transitions and its Generalization 
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 Cf. Contessa (2007, 52-55) and references therein.
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 The key ingredient necessary to engender a bona fide paradox is for a particular kind of 
correspondence relation to hold between abstract representations and concrete systems. To make 
this point clear we must appeal to a further distinction. While I take “representation” to be 
stipulated denotation, by “faithful representation” I mean a representation that allows agents to 
perform sound inferences from the representational vehicle to the target of representation 
(Contessa 2007, 52-55). That is to say, a faithful representation allows agents to make inferences 
about the nature of the target of representation. Thus, it acts as a kind of “guide to ontology”6 
since it accurately describes aspects of the target of representation. In other words, a faithful 
representation is one in which the vehicle and target of representation resemble each other in 
some manner, e.g. they share some of the same, or approximately same, properties and/or 
relations. The classic example here is a city-map, which is a faithful representation of a city 
because it allows us to perform sounds inferences from the vehicle to the target, i.e. from the 
map to the city. This is so because both the vehicle and the target share various properties. For 
instance, if two streets intersect in the map, then they also intersect in the city. That is to say, 
intersecting streets in the map correspond to intersecting streets in the city. Therefore, the map 
acts as a type of ontological guide accurately describing the city, e.g. there really are intersecting 
streets in the city. It is worth noting that my account potentially differs from Contessa (2007), 
who isn’t clear about the ontological aspect of faithful representations. Contessa (2007) 
differentiates from “epistemic representation,” from which valid inferences can be drawn, and 
faithful ones that permit sound inferences. Whether or not such inferences come with ontological 
baggage depends on whether they are about the target itself. On my account, faithful 
representations license sound inferences about the target itself and hence they the fix the 
ontology of the target. 
With this distinction in hand, if we add a tenet that says the abstract representational 
discontinuities representing phase transitions are faithful and hence correspond to concrete 
physical discontinuities we do get a genuine contradiction. This is so because if systems are 
composed of finite many particles, which is the case within the context of the atomistic theory of 
matter conveyed in tenet 2, then it makes no sense to talk of concrete discontinuities. The notion 
of concrete discontinuities presupposes that matter is a continuum so that there can be an actual 
discontinuity. Otherwise, an apparent discontinuity is actually the rapid coming apart of particles 
and not a real discontinuity. Consequently, adding a tenet as the one just described amounts to 
claiming that systems are not composed of finite many particles and so we get: Concrete systems 
are and are not composed of finite many particles �. 
 In a similar manner, one can engender a kind of paradox by reifying the TDL through an 
appropriate correspondence relation. For instance, one could add the tenet that an appeal to the 
TDL, which could be interpreted as a type of continuum limit faithfully representing an abstract 
system, in fact faithfully represents a concrete system. Thus, we deduce the claim that concrete 
systems are and are not composed of finite many particles � (in the sense that the ontology of 
concrete systems is both atomistic and that of a continuum, i.e. not atomistic). 
 The source of the problem of PT seems to be that the mathematical structure that 
scientifically represents concrete PT—a discontinuity in the partition function—is an artifact of 
an idealization (or an approximation)—the TDL—which is essential in the sense that when one 
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 Cf. Sklar (2003, 425). 
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“de-idealizes” said idealization, the mathematical structure representing PT no longer exist.7 
Accordingly, I would like to suggest that what is really interesting about PT is the manner by 
they might shed light on the nature of scientific representation and idealization. In particular, 
notice that once concerns regarding representations are incorporated, the paradox of PT can be 
generalized by making use of the concept of an EI: 
1. Concrete systems include a concrete attribute �. 
2. Concrete systems display a concrete phenomenon �. 
3. � is scientifically-mathematically represented by �’. 
4. �’ can only arise by appealing to an idealizing limit �. 
5. A system in the idealizing limit I includes an attribute �≈ such that � ≠ �≈. 
6. �′ faithfully represents �. 
 
Tenet 1 and 2 imply that concrete systems are � and display �. Tenets 3-5 imply that � is 
scientifically represented by �’, which presupposes �≈. Tenet 4 encompasses our EI since any 
de-idealization of � will render �’ nonexistent. So far there is no contradiction. But, when one 
adds the correspondence relation described by tenet 6, a bona fide paradox arises: Concrete 
systems are and are not � (since they are � and they are �≈and � ≠ �≈). What is important to 
notice is that tenets 1 and 2 are claims about concrete systems, wherein tenet 2 identifies the 
concrete phenomenon to be scientifically accounted for, while tenets 3-5 are claims about 
abstract scientific accounts of concrete systems, and it is tenet 6 that connects the abstract with 
the concrete via faithful representation, thereby engendering a genuine paradox. The question, of 
course, is why would one endorse tenet 6? The answer is that without tenet 6 the entire scientific 
account of the concrete phenomenon in question seems somewhat mysterious to anyone with 
non-instrumental sympathies. In particular, those with realist intuitions will want to unveil the 
mystery with a correspondence relation that tells us that our abstract scientific accounts gets 
something right about the concrete world. But how would one argue for a correspondence 
relation along the lines of 6? It seems to me that, given the “essentialness” aspect of the 
idealizing limit that arises in tenets 3 and 4, the only way to justify tenet 6 is by appeal to an 
indispensability argument.8 In other words, something of the sort: 
1) A scientific account of some concrete phenomena appeals to an idealization(s) and refers 
to idealized abstract objects. 
2) The idealization appealed to is essential to the scientific account in the sense that any de-
idealization renders the scientific account less successful and the idealized abstract object 
nonexistent. 
3) Hence, the idealization appealed to, and the idealized abstract objects made use of, are 
indispensible to the account. 
4) Thus, as scientific realists, we ought to believe that such abstract idealized objects do 
exist and are concrete. Further, the ontological import of such idealizations is true of 
concrete systems, on pain of holding a double standard. 
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 For a more precise statement to this effect see Butterfield’s (2011, 1123-1130) and Mainwood’s 
(2006, 216-218) discussion of Lee-Yang Theory and KMS states. 
8
 For a survey of the Indispensability Argument of mathematics and a defense see Colyvan 
(2001). 
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Said differently, and in the specific cases of PT, since reference to a discontinuity in � is 
indispensible to scientific accounts of PT, and since these discontinuities only arise by appealing 
to EI, we ought to believe in the existence of concrete discontinuities. 
 Thus, in contrast to many of the scholars engaged in the phase transition debate, which 
assume that there is a paradox and then continue to attempt to dissolve it by some manner or 
other, I claim that in order to get a genuine paradox one needs to justify a correspondence 
relation (such as the one appearing in tenet 6) by appealing to an indispensability-type argument. 
Since cogent indispensability-type arguments require serious philosophical work and are very 
much controversial, and since no author engaged in the phase transition debate has undertaken 
such work, it follows that much of the controversy revolving around phase transitions is not well-
motivated. That is to say, claims to the effect (i) that PT are or are not emergent, (ii) that they are 
or are not reducible to Statistical Mechanics (SM), and (iii) that they do or do not refute the 
atomic theory of matter, are grounded in a frail foundation that does not licensed such significant 
conclusions. 
One might worry that, contrary to my claims, a bona fide paradox of PT can arise on the 
epistemological level by conceding to a set of tenets from which it is possible to deduce that SM 
does and does not govern phase transitions. The idea here is to argue that “SM-proper” is not 
licensed to appeal to the TDL and so SM-proper does not govern PT. However, the objection 
continues, it is generally assumed that SM is the fundamental theory that governs PT. Thus, we 
have a paradox and the natural manner by which to dissolve it is to argue that SM-proper does 
indeed have the tools to account for PT (Callender 2001, Menon and Callender 2010), or else to 
claim that PT are emergent. In reply, it is far from clear to me that SM-proper is not licensed to 
appeal to the TDL, and so that it does not govern PT. In fact, there are reasons to think that the 
TDL is ‘part and parcel’ of SM-proper because (a) it is common practice to appeal to the TDL in 
modern approaches to SM, and (b) the TDL is used in SM not only to account for phase 
transitions but to account for, among others, the equivalence of SM ensembles, the extensivity of 
extensive thermodynamic parameters, Bose condensation, etc. (Styer 2004). In addition, (c) all 
the best scientifically accounts of PT, and these include mean field theories, Landau’s approach, 
Yang-Lee theory and Renormalization Group methods, represents PT as discontinuities by 
appealing to the TDL, and (d) the large majority of empirically confirmed predictions of SM, 
within the context of PT and beyond, appeal to the TDL. 
Moreover, even if it was the case the SM-proper is not licensed to appeal to the TDL, no 
contradiction would arise. Rather, it would just be a brute fact that SM-proper does not govern 
phase transitions and “SM-with-the-TDL” does. If then it is claimed that the ontologies of SM-
proper and SM-with-the-TDL are radically different so that indeed there is a paradox, we must 
notice that such a claim amounts to no more than reviving the paradox at the level of ontology, 
and hence my discussion in this section bears negatively on this claim. 
Last, the claim that PT are emergent because SM-proper cannot account for them seems 
to replace one problem—PT are not governed by the fundamental theory—with another 
problem—PT are emergent. How does dubbing PT “emergent” illuminate our understanding of 
them or of their scientific accounts? How is this philosophically insightful? Accordingly, I 
endorse Butterfield’s (2011) description of emergence as novel and robest mathematical 
structure that arises at a particular limit, as opposed to a failure of intertheoretic reduction of 
some sort. It is worthwhile to note that the insistence on the indispensibility of taking such limits 
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for the purpose of emergence understood in this manner has been repeatedly stressed by, e.g., 
Batterman (2005, 2010, 2011). 
3. The Essential Idealization Problem. 
The above discussion points to what I consider to be the central philosophical issues 
arising out of the debate concerning PT. First, the discussion regarding (i) the need for a 
correspondence relation between our abstract scientific-mathematical representations and 
concrete systems, (ii) the appeal to the concept of “faithful representation,” and (iii) the 
identification that the phase transition paradox can be generalized to any scientific account that 
appeals to EI, demonstrates that a solution to the following problem is needed: 
The Essential Idealization Problem (EIP) ― We need an account of how our abstract and 
essentially idealized scientific representations correspond to the concrete systems 
observed in the world and we need a justification for appealing to EI’s, i.e. an explanation 
of why and which EI’s are successful, which does not constitute a de-idealization 
scheme.9 
To this effect Batterman (2005, 2010, 2011) has made progress by explaining that it is not at all 
clear that traditional mapping accounts of scientific and mathematical representation work in 
cases of EI. In particular, this is so because the abstract mathematical structure doing the 
representational work does not “latch on,” and so is not partially isomorphic or homomorphic, to 
any concrete physical structures in the external word. Moreover, insofar as the physical world 
constrains scientific representations, there are reasons to think that consideration of scale size, in 
which the phenomenon of concern occurs, plays an important role in modeling and scientifically 
representing such phenomenon. 
Second, the discussion of indispensability makes it clear that the mystery revolving 
around the EIP is truly mysterious for those with scientific realist sympathies and, in fact, may 
threaten certain conceptions of realism. This follows because, insofar as arguments like the “no 
miracles argument” and “inference to best explanation” are cogent and give us good reason to 
believe the assertions of our best scientific accounts, including those about fundamental laws and 
unobservable entities, then in the case of accounts appealing to EI, these arguments can be used 
via an Indispensability Argument to reduce the realist position to absurdity. What is needed is a 
realist solution to the EIP and thus a realist account of PT. 
In fact, such potential solutions to paradox of PT can extracted from two recent 
contributions to the debate: Butterfield (2011) and Norton (2011). Although it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to treat these contributions thoroughly, I will end by discussing them shortly 
in effort to support my suggestion that, although such solutions pave the road for further work to 
be done, it is questionable whether they are conclusive and exhaustive. 
Butterfield (2011) grants that the TDL is “epistemically indispensable” for the emergence 
of the novel and robust mathematical structure that is used to represent PT, but denies that any 
paradox emerges because the limit is not “physically real.” Using the terminology expressed 
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 Mainwood (2006, 214-5) also identifies a similar problem but in a context that is different from 
mine, and his solution (238), endorsed by Butterfield (2011), misses the central issue discussed 
here. 
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here, the discontinuities in � play a representational role but not a faithfully representational one. 
The question arises, how come unfaithful representations work so well? To that end, Butterfield 
(2011, Section 3) appeals the distinction, also used by Norton (2011, Section 3), between “limit 
quantities” or “limit properties,” i.e. the limits of properties, and “limit system,” i.e. the system at 
the limit. He continues to argue that the behavior of certain observable properties of concrete 
finite systems, e.g. magnetization of a ferromagnet, smoothly approaches the behavior of the 
corresponding properties of abstract infinite systems. Moreover, it is the large � behavior, not 
the infinite �, which is physically real. 
Norton (2011) suggest that by viewing the TDL as an “approximation”—an inexact 
description of a target system, instead of an “idealization”—a novel system whose properties 
provide inexact descriptions of a target system, we can diffuse any problems that might arise. 
Within the context of our discussion, Norton’s idea is that no paradox can arise if the TDL is an 
approximation since approximations do not refer to novel systems whose ontology might be 
drastically different from the target systems, thereby engendering a paradox once we add an 
appropriate correspondence relation. In a similar manner to Butterfield (2011), his justification 
for appealing to such an approximation is pragmatic: the behavior of the non-analytic � 
belonging to an infinite system, is approached by an analytic Z corresponding to finite system 
with large �. 
From my viewpoint, this cannot be the whole story. First, both accounts seem to ignore 
that it is a mathematical structure that arises only in the limiting system that is doing the 
representational work for us. Moreover, the accounts seem to suggest that we must revise our 
definition of PT as occurring when the partition function has a discontinuity, and substitute it 
with something along the lines of “PT occurs when various thermodynamic potentials portray 
sufficiently extreme gradients.” The weakness of this suggestion is that we have substituted a 
precise characterization of PT, with a vague one.  But more problematic is the idea that we 
should be able to construct a finite � system that has a, say, Helmholtz free energy with an 
extreme gradient, which does evolve into a discontinuity once the TDL is taken.10 Second, the 
Butterfield-Norton approach outlined above seems incomplete for it does not give us an account 
of why it is that the concrete external world constrains us to model and scientifically represent 
certain phenomena with mathematical structures that only emerge in limiting systems whose 
ontology does not correspond to that of the fundamental theory. For this purpose, talk of 
“mathematical convenience,” “empirical adequacy,” and “approximation” (understood as a 
purely formal procedure) misses what seems to be the truly intriguing features of PT. My 
suggestion is that we can further advance our understanding of PT, and similar phenomena that 
gives rise to the EIP, by attempting to amend accounts like Butterfield’s (2011) and Norton’s 
(2011) with some of the key insights of Batterman (2005, 2011) regarding what mathematical 
techniques one must appeal to in order to properly represent certain kinds of phenomena. 
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 Mainwood (2006, 232) makes the same point. 
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Abstract
There are two notions of abstraction that are often confused. The material view implies 
that the products of abstraction are not concrete. It is vulnerable to the criticism that 
abstracting introduces misrepresentations to the system, hence  abstraction is 
indistinguishable from idealization. The omission view fares better against this criticism 
because it does not entail that abstract objects are non-physical and because it asserts 
that the way scientists abstract is different to the way they idealize. Moreover, the 
omission view better captures the way that abstraction is used in many parts of science. 
Disentangling the two notions is an important prerequisite for determining how to 
evaluate the use abstraction in science.
I. Introduction 
! The west pediment of the Parthenon is a physical object that exists in space and 
time, but it is also triangular. We say that the west pediment is concrete, but that 
triangles are abstract. What accounts for this difference? The received view in 
philosophy of science is that an object is abstract when it is not concrete (e.g. Cartwright 
1994). Call this the material view of abstraction. The problem with the material view is 
that it implies that abstract objects are not physical. However, scientists often work with 
systems that are abstract but also physically instantiated. For example, experiments 
conducted in greenhouses abstract away from properties such as the color of the plants 
in question and whether or not they are subject to herbivory. Nonetheless, the plants in 
these experiments are concrete particulars like the west pediment of the Parthenon and 
unlike triangles. Moreover, the material view blurs the distinction between abstraction 
and idealization, as idealized objects are not concrete. For example, assuming that a 
population is inﬁnite is common practice in models of population genetics, yet no actual 
population in the world is inﬁnite. In this sense, inﬁnite populations are like triangles 
Abstract and Complete
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and unlike the west pediment of the Parthenon. The problem is that the main goal of 
proponents of the material view is to defend abstraction from critics who argue that 
both abstraction and idealization involve distortion, hence they are not distinct 
processes (e.g. Humphreys 1995). Unfortunately, the material view of abstraction 
undermines the force of their arguments against the critics.  
! Thomson-Jones defends a different view of abstraction where abstraction means 
the omission of irrelevant parts and properties from an object or system (Jones 2005).1  I 
will call this the omission view. Here, abstraction and idealization are distinct because 
idealization requires the assertion of a falsehood, while abstraction involves the 
omission of a truth (ibid). Thus, while both idealization and abstraction can result in the 
distortion of a system, the distortion is very different in each case. When we abstract, we 
do not describe the system in its entirety, so we are not telling the whole truth. 
However, when we idealize, we add properties to the system that it does not  normally 
possess. Therefore, our description of an idealized system contains falsehoods. 
! Both the material and omission views about abstraction are relevant to parts of 
scientiﬁc inquiry, but it is important to keep them distinct. If we fail to do so and lump 
abstraction together with idealization, we are in danger of trivializing an important 
aspect of science. I will argue that the notion of abstraction that is relevant to models, 
modeling, experiments, and target system construction (Godfrey-Smith 2006) is a 
version of the omission view. Speciﬁcally, this is the view that abstraction is the opposite 
of completeness. We start off with a complete object or system, one that has all its parts 
Abstract and Complete
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1 Cartwright also defends this view in places, yet she uses the two notions interchangeably (Cartwright 
1994). This implies that she views the material and omission views as two different aspects of the same 
notion instead of two distinct notions of abstraction. 
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and properties. When we abstract, we omit the parts and properties that are irrelevant 
for our purposes. An important implication of this view is that the outcomes of the 
process of abstraction can be concrete and physical. 
II. The use of Abstraction in Science
! The material view of abstraction is intuitive and deeply entrenched. Prime 
examples of abstract objects are mathematical objects such as numbers and triangles, 
which are not physically instantiated. Examples of abstract objects in other disciplines 
are concepts and ideas which are not tangible (e.g., fairness, evil, superego). 
Interestingly, in many of these cases, we can arrive at these objects through the process 
of omission. For example, we can start off with two roses, omit properties such as color, 
smell, photosynthetic capacity, chemical composition and so on, until we arrive at the 
number two. Historically, philosophers writing on abstraction (e.g. Aristotle and Locke) 
have held versions of the material view but explained how we arrive at abstract objects 
with the omission view (Rosen 2009, Cartwright 1994). It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the two views of abstraction are often lumped together as aspects of the same 
notion. 
! However, the use of abstraction in science is often quite different. Scientists often 
omit a number of parts and properties from a system, yet do not treat the resulting 
systems as immaterial or intangible. In the remainder of this section I will give some 
examples systems used by scientists that are both abstract and concrete. The ﬁrst is an 
experiment from plant ecology, aimed at determining the cause of competition between 
two plants. In this experiment, Jarchow and Cook (2009) conducted a series of 
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experiments with the invasive aquatic cattail species Typha angustifolia and the native 
wetland species Bolboschoenus ﬂuviatilis, which inhabit North American lakes. They took 
specimens from both species back to the greenhouse and grew them in a single 
controlled environment.  The results showed that T. angustifolia had a competitive 
advantage over B. ﬂuviatilis because of allelopathy (the exudation of toxins from its 
roots). These toxins inhibit the growth of the native species (with a resulting 50% 
reduction in biomass) which allows the invader to soak up the limited nutrients in the 
soil. Above ground, the invader rapidly increases in size and shades the native species, 
which further reduces its growth rate. 
! It seems strange to think of this experiment as an abstract system, if we retain the 
idea that abstract objects are immaterial. The system of the plants in the greenhouse is 
as tangible and physically instantiated as the plants in the lake ecosystem. However, by 
bringing the plants into the greenhouse, the scientists are excluding all the other parts 
and properties of the lake ecosystem. The experiment, conducted in a simpliﬁed 
environment, allowed the scientists to identify the existence of competition between the 
two plants and to isolate the cause of the competitive advantage of T. angustifolia. They 
achieved this by being able to isolate the important factors from the system and 
omitting or parametrizing the other, irrelevant factors. In other words, the scientists 
started off considering a complete system with all its parts and properties (the lake 
ecosystem) and ended up with a system with fewer parts (fewer individuals from fewer 
species) and properties (the particular plants are not thought of as prey, or as 
contributing to the uptake of atmospheric CO2).  
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! Moreover, this example is not a one-off case. The very nature of experimentation 
in ecology is based on the idea that ecosystems are very complex and identifying the 
most important causal factors that lead to ecological phenomena involves controlling 
and parametrizing other factors. The same is true of experiments in evolutionary 
biology. Geneticists test mutation rates in populations of E. coli and Drosophila in 
controlled laboratory settings. The point of those experiments is to isolate the genetic 
factors that affect mutation rates, without the compounding or mitigating effects of 
developmental and environmental variation. Even further aﬁeld, experiments in 
psychology are conducted in controlled environments, with the aim of minimizing 
irrelevant effects. 
! Abstraction is also an important step in modeling. As with experimentation, 
when scientists model a particular phenomenon in a system, they do not model the 
entire system but a subset of parts and properties of that system. The identiﬁcation of 
which parts of the system are important and the omission of those parts that are not, is 
another example of the process of abstraction. 
! I will illustrate with an example from population ecology. The marmots of 
Vancouver Island (Marmota vancouverensis) are classiﬁed as critically endangered. It is 
estimated that their population has dropped 80%-90% since the 1980’s and currently 
consists of roughly 200 individuals (Brashares et al. 2010). Ecologists studying these 
social rodents wish to understand how to bring back the population from the brink of 
extinction. In order to that, they must understand the causes of the decline in the 
marmot population. A good place to start is to look at a standard model of population 
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growth and check if the actual marmot population deviates from the model (this was 
the exact strategy undertaken by Brashares and colleagues) (ibid). There are a number 
of models in ecology which measure population growth; the logistic growth model 
(originally developed in 1838 by Pierre Verhulst) is often used in the early stages of a 
study, because it is not entirely unrealistic (as it takes into account the effect of density 
on population growth) but at the same time it is quite simple (Fig 1). 
! Fig 1. Logistic Growth Model
!
                      
                    dN                N                   = rN (1-  )                        (1)                 dt                  K         
! (N) is the number of organisms in population. (r) is the intrinsic growth rate of the 
! population. (K) is the carrying capacity of the environment: the total number of organisms a 
! particular environment can support. 
!  This model measures how the growth rate of a population (N) is limited by the 
density of the population itself. (r) is the intrinsic growth rate, the maximum possible 
growth rate of the population. It is roughly equivalent to the number of deaths in the 
population subtracted from the number of births in that population.2  The second 
important component of the model is (K), the carrying capacity of the environment. (K) 
imposes the upper limit on population growth because it is the maximum number of 
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rates and therefore have a high value of (r).
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individual organisms that a particular environment can support. Factors that affect (K) 
are the environment’s resources, yet they vary across environments and species.3 !
! There are two sets of abstractions from the Vancouver Island (VI) ecosystem that 
need to occur so that the population growth of actual marmots can be compared with 
the prediction of the logistic growth model. The ﬁrst is the elimination of parts that are 
not relevant. This includes the elimination of all units that are not relevant for 
measuring the population growth of marmots. The other animals, most of the plants on 
VI, and inanimate parts such as the marmot burrows will be omitted. The only other 
parts of the system that will be included are the plants that the marmots feed on (for 
example, cow parsnips, Kinnikinnick-fruit and huckleberries). The second set of 
abstractions concerns the properties that are relevant for the experiment or model. 
Properties such as eye color, fur length and fur color will not be relevant, because they 
do not affect short-term population growth. On the other hand, properties such as sex, 
time spent foraging and metabolic rate are relevant because they determine (r) the 
intrinsic growth rate of the marmot population. 
! With these abstractions in place, scientists were able to ﬁgure out that the growth 
rate of the marmot population on VI was falling, despite being far from close to the 
carrying capacity of the island. The reason for this is a phenomenon known as the Alee 
effect (named after Warder Clyde Allee who ﬁrst described it). This effect occurs in 
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(K) of plant populations. For many social mammals, space is very important as it affects the location of 
territory or the number  of nesting sites. For example, the size of beaver populations in an area is partly 
determined by where each family can build its dam (and each damʼs proximity to other dams).
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small populations when a fall in population density decreases the growth rate instead of 
increasing it. Brashares et al. found that this instance of the Allee effect was caused by a 
‘social meltdown’ (ibid). Unlike other marmots, VI marmots are very social and the 
decline in population leads to difﬁculty in ﬁnding mates, which reduces the growth rate 
even more. 
! This example is aimed at showing that abstraction is an integral part of modeling 
in science. In the paper, the logistic growth model is compared with the actual 
population of marmots, considered in isolation from the other parts of the ecosystem 
(ibid). There is no reason to think that the collection of marmots and the properties of 
their population is not concrete. Nonetheless, the population of VI marmots has fewer 
parts than the entire ecosystem on VI. In this second sense, it is more abstract that the 
entire VI ecosystem. 
! To recap the argument so far, there are two views of abstraction: the material 
view and the omission view. On the material view abstract objects are immaterial. On 
the omission view abstract objects are simply incomplete, and can be either material or 
immaterial. The two views are easily confounded because immaterial abstract objects 
result from the process of omission. However, there are a number of examples in science 
where the process of omission leads to physical objects or systems. Thus, the material 
view cannot account for all the objects or systems that arise from the process of 
omission. In contrast, the omission view accounts for all systems that result from 
omission, irrespective of whether or not they are concrete. Thus, if we want a single, 
uniﬁed notion of scientiﬁc abstraction, then we should opt for the omission view.
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III. Abstraction and Idealization 
!
! In the introduction, I mentioned another criticism of the material view of 
abstraction, namely that abstraction and idealization are not distinct concepts and they 
can be used interchangeably to signify any distortion in the scientiﬁc representation of a 
phenomenon. This view, endorsed explicitly by some (Humphreys 1995) and implicitly 
by many more (McMullin 1985), implies that there is no real or interesting distinction 
between abstraction and idealization. The two processes are thought to be inextricably 
linked, if not identical, and attempting to separate them results in confusion. The main 
proponent of the material view of abstraction is Paul Humphreys, who argues that in 
order to talk about abstract systems we usually have to represent them in some manner, 
and this representation will not be concrete (Humphreys 1995). However, idealized 
systems are also representations that are not concrete. According to Humphreys, the 
two types of representations are, therefore, not easily distinguishable. 
! This diagnosis is quite apt. Cartwright (the main proponent of the material view) 
states that when we idealize, we start off with a concrete object and “mentally rearrange 
some of its inconvenient features -some of its speciﬁc properties- before we try to write 
down a law for it” (Cartwright 1994 187). In contrast, when we abstract, we strip away 
properties from a system “in our minds” (Cartwright 1994). Thus, for example, when 
we omit all the irrelevant properties from the west pediment of the Parthenon, we are 
left with the shape of a triangle. This shape cannot be a true triangle though, as it is not 
a perfect geometrical shape. This is because the west pediment contains imperfections 
which are retained in the process of abstraction. According to Cartwright, this does not 
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really matter, as we can pretend that the abstract shape is a true triangle. The 
imperfections are already present in the real system and are not the result of our 
abstraction. In addition, these imperfections are themselves insigniﬁcant, and for all 
intents and purposes the abstract triangle is close enough to a true triangle. Thus, 
despite the imperfections retained in the process of abstraction, we are close enough to 
the real systems that we are entitled to pretend that our abstract shape is a true triangle.
! The problem, as Humphreys points out, is that once we start pretending what a 
system is like, we blur the lines between abstraction and idealization. We cannot 
legitimately focus on the triangle’s geometrical properties because an imperfect concrete 
triangle will remain imperfect after we abstract. If we want our abstract triangle to have 
geometric properties, then we have to add them to abstract triangle. In the case of true 
abstraction all the properties of the abstract object already exist in the real world. Hence, 
as soon as we start pretending, we are adding properties to our system that the material 
triangle does not have. In other words we are misrepresenting, or distorting the system. 
If this is the case, then abstraction and idealization seem very similar. To put the point 
differently, adding geometrical properties to a triangle is very much like assuming that 
a population in biology is inﬁnite. No triangle in the actual world is perfect, just as no 
population of organisms in the world is inﬁnite. In both cases, misrepresenting the 
system by adding properties is extremely useful, as it helps us model the system with 
the use of mathematics. Nonetheless, misrepresentation of a system, according to 
proponents of the material view, counts as idealization.
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! I agree with Humphreys that this is an important problem for the material view 
of abstraction. As soon as we disassociate abstract objects from concrete objects, then we 
are abstracting ‘in our minds’ and representing them imperfectly. However, this 
criticism loses its force when pitted against the omission view of abstraction. On this 
view, abstraction is ‘mere omission’, i.e., we only abstract properties that are irrelevant 
for our system (Jones 2005). In the case of the west pediment, these properties are the 
pediments color, the fact that it contains statues, that is made of marble. What we are 
left with is a  concrete shape that is also triangular. Importantly, this triangular shape is 
not a true triangle, it is simply approximates a true triangle. Mere omission cannot give 
rise to an immaterial true triangle from the imperfect and concrete pediment. 
! On the omission view, abstracting from the west pediment is like abstracting 
parts and properties from the VI ecosystem in order to explain the population size of 
the VI marmots. In the case of VI, the ideal population is represented by the model 
which is compared to the size of the actual population of marmots. Similarly, a true 
triangle can be compared to the actual approximately triangular shape of the west 
pediment. The difference between the material and omission views is that in the latter, 
there is no pretending. On the omission view, we can identify differences are between 
the abstract and ideal systems. Hence abstraction and idealization can be kept distinct. 
! A distinct criticism which does bear against the omission view attempts to 
assimilate abstraction to idealization because both fundamentally involve distortion.4 
The idea is that omitting aspects of a system results in the misrepresentation of the 
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system. Consequently, abstraction is a special case of idealization. In other words, no 
parts or properties of a system are strictly speaking ‘irrelevant’, hence they cannot be 
omitted from without the system being distorted. Omission necessarily results in 
distortion, because systems in nature are irreducibly complex. For example, ecosystem 
ecology is subﬁeld of ecology that advocates holistic approach that views ecosystems as 
wholes or even individuals (Odenbaugh 2007). This is in direct contrast to the subﬁeld 
of population ecology, where population dynamics are thought to capture and explain 
ecological phenomena. The big difference between the two approaches is that 
population ecologists work with more abstract models, as they omit a number of factors 
(especially abiotic factors) as irrelevant. On the other hand, ecosystem ecologists think 
that omitting abiotic factors from complex ecosystems results in overly simplistic 
models. The problem with that is that various processes which involve abiotic factors 
are themselves omitted or misrepresented, which in turn gives a distorted view of the 
way an ecosystem functions. In other words, it is the omission of factors from the 
system that leads to its misinterpretation.
! Thomson-Jones attempts to avoid this problem by restricting abstraction to 
precisely those omissions that do not result in misrepresentation (Jones 2005). As stated 
above, a ‘mere omission’ does not misrepresent a particular feature of a system because 
it retains ‘complete silence’ with respect to whether the system contains the feature 
(ibid). So if an omission results in a misrepresentation, then it is not the type of omission 
that is part of abstraction. The problem is that the criticism presented here is much 
stronger. The criticism denies the possibility of ‘mere omission’ altogether.  
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! I agree with the critics that omission can be thought of as distortion. Still, I do not 
think that it should undermine the importance of abstraction in science. For the 
remainder of this section I will put forward some preliminary proposals which show 
how the omission view can help distinguishing between abstraction and idealization. 
The ﬁrst point is that denying the possibility of ‘mere omission’ altogether is too strong. 
Phenomena in the world have a very large number of parts and properties and 
scientists always omit some of them in their experiments and models. Some of these 
properties do not have an effect on the study. For example, one of the properties of the 
VI marmots is eye color. The paper does not make any reference to this property, 
because the scientists did not think that it was relevant for population growth. I think it 
is safe to say that the property of eye color which was present in the system, was 
‘merely omitted’ from the model. 
! The upshot is that abstraction and idealization are distinct processes that give 
rise to different types of phenomena. Therefore the norms that govern these processes 
should also be different. There is a substantial literature that deals with the 
methodology and evaluation of idealizations (see for example Giere 1988, Weisberg 
2007a). An idealization misrepresents a factor that is considered important for the 
phenomenon of interest, by adding properties to it or changing some of its properties. 
For example, scientists may assume that a population is inﬁnite, in order to construct an 
evolutionary model that is computationally tractable. In order to be successful, the 
idealized system must be informative about the real system, despite the 
misrepresentations. This can be achieved if the idealized system is to some extent 
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isomorphic to its real-world counterpart, or if it is sufﬁciently similar to it (van Fraassen 
1980, Weisberg 2007b). 
! The case of abstraction is different. Phenomena in nature have many more parts 
and properties than one can include in an experiment or model. Hence, when scientists 
abstract they want to preserve only those parts and properties that are relevant for the 
phenomenon they are studying. These omissions help them make sense of the 
phenomenon so they can study it. In many cases it might be impossible to study a 
phenomenon without omitting a large number irrelevant factors. As stated above, when 
abstracting, scientists aim for ‘mere omission’. Therefore, the evaluation of an 
abstraction should focus on whether the it is a case of ‘mere omission’ or not. To my 
knowledge, there is no account that fully speciﬁes a method for the evaluation of 
abstractions.5 It is usually left to the discretion of the scientist.  
! It unlikely that the methods used to evaluate idealizations (such as isomorphism 
or similarity) can be applied to the evaluation of abstraction. Abstract systems are 
already very similar to their real-world counterparts, because they are concrete and real. 
The differences between concrete systems at different levels of abstraction are much 
more ﬁne-grained than differences between idealized and real systems. Also, an abstract 
system can be to a large extent isomorphic to a complete system, yet lack a relevant 
property. For example, an experiment that looked at competition between T.angustifolia 
and B.ﬂuviatilis, which focused only on above-ground competition and did not take into 
account below-ground competition would be isomorphic to the real-world ecosystem, 
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Jones 2005, Weisberg 2007). Still, these accounts are focused on describing the process of abstraction 
and do not give a generalized account of how abstractions should be evaluated. 
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yet it would also be missing relevant aspects of complete system.6 Thus, it seems that a 
different method is needed for a full and generalized evaluation of abstraction in 
science. This account will have to wait for another paper. The purpose of this paper was 
to show that before any such account is possible, the omission view must be distanced 
from the material view of abstraction and hence from idealization.  
IV. Conclusion: Abstract and Complete
! The two notions of abstraction captured by the material view and the omission 
view respectively, are easily confused. The examples that are usually used to illustrate 
discussions of abstraction exacerbate the situation, as they are often taken from 
mathematics and mathematical objects are seen as paradigm examples of abstract 
objects. While the distinction might not be necessary in mathematics, it is very 
important for science, especially biology. Failing to distinguish between the two notions 
undermines the role that abstraction plays in scientiﬁc experimentation and modeling, 
as it is often subsumed under the concept of idealization. Keeping these two concepts 
separate will give us a more accurate picture of scientiﬁc methodology and will help in 
the formulation of a generalized account for the evaluation of the process of abstraction. 
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the effects of competition can be seen by looking at the differences in shoot biomass of the competing 
plants. Still, without the inclusion of below-ground competition and its effect on root biomass, the cause of 
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their experiment, they could have overlooked the importance of allelopathy as the main cause of 
T.angustifoliaʼs competitive advantage. 
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Abstract 
I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Bechtel and 
Craver is unsatisfactory, since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the 
same level and is incompatible with Bechtel and Craver’s account of downward 
causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for 
analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more 
well‐defined notions such as composition and scale. One outcome of this is that 
there is no distinct problem of downward causation.  
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1. Introduction 
The notion of “level” appears in several contexts in philosophy of science. For 
example, the debates on downward causation, mechanistic explanation, reduction, 
and emergence are conducted in the framework of levels. However, there is no 
agreement on the definition of a level, or on the criteria for distinguishing levels. 
Craver and Bechtel (2007) have recently presented a theory of “levels of 
mechanisms”, which has gained broad acceptance and is currently the most 
coherent and promising account of levels. They argue for levels of mechanisms, 
where the relata are mechanisms at higher levels and their components at lower 
levels. Importantly, these are not general levels of organization, but identified with 
regard to a certain mechanism. Craver and Bechtel claim that although levels of 
mechanisms is certainly not the only sense in which “level” is employed in 
neuroscience or philosophy, it captures the central sense in which explanations in 
neuroscience span multiple levels. They also employ this theory of levels to deal 
with the problem of downward causation, arguing that what appears as downward 
causation can be explained away as same‐level causation that has mechanistically 
mediated effects.  
In this paper, I will (1) show that the mechanistic account of levels is unsatisfying, 
(2) defend an alternative “deflationary” account of levels, where the notion of level 
is replaced with the more fundamental notions of composition and scale, and (3) 
explore the consequences this has for the debate on downward causation.  My focus 
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is on neuroscience and downward causation, but the general arguments I raise 
against levels apply more broadly.  
In the next section, I will briefly present the account of levels of mechanisms. In 
section 3, I will show that this account fails as a theory of levels, since it does not 
provide any plausible same‐level criterion. In section 4, I argue that we should get 
rid of the problematic notion of “level” altogether and replace it with notions such as 
scale and composition, which are far better understood. In section 5, I explore some 
of the consequences this has for the debate on downward causation.  
 
2. Levels of Mechanisms 
In most philosophical theories of levels, the core idea is that levels are 
compositional:  wholes are at a higher level than the parts that they are composed of 
(e.g., Oppenheim and Putnam 1958; Wimsatt 1994; Kim 1999). The mechanistic 
account of levels retains this basic idea, with one important amendment: the relata 
are not just wholes and parts; they are behaving mechanisms and their active 
components. This means that the higher‐level entity is an active mechanism 
performing some function, and the lower‐level entities are components that 
contribute to the mechanism for this function.  
Craver gives the following characterization: “In levels of mechanisms, the relata are 
behaving mechanisms at higher levels and their components at lower levels. These 
relata are properly conceived neither as entities nor as activities; rather, they should 
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be understood as acting entities. The interlevel relationship is as follows: X’s Φ‐ing 
is at a lower mechanistic level than Ψ‐ing if and only if X’s Φ‐ing is a component in 
the mechanism for S’s Ψ‐ing. Lower‐level components are organized together to 
form higher‐level components.” (Craver 2007, 189) 
In a similar vein, albeit in more vague terms, Bechtel writes: “Within a mechanism, 
the relevant parts are … working parts—the parts that perform the operations that 
enable the mechanism to realize the phenomenon of interest. … It is the set of 
working parts that are organized and whose operations are coordinated to realize 
the phenomenon of interest that constitute a level” (Bechtel 2008, 146).  
Craver’s (2007, 165‐170) main example is the case of spatial memory and LTP (Long 
Term Potentiation), where he identifies four levels. On the top of the hierarchy, 
there is the level of spatial memory, which involves various types of memory and 
learning. The level of spatial map formation includes the structural and 
computational properties of various brain regions involved in spatial memory, most 
importantly the hippocampus. The cellular­electrophysiological level includes 
neurons that depolarize and fire, synapses that undergo LTP, action potentials that 
propagate, and so on. At the bottom of this hierarchy is the molecular level, where 
we find NMDA and AMPA receptors, Ca2+ and Mg2+ ions, etc. Entities at each lower 
level are components in a higher‐level mechanism: for example, the hippocampus is 
an active component in the spatial memory mechanism, synapses are active 
components in the hippocampal mechanism of memory consolidation, and finally, 
NMDA receptors are active components of the synaptic mechanism of LTP.    
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Importantly, Craver and Bechtel emphasize that levels of mechanisms are not 
general levels of organization in the vein of Oppenheim & Putnam (1958), 
Churchland & Sejnowski (1992) or Wimsatt (1994). “A consequence of this view is 
that levels are identified only with respect to a given mechanism; this approach does 
not support a conception of levels that extend across the natural world” (Bechtel 
2007).”How many levels there are, and which levels are included, are questions to 
be answered on a case‐by‐case basis by discovering which components at which size 
scales are explanatorily relevant for a given phenomenon” (Craver 2007, 191). 
Bechtel and Craver see this as a point in favor of the mechanistic account of levels, 
since accounts of general levels of organization are ridden with problems: it makes 
little sense to compare the “level” of glaciers and pyramidal cells, or black holes and 
microchips. However, the limitations Bechtel and Craver impose are quite extreme: 
in the mechanistic framework, it does not make sense to ask whether things that 
belong to different mechanisms are at the same level or not. We cannot even say 
that a certain molecule in a hippocampus is at a lower level than the hippocampus, 
unless the molecule is a component of some hippocampal mechanism (Craver 2007, 
191).  
Even within one mechanism, things that do not stand in a part‐whole relation may 
not be in a level‐relation to each other (see, e.g., Craver 2007, 193). One salient 
example of this is that there is no sense in which the subcomponents of different 
components of the mechanism are at the same or different level. For example, a 
component C1 of mechanism M is at one level lower than M, and a subcomponent S1 
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of C1 is one level lower than the component C1. Another component C2 of M is also 
one level lower than the mechanism M, and its subcomponent S2 is one level lower 
than the component C2. However, according to the mechanistic account, the 
question whether subcomponents S1 and S2 are at the same or different level makes 
no sense, since they do not stand in a part‐whole relation to each other. I return to 
this issue in the next section. 
To summarize, the key features of this account are the following: (1) Levels are 
“local” – they are always defined relative to one mechanism and the phenomenon of 
interest. (2) The relata are mechanisms at higher levels and components or “acting 
entities” or “working parts” at lower levels. (3) Things are assigned to different 
levels solely based on the part‐whole (or component‐mechanism) relation: wholes 
are at a higher level than their parts; parts are at a lower level than the wholes they 
belong to. In the next section, I show that these features lead to problems, 
particularly feature (3).  
 
3. Components, Mechanisms, and Problems 
Let us consider the mechanism for phototransduction (the conversion of light 
signals into electrophysiological information) in the retina. Components in this 
mechanism include rod and cone cells, which are morphologically and functionally 
distinct types of cells. However, the phototransduction cascade in both rods and 
cones involves similar components: G proteins (transducin), cyclic guanosine 
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monophosphate (cGMP), cGMP‐gated ion channels, and so on. The cGMP‐gated 
channels in rods and the same types of channels in cones are subcomponents of 
different components of the mechanisms for light adaptation. They do not stand in a 
part‐whole relation. Hence, according to the mechanistic account, there is no sense 
in which they are at the same or higher or lower level with regard to each other.  
However, this is quite implausible. cGMP‐gated ion channels in rods and cGMP‐gated 
ion channels in cones are same types of things with same properties, at the same 
scale, in the same system, and playing a corresponding role in their respective 
mechanisms (i.e., they are the same types of “acting entities”). If the mechanistic 
account implies that there is no sense in which these ion channels are at the same 
level, something seems to have gone wrong, or at least the levels metaphor is used 
in a way that is extremely unintuitive (I return to this in Section 4). 
Things get even more problematic when we consider subcomponents that are 
causally interacting with each other. For example, consider synaptic transmission 
between rod cells and (OFF‐type) bipolar cells. In the mechanism for synaptic 
transmission between these cells, active components of the rod cell include synaptic 
vesicles, which in turn have glutamate molecules as their subcomponents. The 
active components of the bipolar cells include (AMPA) glutamate receptors, which 
have “binding sites” as active components. When the rod cell is firing, the glutamate 
molecules in the vesicles are released, and they bind to the binding sites of the 
glutamate receptors.  
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This means that subcomponents (glutamate molecules) of one component (synaptic 
vesicles) are causally interacting with subcomponents (binding sites) of a different 
component (AMPA receptors).1 Yet, Craver and Bechtel explicitly state that there is 
no sense in which subcomponents of different components are at the same level. 
This is not only peculiar, but also in fundamental conflict with Craver and Bechtel’s 
(2007) account of cross‐level causation: they explicitly defend the view that there is 
no cross‐level or downward causation – causation is an intralevel matter, and effects 
can be then “mechanistically mediated” upwards or downwards in the mechanism. 
In other words, being at the same level is a necessary condition for causal 
interaction. However, we have now seen that if we follow Craver and Bechtel’s own 
theory of levels, there are clear cases where there are causal interactions between 
entities that are not at the same level. Thus, there is a fundamental conflict between 
the mechanistic theory of levels and the mechanistic account of downward 
causation.2  
                                                        
1 This is not an isolated example ‐ Fazekas and Kertesz (2011) have recently pointed 
out other examples and argued that, quite generally, if the components of a 
mechanism causally interact, also their subcomponents have to causally interact. 
2 I do not want to discuss the nature of causation here, and my main points hold 
independently of any particular theory of causation. However, the account of 
causation most naturally fitting the general framework here would be the 
interventionist theory of causation (e.g., Woodward 2003), which also Craver 
(2007) explicitly endorses. 
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These problems are related to the fact that the mechanistic account gives no 
satisfactory criterion for determining when things are at the same level. According 
to Craver, there is only a partial answer to this question: ”X and S are at the same 
level of mechanisms only if X and S are components in the same mechanism, X's Φ‐
ing is not a component in S's Ψ‐ing, and S's Ψ‐ing is not a component in X's Φ‐ing.” 
(2007, 192). In other words, what places two items at the same mechanistic level is 
that they are in the same mechanism, and neither is a component of the other 
(Craver 2007, 195). 
One way of interpreting this is that if any two components in the mechanism are not 
in a part‐whole relation with each other, they are at the same level. However, this 
would have some bizarre consequences. Consider components X and S in 
mechanism M. They are at the same level, since X is not component of S and S is not 
a component of X. Consider then a subcomponent S1 of S. It is also not a component 
of X, and X is not a component of S1. Then X and S1 are also at the same level, as well 
as all the further subcomponents of S1 and all their subcomponents! This would be a 
rather strange account of the same‐level relation.  
Supposedly the idea is rather that things that are components in a mechanism but 
not components in any intermediate component are at the same level. For example, 
rod A is at the same level as rod B, since they are components of the 
phototransduction mechanism and do not stand in a part‐whole relation, but a 
cGMP‐gated ion channel in rod B is not at the same level as rod A, because the cGMP‐
gated ion channel is a component of rod B, and not a “direct” component of the 
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phototransduction mechanism. Let us call such components that are components in 
the mechanism directly and not in virtue of being components in another 
component direct components.  
If no further restrictions are added, direct components can include things of 
radically different sizes with very different causal properties. For example, direct 
components in the mechanism for light transduction in rod cells include things such 
as the outer segment of the cell, which has the function of capturing photons and 
may contain billions of opsin molecules. On the other hand, direct components in the 
mechanism also include single photons hitting the cell, or Na+‐ions in the cell ‐ these 
are also not components in any intermediate component of the mechanism. It 
follows that rod outer segments are at the same level of mechanism as photons or 
Na+‐ions, even though they differ in scale with a factor of at least 107 .  
Thus, it seems that the same‐level criterion that Craver proposes is both too weak 
and too strong. It is too weak because it implies that in many cases things that are 
causally interacting and have very similar properties are not at the same level. It is 
too strong because it implies that in many cases things that are of radically different 
size and that interact at completely different force or time scales are at the same 
level. This (1) makes the criterion ineffective for distinguishing between interlevel 
and intralevel causation, and (2) streches the metaphor of “level” near the breaking 
point. 
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4. Levels: A Deflationary Account 
The main source for the problems outlined above is that the account of Craver and 
Bechtel is too limited as a theory of levels. It is not an undue exaggeration to say that 
the account of levels of mechanisms is in fact an account of mechanistic composition: 
it relies entirely on the component‐mechanism relation and simply labels whole 
mechanisms as being at higher “levels” and their components as being at lower 
“levels”. For this reason, it is difficult to define any reasonable same‐level relation in 
this framework: composition only relates parts and wholes, and not parts with other 
parts or wholes with other wholes.  
My suggestion is, first of all, to take the approach of Craver and Bechtel into its 
logical conclusion and to deflate the notion of mechanistic levels into simply 
mechanistic composition. We can simply reinterpret the mechanistic account of 
levels as an account of mechanistic composition, as long as we strip away the idea of 
being at the “same” mechanistic level and the related claims about same‐level 
causation. I fully agree with Craver and Bechtel in that explanations in neuroscience 
refer to robust properties and generalizations throughout the compositional 
hierarchy – for example, in the explanation for phototransduction we need to 
consider the 11‐cis‐retinal molecule changing shape, the rod photoreceptor cell 
hyperpolarizing, the retinal network computing, the eye converting light to 
electrophysiological signals, and so on.  
However, it is obvious from section 3 that this will not be sufficient as a framework 
for dealing with issues such as downward causation. Therefore, the second step of 
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my solution is to take into account the dimension of scale, which is largely 
independent from composition. In his discussion of levels, Craver (2007, ch. 5) 
acknowledges the importance of size scale, but argues that it is secondary to 
composition: components cannot be larger that the wholes they are part of, so in 
this sense the size dimension partly follows the compositional dimension. However, 
we have also seen above that composition and size often come apart: the direct 
components of a mechanism can be of radically different sizes, and similarity or 
difference of size does not imply that entities are in any way compositionally 
related. Composition and scale are largely independent dimensions (see also 
Richardson and Stephan 2007; Rueger & McGivern 2010).  
The most commonly discussed scale is size scale, but also other scales such as the 
temporal scale (the speed of interactions) or the force scale (the strength of 
interactions) may be just as important in understanding complex systems (see, e.g., 
Simon 1962; Rueger & McGivern 2010). For example, molecular interactions happen 
at a much faster time scale than interactions between neurons, which are again 
faster than interactions between brain areas. The force scale is particularly 
important when considering physical and chemical interactions: for example, the 
forces binding subatomic particles (quarks) together are much stronger than the 
forces binding atoms together, which are again stronger than the forces binding 
molecules together. For the sake of clarity, I focus here mostly on the size scale. 
One problem of the mechanistic account of levels was that its same‐level relation 
leads to results that seem arbitrary and unintuitive: for example, there is no sense in 
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which subcomponents of components are at the same mechanistic level, even when 
they are same types of things, while entities of radically different sizes can be at the 
same level. In my view, it is better to get rid of the idea of being at the “same level” 
altogether, and just to focus on how things are related on different scales (see also 
Potochnik & McGill 2012). For example, cGMP‐gated ion channel are obviously 
found at the same size (and temporal) scale than cGMP‐gated ion channels in cones, 
while rod outer segments are found at very different size (and temporal) scales than 
Na+ ions.  
One outcome of analyzing levels in terms of scale and composition is that we no 
longer need any distinct notion of level. If scale and composition are sufficient for 
analyzing explanations in neuroscience, the notion of “level” does not add anything 
to our conceptual toolkit. Explanations in neuroscience are “multilevel” only in the 
sense that they refer to robust properties and generalizations at various stages in 
the compositional hierarchy and at different (size) scales.  
This approach is also supported by neuroscientific practice. In contrast to what 
Craver (2007, ch. 5) suggests, levels talk is not very common in neuroscience, 
neither in journal articles nor in standard textbooks such as Kandel, Jessell and 
Schwartz (2000) or Purves et al. (2004). In many articles (see, e.g., Malenka & Bear 
2004) the term does not come up at all. When it does appear, it is most often 
referring to levels of processing, such as the different stages of visual information 
processing (the retina, the LGN, the visual cortex, and so on), which are something 
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very different from levels of mechanisms, and “levels” only in a metaphorical sense.3 
This supports my point that the notion of level does not pick up any distinct or 
important category.4 
If one insists on using the term “level” to refer to stages of composition or to 
different size scales (or to various other things – scale and composition are merely 
the senses most relevant in this context), one has to at least make clear in exactly 
which sense the term is used. However, the danger in this is that other intuitions 
about levels may creep in – for example, when talking of compositional stages as 
“levels”, one is easily lead to think that things can be at the “same level” of 
composition.  
 
5. Downward Causation and Levels 
 I have argued above that the idea of levels is thoroughly problematic, at least in 
philosophy of neuroscience, and that we should abandon the project of trying to 
define levels. Let us now turn to the issue of downward or top‐down causation that 
has been traditionally discussed in the framework of levels (e.g., Campbell 1974; 
                                                        
3 Of course, the word “level” often comes up in the trivial sense of “luminance level”, 
“level of oxygen”, “level of noise”, etc. 
4 Ladyman and Ross (2007, 54) reach a similar conclusion in the philosophy of 
physics.  
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Emmeche et al. 2000; Kim 1992, 1999; Craver and Bechtel 2007; Kistler 2009).5 The 
question is whether higher‐level causes can have lower‐level effects. In spite of 
various arguments to the effect that downward causation is not possible, the debate 
keeps resurfacing, partly because (neuro)scientists often rely on top‐down 
experiments and explanations that seem to imply some kind of downward 
causation.  
As we have seen above, Craver and Bechtel (2007) have proposed a novel solution 
to the problem of downward causation. They argue that what appears to be 
downward causation in top‐down experiments and elsewhere should be understood 
as normal same‐level causation that has “mechanistically mediated” effects 
downwards in the mechanism: there is no causation from higher to lower levels or 
the other way around.  
Considering the discussion in the previous two sections, it is clear that the reason 
why the solution of Craver and Bechtel does not work is that it relies on the 
distinction between same‐level and cross‐level causation. We have seen how 
difficult it is to define the same‐level relation, or levels in general, in a coherent and 
scientifically plausible way. The term “level” does not seem to pick up any distinct 
                                                        
5 In a recent article, Love (2012) discusses top‐down causation in terms of levels, 
but in a way that comes closer to my approach: he argues that there are many 
different kinds of level‐hierarchies and correspondingly many different kinds of top‐
down causation. 
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category in neuroscience. For this reason, basing the account of downward 
causation on the distinction between same‐level causation (which is supposed to be 
unproblematic) and cross‐level causation (which is supposed to be unacceptable) 
necessarily leads to problems.  
One possibility would be to try to reformulate Craver and Bechtel’s solution in terms 
of scale and composition. If we could distinguish between same‐ and different‐
“level” causation in terms of scale and composition, perhaps the solution could still 
work. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case. As I have already pointed out 
in the previous section, composition as such does not involve any same‐“level” 
relation. Regarding (size) scale, the problem is that there is absolutely no reason to 
restrict causation to things of same or similar size: elephants squash flies, the fission 
of uranium atoms causes cities to disintegrate, and so on. Therefore, we have to 
conclude that Craver and Bechtel’s approach downward causation is unsatisfactory. 
If we abandon the framework of levels and focus on scale and composition, what 
appears to be downward causation reduces to two categories: (1) Causes that act 
from the mechanism as a whole to the components of the same mechanism, and (2) 
causation between entities of different (size) scales. In my view, it is fairly clear that 
there can be no causation between things that are related by composition (category 
(1)), since composition is a form of non‐causal dependency. It does not seem right to 
say that, e.g., the retina as a whole causes a rod cell in that retina to fire. On the other 
hand, as the examples in the previous paragraph show, causation between things of 
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different size6 is in principle unproblematic (category (2)). In this way, putative 
cases of top‐down or downward causation can be analyzed away in terms of 
composition and scale.7 
One remaining problem for “downward” causation of category (2) is Kim’s 
argument against higher‐level causes. It might prima facie seem that getting rid of 
levels dissolves this problem, since it is often formulated in terms of levels: the 
argument states that a higher‐level property cannot be a genuine cause for a lower‐
level property, since (due to physical causal closure) the lower‐level property 
already has a sufficient lower‐level cause (see, e.g., Kim 1992; 1999). However, the 
idea of “levels” is not essential in Kim’s argument: what is at issue there is the 
tension created by two competing (and non‐causally correlated) causes for the same 
effect. Without the framework of levels, the argument does not disappear, but turns 
into the general causal exclusion argument (see, e.g., Kim (2002) Bennett (2008) for 
more).  
                                                        
6 Whether the same holds for other scales, such as the temporal or the force scale, is 
an open question that goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
7 One way of interpreting Craver and Bechtel (2007) is that their main point is quite 
similar, namely that apparent causation from parts to wholes or wholes to parts can 
be analyzed away in terms of normal causal relations. If this is the case, it is 
unfortunate that the theory of levels and the distinction between “same‐level” and 
“different‐level” causation is so prominent in the paper, since this makes the account 
unnecessarily complex and confusing.  
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What Craver and Bechtel (2007) are considering, and what I have discussed in this 
section, is the intelligibility of causes acting from higher to lower levels. I have 
argued that downward causation is not intelligible in the sense of causation from a 
mechanism as a whole to the parts of that same mechanism, but causation from 
higher to lower scales is as such unproblematic. There may be real problems related 
to causation in neuroscience, such as the causal exclusion problem, but there is no 
distinct problem of downward causation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, I have argued that the account of “levels of mechanisms” is 
unsatisfactory as a theory of levels, since it does not include a plausible same‐level 
relation, leads to extremely unintuitive results, and is in conflict with the account of 
downward causation proposed by Craver and Bechtel. Generally speaking, there 
seems to be no need for a distinct notion or theory of levels in philosophy of mind or 
neuroscience; it is better to rely on more familiar and well‐defined notions such as 
scale and composition. With this approach, apparent cases of downward causation 
can be analyzed away. 
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1. Introduction  
Stem cells are defined as cells that can give rise to more cells like themselves, as well as more 
specialized, or differentiated, cells.1 These two cellular processes are termed, respectively, self-
renewal and differentiation.  A striking feature of stem cell biology is the sheer variety of stem 
cells: adult, embryonic, pluripotent, induced, neural, muscle, skin, blood, etc.  This diversity is 
exploited in political debates over stem cell funding, and complicates public discussions about 
stem cells and their therapeutic promise.  Stem cells derived from human embryos are cast as 
ethically dubious alternatives to so-called “adult stem cells” or, more recently “induced 
pluripotent stem cells.”2 A variety of “stem cell therapies” are touted by medical professionals – 
some backed by solid evidence, some experimental, and some purely “snake oil.”3 The 
multiplicity of stem cells, complexity of techniques and terminology, and the passionate nature 
of debate surrounding their source and potential is such that in some quarters, “the traditional 
notion of stem cells as a clearly defined class of intrinsically stable biological objects that can be 
isolated and purified, has begun to give way… the „stem cell‟ becomes a fleeting, ephemeral and 
mythical entity” (Brown et al 2006, 339-343).  
To distinguish reasonable hopes from misleading hype, it is necessary to clarify the stem 
cell concept and its application in various contexts.  Philosophers of science have a distinctive 
role to play here.  Bioethicists have approached stem cells as a human reproductive technology, 
framing debates in terms of moral status, personhood, life and human identity.  But this approach 
                                               
1
 See Melton and Cowan (2009, xxiv), Ramelho-Santos and Willenbring (2007, 35), the 2011 US 
National Institutes of Health stem cell information page, and the 2011 “Glossary” of the 
European Stem Cell network.  For history of the term, see Maienschein (2003), Shostak (2006).  
2
 This „oppositional‟ stance made possible the August 2010 injunction on federally-funded 
embryonic stem cell research in the US, which was imposed because competition for funds 
allegedly harmed adult stem cell researchers.  
3
 See „About stem cell treatment‟ at http://www.isscr.org/. 
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does not fully engage stem cell science, focusing instead on the fragment that manipulates 
human embryos.  This paper argues that the roots of stem cell controversy are not solely in 
ethics, but also the core concepts and methods of stem cell researchers.  I show that pluralism 
about stem cells, and disagreement about their potential, has conceptual and evidential grounds.  
This situation gives rise to a deep evidential challenge: the “stem cell uncertainty principle.”4 
When clearly stated, this principle makes explicit the uncertainty inherent in the basic stem cell 
concept.  Its constraints have important implications for progress in stem cell research, as well as 
public understanding of this science.    
 Section 2 explicates the general stem cell concept, focusing on processes of self-renewal 
and differentiation.  This analysis reveals the key variables and parameters that must be specified 
for the concept to apply in actual cases; that is, to classify cells (singly or in populations) as stem 
cells.  Section 3 summarizes the core experimental method for identifying stem cells, and shows 
how it dovetails with the general concept.  Stem cell experiments specify the key variables and 
parameters for particular cases.  The evidential challenge posed by these experiments is 
examined in Section 4.  Briefly: stem cell capacities are realized only in descendants.  So an 
individual stem cell can be identified only retrospectively; stem cell researchers literally don‟t 
know what they‟ve got until it‟s gone.  The problem cannot be avoided by focusing on cell 
populations or inventing new techniques.  Section 5 considers the implications of this result, and 
offers suggestions for how stem cell research can progress given its evidential constraints.  
Section 6 summarizes the conclusions and indicates their broader significance.   
Some basic tenets of cell theory are assumed throughout.  Every organism begins as a 
single cell, which, in multicellular organisms, gives rise to all the body‟s cells.  Cells reproduce 
                                               
4
 This term is from Nadir (2006). 
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by binary division.5 The life of a cell begins with a division event and ends with either a second 
division event yielding two offspring, or cell death yielding no offspring.  Generations of cells 
linked by reproductive division form a lineage.  Self-renewal is cell reproduction in which parent 
and offspring resemble one another.  Differentiation, along with growth, is the core phenomenon 
of development: the process by which parts of a developing organism acquire diverse, 
specialized traits over time.  These premises provide the background for further clarification of 
the stem cell concept.  
 
2. Stem cell concept  
Stem cells are defined as cells capable of both self-renewal and differentiation.  The simplest 
way to conceptualize a stem cell is in terms of a cell division event that includes both processes: 
one cell like the parent, the other more specialized (Figure 1a).  But this simple model does not 
capture the stem cell concept.  No two cells are the same or different in every respect.  At 
minimum, the cells involved in a division event (one parent and two offspring) differ in position 
and intercellular relations, and share some material parts, including DNA sequences.  
Comparisons that determine „stemness‟ must be made relative to some set of characters, such as 
size, shape, concentration of a particular molecule, etc.  Given a set of characters C={x, y, z…n}, 
values within and across cell generations can be compared, to determine relations of sameness 
and difference among cells in a lineage (Figure 1b).   
 
[FIGURE 1]  
                                               
5
 There are two modes of cell division: mitosis and meiosis.  In mitosis, the genome replicates 
once before the cell divides.  In meiosis, the genome replicates once, but two rounds of cell 
division follow, yielding four offspring cells with half the complement of DNA.  Stem cell 
phenomena involve mitosis, so the term “cell division” here refers to that mode only. 
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2.1 Stem cell capacities 
The above is still insufficient to define self-renewal and differentiation, which have temporal as 
well as comparative aspects.  The dynamic aspect of self-renewal is conceived as the number of 
division cycles in which parent and offspring cells are the same with respect to some set of 
characters C (Figure 2a).6 Differentiation involves change within a cell lineage over a time 
interval t2-t1.  The simplest way to conceive of cellular change is in terms of a single cell with 
some character X (e.g., shape or size), which has value x1 at time t1 and x2 at a later time t2.  But 
not every such change counts as differentiation.  A cell that changes character value from x1 to x2 
thereby differentiates only if the change is „directed‟ in at least one of two ways: toward more 
specialization or greater diversity.  These two „directions‟ correspond to two kinds of 
comparison: between cells of a developing lineage, and between developing and mature cells 
(Figure 2b).  The former become more heterogeneous over time, differentiating from one 
another.  More precisely, cells in lineage L diversify over time interval t2-t1, relative to a set of 
characters C, if and only if values of C vary more at t2 than t1.  The second comparison is 
between cells that have completed development and those that have not.  The diverse cells 
composing the body of a fully-developed organism are classified according to typologies that 
may extend to hundreds of cell types.  Each of the latter is defined by a cluster of character 
values, Cm.  A cell specializes over time interval t1-t2 just in case its character values are more 
similar to Cm at t2 than at t1.7 The relevant set of characters is determined primarily by attributes 
of mature cells that are the end-points of the process.  
                                               
6
 Cell cycle rate converts this to calendar time; in practice both measures are used. 
7
 In many cases, however, there is not one cell fate to consider, but a whole array, each with a 
characteristic complex of traits (Cm1, Cm2…Cmn).  So, in general, a cell specializes over t1-t2 if its 
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[FIGURE 2]  
 
These considerations support the following characterizations of the reproductive 
processes that define stem cells: 
 
(SR)  Self-renewal occurs within cell lineage L relative to a set of characters C for duration if 
and only if offspring cells have the same values for those characters as the parent cell(s).  
 
(DF)  Differentiation occurs within cell lineage L during interval t1-t2 if and only if character 
values of some cells in L change such that (i) cells of L at t2 vary more with respect to characters 
C than at t1, or (ii) cells of L at t2 have traits more similar to traits Cm of mature cell type(s) than 
at t1. 
 
Putting the two together yields a general definition of „stem cell‟: a stem cell is the unique stem 
of a branching structure organized by SR and DF, such that each branch terminates in exactly 
one mature cell type (Figure 2c).  This minimal, abstract model8 structurally defines a stem cell 
by position in a cell hierarchy organized by reproductive relations.   
 
2.2 Parameters 
                                                                                                                                                       
traits are more similar to some Cm at t2 than at t1.  The attributes of specialized mature cells are 
so various that it is awkward to conceive them as values of a single set of characters.  A cell can 
become more similar to an adult cell type either by changing values of a set of characters C (x1 to 
x2), or by changing its set of characters (C to C'). 
8
 „Model‟ here is used in Giere‟s sense (1988).   
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This minimal model covers every case of stem cells.  But on its own, it entails no predictions 
about cell phenomena.  Representational assumptions are needed to connect its objects to 
biological targets.  Three different representational assumptions are prevalent in stem cell 
biology today, interpreting the model‟s objects as: (i) single cells undergoing division; (ii) 
reproductively-related cell populations with statistical properties; or (iii) reproductively-related 
cell types.  In addition, applying the minimal stem cell model requires specification of its key 
parameters and variables: temporal duration and characters of interest. Whether a given cell 
counts as a stem cell depends, in part, on how these parameters are specified.  Table 1 
summarizes the parameters associated with the major stem cell types in use today.  
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
In general, the shorter the duration of interest, the lower the bar to qualify as a stem cell.  
Most stem cell research is concerned with longer intervals, so the bar to qualify as a stem cell is 
higher.  But there is no absolute threshold.  What counts as a stem cell varies with the temporal 
duration of interest.  Another variable is number of terminating branches in the cell lineage 
hierarchy.  Termini of these branches are cell fates, each distinguished by a “signature” cluster of 
character values, Cm.  The more terminating branches emanate from a cell, the greater its 
developmental potential.  The maximum possible developmental potential is totipotency: the 
capacity to produce an entire organism (and, in mammals, extra-embryonic tissues) via cell 
division and differentiation.  In animals, this capacity is limited to the fertilized egg and products 
of early cell divisions.  In the late-19th/early-20th century, such cells were referred to as stem 
cells, but terminology has since shifted.  The maximum developmental potential for stem cells in 
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the contemporary sense is pluripotency: ability to produce all (major) cell types of an adult 
organism.  Somewhat more restricted stem cells are multipotent: able to produce some, but not 
all, mature cell types.  Stem cells that can give rise to only a few mature cell types are 
oligopotent.  The minimum differentiation potential is unipotency: the capacity to produce a 
single cell type.  This classification of potencies, though imprecise, provides a convenient 
framework for comparing stem cells associated with different cell traits and fates (Table 1).  
Finally, applying the abstract model requires criteria to judge cells the same or different 
with respect to a set of characters.  Our only access to cells is via technologies that visualize, 
track, and measure them.  So character values attributed to cells are very closely associated with 
methods of detection.  Cells in adult organisms are distinguished by morphological, histological, 
and functional criteria, which figure prominently in typologies.  Undifferentiated cells are often 
characterized negatively, as lacking these traits.  Cell traits, fates, and technologies for 
distinguishing them are all closely entwined.  Specifying criteria for cell character values to 
count as the same or different amounts to specifying a set of methods for measuring those 
characters.  This brings us to concrete experiments that identify stem cells. 
 
3. Methods  
Methods for identifying stem cells share a basic structure of three stages (Figure 3a).  The 
starting point is a multicellular organism, the source of cells.  From this source, cells are 
extracted and values of some of their characters measured.  These cells (or a sample thereof) are 
then manipulated so as realize capacities for self-renewal and differentiation.  Each experiment 
involves two manipulations.  In the first, cells are removed from their original context (a 
multicellular organism) and placed in a new environment in which their traits can be measured.  
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Second, measured cells are transferred to yet another environmental context, which allows stem 
cell capacities to be realized.  Finally, the amount of self-renewal and differentiation is 
measured.  Stem cell experiments9 thus consist of two manipulations, each followed by 
measurement, of cells from an organismal source.  
 
[FIGURE 3]  
 
This basic method identifies stem cells by three sets of characters: of organismal source, 
of extracted cells, and of progeny cells (Figure 3b).  The characters included in the first and third 
sets are standardized and robust across a wide range of experiments.  For organismal source, 
these characters are species, developmental stage, and tissue or position within the organism.10 
Values of these characters are determined by choice of materials for an experiment: mouse or 
human; embryonic or adult; blood, muscle or a quadrant of the early embryo.  Values for the 
other two sets of characters are measured during an experiment.  For progeny cells, characters 
included are those of mature cell types: morphology, expression of specific genes and proteins, 
and function within an organism.  Exactly which characters comprise the set depends on the type 
of differentiated cells expected.  For blood cells, the relevant characters are associated with 
immune function; for neurons, electrochemical function; for germ cells, morphological and 
genetic traits of gametes.  Though the set of characters varies across experiments, for any 
particular experiment the characters of interest are established in advance: part of the standard set 
                                               
9
 Stem cell biology includes many kinds of experiment.  For brevity, I refer to experiments that 
aim to isolate and characterize stem cells as „stem cell experiments.‟  But this should not be 
interpreted as exhaustive of experiments in the field.   
10
 Another frequently-used organismal character is genotype or strain.  
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of morphological, biochemical and functional traits used to classify cells in multicellular 
organisms.   
In contrast, there are no such pre-established criteria for inclusion in the set of characters 
of extracted cells – i.e., presumptive stem cells.  These characters vary widely across 
experiments, shifting rapidly in response to technical innovations and new results within the 
field.  Yet measurement of their values is the linchpin of stem cell experiments.  Experiments 
aimed at isolating and characterizing stem cells succeed just in case they reveal the “signature” 
traits of stem cells from a given source.  Relations among values of these variables map features 
of organismal source and differentiated descendants onto a „stem cell signature,‟ entailing many 
predictions.  A predictive model of this sort would describe robust relations between the values 
of variable characters in these three domains.  We do not yet have such a model, however; 
„mapping‟ relations among source, signature, and progeny are largely unknown, even for the 
best-understood stem cells.  Indeed, the „stem cell signatures‟ we have are at best provisional.   
An important goal of stem cell research is to flesh out this speculative sketch.  But here the stem 
cell concept itself poses a serious challenge.  
 
4. Uncertainty  
Stem cell experiments involve two sets of measurements, both of which provide data about 
characters of single cells.  But no single cell persists through both sets of measurements.  Cells 
reproduce by division, so descendents and ancestors cannot co-exist.  The second set of 
measurements is of cells descended from those measured in the first.  Self-renewal and 
differentiation potential are measured after realization of these capacities in controlled 
environments: the second set of measurements.  A single stem cell, therefore, can be identified 
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only retrospectively.  At the single-cell level, stem cell researchers literally don‟t know what 
they‟ve got until it‟s gone.  
 There are three distinct evidential problems here.  First, self-renewal and differentiation 
potential cannot both be measured for a single cell.  To determine a cell‟s differentiation 
potential, that cell is placed in an environment conducive to differentiation, and its descendants 
measured.  To determine a cell‟s self-renewal ability, the cell is placed in an environment that is 
conducive to cell division without differentiation, and its descendants measured.  It is not 
possible to perform both experiments on a single cell.  Since stem cells are defined as having 
both capacities, stem cells cannot be identified at the single-cell level.  Second, the capacity for 
self-renewal cannot be decisively established for any stem cell.  An offspring cell with the same 
capacities as a stem cell parent has the same potential for differentiation and for self-renewal.  
Even if both could be measured for a single cell (which they cannot), it is the offspring of the 
offspring cell that indicates the latter‟s capacities.  The relevant data are always one generation in 
the future.  Experimental proof that a single cell is capable of self-renewal is infinitely-deferred.  
Third, in any experiment, differentiation potential is realized in a range of (highly artificial) 
environments.  But these data cannot tell us what a cell‟s descendants would be like in a different 
range of environments – in particular, physiological contexts.  There is, inevitably, an evidential 
gap between a cell‟s capacities, unmanipulated by experiment, and their realization in specific, 
highly artificial, contexts.  For all three reasons, claims that any single cell is a stem cell are 
inevitably uncertain.  This uncertainty admits diverse, even arbitrary, operational criteria for self-
renewal, and underpins perennial debate over the extent of differentiation potential in stem cells 
from adult organisms.   
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -298-
 11 
These evidential limitations of stem cell experiments have been likened to the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle, which states that a particle‟s mass and velocity cannot be simultaneously 
measured.  In physics, the procedure used to determine the value of one alters the value of the 
other.  The analogy suggests that measurement itself is the problem; e.g., “…we cannot 
determine both the function of a cell and its functional potential…[because] our determination of 
a cell‟s function at a given point in time interferes with an accurate determination of its 
developmental potential” (Nadir 2006, 489), and we cannot rule out the possibility that “the 
investigator might be forcing the stem-cell phenotype on the population being studied” (Zipori 
2004, 876).  But for stem cell biology, the problem is not measurement of cells per se, but their 
transfer to different environmental contexts.  Stem cell capacities are realized and measured in 
cells descended from „candidate‟ stem cells, in different environments (for differentiation 
potential).  Potten and Loeffler (1990) articulate the issues incisively: 
 
The main attributes of stem cells relate to their potential in the future.  These can 
only effectively be studied by placing the cell, or cells, in a situation where they 
have the opportunity to express their potential.  Here we find ourselves in a 
circular situation; in order to answer the question whether a cell is a stem cell we 
have to alter its circumstances and in so doing inevitably lose the original cell and 
in addition we may see only a limited spectrum of responses… Therefore it might 
be an impossible task to determine the status of a single stem cell without 
changing it.  Instead one would have to be satisfied with making probability 
statements based on measurements of populations (1009).   
 
It might seem that stem cell biologists can avoid these problems by shifting their focus to 
cell populations.  Representational assumptions (ii-iii) allow for exactly this (see §2 above).  
Two kinds of model, stochastic and compartmental, yield hypotheses about stem cell 
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populations.11 But experimental support for these hypotheses depends on hypotheses about single 
stem cell traits.  Here I address stochastic population models only; an analogous argument can be 
made for compartment models.12  Stochastic population models of stem cells are based on the 
following assumptions.  Any population of cells experiences some number n divisions over a 
period of time , such that the population grows, diminishes, or remains constant in size.  Any 
dividing cell in the population has a certain probability of undergoing each of three kinds of 
division: both offspring like the parent (p), one offspring like the parent (r) or no offspring like 
the parent (q), where p + r + q = 1.  Relations among p, r, and q values entail general predictions 
about cell population size (growth, decrease, or “steady-state”), and equations that predict mean 
and standard deviation in population size, probability of stem cell extinction, and features of 
steady-state populations are derived.13  In these equations, p is the fundamental parameter.  
Testable predictions require that its value be estimated.  This is done by estimating the 
coefficient of variation for stem cell number in populations of the same age produced by division 
from a single founding stem cell.  The data required for such an estimate are numbers of stem 
cells in replicate colonies, each originating from a single stem cell.  
Given such an estimate, a stochastic stem cell model predicts features of cell population 
kinetics, which can then be compared with experimental data.  But the hypothesis thereby tested 
is not that „founder‟ cells are stem cells.  Rather, it is that stem cell population size is regulated 
so as to yield predictable population-level results from randomly-distributed single-cell 
capacities.  Testing this hypothesis requires identifying stem cell populations.  Stochastic models 
make predictions, given the assumption that „founding elements‟ are stem cells.  All these 
                                               
11
 Terms from Loeffler and Potten (1997). 
12
 [reference removed for blind review] 
13
 Details in Vogel et al (1969).   
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predictions hinge on estimation of the fundamental parameter p, the probability that a stem cell 
undergoes self-renewal.  This parameter is estimated from the pattern of variation in a set of 
replicate colonies, initiated by a single “stem element.” But in order for experiments to be 
replicates, all the stem elements for the set of colonies must be assigned the same probability 
values for p and (1-p); i.e., the same capacities for self-renewal and differentiation.  So 
experimental test of a stochastic stem cell model depends on the assumption that the cell 
population measured is homogeneous with respect to these characters.  This is exactly the 
evidence that the stem cell uncertainty principle ensures we cannot get.  Stochastic population-
level stem cell models therefore do not avoid the evidential challenge above. 
To sum up: stem cell experiments, no matter how technically advanced at tracking and 
measuring single cells, cannot resolve stem cell capacities at the single-cell level.  This is 
because we cannot directly measure a single cell‟s capacity for self-renewal or differentiation, 
separately or together.  To measure both self-renewal and differentiation potential for a single 
cell, and to elicit the full range of a cell‟s potential, multiple „copies‟ of that cell are needed - a 
homogeneous cell population of candidate stem cells.  Thoroughgoing focus on cell populations 
cannot get around this problem, since evidence for population-level models of stem cells also 
depends on the assumption of a homogeneous „founder‟ stem cell population.  The „uncertainty 
principle‟ is an unavoidable evidential constraint for stem cell biology.   
 
5. Progress 
How, then, should stem cell biologists proceed?  In practice, the dominant strategy is to adopt a 
„single-cell standard;‟ that is, to assess progress not in terms of hypotheses, but experimental 
methods.  Better experimental methods improve our access to single cells.  Current “gold 
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standards” for stem cell experiments are articulated in exactly these terms.  These standards are 
implemented somewhat differently for stem cells with different potencies.  For „tissue-specific‟ 
stem cells, the gold standard is a single-cell transplant leading to long-term reconstitution of an 
animal‟s tissue or organ.  An ideal pluripotent stem cell line behaves as a single cell, exhibiting 
the same traits in the same culture environment, so self-renewal or differentiation capacities can 
be realized on demand.14 But across the entire field, technologies that enhance our ability to 
isolate or track single cells are quickly adopted and reported as advances.15 Post-genomic and 
micro-imaging technologies are increasingly important in stem cell biology, for this reason.  But 
the single-cell standard dates back to post-WWII experiments with cultured cells and 
transplantable tumors in inbred mice.  The first method for measuring stem cells was announced 
as “a direct method of assay for [mouse bone marrow] cells with a single-cell technique” (Till 
and McCulloch 1961, 213). 
 This approach is evidentially well-founded.  The single-cell standard, applied across 
many stem cell types (i.e., experimental contexts), supports the assumption of homogeneity on 
which all stem cell models depend.  An experiment that meets the standard begins with a single 
cell in a controlled environment, with all relevant signals that could impact the cell taken into 
account.  If all other cell reproduction in this environment is blocked, or products of the founding 
cell can be distinguished from all other cells, then results reflect the reproductive output of a 
single starting cell, and no others.  Measured stem cell capacities are then unambiguously 
attributed to that cell in that environment.  Technologies that track a single cell‟s reproductive 
output over time, combined with techniques that measure character values of single cells, can 
                                               
14
 “Gold standards” from Fundamentals of Stem Cell Biology (Cowan and Melton 2009) and the 
International Stem Cell Initiative‟s characterization of hESC lines (Adewumi et al 2007). 
15
 For recent examples, see special issues of Nature Reviews Genetics (April 2011) and Nature 
Cell Biology (May 2011). 
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yield data of this sort.  In this way, technical innovations guided by the single-cell standard can 
bolster evidence for stem cell models – but only relative to the environment in which stem cell 
capacities are realized.  More general results are obtained from replicate experiments using a 
range of environments.  If the same environment tends to elicit self-renewal of the same duration 
and/or differentiation into the same cell types, while different environments reliably yield 
different results, this indicates that the cell population from which replicates are drawn is 
homogeneous with respect to stem cell capacities.  Of course, populations homogeneous with 
respect to one set of character values need not be homogeneous with respect to others.  But 
sorting cells into populations homogeneous for many measurable traits is the best we can do, 
since stem cells cannot be identified in advance.  
So the „stem cell uncertainty principle‟ does not block progress in stem cell research.  
But, since the possibility of heterogeneity in stem cell capacities cannot be completely ruled out, 
hypotheses about stem cells can never be fully and decisively established.  Stem cell experiments 
can provide good evidence for hypotheses at the single-cell level, but only relative to the set of 
characters used to specify a homogeneous sub-population.  As new cell traits are discovered and 
made accessible to measurement, the assumption of homogeneity must be continually reassessed 
and revised.  All substantive models of stem cells are therefore necessarily provisional, and 
become obsolete when new characters and environments are introduced.  This evidential 
constraint necessitates a mode of collaboration in stem cell research that gives the lie to the idea 
that the field is essentially a competition of models and methods in a „race to the cure.‟ Improved 
single-cell methods applied to all available stem cell types gives rise to a whole constellation, or 
network, of improved models.  In this way, guided by experiment, the entire field moves forward 
together.  
San Diego, CA -303-
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6. Conclusions  
The basic stem cell concept is relational and relative.  So stem cells are not defined absolutely, 
but relative to an organismal source, cell lineage, environments, traits and a temporal duration of 
interest.  Experimental methods for identifying stem cells specify these parameters.  In any actual 
case, therefore, stem cells must be understood in terms of experimental methods used to identify 
them.  The stem cell uncertainty principle imposes evidential constraints on these methods, 
however.  Several consequences follow.  First, all stem cell claims are provisional, dependent on 
an assumption of cell homogeneity that must be continually reassessed as research moves 
forward.  Second, stem cell pluralism is not a symptom of incomplete understanding, but follows 
from the general stem cell concept.  Claims about stem cells based on different elaborations of 
the basic model do not conflict.  The diversity of stem cells should not be a source of contention, 
but a positive resource for inquiry.  Finally, technical innovations that increase experimenters‟ 
ability to measure and track single cells can bring about a situation in which experiments can 
provide strong evidence for hypotheses about stem cells. „Single-cell‟ technologies are thus an 
important form of progress in stem cell biology, with evidential significance.  
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Figure 1 Simple stem cell model: (a) single cell, (b) cell population.  
A. 
 
 
 
 
B.   
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Figure 2 The stem cell concept: (a) self-renewal, (b) differentiation, (c) both.  Arrows represent 
cell reproductive processes, variables represent key parameters (see text).    
A.  
 
 
B.  
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -308-
 3 
Figure 2, cont.  
C.  
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Table 1 Stem cells, classified in terms of the general model and its key parameters.  (For 
simplicity, time intervals are left approximate and only characters are indicated, not specific 
values.  The latter are diverse; ‘various’ indicates that no standard is widely-accepted for a stem 
cell type.) 
 
Stem 
cell 
 
Characters Time 
interval/ 
duration 
 
Potency 
 
Source 
 
ESC 
shape, size, cell 
surface markers, 
gene expression 
 
indefinite 
(>50 
cycles) 
 
pluripotent 
 
early embryo 
inner cell mass 
 
HSC 
 
various 
various 
(wks-
decades) 
 
multipotent 
bone marrow, 
cord blood, 
peripheral blood 
 
NSC 
morphology, cell 
surface markers, 
nerve function 
 
months-
years 
 
oligopotent 
 
brain (adult and 
embryonic) 
iPSC shape, size, cell 
surface markers, 
gene expression 
months-
years 
pluripotent differentiated 
cells (various 
tissues) 
epiSC shape, size, cell 
surface markers, 
gene expression 
months-
years 
pluripotent early embryo 
inner cell mass 
GSC shape, size, cell 
surface markers, 
gene expression 
months-
years 
pluripotent genital ridge 
(embryo) 
CSC various ? ? cancer (leukemia) 
EC shape, size, cell 
surface markers 
weeks-
months 
pluripotent cancer 
(teratocarcinoma) 
epiderm morphology, cell 
surface markers 
years unipotent skin 
hair morphology, cell 
surface markers 
years unipotent follicle 
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Figure 3 Basic design of stem cell experiments: (a) experimental procedure, (b) results. 
A. 
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TRUE Is False and Why It Matters 
Robert William Fischer 
Texas State University-San Marcos 
 
1. Introduction 
The proponents of inference to the best explanation (IBE) are willing to move from a judgment 
about the quality of an explanation to a judgment about its probability. In other words, they 
sanction inferences that have this form:  
P1: Facts f1 – fn obtain. 
P2: If true, hypothesis h would offer a better explanation of f1 – fn than would any 
competing hypothesis. 
C: So, probably, h is true.1 
 
This formulation raises an obvious question: for a given hypothesis, in what sense is it alleged to 
offer a ‘better’ explanation of f1 – fn? The standard answer is that the hypothesis has a higher 
score on the explanatory virtues: conservatism, modesty, simplicity, generality, and predictive 
power.2 But this answer appears to be problematic. Here Bas van Fraassen’s objection to it: 
Judgments of simplicity and explanatory power are the intuitive and natural vehicle for 
expressing our epistemic appraisal. [But these] are specifically human concerns, a 
function of our interests and pleasures, which make some theories more valuable or 
appealing to us than others. Values of this sort […] provide reasons for using a theory, or 
contemplating it, whether or not we think it true, and cannot rationally guide our 
epistemic attitudes and decisions. For example, if it matters more to us to have one sort of 
question answered rather than another, that is no reason to think that a theory which 
answers more of the first sort of questions is more likely to be true (not even with the 
                                                 
1
 Depending on your views about explanation, this argument may need an additional premise: something to the 
effect of, “if true, hypothesis h would provide a satisfactory explanation of f1 – fn.” However, nothing here turns on 
its inclusion. 
2
 This particular list is due to Quine and Ullian, with ‘generality’ substituted for the more awkward ‘fecundity’ 
(Quine and Ullian 1978, 64-82). It is not unusual. For very similar ones, see (Lycan 1988, 130) and (Lipton 2004, 
122). Obviously, not everyone characterizes IBE this way. For example, at best, Bayesians construe IBE as a 
heuristic tool for fixing the priors and likelihoods. The debate with the Bayesian is an important one, but I can set it 
aside here: I am taking for granted the conception of IBE that my interlocutors are taking for granted (at least with 
respect to the objection that I discuss in the main text). 
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proviso ‘everything else being equal’). It is merely a reason to prefer that theory in 
another respect (Van Fraassen 1980, 87).3 
 
IBE faces a slew of objections, many of which are formidable. However, let’s bracket all but the 
one that appears above. Does it provide a distinct problem for those who regard IBE as a source 
of epistemic justification? In other words, is IBE faulty simply because it relies on “specifically 
human concerns” that are “a function of our interests and pleasures?” No.  
Let’s get clearer about van Fraassen’s argument. It seems to go as follows: 
P1: If reason r is an epistemic reason for (subject s to believe) p, then r increases the 
likelihood of p’s truth. 
P2: But IBE’s reason(s) for (subject s to believe) hypothesis h do not increase the 
likelihood of h’s truth. 
C: Therefore, the reasons given by inference to the best explanation are not epistemic 
reasons. 
 
Let’s call this the argument from the truth-conduciveness of epistemic reasons (ATER). If ATER 
is sound – and if (plausibly enough) you need epistemic reasons to get epistemic justification – 
then it seems that IBE cannot provide us with epistemic justification. 
 Some respond to ATER by attacking P2.4 However, I tend to think that P2 is true. My 
quarrel is with P1: it is not the case that all epistemic reasons increase the likelihood of truth.5 
The claim that they do assumes a form of epistemic value monism – which, I’ll argue, even 
IBE’s critics should reject. In my view, then, the objection above amounts to the observation that 
                                                 
3
 We find the same argument in one of Scott Shalkowski’s recent papers: “Reasons are sometimes epistemic, 
sometimes pragmatic. IBE is proposed as a general kind of inference involving epistemic reasons; it is to provide us 
with reasons to adopt a theory as more likely to be true than its competitors and not merely as a tool useful for 
accomplishing some non-alethic goal. [...] Simplicity is a theoretical virtue, let us grant, but it is an instrumental 
virtue. Simple theories are easier to work with, so recognizing that a theory is simple provides one with a reason to 
work with the theory, but this is a conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning” (Shalkowski 2010, 171-172). 
4
 Richard Swinburne, for example, contends that “it is a fundamental a priori principle” that simpler theories are 
more likely to be true than are more complex ones (Swinburne 2001, 102). And there are a number of less radical 
defenses of simplicity: e.g., (Quine and Ullian 1978), (Sober 1981), and (Kelly 2007). 
5
 There are, of course, philosophers who insist that the individual virtues are individually truth-conducive. 
Simplicity is usually taken to be the hardest one to defend, but Richard Swinburne nevertheless contends that “it is a 
fundamental a priori principle” that simpler theories are more likely to be true than are more complex ones 
(Swinburne 2001, 102). There are also a number of less radical defenses of simplicity – e.g., (Quine and Ullian 
1978, 69-70), (Sober 1981, 145), and (Kelly 2007, 561). 
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IBE is incompatible with epistemic value monism, and that is no objection at all. 
 
2. From ATER to TRUE 
We need to begin by distinguishing two ways of interpreting ATER’s first premise: 
P1: If reason r is an epistemic reason for (subject s to believe) p, then r increases the 
likelihood of p’s truth. 
 
On the flat-footed reading, P1 imposes a necessary external condition on epistemic reasons: 
namely, that they must increase the likelihood of truth. But if this is the correct reading, then 
there are two strikes against van Fraassen’s relying on P1. First, no proponent of IBE needs each 
explanatory virtue to be individually truth-conducive; IBE does not require that, for example, 
simpler theories are more likely to be true just in virtue of their simplicity. Rather, the proponent 
of IBE needs it to be the case that the virtues are jointly truth-conducive. There is no obvious 
reason why various non-truth-conducive virtues might not ‘cancel one another out’, allowing the 
reasoner to triangulate the truth, as it were.6 Second, and more importantly, while epistemic 
reasons may need to satisfy an external condition, it’s hard to see how making this point would 
help van Fraassen. To assess IBE’s reliability, we would need to check whether (a) there is a 
positive correlation between those propositions supported by the reason in question and those 
propositions that are true and (b) a negative correlation between those propositions supported by 
the reason in question and those propositions that are false. But propositions don’t wear their 
truth values on their sleeves, so we can only go on our best judgments. And as soon as we admit 
this, we must also recognize that there will be disagreement: if I think that our judgments about 
the existence and properties of unobservables are generally accurate, then I will be inclined to 
say that reasons supporting those judgments are truth-conducive; if van Fraassen doesn’t, then he 
                                                 
6
 For more on this point, see (Fischer, ms). 
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won’t be so inclined. So on the ‘necessary external condition’ reading of P1, the merits of ATER 
turn on the merits of P2 (which alleges that IBE’s reason(s) for hypothesis h do not increase the 
likelihood of h’s truth). And our judgments about the merits of P2 will depend on two factors: 
first, the list of hypotheses that we believe to be justifiable via IBE; and second, the list of those 
hypotheses that we take to be true. But van Fraassen is using this argument (among many others) 
to motivate shortening the list of hypotheses that we take to be true; i.e., he is trying to argue that 
IBE cannot justify beliefs about unobservables. Hence, the ‘necessary external condition’ 
reading of P1 does not help his project; it seems to beg the question at hand. What is the 
alternative? 
 I propose that P1 concerns the aim of epistemic reasons. We might reformulate ATER 
accordingly: 
P1*: If reason r is an epistemic reason for (subject s to believe) p, then r is aimed at 
increasing the likelihood of p’s truth. 
P2*: But IBE’s reason(s) for (subject s to believe) hypothesis h are not aimed at 
increasing the likelihood of h’s truth. 
C: Therefore, the reasons given by inference to the best explanation are not epistemic 
reasons. 
 
I think that this reading fits more naturally with the passage quoted above; at any rate, it avoids 
the problems just mentioned. It also make it clear why, earlier, I posited a connection between P1 
and epistemic value monism. P1* insists that the only epistemically valuable feature of a reason 
is its being aimed at truth. Hence, P1* commits its proponent to a version of epistemic value 
monism – the view that reasons have only one epistemically relevant feature.  
  
3. TRUE 
What’s wrong with P1*? It will be easier to see this if we take a detour through ethical theory.7 
                                                 
7
 My argument in this and the next section is inspired by (Lycan 1988, Chapter 7). I do not mean to suggest that 
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Utilitarianism, at least in its simple, hedonistic form, is committed to both value monism and 
proceduralism. An ethical theory is committed to the former if it maintains that all situations 
have only one morally relevant feature; according to utilitarianism, that feature is well-being. An 
ethical theory is committed to the latter just in case it says that there is a decision procedure for 
determining whether an action is obligatory, permissible, or wrong; for utilitarians, this is the 
principle that you should maximize well-being.8 With these two points in mind, and idealizing a 
bit, we can represent utilitarianism with a function: it takes a set of action / outcome pairs as 
inputs, selects the one with the greatest overall well-being, and gives the action that leads to that 
situation as the output; that action, of course, is the one that utilitarians judge to be obligatory.9  
 The function just outlined represents act utilitarianism. How would we need to modify it 
in order to represent rule utilitarianism? We replace the set of action / outcome pairs with a set of 
slightly more complex pairs, the first member of which is a candidate moral rule, the second of 
which is the outcome that would result from universal adherence to that rule. The function still 
selects the one with the greatest well-being. However, instead of giving an obligatory action as 
an output, it gives a moral rule; we then apply the rule to our situation to determine what’s 
obligatory. 
 It’s easy to reframe rule utilitarianism as an epistemological position. Instead of 
candidate moral rules, the first member of each pair is a candidate epistemic policy; instead of 
global outcomes, the second member of each pair is the number of truths that would be believed 
if that policy were followed.10 Instead of selecting the outcome with the greatest well-being, our 
                                                                                                                                                             
Lycan would agree with anything that I say here. 
8
 I’m using the phrase ‘decision procedure’ loosely, where it doesn’t imply that informed and competent agents are 
always in a position to carry it out. 
9
 Here is one respect in which this is an idealized representation: like Stalnaker’s account of counterfactuals, it 
assumes that there are no ties. 
10
 I am treating wellbeing as a simple property; hence, the parallel with truths believed. Later, I’ll discuss a variant 
that balances truths believed with falsehoods avoided. 
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new function selects the one with the greatest number of resultant true beliefs, giving that 
epistemic policy as an output. As before, the output is not itself the obligatory action; rather, the 
output is the principle that determines what you ought to believe in a given circumstance – 
equivalently (so say I), it determines the belief that you would be justified in holding in those 
circumstances. Let’s call this view truth-maximizing rule utilitarianism in epistemology (TRUE). 
Like its cousin, TRUE is a version of value monism: it takes truth to be the only feature of a 
belief that is of worth. Also like its cousin, TRUE is a form of proceduralism: it takes there to be 
a straightforward decision procedure that settles which of the many possible epistemic policies is 
correct. Why does it recommend maximizing true beliefs? As in ethics, your theory of value 
drives your theory of the right: if you think that only well-being is of moral worth, then it is hard 
to see what you would recommend other than maximizing well-being. After all, if well-being is 
of moral value, then surely more is better, at least if all other things are equal. And if value 
monism is true, then all other things always are equal – there is never anything else with which 
well-being competes. So, you should maximize it. The same argument applies, mutatis mutandis, 
to truth given TRUE. 
TRUE is probably not just a form of epistemic value monism: it is probably the only 
epistemological position that is plausible if epistemic value monism is correct. As I suggested in 
the preceding paragraph, it’s likely that epistemic value monists are committed to an 
epistemology that is structurally analogous to utilitarianism. But in epistemology, the analog of 
act utilitarianism is hopeless: that view would say that a belief is justified iff it’s true, since (a) 
such a view would only take into consideration the local features of the belief and (b) such a 
view would take the truth of that belief to be the only feature that matters. But, of course, it is not 
the case that a belief is justified iff it’s true. The analog of rule utilitarianism, TRUE, avoids this 
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problem by introducing the epistemic policies: they are designed to take non-local factors into 
account – namely, the number of true beliefs that would be achieved given universal adherence 
to the epistemic policy – thereby preventing TRUE from having the awkward consequence that 
sinks the epistemic analog of act utilitarianism. 
 
4. We Should Reject TRUE 
However, as sane as it may sound, TRUE has very implausible implications. Here is the 
argument. I suggested that we can represent TRUE as a function: the inputs are policy / success 
rate pairs, the output is the most truth-conducive epistemic policy. I also intimated that ‘being the 
most truth-conducive epistemic policy’ means ‘being the policy that produces the greatest 
number of true beliefs if it were followed’. But this can’t be right. The policy that will do best 
here is the one that tells us to believe everything. If truth is the only valuable doxastic feature, 
then there is no value to avoiding falsehood. So, if we were to believe every proposition and its 
negation, then we wouldn’t miss out on any truths, thereby maximizing what’s of epistemic 
value.11 But this is ridiculous. 
To avoid this problem, we should make a friendly amendment to TRUE. We’ll still say 
that truth is still the only valuable doxastic feature, but we’ll add a principle called 
‘NOFALSITY’, according to which believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. Call our revised 
version of TRUE – i.e., the conjunction of TRUE and NOFALSITY – ‘T&~F’. T&~F preserves 
the spirit of TRUE, if not the letter. Problem solved? 
No. Now, the most straightforward interpretation of ‘being the most truth-conducive 
                                                 
11
 Objection: We can’t believe contradictions, epistemic policies create epistemic obligations, and we aren’t 
obligated to do the impossible; so, we can’t be obligated to believe every proposition and its negation, which means 
that this policy is not in the running. Reply: It’s not at all clear to me that we can’t believe explicit contradictions. 
But even if that’s right, then we certainly can believe implicit contradictions. In other words, even if we can’t 
believe p & ~p, it’s surely the case that we can believe p and we can believe ~p.  
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epistemic policy’ is something like ‘being the policy that maximizes the ratio of truths to 
falsehoods believed’. This looks like a recipe for radical epistemic caution: if you take this policy 
seriously, then you should believe only self-evident truths. If you believe even one falsehood, 
then it doesn’t matter how many truths you believe, since your ratio of true to false beliefs will 
invariably be lower than it would have been had you believed no falsehoods at all. But as long as 
you find at least one self-evident truth (the cogito or your favorite tautology) and you believe no 
falsehoods whatever, your ratio will be as high as it possibly can be.12 
So we seem to be torn between two extremes: either radical epistemic abandon (believe 
everything) or radical epistemic caution (believe only the self-evident). You might object I’m 
assuming both more and less control over our beliefs than is plausible, ignoring: 
(a) that you can’t believe whatever you want, so you can’t believe everything (which 
is supposed to undermine my objection to TRUE), and 
 
(b) that so many of our beliefs form spontaneously, so we can’t limit ourselves to 
believing a single self-evident truth (which is supposed to undermine my 
objection to T&~F). 
 
I grant both (a) and (b), but they make no trouble for my argument. Concerning (a), is it really 
just your inability to believe everything that makes it a terrible epistemic policy? If TRUE is 
correct, then this seems to be the case. Surely it isn’t, though. Even if it were psychologically 
possible to believe indiscriminately, that would not be a way of securing justified beliefs. And 
the same point applies to (b): even if it were psychologically possible to believe only the self-
                                                 
12
 Objection: Any number over zero isn’t a ratio (it’s ill-defined); so, you would have to believe at least one 
falsehood to achieve the goal of maximizing the ratio of true to false beliefs. Reply: First, the ‘maximize the ratio’ 
formulation isn’t mine; it’s common enough in the literature: see, e.g., (Nozick 1993, 69). Second, it’s easy enough 
to recast the conversation in terms of maximizing the percentage of truths believed, in which case my argument 
stands. And third, you can still make the ratio version work. Suppose that you believe one self-evident truth and 
believe its negation; you then believe as many propositions as you can that are logically equivalent to the self-
evident truth. Since there are infinitely many of them, you can make the ratio as high as your mental capacities 
permit (and this with minimal epistemic risk). Objection: Logically equivalent propositions are equivalent, period; 
so, this solution puts your ratio at .5. Reply: Logically equivalent propositions are not equivalent, period. If they 
were, then ‘red is a color’ and ‘2 + 2 = 4’ would express the same proposition, since they both express necessary 
truths. And that’s absurd. 
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evident, would this be a good epistemic policy? If T&~F is correct, then the answer is ‘Yes’. But 
surely this would be a mistake. 
Here is a further consideration. Perhaps some beliefs are inescapable: even if we judge 
them to be false, we cannot abandon them. If there are such beliefs, though, and we indeed judge 
them to be false, then surely we can still recognize the epistemic tension that this creates. I 
suspect that something similar is the case when we judge the risk of error to be unacceptably 
high: whether or not we can actually abandon the beliefs in question, if we judge the risk of error 
to be too great, then surely we can judge them to be epistemically subpar. But when is the risk 
excessive? If TRUE is correct, then our only advice is to believe as many truths as possible; it 
follows that the risk is never excessive. If a belief is epistemically subpar just in case the risk of 
being wrong crosses some threshold, TRUE seems to suggest that we should never judge a belief 
to be epistemically subpar. Alternately, if T&~F is correct, then our only advice is to maximize 
the ratio of truths to falsehoods believed; now, the risk is excessive whenever there is a threat 
that we might not maximize that ratio, which is to say that it’s excessive whenever we believe 
what isn’t self-evident. T&~F seems to suggest, then, that we should almost always judge our 
beliefs to be epistemically subpar. So, whether supplemented with NOFALSITY or not, TRUE is 
in trouble. 
Someone might object that it’s uncharitable to articulate either TRUE or T&~F in terms 
of truth simpliciter. Rather, they should be cashed out in terms of significant truths (i.e., 
“maximize the number of significant truths believed’ or ‘maximize the ratio of significant truths 
to falsehoods believed’). I agree that it should be, but the proponents of TRUE and T&~F 
cannot. What makes some truths significant while others are not? Whatever it is, it’s something 
other than their mere truth – perhaps their usefulness, or their explanatory power, or their fit with 
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what we believed pre-theoretically, or what have you. And crucially, either the significance of a 
belief is explicable solely in terms of its truth, or it isn’t. In other words, significance is either 
extrinsically or intrinsically valuable. If it’s extrinsically valuable, then significance won’t save 
either TRUE or T&~F from the problems that I’ve been detailing, since there will never be a 
case in which significance trumps truth, thereby giving you a reason to take an epistemic risk. 
But if significance isn’t explicable solely in terms of its truth – i.e., if it’s intrinsically valuable –
then to set significance alongside truth is to reject epistemic value monism, and hence to reject 
TRUE and T&~F. 
 
5. Back to IBE 
I grant that I may have overlooked a perfectly good policy that’s based on the assumption that 
truth is the only thing of epistemic worth; if so, then TRUE’s devotees should provide it. 
Suppose they can’t. How should we diagnose the problem? Well, as I’ve indicated, rationally 
increasing your stock of beliefs beyond the self-evident requires a policy about the management 
of epistemic risk. Whatever policy you adopt, it will need to give advice having the following 
form: risk error only if…, where the ellipses stand for something else of epistemic worth. Your 
policy might be, for example, that you should risk error only if the proposition would increase 
the coherence of your belief system. Alternately, you may maintain that you should risk error 
only if the proposition in question seems to be true, absent any defeaters – this is the way taken 
by those who defend ‘phenomenal conservatism’ (e.g., (Huemer 2001)). If you go the first route, 
then you’re assigning epistemic value to coherence; if you go the second, then you’re assigning it 
to conservatism. There are no doubt plenty of other options, but they’ll all lead you to assign 
intrinsic epistemic value to something other than truth. In other words, they’ll lead you to deny 
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epistemic value monism. But now recall ATER: 
P1*: If reason r is an epistemic reason for (subject s to believe) p, then r is aimed at 
increasing the likelihood of p’s truth. 
P2*: But IBE’s reason(s) for (subject s to believe) hypothesis h are not aimed at 
increasing the likelihood of h’s truth. 
C: Therefore, the reasons given by inference to the best explanation are not epistemic 
reasons. 
 
If epistemic value monism is false, then P1* is false. So P1* is false. IBE may face a number of 
serious challenges, but ATER is not among them. 
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Title: Broken Mechanisms: Function, Pathology, and Natural Selection
Abstract: The following describes one distinct sense of ‘mechanism’ which is prevalent 
in biology and biomedicine and which has important epistemic benefits. According to this 
sense, mechanisms are defined by the functions they facilitate. This construal has two 
important implications. Firstly, mechanisms that facilitate functions are capable of 
breaking. Secondly, on this construal, there are rigid constraints on the sorts of 
phenomena ‘for which’ there can be a mechanism. In this sense, there are no 
‘mechanisms for’ pathology, and natural selection is not a ‘mechanism of’ evolution, 
because it does not serve a function. 
1
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Section 1. Introduction. The following presents a distinct sense of ‘mechanism’ that is 
prevalent in biology and biomedicine and which has important epistemic benefits. I will 
use the term ‘functional mechanism’ to describe this sense. According to this sense, a 
mechanism is defined by the function that it serves (in addition, perhaps, to other 
characteristic features such as spatial, temporal, organizational, and hierarchical 
constraints). More formally, for all X and for all Y, where X is a biological system and Y 
is a biological phenomenon, X is a mechanism for Y only if X has the function of 
facilitating Y. Strictly, this is not a definition of ‘mechanism’ but a necessary condition on 
the sense of ‘mechanism’ I wish to identify. This is a sense that has been obscured or 
overlooked in much of the new mechanism literature, though some biologists, 
psychologists, and philosophers have recognized it explicitly (Williams 1996, 9; Tooby 
and Cosmides 2006, 185; Buss 2005, 69; Moghaddam-Taaheri 2011; Moss 2012).  
There are two important implications of this characterization of mechanism. These 
implications can also be used as indicators of its presence in biological contexts. First, 
mechanisms that serve functions can break. To say that a mechanism for Y is ‘broken’ 
means that Y is its function and it fails to perform Y. Moreover, it is difficult to 
understand what else it might mean for a mechanism for Y to be ‘broken,’ rather than for 
it to cease to be a mechanism for Y. Biologists and biomedical researchers have a 
comprehensive lexicon to describe ways that mechanisms can break. A mechanism can 
‘breakdown;’ it can be ‘usurped’ or ‘coopted’ by another mechanism or biological 
process; it can be ‘interfered with’ or ‘disabled;’ it can ‘fail to function.’  Philosophers of 
the new mechanism tradition have recognized the fact that mechanisms can break, and 
2
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have described its significance for understanding causation, identifying the components 
of mechanisms, and treating disease (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson 1993, 19; Craver 2001, 
72; Glennan 2005, 448; Darden 2006, 259). Consequently, it is imperative to understand 
the commitments this involves.  
Second, functional mechanisms impose constraints on the sorts of biological phenomena 
‘for which’ there can be a mechanism. For example, in this sense of the term, there are no 
‘mechanisms for’ pathology, because a pathology in a biological system is not a function 
of any part of that biological system.1 Rather, pathologies are explicable as causal 
consequences of the breakdown of a mechanism for a function. Secondly, in this sense, 
natural selection is not a ‘mechanism’ of evolution because it does not serve a function, 
on any well-developed theory of function that is consistent with biological usage. This 
statement will be defended in Section 4. 
The following adopts a modest pluralism with regard to ‘mechanism.’ There are cases in 
which biologists and biomedical researchers use the term ‘mechanism’ without functional 
implications. In some cases, mechanism is used synonymously with ‘physical 
explanation’ (Moss 2012); in this sense of the term, it is almost trivial to say that natural 
selection is a ‘mechanism of’ evolution, just as it is a ‘mechanism of’ extinction. My 
concern, however, is that the functional sense of mechanism has been obscured by much 
1 It may be the case that there is a mechanism in some other system that performs its 
function by inducing a breakdown in a mechanism in the first system, which in turn 
causes a pathology. (I thank Joyce Havstad for this observation.)
3
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of the new mechanism literature. Glennan, for example, has insisted that ‘mechanism’ has 
no normative or teleological connotations (Glennan 1996, 52-3; 2002, 128; 2005, 445). 
Craver accepts that mechanisms serve functions but accepts an extremely liberal 
conception of function according to which the function of a system is relative to the 
interests of the research community that investigates it (see, also, MDC 2000, 6; Craver 
2001; forthcoming; Glennan 2002, 127 [fn. 6]; Glennan 2005, 456).2 Both of these 
commitments are inconsistent with the strain of biological and biomedical usage I wish to 
identify. More importantly, these commitments tend to misinterpret such usage where it 
occurs, and by doing so, they relinquish the epistemic benefits associated with this usage. 
The following also adopts a modest pluralism with respect to ‘function.’ My intention is 
not to identify a uniquely correct sense of ‘function.’ Rather, there are several concepts of 
function that are consistent with this sense of ‘mechanism,’ such as those that appeal to 
selection, design (as in the case of artefacts), or contributions to the survival, 
reproduction, or inclusive fitness of individuals.3 However, it is important to note that this 
sense of mechanism is not consistent with the causal role theory of function or its more 
2 Also see Bechtel and Richardson 1993, 17, where the ‘function’ of a part is 
characterized in terms of its causal role – that is, its contribution, in tandem with the other 
parts, to the ‘behavior’ of the system as a whole. Glennan (2005; 448) uses the term 
‘causal role’ to characterize the ‘function’ of a part. 
3 See Garson 2011; 2012, which defend a generalized account of the selected effects 
theory. 
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recent variants, according to which the function of a system’s part consists merely in its 
contribution, in tandem with the other parts of the system, to some phenomenon of 
interest to a research community. This is because the causal role theory licenses 
ascriptions of function, and hence, ascriptions of mechanism, that are inconsistent with 
much of the biological and biomedical literature, as will be shown in Sections 2 and 3. 
The view that mechanisms serve functions is not novel; G. C. Williams (1966) forcefully 
propounded it in his famous Adaptation and Natural Selection. He proposed that 
‘mechanism’ be defined in terms of function; in addition, he held that ‘functions’ are 
selected effects (ibid., 9). He maintained that ‘mechanism’ should not be used to describe 
incidental effects of a trait or physically inevitable consequences of a trait’s performing 
its function (ibid., 11-12). The reason for his insistence is that he regarded the term 
‘mechanism’ as synonymous with ‘means,’ but the latter concept is inapplicable in the 
absence of a corresponding function, goal, or purpose. Some evolutionary psychologists 
have accepted Williams’ strictures on the term ‘mechanism’ (e.g., Tooby and Cosmides 
2006, 185; Buss 2005, 69), and similar views have recently been proposed by 
Moghaddam-Taaheri (2011) and Moss (2012).4 As will be elaborated in Section 2, 
4 The difference between Moss’ view and my own is that, according to Moss, 
mechanisms need not serve functions. They need only ‘refer to’ the functions (or goals) 
of a biological system (pers. comm.) For example, in my view, there are no mechanisms 
for pathology because pathologies on the part of a system are not a function of that 
biological system. On Moss’ view, there are mechanisms for pathology because to 
describe something as a ‘mechanism for pathology’ is to make reference to the goals of a 
biological system (since, by definition, pathologies tend to undermine the ability of such 
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Williams’ usage is consistent with much contemporary biological usage as well. As a 
consequence, the working assumption that mechanisms serve functions is a useful 
heuristic for philosophers, sociologists and historians to employ in the interpretation of 
biological texts. 
Section 2 describes the prevalence of this sense of ‘mechanism’ in biology and 
biomedicine and its epistemic benefits. Sections 3 and 4 respond to two kinds of 
counterexamples that purport to show that this view is largely at odds with biological 
usage. 
Section 2. Functional Mechanisms. This section does three things. First, it shows how 
the notion of a functional mechanism provides a parsimonious explanation for how 
mechanisms can break. Second, it shows the prevalence of this sense of mechanism in 
biological and biomedical usage. Finally, it describes an important epistemic benefit of 
this usage, namely, that it maximizes the inferential coherence of biology and 
biomedicine.  
Conceptual Parsimony
The fact that (some) mechanisms can break implies that (some) mechanisms are 
normative. To say that a mechanism is ‘normative’ simply means that, where Y represents 
some biological phenomenon of interest to researchers, it is possible for something to be 
systems to realize their goals). 
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a mechanism for Y, despite the fact that it cannot perform Y. One way to explain the 
normativity of mechanism is by reference to the normativity of function. That is, to say 
that a mechanism for Y is ‘broken’ implies that has the function of facilitating Y but 
cannot do so. 
Moreover, this is a particularly good explanation for the normativity of mechanism 
because it exhibits conceptual parsimony. Although the proper explication of ‘function’ is 
controversial, there is no great mystery about how functions can be normative (see 
Garson 2008 for an overview). For example, according to the selected effects theory, to 
say that biological trait X has the function Y is to imply that X was selected for Y by a 
natural process of selection. To say that X is dysfunctional with respect to Y implies, 
amongst other things, that it cannot do Y. For another example, according to one version 
of the ‘goal-contribution’ account, the function of a trait is defined, roughly, as its 
statistically typical contribution to the survival or reproductive capacity of each member 
of the reference class that possesses that trait. To say that a trait cannot perform its 
function implies that it cannot make this contribution. 
As a consequence, philosophers have availed themselves of the concept of function in 
explaining the normativity of other biological categories, such as biological ‘information’ 
and biological trait classification. For example, for some philosophers, to say that a signal 
can carry ‘misinformation’ implies that it fails to fulfill its proper function of indicating 
the source (e.g., Dretske 1986). For another example, to say that biological trait 
classification is ‘abnormality-inclusive’ is to say that what makes a token of a trait a 
7
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member of a certain type is the fact that it possesses the function that defines the type, 
even if it is unable to perform that function (e.g., Neander 1991; Rosenberg and Neander 
2009). This observation is not necessarily an endorsement of these approaches to 
information and trait classification. The fact that appeals to the concept of function are 
plausible and defensible in other biological contexts suggests, however, that it is a 
parsimonious strategy for explaining the normativity of mechanism. Below, I will explain 
how this strategy is also quite useful in biomedicine. 
This is not to say that biologists do not sometimes use the term ‘mechanism’ in some 
other sense, one without normative connotations. However, to the extent that it makes 
sense to talk about a ‘broken’ mechanism, it is likely that the functional sense of 
‘mechanism’ is presupposed.  
Consistency with Biological Usage
Biologists routinely explain pathologies by reference to the ‘breakdown,’ ‘cooption,’ 
‘usurpation,’ or ‘interference with,’ a biological mechanism. A short list of examples can 
be used to illustrate the point: 
• “…drugs of abuse can hijack synaptic plasticity mechanisms in key brain 
circuits.” (Kauer and Malenka 2007, 844; emphasis mine)
8
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• “…drugs of abuse can co-opt synaptic plasticity mechanisms in brain circuits 
involved in reinforcement and reward processing.” (ibid.; emphasis mine)
• “Only by understanding these core synaptic mechanisms can we hope to 
understand how drugs of abuse usurp or modify them.” (ibid., 845; emphasis 
mine)
• “It is argued here that potentially irreversible impairments of synaptic memory 
mechanisms in these brain regions are likely to precede neurodegenerative 
changes that are characteristic of clinical [Alzheimer’s disease].” (Rowan et al. 
2003, 821; emphasis mine)
• “However, it is possible that a disruption of synaptic plasticity-related 
mechanisms by soluble AB also contributes to clinical symptoms.” (Ibid., 826; 
emphasis mine)
The fact that biologists often explain diseases in terms of broken mechanisms suggests 
that, for these cases, mechanisms are defined by the functions they serve. It does not 
imply that biologists always define mechanism in terms of function. But the fact that they 
sometimes do so demands an explanation. The explanation offered here is that they are 
utilizing the functional sense of mechanism. 
9
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Craver (2001; forthcoming) develops a view of the relationship between mechanism and 
function according to which mechanisms serve functions (also see Piccinini and Craver 
2011 and MDC 2000, 6). His attempt to give an explicit and lucid account of the relation 
between mechanism and function is admirable. However, his particular construal of the 
concept of function is overly liberal. I believe that Craver’s overly liberal concept of 
function has the tendency to distort biological usage in important ways, and in so doing, 
to forgo the epistemic benefits of this more restrictive use. Craver accepts a version of the 
causal role theory associated with Cummins (1975). For Craver, all that is required for an 
activity of a system (considered in toto) to constitute its function is for there to be a 
research community which takes that activity as the focus of its explanatory interest. 
Once the research community has (conventionally) selected an activity of the system to 
constitute its function, the function of each part of the system can be identified (non-
conventionally) as the contribution that it makes, in tandem with the other parts, to 
yielding the function of the system as a whole.
However, this ‘perspectival’ view of function is inconsistent with much of biological and 
biomedical usage. For example, if a research community is interested in the 
pathophysiology of Alzheimer’s disease, then, according to Craver, it would be 
appropriate, from the standpoint of that research community, to say that certain 
neurological processes have the function of producing Alzheimer’s disease, and that the 
mechanisms that carry out this function are ‘mechanisms for’ Alzheimer’s disease 
(Craver forthcoming). But Alzheimer’s disease is almost universally recognized as a 
‘dysfunction,’ and the causal processes that produce it are often described as the result of 
10
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a broken ‘mechanism for’ normal cognitive function, as indicated in the quotations 
above. I do not claim that Craver cannot develop his theory in such a way as to make 
sense of this discrepancy (see, e.g., Hardcastle 1999 for such an attempt, though I believe 
that Hardcastle’s attempt also results in function ascriptions that are inconsistent with 
biological usage). My claim, however, is that there is no correlation between the fact that 
a research community takes an interest in a phenomenon and the willingness on the part 
of the members of that community to describe that phenomenon as a ‘function’ of some 
system and the causal processes that carry out that function a ‘mechanism for’ that 
phenomenon. 
Epistemic Benefits
Lastly, and most importantly, the notion of a functional mechanism has epistemic 
benefits. It is a good habit of thought for biologists and biomedical researchers. This is 
because it maximizes the inferential coherence of biology and biomedicine. In short, 
there are many more states of an organ or organ system that are consistent with pathology 
than are consistent with normal functioning. Moreover, these pathological states typically 
can be explained as the result of broken mechanisms for normal function. This suggests 
that an efficient research strategy for pathology is to attempt to understand the (relatively) 
smaller number of mechanisms for normal function and to use that information to both 
explain the diversity of pathological states (e.g., Moghaddam-Taaheri 2011, 608-610) as 
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well as predict the existence of pathologies that may not have been discovered or the 
etiology of which is unknown. 5
For example, Lambert-Eaton syndrome and myasthenia gravis are two pathologies of the 
neuromuscular junction. The former impairs the motor neuron’s ability to release 
acetylcholine (ACh) and the latter impairs the muscle fiber’s ability to respond to ACh. A 
researcher may track the etiology of each disease by describing a separate ‘mechanism’ 
for each, replete with spatial, temporal, organizational, and hierarchical constraints. 
Alternately, he or she may track the etiology of each disease by noting that both result, in 
an explicable way, from breakdowns in the mechanism for ACh transmission in the 
neuromuscular junction. The latter is more useful because it forces the researcher to 
integrate information regarding each disease with information about how the mechanism 
normally functions, in such a way that information about the former enhances 
information about the latter, and vice versa. This is what I mean by maximizing the 
inferential coherence of biology and medicine. By the same token, many diseases, such as 
anencephaly, spina bifida, and cranioachischisis, result from various breakdowns in the 
mechanism for neurulation. Attempting to identify a separate ‘mechanism’ for each 
(again, replete with spatial, temporal, organizational, and hierarchical constraints) is less 
5 This point is also suggested in Neander (forthcoming), who argues that the practice of 
pathology is best served by characterizing pathologies as involving deviations from 
normal function. While she does not specifically discuss mechanism, I believe the same 
point can be made with regard to mechanism: pathologies are most efficiently described 
as resulting from breakdowns in functional mechanisms. 
12
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -334-
efficient than observing that all of them are explicable consequences of a breakdown in 
the same mechanism, seeking to identify that mechanism, and identifying the causal 
pathways by which breakdowns in that mechanism lead to disease. The working 
assumption that mechanisms are defined by the functions they facilitate helps to 
standardize that practice. 
I am not claiming that all pathologies can be explained currently in terms of broken 
mechanisms. This is because the mechanisms may be unknown, or the functions of those 
mechanisms may be unknown. For example, prion-related diseases were believed to be 
caused by proteins before it was known what mechanism or mechanisms they disrupt.6 
(As it turned out, the prion coopts the folding pattern of other proteins, which disrupts the 
ability of the latter to carry out their functions.) In these cases, it should be acknowledged 
that the pathology is likely the result of the breakdown of an unknown mechanism, or of 
the breakdown of a mechanism for an unknown function, rather than that there is a 
‘mechanism for’ the disease. 
I am also not claiming that knowledge of the functional mechanism is a logical or 
epistemological prerequisite for medical treatment. Rather, when such knowledge is 
available, understanding pathology in terms of broken mechanisms enhances the 
inferential coherence of the theoretical infrastructure of biomedicine, which may result in 
improved treatment for that or related pathologies. Finally, I am not claiming that one 
cannot use information about pathology to illuminate the mechanism for normal function. 
6 I thank Lindley Darden for this observation. 
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Certainly, one can use what is known about the pathology (for example, that cystic 
fibrosis is associated with mutations in the cftr gene) to assist in discovering the 
mechanisms for normal function. Once these corresponding mechanisms are known, the 
foregoing considerations suggest that viewing pathology in terms of broken mechanisms 
is theoretically and practically advantageous.
Section 3. Apparent Counterexample 1: Mechanisms for Pathology. One main 
criticism of this view is that there are many counterexamples to this usage. Though 
biologists sometimes describe disease in terms of a ‘breakdown’ of a mechanism, they 
often use the expression ‘mechanism for pathology.’ This fact can be confirmed by doing 
a search for ‘mechanism for’ in any major biological or biomedical journal. This suggests 
that, as a rule, the use of the term ‘mechanism’ is independent of considerations of 
function. 
It is true that there are numerous apparent counterexamples to this view, that is, instances 
in which biologists use the locution, ‘mechanism for pathology.’ However, this 
expression can often be seen, justifiably, as elliptical for one that has a different 
signification than that which philosophers of the new mechanism tradition would 
generally attribute to it. Specifically, when a biologist claims to have discovered a 
‘mechanism for pathology,’ that locution can often be interpreted as shorthand for the 
claim that there is a mechanistic explanation for the pathology. The term ‘mechanistic 
explanation’ is used here non-conventionally to describe an explanation that cites a 
mechanism. As argued above, pathologies typically do admit of ‘mechanistic explanation’ 
14
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in this non-conventional sense, because they can often be explained via a breakdown or 
cooptation of a mechanism and hence by reference to a mechanism. But in this sense, to 
say that there is a ‘mechanistic explanation for’ Y does not imply that there is a 
‘mechanism for’ Y. All it implies is that there is a mechanism for some function Z, and Y 
results from the breakdown of this mechanism. 
For example, two recent popular presentations of scientific articles seem to recognize the 
existence of mechanisms for pathologies.7 The first is entitled, “Team Identifies 
Mechanism of Cancer-Induced Bone Destruction;”8 the second, “A Possible Physical 
Mechanism of Cancer Metastasis.”9 However, a careful reading of the articles on which 
they are based shows that they actually support the view that mechanisms serve 
functions. For example, in the scientific article on cancer metastasis, the mechanism 
identified, and described as a ‘mechanism,’ is merely a mechanism for cell elasticity. 
This property has functional significance but can be coopted in such a way as to facilitate 
metastasis (Rolli et al. 2010). In the article on bone destruction, the mechanism 
described, and described as a ‘mechanism,’ is a mechanism for bone resorption, which 
along with bone formation performs the function of maintaining bone structure (Lynch et 
7 I thank Stuart Newman for these references. 
8 http://www.mc.vanderbilt.edu/reporter/index.html?ID=3979, accessed October 29, 
2011. 
9 http://www.nasw.org/users/mslong/2010/2010_01/Metastasis.htm, accessed October 29, 
2011.
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al. 2005). It explains bone destruction in terms of the dysregulation of the balance 
between formation and resorption. 
These articles suggest that when biologists talk of a ‘mechanism for’ pathology, the 
mechanism in question should often be understood not as a ‘mechanism for’ the 
pathology but a ‘mechanism for’ a lower-level component within a pathological system, 
which when considered on its own may have functional significance but which may be 
coopted to produce pathology. This form of explanation can loosely be called a 
‘mechanistic explanation’ because it cites a mechanism. One need not recognize 
mechanisms for pathology in order to accommodate this usage.
Despite the fact that many apparent counterexamples are not actual counterexamples, 
actual counterexamples to this view probably exist. However, the existence of actual 
counterexamples should not be taken to discredit the theory as a whole, so long as these 
counterexamples are infrequent. This is because the property of facilitating a function is 
not a necessary condition for characterizing every instance of the term ‘mechanism’ in the 
biological literature, but only a distinctive and prevalent subset. Along the same lines, 
some of the founding documents of the new mechanism tradition emphasize that the 
various definitions of ‘mechanism’ offered are not intended as necessary and sufficient 
conditions for use, but as characterizations that emerge from philosophical reflection on 
biological usage (e.g., Darden 2006, 273). The proposal offered here should be taken in a 
similar spirit. One consequence is that the mere existence of isolated counterexamples 
need not disqualify this proposal; in the same way, the fact that scientists do not always 
16
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use the term ‘mechanism’ with the rich spatial, temporal, organizational, and contextual 
constraints associated with the new mechanism tradition need not disqualify the latter. 
Explications of biological ‘mechanism’ should be judged, not in terms of their 
consistency with every conceivable instance in which a scientist uses the term, but in 
terms of the benefits and costs of accepting the proposed usage. The last section 
presented three benefits associated with the notion of a functional mechanism. The cost is 
that there may be occasional counterexamples that cannot be accommodated in the 
prescribed fashion. In order to discard this view, one would at least have to show that the 
actual (and not merely apparent) counterexamples are numerous enough to render the 
analysis largely inconsistent with biological usage, to the point where the benefits are 
outweighed by the fact that it often produces misunderstandings, that it thwarts 
philosophical attempts to understand the way biologists reason about the world, or that it 
does not constitute a good methodological strategy for biology. 
Section 4. Apparent Counterexample 2: Natural Selection as a ‘Mechanism’. 
Scientists often describe natural selection as a ‘mechanism’ of evolution (e.g., Havstad 
2011, for examples). This has produced a debate amongst philosophers of biology about 
whether natural selection is a mechanism in the sense characterized by the new 
mechanism tradition. Some have argued that it is not a ‘mechanism’ in that sense because 
it does not exhibit a unique decomposition into parts (e.g., Skipper and Millstein 2005, 
336); there is too much variability in the spatial or temporal organization of the parts 
(Ibid., 338; Havstad 2011); it fails to exhibit the kinds of activities or interactions 
17
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characteristic of mechanisms (Skipper and Millstein, 2005, 341); or the stages of natural 
selection are connected by probabilistic and non-deterministic links (Ibid., 343; also see 
Darden 2006, 278-9 and Barros 2008 for a response).
According to the sense of ‘mechanism’ sketched above, natural selection is not a 
mechanism of evolution because natural selection does not have a function. This is the 
case whether one appeals to the selected effects theory of function or the goal-
contribution theory. On the selected effects theory, something has a function only if it was 
selected for by a selection process. Natural selection itself, however, is not selected for. 
On the goal-contribution theory, the function of a trait consists in its (statistically typical) 
contribution to the goal of a biological system in which it is contained (that is, of which it 
is a component). Though natural selection can promote the evolution of such goal-
directed biological systems, it is not in any obvious sense a ‘component’ within a 
biological system. There may be another sense of the term according to which natural 
selection is a ‘mechanism,’ such as the causal role view, but as noted above, this sense is 
largely inconsistent with biological usage. The fact that there is a serious disagreement 
regarding whether or not natural selection is a ‘mechanism’ of evolution suggests that 
some of the disputants may have something like functional mechanisms in mind. 
While natural selection is not a mechanism, this would not prevent other evolutionary 
processes from having ‘mechanistic explanations’ in the functional sense. Mutations, for 
example, often result from breakdowns of mechanisms for replication, proofreading, or 
mismatch repair. Williams (1966, 125) shows admirable consistency in his use of 
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‘mechanism’ and ‘function’ when he states that mutation is not a ‘mechanism for’ 
producing offspring with new combinations of genes, because mutations do not have a 
function. It is possible that some mutations result from a functional mechanism (rather 
than a broken mechanism). There are hypothesized mechanisms for upregulating the 
mutation rate in the face of environmental stress, via, e.g., the upregulation of error-prone 
DNA polymerase Pol IV (Darden 2006, 248-267).
The notion of a functional mechanism has important implications both for philosophical 
discussions about mechanism and for biology and biomedicine. First, it highlights a 
distinct sense of ‘mechanism’ that is prevalent in biology and biomedicine and that has 
been largely neglected. Second, this sense of ‘mechanism’ maximizes the inferential 
coherence of biology and biomedicine. Third, it helps to diagnose and resolve various 
disagreements about the scope of ‘mechanism,’ specifically, whether there are 
pathological mechanisms or whether or natural selection is a mechanism. 
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Carl Craver, Lindley Darden, Blaine Ford, Joyce 
Havstad, Lenny Moss, Karen Neander, Stuart Newman, Anya Plutynski, and Eric Saidel, 
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ABSTRACT 
Many scientific models are non-representational in that they refer to merely possible 
processes, background conditions and results. The paper shows how such non-
representational models can be appraised, beyond the weak role that they might play as 
heuristic tools. Using conceptual distinctions from the discussion of how-possibly 
explanations, six types of models are distinguished by their modal qualities of their 
background conditions, model processes and model results. For each of these types, an 
actual model example – drawn from economics, biology, psychology or sociology – is 
discussed. For each case, contexts and purposes are identified in which the use of such a 
model offers a genuine opportunity to learn – i.e. justifies changing one’s confidence in a 
hypothesis about the world. These cases then offer novel justifications for modelling 
practices that fall between the cracks of standard representational accounts of models. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Philosophers’ approaches to appraising models have largely been focused on their 
representational functions. Models are representations; they are good models to the extent 
that they are good representations. Various criteria for good representations have been 
proposed, from isomorphism (van Fraasen 1980) through similarity (Giere 1988) to 
partial resemblance (Mäki 2009). The implicit assumption underlying these accounts is 
that models represent real targets – entities or properties that are found in the real world. 
Without this assumption, none of the assessment criteria for models would have much 
bite: they require comparing model properties with properties that can be independently 
observed, measured, or at least indirectly inferred. 
 
This differs notably from the way many modellers describe their own work. Instead of 
seeking to represent aspects of the real world, they claim to be aiming at constructing 
possible or parallel worlds that may give relevant insights about the real world in more 
indirect ways (for an elaboration oft his view, see Sugden 2000). In particular, they claim 
that these model constructions involve reference to possible processes, possible 
background conditions, and even possible phenomena or properties. Let me call such 
models non-representational models. Crucially, modellers claim that non-
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representational models (at least sometimes) offer a genuine contribution to our 
knowledge about the real world. 
 
Philosophers, if they treat such cases at all, have by and large appraised such non-
representational models as playing merely a heuristic role, for example in “conceptual 
exploration” (Hausman 1992), “getting acquainted with mechanisms” (Hartmann 1995), 
“define the extreme of a continuum of cases” (Wimsatt 2007), or facilitating “creative 
thought” (Holyoak & Thagart 1995). This heuristic justification is weak, because success 
criteria for such functions are unclear in the extreme. Furthermore, it places the use of 
non-representational models in the same category as taking a walk, reading the 
newspaper, or whatever else scientists do in order to inspire themselves to novel theory 
development. Bunching non-representational modelling together with practices that 
cannot be rationally accounted for seems an unsatisfactory state, which this paper seeks 
to repair. 
 
Section 2 offers a characterisation of learning from models, and what kind of hypotheses 
might be learned from non-representational models. Section 3 employs conceptual 
distinctions from the discussion of how-possibly explanation, in order to analyse different 
kinds of possibility claims made with non-representational models. Six kinds of non-
representational models will emerge. Section 4 illustrates each kind with a concrete 
scientific model, and argues that in particular contexts and for specific purposes one 
learns from each. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Learning from Models  
Modelling is a set of reasoning practices for cognitively limited beings (Wimsatt 2007). 
The inferences one can legitimately draw from scientific models are inferences from 
information already contained in one’s set of beliefs.
1
 An ideal Bayesian agent would 
have no use for scientific models. Being very much unlike ideal Bayesian agents, humans 
often have to rely on models to justify some of their beliefs.  
 
It is in this sense that we can learn from models. Models facilitate their users in making 
inferences from their own background beliefs. If these inferences affect the model user’s 
beliefs about some other hypothesis, then the model user learned from the model. 
Learning from a model M, I suggest, is constituted by a change in confidence in certain 
hypotheses, justified by reference to M.  
 
                                                
1
 Including beliefs one accepts only tentatively, e.g. for the purpose of a thought experiment.  
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We do not learn from models in the same way as we learn from straightforward 
observation. Although observation (of the model) is often part of modelling, we 
ultimately do not want to learn about the model artefact, but about the real world. Thus 
the learning I will focus on in this paper concerns changes in confidence in a hypothesis 
about the world. 
 
With representational models this is accomplished by (i) investigating certain properties 
of the model and (ii) establishing that the model is a sufficiently accurate representation 
of a (real world) target, in order to license an inference from model to target. 
Aerodynamic behaviour of a scale model of a new type of airplane, for example, is 
investigated in a wind tunnel. It is then concluded that an actual airplane of that type has 
similar properties, given that scale model and actual plane are sufficiently similar with 
respect the proportions of their hull elements, the geometry of their wings, etc. If the 
model user believes in the truth of the model investigation and the sufficient similarity 
between model and target, and her prior beliefs about the plane’s aerodynamics are not 
identical to the model result, then she has learned from the model about the world. 
  
I claim that one can similarly learn from non-representational models. That is, reference 
to non-representational models may justify changing one’s confidence in some 
hypothesis about the world. By definition, this cannot be accomplished by a belief in the 
model being a sufficiently accurate representation of a (real world) target. Instead, the 
inference from model to hypothesis must be licensed differently. I will argue that typical 
beliefs that license such inferences are those that consider certain background conditions 
or certain processes “possible”, or “credible” (Sugden 2000). Hypotheses whose 
confidence change is justified through reference to such models include the following 
types:  
 
• That an entity or property is possible. A special case of this is the hypothesis that 
something is impossible in the actual world. 
• That a process yields a property. A special case of this is the hypothesis that an 
actual process does or does not have the capacity (in non-actual circumstances) to 
bring about a certain property. 
• That an entity or property possibly is a cause of an actual phenomenon 
 
Of course, such hypotheses do not make claims about particular actual entities or about 
properties instantiated in the real world. To justify changes in such hypotheses would 
require models that represented these entities or properties sufficiently well. 
Nevertheless, these hypotheses are about the world. Reflecting on the impact of such 
hypotheses on explanation or control supports this claim. Consider for example: 
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• A policy maker seeking to reduce urban segregation might change her policies 
upon learning that racist preferences are not a necessary cause of segregation. 
• A scientists seeking to explain a population dynamic might change his explanatory 
strategy when learning that this dynamic cannot be produced from actual background 
conditions with a set of plausible migration decision rules alone.  
• A policy maker who learns that preferences for reciprocation are adaptive under 
certain possible conditions might change her evaluation of certain institutional 
regulations.  
 
Thus, changes in confidence of hypotheses of the above kind affect the ways we seek to 
explain and control the actual world. If non-representational models would justify 
changes in the confidence of such hypotheses, one would learn from such models about 
the world. 
 
 
3. How-Possibly Explanations 
Schematically, a model consists of a set of initial conditions Q, a model process P and a 
model result R, derived from this process and the initial conditions. One learns from such 
a model if R affects one’s confidence in a hypothesis about the world. In the case of 
representational models, this may be because Q and P are sufficiently similar to a target 
to consider R relevant for that target, and hence information contained in R relevant for 
the confidence one has in hypotheses about the target. In the case of non-representational 
models, this may be because Q and P are at least considered possible, plausible or 
credible enough to consider R a relevant possibility. Considering R a relevant possibility 
then may affect one’s confidence in certain hypotheses.  
 
What part of a model is considered merely possible (rather than actual) and what kind of 
possibility is meant here will crucially influence whether the model result is considered a 
relevant possibility. It is therefore helpful to analyse different model types by the 
different possibility claims they contain. Here the extant literature on how-possibly 
explanations is very instructive. This literature controversially discusses what 
characterises how-possibly explanations, what distinguishes them from how-actually, 
potential, or how-possible explanations, and whether how-possibly explanations are 
explanations at all. In this paper, I eschew these controversies. Instead I use the 
conceptual distinctions offered by this debate to categorise different kinds of models, and 
to elicit the purposes and contexts in which the respective model types might offer 
learning opportunities.  
 
The debate commences with Dray’s (1957) claim that how-possibly explanations have a 
different aim and a different structure from how-actually explanations. How-possibly 
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explanations aim at giving an account how events that are considered impossible could 
have happened. How-actually explanations, in contrast, aim at accounting for how actual 
events have happened. Furthermore, Dray argues that how-possibly explanations rebut 
the impossibility of the explanandum by giving a necessary condition for its occurrence. 
He contrasts this with actual explanations offering sufficient conditions for their 
explanada. Reiner (1993) has criticised Dray’s account, pointing out that how-possibly 
explanations do not really identify necessary conditions of the explanadum, but rather 
necessary parts of a sufficient condition for the explanadum.  
 
This distinction is relevant for the present analysis. Actual explanation requires the 
identification of true (sufficient parts of) causes that brought about the explanadum.   
Representational models are one mode of identifying and representing these causes. 
How-possibly explanations, in contrast, identify elements of possible causes for an 
explanadum. Models can represent such possible causes – and hence contribute to how-
possible explanations – without representing real-world targets. How-possibly 
explanations, in Dray and Reiner’s sense, give non-representational models a purpose.   
 
More recently, how-possibly explanations have been interpreted not in contrast to how-
actual explanations, but rather as their precursors. According to this view, how-possibly 
explanations are similar to how-actually explanations, in that they satisfy most 
explanatory virtues, but they are inferior in that they lack adequate empirical support 
(Resnik 1991, 143). In particular, they are reasonably complete, showing how the 
explanadum was generated through a process from initial and background conditions. But 
process and background conditions are not well supported empirically, so that the 
account offers a mere possible, partial or potential explanation. 
 
One may disagree whether Resnik’s type should fall into the category “how-possibly 
explanation” (for a negative view, see Forber 2010). What is clear, though, is that non-
representational model often serve the purpose that Resnik describes, and that this 
purpose is different from the one Dray and Reiner identify. First, models serving 
Resnik’s type of how-possibly explanation will yield a result that represents a real-world 
target – otherwise, the similarity to how-actually explanations would not even arise. 
Models serving Dray-Reiner type how-possibly explanations, on the other hand, may 
yield results that do not represent real-world targets. Second, models for Resnik-type 
how-possibly explanations must be “reasonably complete” in order to be turned into how-
actual explanations when empirical evidence for their similarity to some real-world target 
is forthcoming. No such requirement is imposed on models for Dray-Reiner type how-
possibly explanations. They may serve their purpose of rebutting impossibilities with a 
rather sketchy structure, singling out only certain possible processes or background 
conditions. 
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Dray type how-possibly explanations focus on identifying some conditions that show the 
possibility of the explanadum. Another kind of how-possible explanation instead focus on 
indicating the sort of process through which the explanadum took place (Reiner 1993). 
Consecutive authors point out that this may consist in a mere proposal of a possible 
mechanism, or alternatively in providing a partial mechanism that in fact had the 
explanandum as outcome. In the latter case, the actual mechanism that produced the 
explanadum is identified, but in a way insufficient “to see more how the explanadum 
phenomenon was produced” (Persson 2011). Both purposes are served by non-
representational models – the first by a model presenting a possible process, the second 
by a model presenting an actual process without sufficient causal detail, under possible 
background conditions.  
 
Finally, Forber (2010) distinguishes between global and local how-possibly explanation. 
Global how-possibly explanations account for the possibility that an idealised object has 
a certain property, produced by a possible process from possible background conditions. 
Their purpose is to investigate the capabilities of general model processes (Forber 2010, 
33). Local how-possibly explanations, in contrast, account for the possibility of a real 
target object having a certain property, produced by a possible process from actual 
background conditions. Their purpose is to guide speculation on how a particular model 
process can produce actual target properties. Forber’s distinction thus points to a 
difference between non-representational models with an abstract result, and those with a 
concrete result. 
 
Let me summarise. Non-representational models have a number of distinct purposes, 
which have been discussed in the philosophical literature under the heading of “how-
possibly explanation”. As the analysis of some of the key controversies in this literature 
showed, this notion contains a number of disparate scientific objectives – some of them 
explanatory, some offering other forms of epistemic gain, some merely heuristic. 
Crucially, these different purposes are served by different kinds of non-representational 
models. These models kinds can be distinguished by the modalities of the model result, 
the model process and the initial conditions. Keeping things simple and merely 
distinguishing between actual and possible (non-actual) processes and initial conditions, 
and concrete and abstract model results, we get six different kinds of non-representational 
models.
2
 In the next section, I discuss each of these six non-representational models at the 
hand of an example, showing how in particular situations and for particular purposes, one 
can learn from each.  
                                                
2
 Excluding both the representational model with actual initial conditions, actual process and concrete 
model result, as well as the representational model with actual initial conditions, actual process and abstract 
model result. 
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4. Six Cases of Learning from Non-Representational Models 
My preceding abstract discussion leaves many ambiguous cases – a model may contain, 
say, some merely possible initial conditions, and still represent the workings of an actual 
process producing some abstract actual property (as e.g. Mäki 2009 argues). Whether 
such a case is to be counted as a representational or non-representational model will 
depend on the interpretation of the intentions of the modeller and the objectives of the 
models’ users. Instead of debating this in the abstract, it will be perhaps more fruitful to 
discuss the issue of learning from non-representational models at the hand of concrete 
examples. 
 
In the following, I give examples for each of these six kinds of non-representational 
models. For each case, I identify contexts and purposes in which these respective models 
offer an opportunity to learn about the world.  
 
i. Possible initial conditions, possible process, abstract result 
Axtell and Epstein’s (1996) sugarscape is a set of models consisting of agents with 
individual rates of metabolism and fields of vision, a two-dimensional (51x51 cell) grid 
which contains different amounts of sugar on each cell, and rules governing the 
interaction of the agents with each other and the environment. In every step agents look 
around, find the closest cell filled with sugar, move and metabolize. If their sugar level is 
below their metabolism rate, they die. Harvested cells grow back one unit of sugar per 
time period. Using this basic set-up, Axtell and Epstein construct a model of migration, 
where agents’ maximum vision is 10, and all agents are initially clustered together in one 
rectangular block in the southwest the grid. The authors do not claim that either the initial 
conditions of the model or the processes established by the model rules represent any 
actual target; they thus propose a non-representational model with merely possible 
background conditions and process.  
 
Axtell and Epstein’s model produces “waves of migration”: a group of agents move 
outward in north-easterly direction from the initial cluster. Only when this group has 
progressed a considerable distance does the next group follow them. Although they 
mention wavelike movements in some mammal herds and economic “herding” as target 
for other models, they do not argue that the result of their model represents any such 
actual case. Instead, their result is a mere abstract pattern that might be instantiated in the 
real world.  
 
And yet, one might learn from this model. Axtell and Epstein write that the model 
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produced “a phenomenon we did not expect” (Axtell and Epstein 1996, 42). Then they 
analyse the waves as produced by the interplay of food search and consumption by 
agents, and the slow regrowth of sugar; and they analyse the northeast direction of the 
migration (a direction in which single agents cannot move) as produced by “a complex 
interweaving of agents” (ibid.). The model thus justifies reducing one’s confidence in the 
hypothesis that waves of migration cannot arise from mere food dynamics or that they 
cannot go in directions single agents cannot move. Because such patterns might be 
instantiated in the real world, such hypotheses are hypotheses about the real world. 
Anyone who had high confidence in these hypotheses (like apparently the authors 
themselves) learned from this model.   
 
ii. Actual initial conditions, possible process, abstract result 
Schelling’s (1971) checkerboard model produces an abstract pattern of spatial 
segregation that he claims can be found in many cities, but which is not associated with 
any concrete settlement or even type of settlement. Schelling produces this abstract result 
with two types of tokens, initially distributed randomly over a checkerboard. Tokens 
move according to an iterated rule until no more movements occur. The rule is this. For a 
given token, if more than half of the tokens on (Moore-) neighbouring fields are of a 
different type, then this token will move to another vacant field with less than half of the 
neighbouring fields occupied with tokens of the other type. Schelling neither claims this 
process to represent an actual migration process, nor the checkerboard to represent an 
actual neighbourhood. But he claims that the process is started by an actual initial 
condition, namely the (non-racist) preference of individuals not to be in the minority. It is 
the one aspect of his model that he seeks to connect with the actual world, citing 
behavioural examples from restaurants, clubs and classrooms. Schelling’s checkerboard 
model thus is a non-representational model with many possible and one actual initial 
condition, a possible process and an abstract result. 
 
We learn from Schelling’s model because it shows the possible production of an abstract 
pattern (a segregation of the two types of tokens on the checkerboard) from possible and 
one actual background condition and a possible process. In the context of spatial 
residential segregation, where the abstract segregation pattern might be realised, this 
possible production result is of particular importance: until then it was widely believed 
that racist preferences were a necessary cause of segregation. Schelling’s model shows 
that segregation patterns might be produced by another cause, which is an actual 
condition in many real-world populations: namely the preference no to be in the minority. 
The model result thus justified changing one’s confidence in hypotheses about racist 
preferences being a necessary cause of segregation. Anyone who had high confidence in 
such hypotheses learned from Schelling’s checkerboard model.  
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iii. Possible initial conditions, actual process, abstract result 
Güth’s (1995) indirect evolutionary approach offers a model of preference evolution, 
which produces preferences for reciprocity. The model starts with a population of agents, 
who have different preferences over objects of choice (e.g. consumption bundles or 
behavioural strategies). Agents’ rational choices then are determined according to their 
preferences, so that different preferences lead to different choices. Depending on their 
choice (and the environment in which the choice is made), an agent will have greater or 
lesser reproductive success than other agents with different preferences and hence 
different choices. Assuming that preferences are inherited, differential reproduction of 
agents then leads to differential replication of preferences in the population. Clearly, the 
background conditions of this model, in particular the distribution of preferences in the 
population, and the differential reproductive success of certain choices, are mere 
possibilities. The process by which the model result is produced, however, is an actual 
process, namely natural selection through differential reproduction. It has clear 
instantiations both in the domains of cultural and biological evolution. The result – 
preferences for reciprocation – are only described in abstract terms, and Güth makes no 
attempt to link it to concrete real-world targets. Nevertheless, one can learn from Güth’s 
model. It shows that preferences with certain abstract properties
3
 can be produced 
through selection in non-actual circumstances. That is, anyone who with high confidence 
believed that reciprocation, fairness or trust cannot be adaptive traits has good reason to 
change his belief when confronted with this model. 
 
iv. Possible initial conditions, possible process, concrete result 
Ainslie’s (2001) feedback model of self-control produces a concrete result: the moderate 
impulsivity of human choices in the absence of precommitment devices, exemplified for 
example in the considerable number of addicts, most of whom eventually overcome their 
addiction. Ainslie produces this result with a possible description of delayed human value 
as an inverse proportion of delay, and a possible process of recursive self-prediction – 
prediction that is fed back to the on-going choice process. This description of value (also 
known as hyperbolic discounting) was first developed in order to account for impulsive 
choice, and hence is considered an actual initial condition by some. Yet the moderate 
impulsivity of human choice has led many to doubt that humans actually discount future 
value hyperbolically. It is exactly the aim of Ainslie’s model to show that the hyperbolic 
description is compatible with moderate impulsiveness, by directly stoking it on the one 
hand, and by indirectly moderating it through a process of self-prediction that arises from 
this hyperbolic form itself. In the model, Ainslie thus intentionally casts the hyperbolic 
shape as a mere possibility. Furthermore, Ainslie readily admits that the process of 
recursive self-prediction is inaccessible to controlled experiment, and hence remains a 
                                                
3
 In this case reciprocation, but in related papers Güth also produces preference for fairness and trust. 
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mere possibility.  
 
Interestingly, in Ainslie’s model, the proposed process of recursive self-prediction arises 
as a reaction to hyperbolic discounting, and it acts on future choices in the way often 
described as an effect of “the will” or “volition”. Thus, one learns from Ainslie’s model 
in two ways. First, the model justifies a change in confidence in the hypothesis that 
intertemporal behavioural data is incompatible with a hyperbolic shape of discounting. 
Second, the model justifies a change in confidence in the hypothesis that self-control can 
grow “from the bottom up” – from reactions to the hyperbolic shape of discounting. In 
Ainslie’s words: “a small number of selected thought experiments yield a valid rejection 
of the null hypothesis – that contingent self-prediction is unnecessary for volition” 
(Ainslie 2009, 145). All those who had low confidence in such a claim learned from the 
failure of this model. 
 
v. Actual initial conditions, possible process, concrete result 
Axtell’s et al. (2002) Anasazi model fails to produce a historically documented 
population dynamic of a settlement in the US southwest from soil and meteorological 
data, through any member of a set of possible migration decision processes of the 
modelled people. These possible decision processes involved rules whether to reproduce, 
to split up households, or to leave the settlement, given harvest levels. The model thus 
seeks to produce a concrete, actual phenomenon from actual initial conditions through a 
set of possible model processes. One can learn from this model by learning from its 
failure.  
 
In particular, reference to the model justifies changing one’s confidence in the hypothesis 
that the Anasazi’s migration decisions based on subsistence considerations was sufficient 
to produce the exodus of the Anasazi around 1400 AD. Axtell’s et al. model shows that 
with plausible processes, such a result cannot be produced from the actual conditions. 
Therefore, the model justifies increasing one’s confidence in the belief that another 
capacity (cultural “pull factors” as the authors call it, in contrast to subsistence 
consideration “push factors”) must be included in a model to produce the actual 
population dynamics from the initial conditions. 
 
vi. Possible initial conditions, actual process, concrete result 
Trivers (1971) reciprocal behaviour model produces a concrete actual result, the 
particular behavioural patterns exhibited by cleaner fish (labroides dimidiatus) and their 
hosts. To this end, it employs an actual process, frequency-dependent selection, which is 
found in many instances of biological and cultural evolution. Cleaner and host, so Trivers 
argues, are engaged in a indefinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma game, where the gains 
of cooperation (i.e. the cleaner cleans and the host does not eat the cleaner) are 
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sufficiently high to ensure differential reproductive success over unilateral defection. 
However, Trivers’ model does not employ actual, but rather possible background 
conditions. In fact, the very purpose of Trivers’ model is to identify initial conditions that 
would license a selection explanation of reciprocal behaviour between cleaner and host. 
These include: 
 
“. . . that hosts suffer from ectoparasites; that finding a new cleaner may be 
difficult or dangerous; that if one does not eat one’s cleaner, the same cleaner can 
be found and used a second time; that cleaners live long enough to be used 
repeatedly by the same host; and if possible, that individual hosts do, in fact, reuse 
the same cleaner” (Trivers, 1971, 41). 
 
That Trivers list these conditions in this way makes clear that his model is a non-
representational model with merely possible initial conditions. Yet one learns from this 
model: it gives one good reasons to change one’s confidence in hypotheses about what 
the necessary conditions are for reciprocal behaviour between cleaner and host to be an 
adaptive trait.   
 
 
5. Conclusions 
I have argued that one might justify non-representational models by showing that one 
learns from them about the world. I did not claim that one can learn from every non-
representational model, and therefore that every non-representational model is justified. 
Instead, I described a possible way of appraising them, which is stronger than merely 
justifying them as heuristic tools.  
 
To this end, I characterised learning as justifying a change in confidence in certain 
hypotheses about the world. I then discussed a number of hypotheses relating to 
possibility claims, and argued that changing one’s confidence in any of them would affect 
the way scientists and policy makers seek to explain and control the actual world. These 
hypotheses, although relating to possibility claims, thus are about the world.  
 
To analyse different kinds of possibility claims made with non-representational models, I 
employed conceptual distinctions from the discussion of how-possibly explanation. Six 
kinds of models emerged, distinguished by the modality of their background conditions, 
processes and results. Each of these kinds I illustrated with a concrete scientific model. In 
particular contexts and for specific purposes, I argued, one could learn from each of 
them. By demonstrating this, I showed that it is possible to justify each type of non-
representational models, in particular contexts and for specific purposes. This concludes 
my argument. 
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1. Inference to the Best Explanation and the Threat of Vacuity 
To illustrate the advantage of „inference to the best explanation‟ (henceforth, IBE) over 
enumerative induction, Harman (1965, 90-1) invites us to consider inferences from 
samples to populations and the question of “when a person is and when he is not 
warranted in making the inference from “All observed A‟s are B‟s” to “All A‟s are B‟s””. 
Harman continues: 
 The answer is that one is warranted in making this inference whenever the 
 hypothesis that all A‟s are B‟s is (in the light of all the evidence) a better, simpler, 
 more plausible (and so forth) hypothesis than is the hypothesis, say, that someone 
 is biasing the observed sample in order to make us think that all A‟s are B‟s.  
Clearly we can posit various reasons for why all the observed A‟s were also B‟s. It might 
be that “All A‟s are B‟s”; someone could have purposefully manipulated the sample to 
deceive us; perhaps our method for selecting subjects ensures, or makes it likely that, we 
will observe only those A‟s that are also B‟s, and so on. Furthermore, and equally 
patently, the actual reason for the observed regularity will be different in different cases. 
We observe only male drones, because all drones are male. Water that‟s pumped through 
an effective filter will contain no contaminants above a certain size; the absence of 
contaminants from the original water supply, however, often will not be the reason that 
the filtered water is pure. Harman supposes that such reasons can function as 
explanations. Let‟s concede that for now. Faced with competing explanations for an 
observed regularity Harman urges us to infer to the truth (or approximate truth) of 
whichever explanation is best. 
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Harman‟s proposal is thoroughly sensible – we should infer that hypothesis which is 
“better” and “more plausible”.1 However, without some guidance concerning how we 
identify the best, from competing explanations, and Harman has named a problem but not 
solved it. Insofar as IBE is regarded as a substantive theory of confirmation, its advocates 
can‟t rest content with an interpretation that advises only to infer that conclusion which is 
most plausible. Seemingly though Harman‟s phrase is sufficiently seductive, and has 
become sufficiently well-entrenched, that it is now hard to appreciate how vacuous the 
advice really is. Had Harman suggested we infer „that hypothesis which seems most 
plausible in light of all available evidence‟, the attenuated condition of the suggestion 
would perhaps be more immediately apparent. If inferring to the best explanation is 
different, for Harman, it‟s hard to see how. On inspection, inference to the best 
explanation can appear quite insipid.  
Lipton (2004), cognizant of the problem, offers a general means of responding. 
Unfortunately his development of that response opens him to critical objections, or so I‟ll 
argue in Section 2. The problems with Lipton‟s response trace to a failure to identify 
explanatory virtues, as distinct from virtues of the hypotheses that feature in the 
explanation. This diagnosis leaves room for a successful defense of IBE that utilizes 
Lipton‟s general strategy, but insists on peculiarly explanatory virtues, burdening 
advocates for IBE with the task of identifying such. Turning to the work of Woodward 
                                                          
1
 Harman does, in addition, suggest that better explanations are simpler, less ad hoc, and 
explain more. However, these concepts are insufficiently well-defined to provide helpful 
guidance in the face of competing explanations. 
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(for example, Woodward (2003)), I‟ll argue in Section 3 that distinctive explanatory 
virtues are apparent within the sciences and, furthermore, that it is not implausible to 
suggest that these reliably guide theory choice. Part of Woodward‟s project involves 
discriminating descriptions from explanations. An implication of this distinction is that 
Harman‟s example, above, might fall outside the scope of IBE, a possibility I discuss and 
welcome in Section 4. The purpose of the paper is not a complete defense of explanatory 
reasoning, but an attempt to motivate two important pieces of the groundwork: first, to 
urge that IBE requires the identification of explanatory virtues, and can‟t rely on the 
theoretical virtues of those hypotheses that are centrally involved in an explanation; 
second, to suggest that IBE has a limited scope, for purposes of understanding ampliative 
reasoning, which we might move some ways towards delineating by distinguishing 
descriptions from explanations. 
2. Loveliness, Likeliness, Matching, Guiding 
Concerned that IBE avoid appearing trite, Lipton responds in part by distinguishing two 
senses of „best explanation‟. The likeliest explanation, for Lipton, is that which is most 
likely to be correct. Informed that two theories each explain some phenomenon, we 
establish the likeliest explanation by evaluating which theory is best supported by 
available evidence. To infer to the likeliest explanation we needn‟t attend to anything 
about the explanations themselves; it is the well confirmedness of the respective theories 
that matters. The loveliest explanation, in contrast, can‟t be determined by attending to 
the merits of the underlying theory. Lipton suggests that the loveliest explanation 
“provides the most understanding”. White (2005), endorsing Lipton‟s distinction, 
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suggests that explanations are often valued for “the degree of satisfaction” they deliver; 
explanations might disappoint because they are implausible, but also and alternatively 
because they can be “deeply unsatisfying”. Having made this conceptual distinction, 
Lipton and White each suggest that IBE is a potentially important tool for investigating 
inductive reasoning, because explanatory loveliness might prove a reliable guide to 
explanatory likeliness. If this connection between loveliness and likeliness is real, we 
could justifiably appeal to the loveliness of an explanation for purposes of defending 
conclusions about which theory or hypothesis is most plausible, at least in some 
circumstances.  
One concern with the proposal, as described, is that the concepts of understanding and 
satisfaction threaten to introduce a worryingly subjective dimension. What helps one 
person understand some phenomenon might differ from what helps another; explanations 
satisfy some folks, but not others. Judgments about differences in explanatory quality that 
ride on these kinds of consideration are unreliable markers of underlying plausibility. 
Lipton at least is careful to distance himself from overly psychological interpretations of 
the relevant concepts, but we can avoid such connotations altogether since the basic 
distinction suffices. Explanations can be evaluated in terms of the plausibility of the 
theory that motivates them, or in terms of features that are peculiar to explanations and 
independent of associated theories. In what follows I‟ll use the phrase „explanatory 
virtue‟ to denote the latter. IBE avoids the charge of triviality by distinguishing 
explanatory virtues from the overall merits of a theory, and defining the rule as an 
inference based on the former; the plausibility of the rule, at least if it‟s understood 
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normatively, hinges on whether explanatory virtues reliably guide us towards a proper 
evaluation of available theories. 
In furtherance of his claim that explanatory virtues need not be subjective, Lipton 
suggests simplicity, provision of mechanisms, scope, precision, among others, as 
appropriate measures of explanatory loveliness. None are unproblematic concepts, as 
Lipton concedes. Nevertheless, attaching loveliness here helps remove any lingering 
specter of subjectivity. Barnes (1995) protests, however, that these are not reliable guides 
to underlying plausibility. Suppose we have two competing explanations, but only one 
provides a mechanism. Whether we prefer the mechanistic explanation depends on the 
independent plausibility of the mechanism, suggests Barnes, rather than any intrinsic 
value in describing mechanisms. Lipton offers no obvious means of evaluating 
mechanistic hypotheses, but providing them can‟t be a reliable means of improving an 
explanation, or choosing between competing explanations, because even contrived and 
outrageous suggestions about the underlying mechanism describe a mechanism. Barnes 
raises similar complaints against the other putative explanatory virtues that Lipton 
describes. 
Against the first edition of Lipton‟s book Barnes objections seem pertinent. Lipton (1991) 
asserts that “mechanism and precision are explanatory virtues” (118), “unification makes 
for lovely explanations” (119) and suggests that elegance and simplicity are also qualities 
of explanatory loveliness (68). He further argues that by attending to these qualities we 
are typically, reliably directed to the most plausible hypothesis. Lipton is unfortunately 
silent, however, on the issue of how we should balance the pursuit of these various 
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virtues, which might pull in opposing directions. If each virtue is evaluated in isolation, 
then Barnes objections are critical: discriminating purely on the basis of the presence or 
absence of a mechanism, for example, will often warrant an implausible inference. If, on 
the other hand, Lipton intends us to weigh all explanatory virtues and reach an 
appropriate balance between them, then his failure to describe how this should be 
conducted leaves the account disconcertingly obscure. Lipton‟s earlier defense is either 
reasonably transparent, but implausible, or quite opaque. However, Lipton‟s defense 
shifts between the two editions of his book. In the more recent he argues explicitly for a 
correspondence between theoretical and explanatory virtues, then argues independently, 
and on empirical grounds, that we in fact use the latter to evaluate the former. What is 
discussed as “matching” and “guiding” in the later edition are not distinguished in the 
earlier. Lipton hereby implies that the likeliest and loveliest explanations will each 
provide the best balance of various virtues, although again Lipton provides no guidance 
on how we are to recognize the best trade-off. Given Lipton‟s new strategy it becomes 
hard to accuse him of proposing an unreliable rule of inference, since it‟s a rule that by 
definition should guide us towards that conclusion which best instantiates all those 
theoretical virtues that are typically assumed important. The problems with Lipton‟s new 
strategy lie elsewhere. 
One prominent theme in Lipton‟s book is that IBE describes our inferential practices 
better than alternative accounts. Lipton claims such advantages over Bayesianism, 
hypothetico-deductivism and Mill‟s methods of causal reasoning. Deficiencies with each, 
in terms of how well they describe our inferential practices, suggest either their 
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replacement with IBE or, in the case of Bayesianism, augmentation with explanatory 
considerations. These comparative claims have been challenged. Rappaport (1996) 
defends Mill‟s methods against Lipton‟s concerns. Bird (2007) argues that Lipton‟s 
objections are largely ineffective against hypothetico-deductivism. Douven (2005) argues 
that Lipton says too little about how and why Bayesians should build explanatory 
considerations into their framework. Furthermore, even if we concede that IBE better 
describes our inferential tendencies, we don‟t thereby achieve any normative justification 
for explanatory reasoning. What Lipton does say about the normativity of the rule is 
uninspiring.  
According to Lipton‟s matching claim, explanatory reasoning is justified since 
explanatory considerations direct us towards that hypothesis which is most precise, has 
greatest scope, and so on, which Lipton suggests render that hypothesis most probable. 
However, Lipton offers little by way of analysis for these theoretical virtues. 
Consequently, because they‟re notoriously vague, and because it‟s hard to justify why 
they matter for purposes of confirmation, and because we don‟t know how to balance 
these often competing qualities against one another, Lipton leaves many hostages to 
fortune. The justification for explanatory reasoning is entirely derivative, and it is 
derivative on something that‟s worryingly vague. There is no answer as to why we should 
value a rule that directs us towards the simplest hypothesis, other things being equal. 
However, we might reasonably expect that if a theory of confirmation is going to place a 
premium on considerations of simplicity, then it should justify that decision. Leaving so 
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many concepts unanalyzed might leave us again wondering whether there‟s any real 
substance to IBE.  
The failure to more carefully define these concepts becomes problematic again when we 
turn to Lipton‟s guiding principle. It is suggested both that, as an empirical matter, we 
tend to be impressed by explanatory considerations and, when confronted with competing 
explanations, it is the simpler, more precise, and so on, that is inferred. However, there is 
no obvious reason to suppose that the sense of simplicity that I employ when making a 
judgment about competing explanations will be the same sense that might prove a 
justified means of adjudicating between competing hypotheses.2 A normative justification 
for Lipton‟s account requires either that we offer distinct analyses of explanatory and 
theoretical simplicity, then argue that explanatory simplicity is a reliable guide to 
theoretical simplicity, or we stipulate that simplicity has the same sense in each context. 
The former strategy is far from straightforward. The latter makes it much more difficult to 
argue that we in fact prefer simpler explanations, in the relevant sense and other things 
                                                          
2
 For example, in curve-fitting problems it has been argued that introducing additional 
adjustable parameters is appropriate only if will improve the predictive accuracy of the 
curve. If we define simplicity in terms of the number of adjustable parameters, then we 
justify a role for simplicity within certain well-defined contexts (see Forster and Sober 
(1994)). However, the balance between fit and number of parameters emerges from a 
non-obvious mathematical theorem. It seems unlikely that any „intuitive‟ sense of 
simplicity that we might employ in evaluating explanations should guide us towards 
hypotheses that are more simple in this respect. 
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being equal. Maintaining both the guiding principle and a normatively justified 
interpretation of IBE becomes less plausible. 
Hopes of preserving the normative dimension of IBE are further degraded when Lipton 
appeals to data from cognitive psychology. For example, Lipton describes the results of 
work conducted by Kahneman and Tversky, which demonstrated our propensity for 
committing the conjunction fallacy. (Asked to identify which event was most probable, 
given some scenario, many subjects committed the error of supposing a conjunction of 
two events can be more probable than one of the conjuncts.) Lipton offers this as 
evidence both that we are not good at Bayesian updating and that explanatory 
considerations play an important role in how we reason. An obvious concern is that 
Lipton‟s interpretation of the result provides an immediate example of explanatory 
reasoning that is unreliable. Lipton responds that in circumstances more complicated than 
those described by Kahneman and Tversky explanatory reasoning might be more reliable, 
but offers no evidence to support the conjecture.  
In summary, Lipton argues that explanatory loveliness is both a reliable guide to 
explanatory likeliness, because considerations like simplicity and scope are features of 
more probable hypotheses and more virtuous explanations, and an important aspect of our 
inferential practices. However, the connections between these theoretical virtues and the 
plausibility of a given hypothesis are sufficiently vague that it is hard to admit them into a 
theory of confirmation as brute facts. The argument also requires us to concede that our 
natural proclivities, when evaluating explanations, will draw on similar considerations to 
those that will ultimately be deemed important for evaluating hypotheses, and that we 
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apply them in similar ways. Finally, in light of our demonstrated cognitive failures where 
we are perhaps unduly influenced by explanatory considerations, we must hope for 
evidence that such failures are heavily restricted to certain kinds of case. Absent such 
evidence and, although we might have reason to suppose we in fact employ explanatory 
reasoning, we‟d lack any reason to suppose that we should. The normative dimension of 
IBE, as developed by Lipton, is both vague and tenuous. Admittedly Lipton at times 
seems content with defending a purely descriptive interpretation of IBE, in which we 
declare only that explanatory considerations in fact feature prominently in our reasoning. 
Typically IBE is understood as a normative thesis; a purely descriptive thesis certainly 
falls short of my ambitions for the rule. 
Where did Lipton go wrong? I suggest it‟s in arguing that explanatory and theoretical 
virtues align. By adopting that position it becomes hard for explanatory considerations to 
illuminate, account for, or justify judgments about which of competing hypotheses is 
most plausible. The promise of IBE, as initially presented by Lipton, was with the idea 
that we could read off qualities of an explanation and thereby learn something important 
about the merits of the underlying theory. Given the matching claim, any normative 
justification for IBE becomes fully dependent on concepts that are not only problematic 
and vague, but also appear independent of explanatory considerations. Consequently, 
Lipton is forced to adopt an essentially descriptive interpretation of the rule. A model of 
IBE would be more useful and more interesting if we could identify peculiarly 
explanatory virtues, that cannot be identified with qualities of the underlying hypotheses, 
and that help us understand why certain inferences are sensible. Developed in this way 
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and IBE could live up to its reputation as a theory of how we should reason. Utilizing 
Woodward‟s model of causal explanation I‟ll now sketch a way of relating explanatory 
considerations to underlying plausibility that seems promising. 
3. Invariance, Mechanisms and Consilience  
Woodward‟s model is centrally concerned with change relating regularities, regularities 
that describe how changes in the value of one variable affect the value of another. 
Interventions on variables pick out causal and explanatory relations, for Woodward, if 
they are a reliable means of manipulating other variables within the regularity. Many 
regularities will satisfy this standard under some conditions but not others. For example, 
the ideal gas law properly captures our ability to increase the temperature of a gas by 
increasing the pressure, in certain circumstances. The law is thus a change-relating 
regularity that describes a causal relation, exploitable for purposes of explaining. The law 
doesn‟t hold universally, however. When temperatures become sufficiently low, or 
pressures sufficiently high, the law no longer accurately describes the relation between 
these variables. In such conditions we might appeal to the van der waals equation, which 
holds in circumstances where the ideal gas law breaks down. For Woodward, the latter is 
more invariant. Regularities are invariant if they continue to hold despite interventions on 
the variables that feature in that regularity. We explain an outcome by appealing to a 
system of regularities that is invariant under at least some interventions, and which can be 
combined with a range of possible initial and boundary conditions to describe how events 
would have differed had those conditions been otherwise. Only regularities that are 
invariant under some interventions are explanatory. Regularities that are more invariant 
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support a broader range of explanations, since they allow us to say more about how things 
would have been different if initial or background conditions were different.  
Although Woodward isn‟t concerned with the relationship between invariance and 
confirmation, and even expresses some skepticism about inference to the best explanation 
(see note 5), I suspect there are important connections. My proposal is that it is reasonable 
to infer more invariant explanations, over less invariant explanations, because 
considerations of invariance tell us something important about the regularities that ground 
the explanations. My suggestion is that pursuing greater invariance will tend to produce 
the kinds of achievements that scientists consider epistemically significant, including our 
admiration for verified novel predictions, predictive success more generally, and high 
precision testing, our suspicion of ad hoc hypotheses, desire for both `deeper' 
explanations and explanations of `free parameters', as well as our pursuit of theories that 
have greater consilience. Despite their reputations, these concepts are poorly understood. 
The concept of invariance, insofar as it can illuminate these more familiar concepts, 
advances our understanding of confirmation.  
Before offering some details, a few preliminaries are in order. First, invariance is distinct 
from predictive success, consilience, scope, and so on. The proposal thus shares with 
Lipton‟s defense a distinction between two types of explanatory achievement. We can 
evaluate an explanation in terms of its invariance, where more invariant explanations are 
better. Explanatory hypotheses and regularities can also be better insofar as they are less 
ad hoc, more precise, verified by novel predictions, and so on. If invoking the concept of 
invariance offers more plausible analyses for the confirmatory significance of such 
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considerations, then it has importance for our understanding of confirmation as well as 
explanation. What distinguishes my proposal from Lipton‟s more recent defense is that 
invariance is a peculiarly explanatory virtue, rather than a feature of the underlying theory 
or hypothesis. This creates room for a normative defense of explanatory reasoning. It is 
also important to distinguish a more modest from a more ambitious version of the thesis 
I‟m proposing. The more modest rests content with providing a better account for extant 
confirmatory considerations. The more ambitious version assumes, or argues, that those 
concepts are in turn indicative of more general forms of scientific achievement. If 
pursuing invariance helps us achieve deeper explanations, for example, and deeper 
explanations indicate a more truthlike theory, then we connect a distinctively explanatory 
virtue to perhaps the ultimate scientific achievement. Admittedly concepts like 
consilience and ad hoc-ness are only poorly understood, thus difficult concepts to offer in 
defense of realist commitments. However, insofar as IBE might help provide more 
convincing analyses for various intuitions surrounding questions of confirmation, once 
augmented with Woodward‟s concept of invariance, it can simultaneously help justify its 
own normative credentials. It‟s beyond the scope of this paper to start properly exploring 
the connections between invariance and all the concepts I‟ve alluded to. Hopefully a 
couple of examples will provide adequate motivation for the thesis. 
First, let‟s return to Lipton‟s desire for mechanistic explanations and Barnes‟ concern that 
merely adding a mechanism can‟t itself reliably improve an explanation. The concept of 
invariance enables us to distinguish mechanisms that improve our explanations from 
those that don‟t. Drawing on Woodward‟s example, the amount of pressure applied to the 
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gas pedal explains the speed of my car, at least under some conditions. This change-
relating regularity can be exploited for purposes of manipulating the speed of the car, and 
therefore for purposes of explaining the speed, even for those of us who are ignorant 
about how changing the pressure applied to the pedal brings about the change in speed. 
Providing a mechanism that relates these variables will not always produce a better 
explanation: fanciful mechanisms that have no grounding in experience describe 
mechanisms. Mechanisms which are more invariant than the crude regularity we begin 
with increase our ability to manipulate and control the speed of the car under a wider 
range of conditions. We improve our understanding of the counterfactual dependencies 
that describe the system. Providing a mechanism that relates distinct variables will 
improve an explanation only if it is more invariant than the regularity alone.  
Providing mechanisms for causal regularities is an important scientific pursuit. 
Thoroughly speculative mechanisms, however, are not valued, requiring us to find means 
of distinguishing speculative from plausible mechanisms. The concept of invariance 
achieves that. Furthermore, it‟s at least plausible to suppose that this improved ability to 
manipulate a system reflects a better understanding for how a given system behaves.3 
                                                          
3
 Several authors have suggested that IBE has importance for purposes of fixing prior 
probabilities, likelihoods, or both, within Bayes‟ equation (for example, Lipton (2004), 
Okasha (2000), Weisberg (2009)). The rule is thus given a probabilistic interpretation. 
Elsewhere I‟ve argued that advocates for this approach are vulnerable to a critical 
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As a second illustration, again inspired by Woodward (2003, 261-2), consider the puzzle 
of distinguishing consilience from conjunction. Conjoining two theories produces a new, 
more general theory. However, explaining events by appealing to a conjunction is no 
improvement over an explanation that appeals to the relevant conjunct. Conjoining 
Hooke‟s law with the ideal gas law doesn‟t improve our explanations for the temperature 
of a given gas, even though the conjunction is more general. Theories are, however, 
lauded for their consilience. Newton‟s theory of universal gravitation offered 
explanations for falling bodies, planetary motions and tidal effects via a unified system. 
Consilience involves more than just conjunction, but identifying the excess has proved 
problematic. Again the concept of invariance is edifying. Conjunctions provide no 
additional information about the effects of intervening on variables, beyond what‟s 
provided by one of the conjuncts in isolation. Frequently cited cases of consilience, in 
contrast, do provide additional information. Galileo offered explanations for bodies 
falling near the Earth‟s surface.  Newton also offered explanations for bodies falling near 
the surface of Earth (or any other massive object), but his were invariant under changes to 
the mass and radius of the body on which the objects are dropped. Newton‟s explanations 
are invariant in ways that Galileo‟s are not. The concept of invariance accounts for the 
differing attitudes towards conjunction and consilience.  
The concept of invariance promises valuable analyses of various confirmatory concepts. 
A convincing defense of this claim requires both a more careful explication of the two 
                                                                                                                                                                             
dilemma and that IBE should instead be understood as a guide to better representations of 
target systems (see author). 
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concepts already presented, and their relation to invariance, and extended discussions of 
the other concepts I‟ve alluded to. A satisfactory treatment lies beyond the scope of this 
paper, but hopefully I‟ve done enough to at least induce some goodwill for the idea. 
Rather than develop this aspect of the project further, in the following section I‟ll explore 
an independent reason to regard Woodward‟s theory as a helpful crutch for IBE. 
4. Descriptions, Explanations and IBE’s Scope  
For Woodward, explaining involves communicating relations of counterfactual 
dependence. Regularities that don‟t capture such relations can‟t be utilized for purposes 
of explaining, although they might provide useful and accurate descriptions of target 
populations. For example, “All swans are white” cannot explain why a particular swan is 
white, since it doesn‟t provide the kind of dependency to which Woodward attaches 
significance. The explanatory impotence of certain regularities has an important 
consequence for Harman‟s puzzle, described above. Concerned to identify those 
circumstances when it is appropriate to infer „All A‟s are B‟s‟ given that „All observed 
A‟s are B‟s‟, Harman suggests the inference is justified if the former provides the best 
explanation for the latter. If the regularity is not change relating however, then it doesn‟t 
explain at all, at least according to Woodward.  
IBE is understood differently by different authors. One disagreement concerns the rule‟s 
scope. Harman (1965) and Psillos (2002) suggest the rule is more general than inductive 
reasoning; Lipton (2004) describes IBE instead as one important type of non-deductive 
reasoning. I favour Lipton‟s more modest attitude; some of the considerations that 
persuade me will be presented below. Adopting Lipton‟s position burdens one with 
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providing criteria for when IBE can, and cannot, be employed, and an intriguing platform 
for that project is precisely the distinction between descriptions and explanations that 
Woodward‟s model of explanations articulates. Sometimes our concerns are principally 
with describing a process, or kind; sometimes our concerns lie with explaining why 
certain events occurred, or why things are configured in a particular way. Restricting 
explanatory inferences to those circumstances when we are actually engaged in 
explaining seems sensible. It also helps insulate the rule against important objections. 
Consider Hitchcock‟s (2007) objection, in which we imagine two coins, one fair and one 
biased (3:1) in favour of heads. A coin is selected at random and flipped four times, 
where each flip lands heads. We assume a prior probability of 1/2 that we selected a 
particular coin, conditionalize on the new evidence, and thereby determine the posterior 
probabilities. We know how probable it is that we selected either coin, but Hitchcock 
sensibly asks what reason IBE can offer for preferring one hypothesis over the other. 
Relative to the evidence, neither hypothesis is simpler, more unifying nor, more 
generally, more lovely. Thus while the Bayesian can give clear directives concerning 
which hypothesis is more probable, and by how much, advocates of IBE seemingly have 
little to offer. Hitchcock‟s concern is well-directed, but might serve to motivate the 
delineation described above. Whether the selected coin is fair, or not, is a question about 
whether we have properly described the propensity of the coin. Such descriptions will 
align more or less probably with the outcome of subsequent sequences of flips, which are 
thereby entirely relevant for purposes of evaluating the plausibility of the competing 
descriptions. By restricting IBE to the evaluation of change relating regularities, however, 
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the example falls outside the domain of IBE. Hitchcock is thus quite correct, I‟d submit: 
IBE has nothing to offer in terms of illuminating such cases. The lesson is not that IBE is 
flawed, but that it has a restricted range of application.4 
5. Conclusions 
Inference to the best explanation faces various objections and would benefit from 
additional work along several dimensions. Most urgent, to my mind, is that the rule 
distinguish itself from a recommendation simply that we infer that conclusion which is 
most plausible given available evidence. A second significant challenge emerges from 
some very sensible criticisms: explanatory considerations are not always relevant to 
inductive reasoning, so the rule must have a more limited scope than some have 
suggested. The challenge is to identify those circumstances when IBE helpfully and 
properly models good inferential habits. In Woodward‟s account of causal explanation 
I‟ve suggested that we may have the resources both to develop a potentially instructive 
and plausible version of IBE, and simultaneously start to better understand its boundaries.  
  
                                                          
4
 Woodward (2003, 5) also expresses doubts about IBE, arguing that the distinction 
between explanation and description is essential to a proper understanding of scientific 
methodology, but that descriptions are evidently not confirmed by appeals to explanatory 
qualities. Clearly, however, once we rescind hopes of developing IBE into a universal 
model of confirmation, Woodward‟s concern disappears.  
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From Desire to Subjective Value:
On the Neural Mechanisms of Moral Motivation
Abstract
Increasingly, empirically minded moral philosophers are using data from cognitive science and 
neuroscience to resolve some longstanding philosophical questions about moral motivation, such 
as whether moral beliefs require the presence of a desire to motivate (Humeanism).  These 
empirical approaches are implicitly committed to the existence of folk psychological (FP) mental 
states like beliefs and desires.  However, data from the neuroscience of decision-making, 
particularly cellular-level work in neuroeconomics, is now converging with data from cognitive 
and social neuroscience to explain the processes through which agents are moved to act on the 
basis of decisions, including decisions about social and moral norms.  I argue that these 
developments are beginning to cast doubt on the prospect of finding nontrivial physical 
‘realizers’  for the FP states invoked in the Humeanism dispute by posing two distinctive 
challenges that tend to work against each other:  belief-desire directionality and causal relevance.
A great deal of the recent work in cognitive science has, tacitly or explicitly, assumed 
very much the picture of mental organization that folk psychology proposes.  There are 
other straws in the wind, however.  There are findings and theories suggesting that 
something is seriously wrong with the simple belief-desire structure implicit in common 
sense wisdom.
Stich (1983: 230)
§1. From Metaethics to the Neuroscience of Decision
 
For those of us who worry about moral philosophy’s empirical commitments in the age of 
science it is perhaps encouraging that there is now at least one problem with deep roots in 
analytic ethics that is receiving much empirical treatment from philosophers.1  That is the 
1The last decade or so has seen a growing number of philosophers express concern over the 
proliferation of dubious empirical claims and assumptions in ethics. Darwall et al. observe in 
their overview of the last century of work in ethics that, “too many moral philosophers… have 
been content to invent their psychology or anthropology from scratch” (1997: 34-5).  Doris and 
Stich have recently echoed that concern, arguing that philosophy’s empirical complacency has 
discouraged scientists from “undertaking philosophically informed research on ethical issues” 
(2005: 115).
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problem of explaining moral motivation (hereafter “MM”), or the apparent tendency of an agent 
to be motivated by her moral judgments, that particular class of mental states generally 
understood as an attitude of assent to normative claims.
The problem of MM encompasses (at least) two distinct though related philosophical 
disputes.  Motivational internalists (or just “internalists” for our purposes here) argue that moral 
beliefs motivate necessarily while externalists deny this.  And proponents of the so-called 
Humean theory of motivation (Humeanism) argue that moral beliefs are insufficient for 
motivating agents, since motivation requires in addition to a belief the presence of a conative 
state such as a desire.  Anti-Humeans reject the Humean theory on the grounds that moral beliefs 
are themselves sufficient for motivation.  Many endorse internalism or one of a few related ideas 
such as that moral beliefs are simultaneously desire-like (“besires”2) or that moral beliefs co-
occur with or otherwise trigger the relevant desires.  A growing number of naturalistically 
minded philosophers are turning to data from psychology, psychiatry, cognitive science, and 
neuroscience to help resolve these longstanding philosophical disputes about MM.  
For example, Roskies (2003, 2006) argues that patients suffering from damage to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) serve as counterexamples to internalism.3  Kennett 
(2002; Kennett & Fine 2009) argues that clinical research with autistic persons and psychopaths 
favors the Kantian account of motivation, a form of anti-Humeanism according to which moral 
judgments are necessarily motivating.  Prinz (2006) also uses data on psychopathology, though 
to argue for a Humean sentimentalist account of moral concepts according to which an agent’s 
believing an action morally wrong amounts to her having a sentiment of disapprobation toward 
2 The term is due to Altham (1986).
3 More recently Roskies has argued, with Schroeder and Nichols, that instrumentalism—a 
variation on the Humean theory, which holds that an agent is motivated when she forms beliefs 
about how to satisfy her pre-existing desires—“fits well with the neuroscientific picture”  of 
motivational processes (2010: 106).  Instrumentalism is similarly situated in the FP tradition.
2
San Diego, CA -381-
it.
These philosophers are, I think, right to recognize the limits of traditional philosophical 
methods like conceptual analysis, intuition, and armchair reflection for elucidating the 
mechanisms of MM.  They tacitly endorse the rather plausible idea that scientific data can 
catalyze progress on what is increasingly agreed to be (at least in part) an empirical question.   
But there is another assumption at work in each of these approaches that is, I think, 
considerably less plausible.  It is the assumption that scientific research will ultimately preserve 
the framework of commonsense psychology in which disputes about MM are couched.  At the 
heart of that framework is an explicit commitment to realism about folk psychological (FP) 
concepts like belief and desire.  Humeans, anti-Humeans, internalists and externalists alike are in 
dispute about the role that these states play in brining about MM.  Each of these views 
presupposes that the right (or best) account of the relationship between moral judgments and 
motivation will preserve beliefs and desires (or something near enough).  Eliminativism, 
instrumentalism, and skepticism about FP states are neither forms of anti-Humeanism nor 
externalism.4     
But, for reasons I will suggest presently, we have more and more reason to doubt that 
such intentional states do, will, or could feature into our best scientific accounts of the 
mechanisms of judgment and motivation – at least in the particular capacity that the vindication 
of FP realism requires.  Existing lines of research in cellular and social neuroscience are already 
converging toward an account of the causal mechanisms of moral cognition and motivation 
4 Eliminativism is not a form of anti-Humean because the latter theory holds not just that beliefs 
are insufficient for motivation—a claim which might seem compatible with the nonexistence of 
FP states—but also that motivation requires the presence of a desire (or related FP state). 
Eliminativism is not a form of externalism because it seems there is not much sense in the 
eliminativist’s taking a specific position on the effects of undergoing nonexistent states.  Stich 
has made a similar point in response to Dennett’s instrumentalism, arguing, for example, that 
only real entities and not useful fictions can have causes and effects (1983: 244).
3
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which neither invokes commonsense FP states nor appears likely to lend itself to accurate 
redescription in FP terms.
§2. Neuroeconomics:  The Emerging Neuroscience of Decision
The last decade has seen the development of an influential research program, 
“neuroeconomics,” which weds behavioral economics with experimental neuroscience.  Its key 
insight is to use well-vetted theories from behavioral economics to contextualize neural data 
generated by subjects engaged in tasks of judgment and decision.  Somewhat simplistically, 
behavioral economists can look to neuroscience to reveal the physiological constraints on real 
agents that sometimes lead them to violate the axioms of normative economic models, while 
neuroscientists can look to economic theory to help develop algorithmic models of decision-
making.  I will suggest that—insofar as we accept the idea that moral judgments are decisions 
about what it is right, or best, to do under such-and-such circumstances—the data emerging from 
this new discipline are likely to cast doubt on the tenability of philosophical theories of MM.5
Two once-independent lines of research are now converging on a model of human moral 
and social decision.  Neuroscientists engaged in neuroeconomics continue to produce data which 
supports a two-stage mechanism for decision-making in our neural architecture while social and 
cognitive neuroscientists continue to show that the same neural networks and regions implicated 
in that two-stage mechanism are implicated in a subject’s making judgments or decisions about 
moral and social norms.
5 I think that this assumption is plausible for a variety of reasons.  For example, note the cost at 
which the FP realist rejects it:  any uncontroversial instance of an agent’s making a moral 
decision (rather than a moral judgment) must be treated as irrelevant to disputes about moral 
judgment and hence to MM.  This seems much less palatable than accepting the idea that making 
moral judgments is a lot like making decisions in moral contexts.  There are many such reasons 
to grant the assumption, though for the sake of brevity I leave them for another time.
4
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The two stages in the two-stage mechanism for decision-making are valuation and 
choice.  In valuation, subjects assign subjective values (SVs) to individual goods or actions in a 
range of options.  At the behavioral level, SVs can be understood as economic values calculated 
by quantifying the subject’s choices relative to the alternatives.6  At the neural level, it turns out 
that these SVs can be defined as the mean firing rates in action potentials per second of specific 
populations of neurons.  These neural SVs are learned, represented, stored, and ultimately used 
to guide motor systems.  In the second stage, choice, this neural information concerning the most 
highly valued item or action is implemented into motor pathways to guide physical action.
The neural process is thus very much like the process postulated by behavioral 
economists whose traditional models of economic choice explain decision making “as if”  it 
involves choosing a highly-valued option from among an array of options represented in 
common currency (the “common currency hypothesis”).  Neurophysiological data now indicates 
that decision-making at the neural level does indeed seem to involve common currency.  That 
currency is SV:  the responses of particular populations of cells, quantifiable in real numbers 
whose units are action potentials per second, to each of the items or actions available.  
The neural pathways and regions implicated in valuation are the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (VMPFC) and striatum, while those implicated in choice are the lateral prefrontal and 
parietal cortex (Kable & Glimcher 2009).  Recordings from cells in the VMPFC have 
contributed to the localization of valuation.  Researchers have identified three types of neurons 
which respond to the values of individual goods on offer regardless of whether they are chosen 
(offer value neurons), to the values of goods and actions actually chosen (chosen value neurons), 
6 For example, if a monkey chooses reward A (e.g., apple slice) when paired with one 1B (e.g., 
one raisin), 2B (e.g., two raisins), and 3B, it is indifferent at a ratio of 4B:1A, and it chooses B 
when 6B and 10B are offered, then the value of 1A is roughly equal to the value of 4B [i.e.: 
V(1A)=V(4.1B)] and hence has a subjective value of approximately 4.
5
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and to the chosen action itself (choice neurons; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad 2006, 2008). 
Similarly, these three types of neurons have been found in the caudate and putamen of the 
striatum where research indicates they track the values of actions (rather than goods; Samejima 
et al. 2005).  What is perhaps most remarkable about these results is that offer value signals in 
these neurons correspond precisely to the common currency postulated by most “as if” models in 
economic decision theory.
Research on the neural architecture for the second stage, choice, has so far implicated the 
lateral prefrontal and parietal cortex.  Much of this research is based upon work with the visuo-
saccadic control system in the primate brain.  Neuroscientists interested in sensory-motor control 
have studied this system extensively.  It appears to provide the mechanism by which information 
concerning the chosen option, and not the unchosen options, is implemented in motor systems 
downstream from the valuation circuitry.  Hence the explicit link with motivation.  
The details are complex, but briefly the idea is that neurons in the lateral intraparietal area 
(LIP), frontal eye fields (FEF), and superior colliculus (SC) form a network for visuo-saccadic 
decision-making.  Studies with monkeys on saccadic decision-making tasks have repeatedly 
shown that the firing rates of neurons in LIP and FEF increase as evidence accumulates that a 
visual response will result in reward.  Interestingly, once those firing rates cross a threshold, a 
saccade is initiated (Shadlen & Newsome 2001).  Further research has since indicated that this 
firing rate threshold represents a value threshold for movement selection:  the saccade is initiated 
when its value reaches the preset threshold (Roitman & Shadlen 2002).
Much is now known about the mechanism through which SVs—the currency for choice
—are learned and represented in the primate brain.  Dopaminergic (DA) neurons in the midbrain 
encode a reward-prediction error (RPE), i.e., the difference between the outcome of an action 
6
San Diego, CA -385-
actually experienced and the predicted outcome of the action (Schultz et al. 1997).  Research 
indicates that the firing rates of these DA neurons are linearly related to RPE as calculated by 
behavioral-level economic models (Bayer & Glimcher 2005).
As these lines of research elucidate the mechanisms behind choice in the primate brain, 
social and cognitive neuroscientists are revealing that the same regions, most notably the 
striatum and VMPFC are consistently implicated in tasks in which subjects are asked to make 
moral and social judgments (e.g., Greene & Haidt 2002; Moll et al. 2002; Koenigs et al. 2007). 
While much work remains to be done, it is perhaps fair to say that direct links between moral 
judgment and decision-making and the neurophysiology of decision and motivation have now 
been established.  
We must recognize that these results, so long as they continue to withstand scientific 
scrutiny, already have serious implications for philosophers interested in vindicating traditional 
philosophical theories of MM.  These philosophers must either finally put paid to the task of 
locating traditional FP concepts like belief and desire in our going scientific explanations for 
motivational processes (call this the “location project”), or they must content themselves with 
formulating theories in commonsense terms (i.e., speaking from within the perspective of moral 
agency rather than about it, cf. Blackburn 1998) and jettison appeals to scientific data and claims 
about empirical respectability.  But philosophers who appeal to the sciences to support 
philosophical theories of MM have already conceded this latter project.  It is they who owe some 
plausible account of how FP states might plausibly “supervene” on the neurophysiology.
§3. Locating Beliefs and Desires:  Two Challenges for FP Realism
The central feature of valuation is the theoretical construct of subjective value (SV) and the 
7
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mechanisms through which SVs are learned.  In general terms, the trouble for the location 
projecct stems from a tension between the cognitive-level FP story about an agent’s subjectively 
valuing an item or action and the neurophysiological mechanisms upon which that story must 
supervene.  In more specific terms, the problem for the FP realist is that (1) SVs “exist” – they 
are genuine neural entities, and (2) their contribution to decision and motivation processes—i.e., 
their explanatorily relevant characteristics and functions—pertain uniquely to the biophysical 
level.  Here are those two points summarized by the leading neuroeconomist, Paul Glimcher:
1.   “There is nearly universal agreement among neurobiologists that a group of neural 
systems for valuation has been identified” (2009: 511-12); and
2.   There is a large body of data which supports the hypothesis that “learning mechanisms 
distributed through the basal ganglia and frontal cortex contribute to the construction of 
what we refer to as subjective value.  These areas are hypothesized to learn subjective 
values, at a biophysical level, through the well-studied process of synaptic plasticity” 
(519).
We have just briefly reviewed some of that data in the previous section.  I want to conclude by 
outlining what I take to be two of the most pressing challenges that this data appears to pose for 
the FP realist’s location project.
3.1. The Challenge of Causal Relevance
The first challenge for the location project is to get beliefs and desires, whether construed 
as functional roles (e.g. Canberra Plan), sentences in the head (e.g. Fodor), metaphorical 
“directions of fit”  (e.g. Anscombe 1957 and her many followers), etc., to supervene on the 
immediate causes of choice selection, namely the specific cellular and molecular configurations 
that result from synaptic plasticity in dopamine pathways and which make possible 
measurements of SV, without jeopardizing their causal relevance in the second stage—choice—
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which is directly related to motor implementation.
There are several options in any choice context.  What the data from neuroeconomics 
shows if anything is that making a choice is a matter of selecting from among a set of actions or 
items—each of which has a SV quantifiable in neural terms—a highly valued item and 
implementing information concerning that option in motor pathways.  For the FP realist this 
process of selection must involve a set of beliefs and desires about the options on offer.  The 
trouble is that if beliefs and desires are instantiated in this account at all then they must be 
instantiated in such a way as to represent the features of each of the items or actions on offer and 
without jeopardizing the role of beliefs and desires in the kinds of explanations for MM that 
Humeans, internalists, and their opposition are offering.7 
Prima facie, the most plausible way for the FP realist to locate FP states in the neural 
account is to insist that desires are identical to or somehow constituted by SVs (or, again, the 
cellular/molecular configurations that make their measurement possible).  On this account of 
location, for any given context of choice with more than one option the FP realist will have to 
claim that choice involves selecting from among competing levels of desire.  A monkey faced 
with the choice of grapes, bananas and raisins is essentially faced with the task of selecting from 
among competing desires for each of the fruits, and perhaps chooses on the basis of beliefs about 
7 The point appears to be something of a neuroscience analog for some recent objections to the 
possibility of formulating a so-called “belief-desire law”  which some functionalists suppose 
capable of explaining the relationship between intentional states in the theory-theory.  Such a law 
might claim, for example, that “people do what they believe will satisfy their desires.”  In a 
notable objection, Gauker (2005) argues that there are no such laws.  First he criticizes the 
“simple formulation”  of the belief-desire law according to which people do what they believe 
will satisfy their desires by pointing out that “there is never just one thing people desire; they 
always desire a lot of things.  They cannot do everything they think will satisfy all of their 
desires, because they cannot do all of those things at once” (126).  This data suggests that it is 
not just a platitude that people desire lots of things and cannot do them all, but that it is a fact 
about our neural architecture that even if we could locate some scientific analog for desire, say as 
part of SV, its ubiquity in the context of choice would render it explanatorily inert anyway. 
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the quantities available.  Two grapes, the monkey believes, satisfy its desires better than one 
raisin.  Dopamine, synaptic plasticity, learning and so on are merely the neurophysiological 
mechanisms upon which the cognitive events supervene.
Crucially, though, this approach to location will jeopardize the explanatory relevance of 
beliefs and desires in the traditional disputes about MM.  For example, Humeans claim that 
moral beliefs are insufficient for motivation because they require the presence of a desire (or 
similar conative state) to motivate.  Anti-Humeans deny this, generally because they are drawn to 
some kind of motivational internalism.  On the account of location just given, the Humean theory 
(or better, the spirit of that theory) will be true only trivially and its opposition simply a 
nonstarter.  It is true in a manner of speaking that desires are required for motivation, but the 
point is trivial because desires are present to varying degrees in each of the options, including 
those that are ultimately bypassed.  Moral beliefs about the nature of the possible options are 
insufficient for motivation because all such beliefs in the context of choice are insufficient for 
motivation.  It is a platitude that desire (so understood) must be present for motivation precisely 
because in any real choice it is always present in its making a contribution to SV.  
Neither does this result serve as evidence for internalist forms of anti-Humeanism which 
postulate “besires,” i.e. states which are simultaneously belief-like and desire-like, since in any 
given decision each of the unchosen options will be motivationally inert despite each being the 
object of our besires (as it were). 
The rapid proliferation of FP states in any attempt at location—which results from our 
having a rather hazy commonsense conception of precisely what kinds of entities they are and 
consequently no principled or reliable method for picking out their realizers—prevents them 
from contributing anything of value to explanations of MM couched in causal language. For 
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when we gloss these complex neurophysiological processes in commonsense FP terms we end 
up abstracting too far away from the mechanisms most immediately relevant to the explanation. 
Given the mechanisms of valuation, the claim that an agent chooses a particular (moral) course 
of action because she desires to is really just vacuous.8
3.2. The Challenge of Belief-Desire Directionality
I have just suggested that on the most obvious account of location, desires are identical to 
or somehow constituted by SVs.  Now consider the role of beliefs on this same account.  The FP 
realist can perhaps say that the monkey believes that each of its options carries a specific value in 
terms of its desirability.  But that seems to conflate belief and desire in the traditional 
philosophical sense of the terms.  Beliefs, philosophers tell us, are about objective states of 
affairs or facts, not representations of facts about our subjective experiences of desire.
More importantly, though, when we locate FP states in this way the interesting question is 
no longer whether desire must be present in addition to belief in order for choice and motivation 
to occur—which is the question contested by Humeans and anti-Humeans—but rather just the 
opposite:  how beliefs about the desirability of an action or item contribute to selection.  
To see this, consider first that it is a consequence of the MM framework and Humeanism in 
particular that we must find some role for belief as well as desire in the neural explanation. 
Finding neural correlates for desire at the cost of preserving any role for belief in a neural 
explanation for MM is hardly a victory for FP realism.  But while it seems clear enough that for 
8 That is, at least, barring the development of an account of desire fine-grained enough to permit 
us to pick out only certain constituent components of SV rather than SVs themselves.   But such 
fine-grained accounts of desire are not likely to be forthcoming for good reason.  The more fine-
grained the account becomes, the fewer commonsense cases of desiring it is likely to cover.  FP 
realists are sensitive to this problem.  Jackson and Pettit (1990) explain that the difficulty is to 
provide an explication of FP states that is specific enough to capture our commonsense 
attributions yet vague enough to render refutation by neuroscience unlikely.  The challenges 
presented in this section are intended to illustrate why achieving this golden mean is likely 
impossible.
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the FP realist desires must somehow be closely connected to SV, it is far less clear what role 
remains for belief, except perhaps to say that agents have beliefs about their subjective desires 
(SVs).  This, though, yields the peculiar result that an agent navigates the world using 
representational desires and that her course of action is ultimately determined by the presence of 
a scale-tipping belief about which is the optimal desire to satisfy.  That is, this particular account 
of location might find some room for both belief and desire only by turning the dispute about 
Humeanism in the wrong direction.
§4. Some Preliminary Conclusions
SVs, the neural common currency for choice selection, are unlikely to deliver the 
supervenience base that the traditional philosophical account of desire requires.  It is difficult to 
see how the FP realist could provide an account according to which SVs constitute or realize 
desires without also realizing—entirely or in part—beliefs.  SVs are neural representations of 
facts about the physical constitution of the world.  Yet they are also neural representations of the 
facts about how that world, the physical environment, impacts the physical states of agent S’s 
nervous system in particular.  These complex neural representations are for this reason unlikely 
to admit of accurate description in the crude vocabulary of FP.
Are there alternative ways that the FP realist might locate commonsense states in this 
neural model of decision-making that could preserve causal relevance and directionality and 
ultimately vindicate commonsense theories of MM?  It is, most will argue, far too early to rule 
out the possibility entirely.  Even so, the emerging model of decision and motivation sketched 
here appears poised to deliver explanations of MM which differ from commonsense FP theories 
not merely in degree but in kind.  The time is ripe to begin rethinking the commonsense 
12
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psychological framework upon which contemporarily analytic ethics is built.
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The Classical Continuum without
Points
Geo¤rey Hellman and Stewart Shapiro
Abstract
We develop a point-free construction of the classical one-
dimensional continuum, with an interval structure based on mere-
ology and either a weak set theory or logic of plural quantica-
tion. In some respects this realizes ideas going back to Aristotle,
although, unlike Aristotle, we make free use of classical "actual
innity". Also, in contrast to intuitionistic, Bishop, and smooth
innitesimal analysis, we follow classical analysis in allowing par-
titioning of our "gunky line" into mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive disjoint parts, thereby demonstrating the independence of
"indecomposability" from a non-punctiform conception. It is
surprising that such simple axioms as ours already imply the
Archimedean property and that they determine an isomorphism
with the Dedekind-Cantor structure of R as a complete, separa-
ble, ordered eld. We also present some simple topological models
of our system, establishing consistency relative to classical analy-
sis. Finally, after describing how to nominalize our theory, we
close with comparisons with earlier e¤orts related to our own.
.
1 Introduction
Since Aristotle[1], many mathematicians and philosophers have expressed
the view that a genuine continuum cannot be composed of points. Re-
lated to this is the idea, also Aristotles, that a true continuum is "seam-
less" or "indecomposable": it shouldnt be possible to break it apart
cleanly, to separate out a proper part from the rest.
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Of course, the mainstream Cantor-Dedekind theory, along with the
set-theoretic tradition, respects neither of these properties. But alter-
natives, such as the intuitionist and Bishop conceptions and smooth
innitesimal analysis ("SIA"), dont respect both of these either: they
clearly have points. On the intuitionistic or Bishop constructions, the
continuum is entirely made up of points, although these have to be de-
termined by constructive Cauchy sequences of rationals, not arbitrary
such sequences. SIA has points galore but it entertains (without as-
serting the existence of) nilsquare and nilpotent innitesimals forming a
micro-neighborhood 4 (of 0, translatable anywhere along the smooth
line), behaving as a mini-line (linelet) that can be translated and ro-
tated but not bent, i.e. an axiom sitipulates that any (smooth) function
dened on 4 obeys the equation of a straight line. (Its slope at any
locus on the smooth line gives the derivative of the function there.)1
Both these alternative approaches, however, do respect indecompos-
ability, in that they forswear recognition of any function that would take,
say, a constant value on one segment of the line and another constant
value on the rest. And this, in turn, is achieved by giving up the law of
excluded middle, i.e. by restricting the background logic to be intuiti-
ionistic. (The rationales o¤ered by intuitionism and SIA, respectively,
di¤er greatly, but the e¤ects are quite similar in a number of respects,
indecompsability counting as one of them.)
It would be wonderful to present Aristotle with these developments.
We will leave it to scholars (and imaginative script-writers) to conjecture
what he might have said. But the modern-day classicist, and perhaps
many an impartial observer, might say that indecomposability is being
achieved only in a negative sense, that is, by depriving oneself of the
logical means of distinguishingin the sense stipulated, viz. via total 2-
valued functionsone part of the line (or respective lines they recognize)
from the rest.2 Our approach, developed in this paper, will decidedly not
1See Bell [2] for details on the development of SIA. Bell explicitly motivates SIA
by expressions of dissatisfaction with point-based analyses of continua, and insists
that the nilpotent innitesimals of SIA are not to be conceived as further points. Just
why not is not entirely clear, however. Perhaps it is because they (if they exist
something that cannot be proved or refuted in SIA) would be too indenite as to
location or extent to be thought of as points. Perhaps also they are collectively to
be thought of as a kind of glue that holds the more denite points of the smooth
line together.
2We are not saying that the restriction to intuitionistic logic is not well-motivated
from the perspectives of intuitionism and SIA, but merely that indecomposability fol-
lows from the restriction in that it prevents recognizing any discontinuous functions.
Indecomposability does not emerge from an analysis of the continuum and its con-
stituents. It should be noted, however, that indecomposability takes di¤erent forms
in intuitionism and SIA: the indecomposable subsets of the smooth line correspond
2
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respect indecomposability; however, unlike all three approaches already
mentioned, it will be truly non-punctiform. Points or numbers will be
constructed (in several ways); however they will be clearly seen as our
additional superstructure to a thoroughly non-punctiform line.3 More-
over, in one version of this approach, points will only be recognized as
possible additional structure, which seems quite in accordance with
Aristotles conception. Our approach may thus reasonably be called
semi-Aristotelian.
2 Atomless Mereological Continuum
The system developed in this paper is designed to characterize a one-
dimensional continuum consisting of regions as parts, including intervals
although, as will be explained, the notions of open, closed, and half-
open are not available in our system. This continuum does not have any
points as parts, although we will be able to dene point in terms of
intervals. Once we have proved that our continuum is Archimedean, we
will demonstrate that it is isomorphic to the classical Dedekind-Cantor
continuum, as a complete, separable, linearly ordered eld.
Our formalism consists of classical rst-order logic with equality sup-
plemented with a standard axiom system for second-order logic (or logic
of plural quantication, with an unrestricted comprehension axiom for
plurals4), and with an adaptation of the standard (Tarski) axioms of
mereology together with (something implying) the Atomless axiom.
Axioms of Mereology:
1a. Axioms on x  y (x is part of y): reexive, anti-symmetric,
transitive.
Certain of our axioms and theorems are conveniently stated in terms of
a binary relation called overlaps: x overlaps y: x  y ,df 9z(z  x
^ z  y):
1b. Axiom on  and : x  y $ 8z[z  x! z  y]:
to a proper sub-class of the subsets of the intuitionist continuum indecomposable
there. Cf, Bell [3].
3We postpone a comparison with more recent constructions along similar lines
until the nal section, below.
4This looks very much like second-order logical comprehension for monadic pred-
icates, except that it is conditional upon there being something satisfying the predi-
cate. It may be written:
9v(	(v))! 9xx8y[y  xx$ 	(y)];
where y  xx is read y is one of (or is among) the xx, and where 	 is any formula
of the language lacking free xx.
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Theorem 1: Axioms 1a and 1b imply the Extensionality Principle:
x = y $ 8z[z  x$ z  y]:
Proof: From left to right is trivial. (Take y as x; then substitute y for
the second x.) From right to left: Assume the right of Extensionality
and rewrite it as the conjunction of two conditionals: 8z[z x! x  y]^
8z[z  y ! z  x]: By Axiom 1b, the rst of these yields x  y, and the
second yields y  x: By anti-symmetry of , the conjunction of these is
equivalent to x = y:
2. Fusion or whole comprehension: 9u(u) ! [9x8yfy  x $
9z((z) ^ z  y)g], where  is a predicate of the second-order language
(or language of plurals) lacking free x.5
At this point, we could add an Atomless axiom: 8x9y(y < x), where
y < x$df y  x & y 6= x (read y is a proper part of x). But this will
follow from a stronger condition imposed below on the interval structure
of our pointless or gunky line (axiom 5.).
We write x + y for the mereological sum or fusion of x and y ; such
that 8z[z  x + y $ (z  x _ z  y)], and we use
P1
n=0 xn to designate
fusions of innitely many things. Also, if 9z(z  x ^ z  y); then we
write x ^ y for the meet of x and y, which satises 8z[z  x ^ y $ z  x
^ z  y]: (If x and y have no common part, x ^ y is undened.) And we
write xjy for :9z[z  x ^ z  y], pronounced x is discrete from y (and
vice versa). Furthermore, if 9z(z x ^ :(z  y)); then x  y is that part
of x which does not overlap y, viz. 8z[z  x  y $ (z  x ^ :(z  y))]:(If
there is no such z, then x  y is undened.) By axiom 2, fusions always
exist, and meets and di¤erences also exist wherever dened.
The pointless line we wish to characterize well labelG, for gunky.6
Below, well prove that (quite remarkably) our very elementary axioms
su¢ce to characterize G precisely as a certain minimal closure; and then
5The formulation in language of plurals takes this form:
8uuf9w(w  uu)! 9x8y[y  x$
9z(z  uu & z  y)]g,
where uu is a plural variable, w  uu is read w is one of the uu. (If plural variables
are assumed to have instances, then the antecedent and the main conditional can be
omitted.)
6The technical term gunk for the stu¤ of atomless mereology stems from
Lewis.[10, 1991]
Note that, by taking  in Axiom 2 as x = x, a universal individual exists. Since,
in what follows, we will nd useful it to introduce a denumerable innity of atoms to
serve the role of natural numbers (i.e. the atoms with the usual operations dened
on them collectively form an N-structure, i.e. satisfy the Dedekind axioms), we do
not identify the universal object with G:
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well prove that, with its interval structure, G is isomorphic to the clas-
sical real-numbers structure, R.. The point, of course, of having the
Atomless condition is to insure that, literally, G contains no points at
all. Thus, except where we explicitly refer to atoms of an N-structure,
the range of our rst-order and plural variables can be thought of as all
the parts of G, which we also call regions.
It is convenient to introduce a geometric primitive, L(x; y) , to mean
x is (entirely) to the left of y. The axioms for L specify that it is
irreexive, asymmetric, and transitive. And we dene R(x; y), x is
(entirely) to the right of y, as L(y; x):
Now we can introduce an important geometric relation, betweenness:
Betw(x; y; z) for y is (entirely) between x and z:
Betw(x; y; z),df [L(x; y) ^ R(z; y)] _ [R(x; y) ^ L(z; y)]
It follows that Betw(x; y; z)$ Betw(z; y; x):
L(x; y) obeys the following axioms:
3a. L(x; y) _ R(x; y)! xjy. (Of course, xjy implies x 6= y:)
3b. L(x; y) $ 8z; u[ z  x ^ u  y ! L(z; u)]:
The following can now be inferred:
Betw(x; y; z)! xjy & yjz & xjz; and
Betw(x; y; z) ^ Betw(u; x; z)! Betw(u; y; z);
where the transitivity of L is used for the latter.
Now we can dene an essential notion, that of a connected part of
G. Intuitively, such a part has no gaps. The denition is straightfor-
ward:
Conn(x),df 8y; z; u[z; u  x ^ Betw(z; y; u)! y  x]: (Df Conn)
(Anything lying between any two parts of x is also a part of x.)
Furthermore, we can dene what it means for a connected part of G
to be bounded: Let Conn(p): then
Bounded(p),df 9x; y[Conn(x) ^ Conn(y) & Betw(x; p; y):
(Df Bounded)
(A connected region wholly between two others is bounded.) Once we
establish that G is bi-innite, i.e. innite in both directions, it will fol-
llow that, for connected regions, boundedness is a necessary condition
for nite in extent, as commonly understood. And once we have es-
tablished that G is Archimedean, it will follow that boundedness is also
su¢cient for nite in extent.
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We call bounded connected regions intervals and write Int(j),
etc., when needed. However, note that, lacking points, we cannot de-
scribe intervals as either open or closed, or half-open.
Using L; we can impose a condition of dichotomy for discrete inter-
vals:
4. Dichotomy axiom: 8i; j[i; j are two discrete intervals! (L(i; j)
_ L(j; i))]:
Now we can prove a linearity condition among intervals:
Theorem 2 (Linearity): Let x; y; z be any three pairwise discrete inter-
vals; then exactly one of x; y; z is between the other two.
Proof. Applying Dichotomy to the hypothesis, assume that (say) L(x; y):
If also L(y; z); then R(z; y); so that Betw(x; y; z); and this is unique. If
instead L(z; y); then either L(z; x); in which case we have Betw(z; x; y),
uniquely; or L(x; z), in which case we have Betw(x; z; y), also uniquely.
The argument from assuming at rst that R(x; y) is similar.
To guarantee that arbitrarily small intervals exist everywhere along G,
we adopt the following axiom:
5. 8x9j[Int(j) & j < x]:7
An important relation of two intervals is adjacency, which is de-
ned as follows:
Adj(j; k),df jjk ^ @m[Betw(j;m; k)]: (Df Adjacent)
Now suppose that j = 1i=1ji; where Int(ji) and R(ji+1; ji) and
Adj(ji+1; ji): Then we write R(k; j) just in case 8i[R(k; ji); analogously
for L(k; j): This will be useful in the proof of Theorem 3, below.
The following equivalence relations on intervals will also prove use-
ful: j and k are left-end equivalent just in case 9p[p  j & p  k ^
@q(fq  j_ q  kg & L(q; p)]: Right-end equivalent is dened analo-
gously.
One further geometric primitive is very useful both in insuring that
G is innite in extent and in recovering, in e¤ect, the rational numbers
as a countable, dense subset of the (arithmetic) continuum, viz. con-
gruence, as a binary relation among intervals. Intuitively, Cong(i; j) is
intended to mean the lengths of intervals i and j are equal. Thus,
we adopt the usual rst-order axioms specifying that Cong is an equiv-
alence relation. We will sometimes write this as jij = jjj ; but with the
understanding that we have not yet given any meaning to jij standing
7This of course implies the Atomless axiom, introduced above.
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alone, but only in certain whole contexts. Similarly, for intervals i; j; we
can dene, contextually, jij < jjj as meaning: 9j0[j0 an interval ^ j0 < j
^ Cong(i; j0)]; and we may write jij > jjj as equivalent to jjj < jij : Our
next axiom will guarantee that these comparisons make general sense.
We come now to a key axiom, crucial to our characterization of G:
6. Translation axiom: Given any two intervals, i and j, each is
congruent both to a unique left-end-equivalent and to a unique right-
end-equivalent of the other.
In e¤ect, this guarantees that a given length can be transported (more
accurately, instantiated) anywhere along G, and that these instances are
unique as congruent and either left- or right-end equivalent to the given
length. In particular, we can prove
Lemma 1 Given any two intervals i and j such that :Cong(i; j), either
there exists an interval i0 < j with Cong(i; i0);or there exists i0 with
j < i0 with Cong(i; i0):
Proof. By :Cong(i; j); i 6= j: Assume that :(i0 < j) for any i0 such that
Cong(i; i0): By the Translation axiom, there exists i0 such that Cong(i; i0)
and i0 is left-end-equivalent to j: We want to show that j  i0 ; as that
will establish that j < i0; as desired. Assume the contrary, i.e. that
j  i0: Now, if i0   j doesnt exist, then, by denition, i0  j: But, since
Cong(i; i0); we have :Cong(i0; j); whence i0 6= j; and then we would
have i0 < j; contrary to hypothesis. So assume some n  i0   j: By the
hypothesis for reductio, there is also k  j & k  i0; and indeed :(k  i0):
Without loss of generality, we may assume that k is an interval. (See
axiom 5.) Since i0 is left-end-equivalent to j, it follows that k is not left-
end-equivalent to j: But there is m  j   k which is left-end equivalent
to both j and i0 so satises m  i0: Let m0 be a common part of m and
i0: Clearly L(m0; k): But :(L(n; k)); since if it were, it would overlap j,
contrary to assumption. (n cant be left of j; since its part of i0 and
i0and j are left-end equivalent.) Therefore, by the Dichotomy axiom on
L, we have L(k; n); whence Betw(m0; k; n), with both m0; n  i0 but
k  i0, contradicting that i0 is an interval.
Theorem 3 (Trichotomy) For any two intervals, i; j; either jij = jjj or
jij < jjj or jij > jjj :
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 1 and the denitions of the disjuncts.
One further axiom on congruence is useful and intuitively intended,
viz. that congruence respects nominalistic summation of adjacent inter-
vals:
7
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7. Additivity: Given intervals i; j; i0; j0 such thatAdj(i; j); Adj(i0; j0);
Cong(i; i0); Cong(j; j0), then Cong(k; k0); where k = i+j and k0 = i0+j0:
Now to guarantee the bi-innitude of G, we adopt the following ax-
iom:.
Theorem 4 (Bi-Innity of G) Let any interval i be given; then there
exist exactly two intervals, j; k; such that Cong(i; j) & Cong(i; k) &
Adj(i; j) & Adj(i; k) & one of j; k is left of i and the other is right of
i:
Proof. Given an interval i, by denition it is bounded, so there exists
regions that are left of i and regions that are right of i. Assume a
region m to (say) the right of i. (The case to the left is handled exactly
analogously.) If Adj(m; i), then, by the Translation axiom, there is a
unique interval j such that Cong(j; i) and j is left-end equivalent with
m. If not-Adj(m; i); then let f be the fusion of all intervals p such that
Betw(i; p;m). f is an interval. Then, by Translation, there is a unique
interval j with Cong(i; j) and j left-end equivalent to f: Combinig this
with the analogous argument for the case to the left of i completes the
proof.
Since bi-extension obviously iterates, this already insures that G is
bi-innite in the sense of containing as part the fusion of the minimal
closure of any interval i under the operation of bi-extension dened
in the theorem. (This closure is proved to exist in Lemma 3, below.)
But we can do better and also insure that G is exhausted by iterating
the process of anking a given interval by two congruent ones as in Bi-
innity. This is just the Archimedean property, derived below. Toward
this end, call an interval l an (immediate) bi-extension of interval i
BiExt(l; i); or biext(i) = ljust in case l = j+i+k, where j; i; k behave
as in the Bi-innity theorem.
Lemma 2 Let i and j be intervals such that i < j; then :Cong(i; j):
Proof. For a contradiction, assume Cong(i; j). There are three possible
cases: (1) i is left-end equivalent to j; (2) i is right-end equiv. to j; (3)
i is neither. Cases (1) and (2) are argued in exactly the same way. For
deniteness, assume case (1). By Bi-innity, there exists i0 extending
i to the left with Cong(i0; i) and Adj(i0; i), hence Adj(i0; j). But then,
by the hypothesis for reductio and transitivity of Cong, it follows that
both i and j qualify as the unique right extension of i0; as required
by Bi-innity, and since, by hypothesis of the Lemma, i 6= j, this is a
contradiction. Case (2) is argued exactly analogously, considering i0 as
extending i to the right.
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In case (3), let kL be the fusion of all parts x of j such that L(x; i)
and let kR be the fusion of all parts x of j such that R(x; i): kL and
kR are intervals. (Easy exercise.) Clearly, kL + i + kR = j and this
sum is discrete (all three pairs discrete). Now, let j0 be (say) the right
extension of j; i.e. Cong(j0; j) and Adj(j0; j): By Translation, let i0 sat-
isfy Cong(i0; i) with i0 left-end equivalent to j0:By Translation again, let
k0L satisfy Cong(kL; k
0
L) and Adj(i
0; k0L) with L(i
0; k0L); and let k
0
R sat-
isfy Cong(kR; k
0
R) and Adj(k
0
L; k
0
R) with L(k
0
L; k
0
R): Then by Additivity,
Cong(j; i0 + k0L + k
0
R), so, by the uniqueness of (right) extension of j as
required by Bi-innity, we have j0 = i0+k0L+k
0
R, whence i
0 < j0, whence
i0 6= j0, but then both j0 and i0 qualify as the unique right extension of
j; a contradiction.
Now we can characterize G. Toward that, let X be any class of
intervals such that an arbitrary but xed interval i  G is one of the X
and such that if k = biext(j) for j any of the intervals of X; then k is
also in X: Call such X a closure of i under biext.
Lemma 3 By axiom 2, there is an individual which is the common part
of the fusions of each class X which is a closure of i under biext, which
we call their meet or the minimal closure i* of i under biext. (Since i is
stipulated to belong to any such X, the meet is non-null, as required in
mereology.)
Proof. Immediate from axiom 2.
Given a xed unit interval, i, we dene the right-half or postive
half i+ of i as the fusion of i and all intervals j such that R(j; i):
Then we dene the left-half or negative half of i as the fusion of all
intervals j such that L(j; i):
By the criterion for identity of mereological objects, the meet i of
Lemma 3 is unique. We now can prove a theorem characterizing G as
this meet:
Theorem 5 (Characterization of G): Let G be the fusion of the objects
in the range of the quantiers of our axioms; then G = i*, the fusion of
the minimal closure of i under biext:
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that G 6= i*. Since, by stipulation,
i  G and G is closed under biext; we have that i* < G: Then some part
p; indeed (by axiom 5) an interval k  G satsies 8j[Int(j) ^ j  i*!
L(k; j)]_8j[Int(j ^ j  i*! R(k; j]; therefore, by denition, L(k; i*) _
R(k; i*). Lets suppose its R(k; i*). (The other case is argued exactly
analogously.) Let i+ designate the positive or right half of i*. Clearly
9
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i+ is connected; and by our betweenness criterion, it is also "bounded",
so an interval. Therefore, by the Translation axiom, there is a unique
interval m  i+ with the properties (1) m is right-end-equivalent to i+,
and (2) Cong(m; i): But this leads to contradiction, as follows: Note that
i+ consists of the fusion of class K satisfying (i) i is in K and (ii) if j is
in K, then there is a unique j0 adjacent and right of j with Cong(j0; i)
and j0 belongs to K, and (iii) for any other K 0 satisfying (i) and (ii),
K  K 0. Now regarding the relationship between m and K, there are
four cases to consider: (a) All the K are to the left of m; (b) Adjacent
to m on the left is one of the K; (c) One of the Kcall it hproperly
includes m, i.e. m < h; or (d) One of the Kcall it hoverlaps m but
neither is proper part of the other. Case (a) is ruled out since then i+
then runs out before reaching m, contradicting that m  +. In case
(b), it follows that m itself is one of the K; but then another, h0, is in
K, hence h0  i+ with Cong(h0; i) and R(h0;m), but this is impossible
because of property (1) of m above. In case (c), since both m and h
are congruent to i, this contradicts Lemma 2 above that, if j < k; then
:Cong(j; k): (Also, then there would be h0 in K and extending h to the
right, contradicting that m is right-end equivalent to i+.) Finally, in
case(d), some h0, in fact with R(h0; h) and Adj(h0; h); is in K, and h0
< m but both m and h0 are congruent to i, again contradicting Lemma
2. Thus each of the four cases implies a contradiction, which shows that
the assumption of such m, hence of a k  G  i*, must be wrong. Thus,
taking account of the exactly parallel argument for the left (negative)
half of * , it follows that G = i*.8
Finally, we need a guarantee that any interval has a unique bisection.
But that can now be proved as a theorem:
Theorem 6 (Existence and uniqueness of bi-sections): Given any inter-
val i, there exist intervals j; k such that j < i & k < i & jjk & j+k = i
& Cong(j; k); and j; k are unique with these properties.
Proof. Let i be any interval. For any interval j, let j+r be the fusion
of j and the right bi-extension of j. So we need to nd an interval
j that is left-end-equivalent with i such that i = j+r. Let k be any
interval such that k < i. Without loss of generality, assume that k is
8Note that this result, expressing that G is Archimedean, is quite surprising as no
axiom explicitly contains an extremal clause to the e¤ect that the intervals of G
are only those that are part of the fusion of those obtained by repeated applications
of biext starting with a given interval. Nor do we have an induction axiom for
properties of intervals, although, of course, in light of Theorem 3, such an induction
principle could be derived from mathematical induction based on an N-structure.
Alternatively, one could derive that from properties of minimal closures, à la Frege.
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left-endequivalent with i. We have that i  k exists, and is an interval.
If k is congruent with i   k, we are done. So suppose not. Either jkj
< ji   kj or ji   kj< jkj. Let l be an interval that is congruent to the
smaller of those two and is left-end-equivalent with i. So l+r  i. (In fact
l+r < i). Now let j be the fusion of all intervals m such that m is left-
end-equivalent with i and m+r  i. Clearly j+r  i. If j+r = i, we are
done. So suppose that j+r < i. Let n = i  j+r . Then n is an interval.
Let p be an interval such that p < n and, without loss of generality,
suppose that p is left-end equivalent to n. Let q be n  p. Without loss
of generality, assume that either jpj = jqj or jpj < jqj. So p+r  n. Let j0
be the fusion of j and an interval congruent to p immediately on its right.
(First let p1 be congruent with p and right-end-equivalent with j. Then
let p2 be the right bi-extension of p1.Then j
0 = j+p2.) An application of
Additivity shows that j0+r = j+r + p+r, and we have j+r + p+r  i:This
contradicts the denition of j as the fusion of all intervals m such that
m is left-end-equivalent with i and m+r  i:
For uniqueness, given interval i, suppose both i = jL + jR with
Cong(jL; jR) and Adj(jL; jR), and also i = kL + kR with Cong(kL; kR)
and Adj(kL; kR), with neither jL nor jR = kL or kR. Suppose without
loss that kL < jL(and so jR < kR). Let m = jL kL. Then jR+m = kR,
whence Cong(jR +m; kL). Now let m
0 be congruent to m and adjacent
to m to its right. Then Cong(jR m
0; kL). But we have jR m
0 < jR <
jR +m = kR (where jR is discrete from m). Since Cong(jR  m
0; kR),
this contradicts our lemma that if i < j, then :Cong(i; j).
By repeated application of bi-sections, we can, in e¤ect, approximate
any locus along G to within any desired accuracy with su¢ciently many
nested intervals, whose least after k subdivisions is of norm 2 k assuming
the initial unit interval i is of norm 1. (Here we are speaking in our
metalanguage, not yet having reconstructed the norm function in our
object language.) One natural strategy that now suggests itself is to de-
ne an exact locus or point as a Cauchy sequence of such decreasing
intervals. As a warm-up example, let us construct an endpointsay the
leftfor a given arbitrary interval i: That will simply be the set of all
subintervals j of i obtained by successive subdivisions into equal parts
such that for all j; there is no p < i such that L(p, j): In point-based
1-dimensional geometry, if we arbitrarily set the left-endpoint of i = 0,
this corresponds to the Cauchy sequence: < 1
2k
>; k = 1; 2; :::n:::; con-
verging to 0. Indeed, we can introduce 0 in exactly this way: let i be an
arbitrary but xed interval, oriented as just described. Then 0 =df
T
[all
sets S containing i and containing the left half of any subinterval j of i
such that j 2 S]: Similarly, we could dene 1, replacing left (L) with
right (R). (Below, however, we give a denition in terms of Cauchy
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sequences of intervals increasing to the right, in conformity to the rest
of the positive half of G:) Notice that these objects, whether thought
of as numbers or as points, are not claimed to be parts of G: On the
contrary, they are part of a superstructure that we construct over the
mereological-interval structure of G:
In general, we dene a sequence < ji > of intervals increasing to
the right (or left, for negative reals) to be Cauchy just in case, for any
interval, "; there exists N such that for any m > k > N , jm   jk is an
interval, R(jm  jk; jk); and jjm   jkj < j"j :(This last expression was de-
ned contextually above. By assumption that < ji > is increasing to the
right, jm  jk exists and R(jm  jk; jk):Similarly for sequences increasing
to the left. Note the role of axiom 5, guaranteeing that arbitrarily small
intervals are values of ":)
By repeated application of Bi-innity and Translation, we can always
avail ourselves of Cauchy interval sequences s = < sj > increasing to the
right, beginning with our xed unit interval, i; for positive reals (to the
left, beginning with  i for negative reals), i.e. such that R(sk+1 sk; sk)
(L(sk+1   sk; sk)); the fusion of all the intervals sj forms an interval.
9
This proves convenient in giving a second representation of real numbers
as intervals in G itself, which in turnas we shall see belowaugments
the reach of reconstructions that dont rely on set theory. Thus, we will
have available two relative interpretations of the classical continuum, R,
based on G: (1) equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of intervals of
G, or canonical ones from each class; and (2) fusions of canonical Cauchy
interval sequences, as just indicated.
Well return to (2) below. First, let us pursue (1) in some more
detail. We want to construct the reals over the xed interval i already
associated with [0,1]. The rst step is to identify the binary rationals
as the appropriate subintervals left-endpoint-equivalent to i; obtained
by iterated subdivisions licensed by the Bisection axiom. Thus, each
rational of the form n
2k
, where n = 1; 2; :::; 2k 1; corresponds 1-1 with the
left-endpoint-equivalent subintervals of i determined by the kth stage
of bisections. (The reader will have noted that the full binary tree of
Baire space is in e¤ect generated by these subdivisions.) The next step
is to identify arbitrary reals in (0; 1] with increasing Cauchy sequences
of these subintervals.10
9Since we dont recognize a null interval, 0 is conventionally dened either as above
or as a right-ward proceeding (nested) sequence starting with an interval, call it   i
2
;
congruent to the left half of i, choosing at each stage, k, the right half subinterval of
  i
2k 1
:
10Of course, sequences may omit both left and right subintervals at a given stage,
corresponding to a 0 in the binary numeral representation of the real in question.
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The natural ordering of the binary subintervals of i implicit above is
this: j  k $df k   j exists (is non-null) & R(k   j; j):
The next step is to extend this ordering to the increasing Cauchy
sequences of intervals. We set < ri >  < si > just in case 9"9N8k >
N [" an interval & jsk   rkj > j"j & R(sk  rk; rk) (Recall that the norm-
notation was dened contextually using Cong, above.)
3 Recovering R
The pieces are now in place to prove a rst recovery theorem:
Theorem 7: The ordered structure of binary intervals wthin i together
with the Cauchy sequences of them is order-isomorphic to the classical
real numbers of (0; 1] (in their natural ordering, <).
Proof. There is a 1-1 invertible map ' from the binary intervals of
i to the binary rationals of (0; 1]: Dene ' as follows: Set ' of the
left interval, call it i
2
; of i resulting from the 1st subdivision = 1
2
; af-
ter the kth subdivision, set ' of the left-most = 1
2k
; of the next left-
most = 2
2k
; ..., of the next to right-most = 2
k 1
2k
: (' of the right-most
is of course always = 1.)11 Clearly ' is order-preserving. To extend
this to the increasing Cauchy interval sequences, map each such, of the
form < s1; s2; :::; sn::: > to the increasing rational Cauchy sequence
determined by '; viz. < '(s1); '(s2); :::; '(sn); ::: > : Call this exten-
sion of ' '0: That '0 is 1-1 and onto the increasing binary rational
Cauchy sequences is immediate from the properties of ': That '0 is
order-preserving is also clear: if < rk >  < sk >, then beyond some N
(given in the denition of this ordering, above), 9n such that the cor-
responding rational di¤erences, '(sm)   '(rm) > 2
 n; for any m > N;
which denes order on these rational sequences.
Now we can extend this to the whole positive half-line, (0;1) by
applying the same procedure to right-extensions of i by any number of
intervals each congruent with i: E.g. we map the interval i + j; where
Cong(i; j) & Adj(i; j) & R(j; i) to (0; 2] (appealing to the Bi-innity
theorem), iterating this procedure to cover all intervals of the form (0; n]:
Thus, we have:
11Since, e.g., 2
2k
= 1
2k 1
; etc., it appears that ' is many-one; but really it isnt as
the the result of proceeding stepwise to the right simply adds a congruent interval
adjacent to the preceding, so that the result is an interval, and in the case of an even
number of steps, it is always = an interval obtained at an earlier subdivision. E.g. in
one rightward step at the kth subdivision, we get left-most- i
2k
+ next-left-most- i
2k
=
left-most- i
2k 1
; etc. (where the +here is mereological summation).
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Corollary 1 The theorem statement holds for all intervals of the form
(0; n]; hence for the whole positive part G+ of G as order-isomorphic to
the positive reals, (0;1):
Proof. The only thing to check, in addition to what has already been
established, is that the map just introducedcall it '00from G+ to
(0;1) is indeed dened on all of G+ in the sense that no part p  G+
is discrete from all the intervals on which '00 is dened. Suppose, to
the contrary, there is some such part, p: Then p must be discrete from
each binary rational interval left-end equivalent to i, and in particular
discrete from any of the intervals obtained from i by any nite number of
applications of the biext operation introduced above. But then p would
be discrete from the fusion of all such intervals, which fusion = exactly
the meet (= minimal closure of i under biext) that we proved = G in
Theorem 5, above. This contradicts that p  G+:
Corollary 2 The theorem statement holds for all intervals of the form
[ n; 0]; hence for the whole negative part G  of G as order-isomorphic
to the non-positive reals, ( 1; 0]:
Proof. Applying Translation and Bi-innity, the constructions for the
positive part of G can be shifted accordingly. (For the sake of the eld
operations, introduced below, it is simplest to reect the positive inter-
vals about 0, i.e. proceeding leftward starting with  i or subdivisions
thereof.) The proof that the mirror image of the map '00 is dened on
all of G  is exactly analogous to the proof of the rst Corollary that '00
is dened on all of G+:
To extend the isomorphisms of the Corollaries to cover the whole of G
simply stipulate that, for every interval j of the negative part of G and
every interval k of the positive part, j  k:Thus we have established:
Theorem 8: G (i.e. (G;) ) is order isomorphic to R (ordered by <).
Call the isomorphism of the latter theorem :
With respect to the eld-algebraic structure of R, we can proceed in
either of two ways. (1) We could regard it as additional structure of R,
built up in the usual way from the Cauchy seqences dening the reals,
not bothering about any additional structure of G; or (2) we can intro-
duce operations of addition and multiplication of intervals of G and
prove that the order-isomorphism  is also an algebraic isomorphism.
(2) is more interesting so let us pursue it. To dene an interval sum
operation, call it i j; we can rst dene this for binary intervals;which
we can already express as  1(q); for q a binary rational of R, where
such an interval is either left-end-equivalent to i, if q > 0; or right-end
equivalent to  i; if q < 0; where  i is the interval satisfying Cong(i; i)
14
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& Adj(i; i) & R(i; i):Then  will simply be vector-addition along
G:  is then extended to all of R by applying it pointwise to inverse
images under  of the (binary) rational Cauchy sequences dening the
reals in queston. To obtain "multiplication of intervals, i
 j; either of
two method may be used. Remaining entirely within G, we rst dene
this product for inverse images of binary rationals as iterated interval-
addition, ; treating binary fractions of intervals in accordance with the
distributive law of multiplication over addition.12 Then 
 is extended
to all of R by applying it pointwise to inverse images under  of the
rational Cauchy sequences dening the reals in question. Alternatively,
we can adapt the establshed Euclidean geometric method of introduc-
ing product of two lengths by working in the Euclidean plane. Here, of
course, we work in G  G, diagrammatically representing one copy of
G as our abcissa, the other as ordinate, such that the left end of our
unit, i, is the origin, where the two axes cross.13 Then the product j
k
is obtained by taking j as left-end equvalent to i along the abcissa, k
as extending from the origin along the ordinate (either up if we are
operating on +k; or down if we are operating on  k): Next we con-
struct the hypotenuse segment  connecting the right-end of i with
the top-end of k (if were consider j 
 +k, bottom-end of k if its
j 
  k). The value of the product is then represented as the interval
m along the ordinate from the origin to where the segment, call in 0;
meets the ordinate, where 0 extends from the right-end of j and lies
parallel to : (0 forms a second hypotenuse, so we have two similar
triangles. Then the denition of product derives directly from the fact
that jmj
jkj
= jjj
1
:)14 Now the denition of the operation 
 is extended to
all of R via rational Cauchy sequences, as in the rst method.
Recalling that  1(0) was introduced via a rational-interval Cauchy
sequence, one checks that the algebraic laws of the eld operations are
preserved under : Thus, we have
Theorem 9: G (G;;;
) is ordered-eld isomorphic to R (R;<
;+; ).
12E.g.,  1(2:5) 
  1(3:25) is computed by vectorially adding twice the (unit)
interval i and half-i, call this 2:5i; and then vectorially tripling this and adding a
quarter of 2:5i to obtain the answer.
13Justifying this method on the present pointless basis would require adopting
some further primitives and axioms to extend our methods to the Euclidean plane.
We would need further equivalence relations of end-equivalence to replace reference
to the point where two non-collinear intervals meet; and we would need a relation
of angle-congruence for purposes of constructing paralells. All this will be carried
out in further work on two-dimensional continua.
14Note that were now in a position to dene the norm, jjj ; for any interval j;
based on the isomorphism :
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Although these isomorphism theorems rely on the characterization
theorem (5) of G, which already expresses that G is Archimedean, it
is worth pointing out that Theorem 9 implies that G satises a state-
ment of the Archimedean property closer to the one commonly given for
R. Here is one way to formulate this. As will be suggested below, as-
sume as part of our mereological universe a natural-numbers-structure,
N ; constituted entirely of atoms, which we designate 0N ; 1N ; 2N ; :::.
15
Then we can speak of functions from N (0;+N ; N) to intervals of G
by quantifying plurally over (unordered) pairs, (n; j) =df n + j (where
this is nominalistic summing). Now inductively dene a map ' : N !
Intervals of G via
(i) '(0N) = i
(ii) '(nN +N 1N) = biext('(nN)):
Now dene `i divides k (mod 3) to mean: k = '(mN); some mN : Then
we say G is Archimedean just in case
8j9h[j an interval ! h an interval & i divides h (mod 3) & j  h]:
Thus we have
Corollary G is Archimedean.
Proof. This follows from the Characterization Theorem on G as the
minimal closure of i under biext. For a contradiction, suppose that some
interval j  G is not covered by any interval h obtained by iterating
biext, starting with i, any nite number of times. Then, by construction
of G, for some j0  j, j0jG; so j  G, contradiction. (Cf. the proofs of
Corollaries 1 and 2, via the denedness of the maps described there.)
Finally, we would like to be assured that the above development of R
over G is independent of the starting interval, i, i.e. that starting with
any other, j, leads to essentially the same recovery theorems, and even
that the minimal closure of j under biextension is indeed G itself. That
can be arrived at as follows.
Let j be any interval of G other than i:Now minimally close j under
biextension, calling the result j*: Then we proceed in two steps: (1) We
can carry out the whole of the above construction to produce an ordered-
eld isomorphism 0 from the binary intervals and Cauchy sequences
thereof between G0 and R;where G0 and 0 are introduced just as G and
 were but substituting reference to j for that to i throughout. (Think
of a transformation of the interval structure of G based on i combining
a suitable translation and either a shrinking, in case jjj < jij ; or a
15This can itself be carried out along lines of Hellman (1996) but ignoring modal
operators for present purposes.
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stretching, in case jij < jjj, or neither, if Cong(i; j):) Step (2) consists
of demonstrating that, in light of (1), the point-free continuum G0 = j*
based on j is indeed = G: That makes essential use of the Archimedean
property of G0, a¤orded by carrying out the proof of the last Corollary
with G0 in place of G, mutatis mutandis.
Theorem 10: The point-free continuum G0 = j* based on interval j
( G and  G0) = G:
Proof. By denition of G as minimal closure of i under biextension,
G0  G: For since, by hypothesis, j  G, we have that for some nite
n, j  biextn(i), i.e. j is part of the result of the nth iterate of biext
applied to i: Then it is straightforward to show that any k covered by
nitely many applications of biext starting with j is also covered by
nitely many applications of biext starting with i:We need to show the
converse, that G  G0: First we claim that i  G0: This follows from the
Archimedean condition displayed above, applied to G0, interchanging the
roles of i and j to produce an h ( G0) such that i  h: Next we argue
by induction that any interval k obtained from i by repeated application
of the biextension operation will be accessible from j in the same sense
as i is, i.e. by appealing again to the Archimedean condition above for
G0, substituting k for j and j for `i. Then, from the denition of G,
since every intervalm of G is covered by the result of some nite number
of iterations of biextension based on i, it follows from the induction that
m  G0, as well, whence G  G0; and therefore G0 = G:
4 Topological Models
We now present two topological models for our axiomatization.
These illustrate some of the Aristotelian notions of contiguity and con-
tinuity.16 The exercise will also serve to remove any lingering doubts
concerning the consistency of our axiomatization, if there are any.
For both models, the backgroundmeta-theory is the ordinary, Dedekind-
Cantor account of the real numbers, with their usual topological proper-
ties. An open set S of real numbers is said to be regular if S is identical
to the interior of its closure.17
Dene a real number r to be an interior boundary of a set S, if
r =2 S, but there are numbers s; t such that s < r < t and the open set
16For a discussiion and comparison of these concepts, see Hellman and Shapiro
[2012].
17Cartwright [1975] argues that in 3-space, all and only regular open sets are
receptacles, regions of space that physical objects can occupy. Cartwrights theory
is at least partly Aristotelian.
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(s; t) frg is a subset of S. So, for example, the number 1 is an interior
boundary of the union of (0; 1) and (1; 2). Regular open sets are those
open sets that have no interior boundaries.
The domain of our rst model consists of all non-empty, regular
open sets of real numbers. The parthood relation is just the subset
relation, as might be expected. Let  be a non-empty set (or plurality)
of non-empty, regular sets. Dene SUM() to be the interior of the
closure of the union of . This is the fusion relation. So to get the
fusion of a set of regions in our model, rst take the union of the sets,
then the closure of the result, and then the interior of that. The result
is, again, a regular, open set. And it is straightforward to verify that
our Axiom 2, of fusion (or whole comprehension) is satised:
,
(8ww)(9x)(8y)[y  x$ (9z)(z  ww ^ z  y)]
:
This model nicely recapitulates some of Aristotles account of
continuous objects. Consider, again, the intervals (0; 1) and (1; 2). Those
are contiguous, since there is nothing of the same kind in between
them. Indeed, there are no members of our domain in between. The
only thing between them is the real number 1, and f1g is, of course,
not a regular open set. These two intervals are also continuous, in
Aristotles sense, since when we put them togetherwhen we take their
sumwe obtain the interval (0; 2). That is, the boundary disappears
and they become a single interval, a unity.
The proper denitions of the other primitives in our axiomati-
zation are as straightforward as can be. Recall that L(x; y) intuitively
means that the region x is entirely to the left of y. Let X and Y be non-
empty, regular open sets of real numbers. Then dene X to be LEFT
of Y just in case every member of X is smaller than every member of
Y . It is trivial to verify that the relevant axioms are satised.
Recall that an interval is dened to be a connected, bounded
region. In the model, the intervals are just the open intervals, (a; b),
with a < b. And, of course, the Gunkiness axiom 5 is also trivial:
(8x)(9j)(Int(j) ^ j < x):
The notion of left-end-equivalence is also straightforward. Two inter-
vals are left-end-equivalent just in case they have the same left endpoint.
And, of course, congruence of regions is dened to be congruence of
regular, open sets. Verifying the remaining axioms is also trivial.
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Our second topological model is a sort of dual to the rst, as its
domain consists of certain closed sets of real numbers. It is, in one
sense, a little more Aristotelian, since it does allow that intervals have
endpointsalthough these endpoints are not regions in the domain.
Say that a set S of real numbers is regular closed if S is identical
to the closure of its interior. A real number r is an isolated point of a
set B if r 2 B, and there are numbers s; t such that s < r < t and the
open set (s; t) frg is disjoint from B. So, for example, 1 is an isolated
point of f1g, and also of the union of f1g with [2; 3]. Regular closed sets
have no isolated points.
The domain of our second model is the set of non-empty, regu-
lar closed sets of real numbers. As with our rst model, the parthood
relation is the subset relation. If  is a non-empty set of non-empty
regular closed sets, dene the SUM of  to be the closure of union of
. It is straightforward to verify that this SUM is regular closed, and
that Axiom 2 of fusion is satised.
Perhaps this model better captures the Aristotelian notion of
continuous objects. The sum of [0; 1] and [1; 2] is, of course, [0; 2]. Here
the boundary point(s) of the contiguous intervals is absorbed into the
sum.
With this model, we must be a little more careful when char-
acterizing some of the relations in our theory, even the dened ones.
Consider, for example, the two closed intervals [0; 1] and [1; 2], both of
which are in our model. As sets, those are not disjoint, as they have
a member, 1, in common. Recall, however, that in our denition of
overlap:
x  y $ (9z)(z  x ^ z  y);
the quantier ranges over the regions in the model. So [0; 1] does not
overlap [1; 2], since there is no member of the domainno regular closed
setthat is a part of (i.e., a subset of) both. The regions are indeed
discrete. In our second model, intervalsbounded and connected
regionsare closed intervals [a; b].
Let A be the union of [0; 1]; [2; 3]; [4; 5];. . .; and let B be the
union of [1; 2]; [3; 4]; [5; 6], . . . Then A does not overlap Bthey are
discreteeven though their intersection, as sets, is innite.
Our denition of Left is similarly nuanced. If A and B are
regular closed sets, then dene A to be LEFT of B just in case for
every r in A and every s in B, either r < s, or both r = s and r is a
boundary of both. So [0; 1] is to the left of [1; 2]. It is trivial to verify
that the axioms of our theory are all satised in this second model.
This second model does have some rather strange or, at least
intuitively un-Aristotelian regions. Consider the union of the closed
19
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -412-
intervals [:1; :9], [:01; :09], [:001; :009], . . . and f0g. This set is regular
closed, and so is a region in our model. However, it has an actual innity
of discrete parts and a sort of loose point f0g at its left end.
5 Interlude: A Brief Dialogue
Objection: If this is really coherent, it would indeed reënforce that non-
punctiform and indecomposable are very di¤erent attributes as ap-
plied to continua.18 But the connection between them may be greater
than the above seems to imply. Indeed, one may question whether it
really makes sense to say of G that it has any proper parts at all! Lets
take your interval i: You suppose that it makes sense to speak of i and
its negate, Neg( i) = G   i: But consider the question of the two places
where i meets Neg( i): Do they touch there? Surely there must be a
point at each of those places, either as part of i itself or of Neg( i). But
of course, as your system allows, i can be shifted anywhere along G so
that any place can serve as a boundary of an interval, in which case G
is composed of points after all.
Reply: It is indeed part of the standard punctiform conception that
boundaries of (bounded) intervals must exist, and then they must be part
of one or the other of an interval and its complement.19 But the above
theory ofGmakes sense on the basis of a di¤erent conception. According
to it, lets consider your question, whether i and Neg(i) touch. Well,
we dont make sense of that, except to say that, if you mean, Is there
anything in between i and Neg( i)?, the answer is clearly no; and this
is perfectly compatible with the two parts not overlapping. After all,
a very similar thing happens in the case of your Dedekind cuts in the
rationals used to dene irrational numbers: the lower and upper sections
are disjoint (the set-theoretic analogue of our discrete), yet there is no
boundary in the sense of an lub of the lower section or a glb of the
upper, until by at one is introduced by dening it to be the cut (or a
section thereof) itself! We all know and love this move by Dedekind,
and we know how well it works. But that move does not establish that
a corresponding point really exists (was there all along) on any actual
18In the opposite direction, the intuitionistic continuum is indecomposable but,
in some sense of point, is entirely composed of points. Although not all pairs of reals
are orderable (so that exact location cannot be attributed), still they are speced
with innite precision relative to the everywhere dense rationals.
19It seems also to have been Aristotles conception that breaking a line segment
results in (or actualizes) boundary points, endpoints of two new sbintervals. This
may in fact have been Aristotles notion of indecomposability. In that case, note
how di¤erent it is from the intuitionistic conception. There, breaking a continuum re-
sults in a loss (some syrup sticking to the knife, as it were), whereas, on Aristotles
conception, the result is an addition (of endpoints) to the structure.
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1-dimensional continuum (if there are any), much less on any that can
be coherently conceived. And it is simply not a move that we are forced
to make, either on conceptual or on practical grounds. Instead, we can,
if we like, carry out a Dedekind style construction as a superstructure
over G, preserving all the advantages of classical analysis while resisting
the attribution of a point-ontology.
Objection: The analogy with Dedekind cuts (for irrationals) is awed:
Your G is supposed to model a continuum, so the analogue of a division
of G into two discrete yet adjacent parts would be a Dedekind cut in the
reals, not in the rationals. But the Dedekind continuum is complete, so
there are no cuts in the reals without the corresponding real belonging to
one segment or the other. This shows, does it not, that e.g. your Bi-
section axiom really makes no sense unless a point is added at the place
where the two parts meet.
Reply: Agreed, the analogy is imperfect; still, imperfect analogies
can be of heuristic value. But it doesnt follow that points need to be
added where [the] two parts meet, for, as we said above, where they
meet is language belonging to the Cantor-Dedekind theories of a point-
ful continuum, but it is foreign language that cant really be translated
into the theory of G: Point-like places simply are not recognized; that
is the point! Yes, they can be introduced as superstructure, as shown
above, but that doesnt require revising the description of G, or thinking
that really the points are there on G: Just as we can say that two
people believe in the same god(s) without thereby implying that there
exist god(s) in which they both believe, so we can speak (as we have spo-
ken) of two intervals being, say, left-end equivalent without thereby
implying that there is a special further entity called the left end (as a
point) shared by both segments. Even in cases where abstraction based
on an equivalence relation may be reasonable and useful, e.g. as when
we speak of income levels based on persons or families sharing simi-
lar enough incomes, that doesnt meanat least, without much further
argumentthat we have to recognize income levels as entities or that
it is somehow incoherent not to.
6 Non-set-theoretic versions
There were two main places in the above reconstruction where set theory
seemed to play an indisepnsable role: (1) in the use of Cauchy sequences
of binary intervals; and (2) in the use of isomorphisms between G and R.
In the latter case, appeal to set theory is, in a sense, not really problem-
atic with regard to the autonomy of the interval structure of G, since,
after all, were reasoning about the relation of that structure to that of
the classical continuum, which is fundamentally set-theoretic. The rst
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case, however, is problematic, as the autonomy of G is threatened by
reliance on enough set theory to build up R, with its ontology of points,
etc. Is there an alternative way of introducing interval sequences that
improves on this?
Indeed there is. All that is needed is to expand the theory of G by
specifying that, additional to G but entirely discrete from it, there is a
denumerable innity of mereological atoms that form a natural-numbers
structure (N-structure). That is readily expressed with mereology and
plural quantication. (Cf. e.g. Hellman [8].) Now the role of ordered
pairs of the form < n; j >; where n is an atom of the N-structure and j is
an binary rational interval of G; can be served by the (unordered) mere-
ological sum, n+ j:20 Plurally quantifying over such things then enables
plurally quantifying over binary rational interval sequences. Those that
satisfy the Cauchy convergence condition serve as our reals. The upshot
is that, now, we bypass set theory entirely in the development of our G-
interval structure, even to the extent of being able to carry out a great deal
of classical analysis without even recognizing real numbers as objects! In-
stead of speaking of reals as individual objects, we quantify plurally over
the increasing binary rational Cauchy interval sequences corresponding
to them (as their limit points, on standard classical theory). This ful-
lls at least the non-punctiform aspect of the Aristotelian conception
of contiua in a clearly non-parasitic way. Points arent introduced at
all; rather, their mathematical roles are performed by surrogates within
the thoroughly non-punctiform framework of G: We can even claim to
capture Aristotles idea that points exist only potentially, since, as
already seen, we can introduce real numbers or points as objects serving
as the limits of our converging interval sequences, but that is not forced
on us.
But, in order to make good on this last claim, it needs to be checked
that at least a good portion of classical analysis can indeed be con-
structed within the G-framework (with plural quantication but no set
theory, as just described). In particular, how are we to reconstruct quan-
tication over functions from reals to reals if we can only plurally quan-
tify over Cauchy interval sequences. This is no problem so long as our
functions are continuous (or at least continuous on a co-countable do-
main of reals). The key here is that continuous functions are determined
20Although the intervals of G already allow encoding of natural numbers and the
arithmetic operations, representation of sequences of intervals and other functions
within a nominalist framework becomes cumbersome at best, since a stock of intervals
would be serving two roles at once, that of natural numbers and that of items of
sequences. Such problems are bypassed by positing an atomic N-structure discrete
from G:
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by their behavior at rational arguments. Now binary rationals are avail-
able directly as intervals. Suppose we have a sequence of all these rep-
resenting rationals in the domain of denition of f , i.e. we refer plurally
to countably many individuals of the form < n; j >, as dened above.
A continuous function f assigns each of these a real value, represented
over G as a Cauchy interval sequence, f(< n; j >) = fn+j1 ; f
n+j
2 ; :::Now
we would like to code all these (countably many) Cauchy interval se-
quences as a single interval sequence (which itself, of course, need not
be convergentit merely serves to encode the behavior of f at rational
arguments, enumerated in an arbitrary fashion). One convenient way
is to work with just the atoms n of the < n; j > serving in the enu-
meration of rational intervals, coding the (set-theoretic) ordered-pair
< n; f(< n; j >) > as the sequence n + fn+j1 ; n + f
n+j
2 ; :::Then the re-
striction f  Q of f to rationals can be coded up in a single sequence by a
dove-tailing construction on the countably many sequences of this latter
form.21 In this way, we bring continuous and co-countably continuous
functions within the purview of plural quantication of the language of
the G-interval structure.
With one more reductive step, we can improve further on this to bring
also the isomorphism recovery theorems within the purview of the theory
of G (or its expanded version, providing for an atomic N-structure).
Instead of recovering real numbers as Cauchy interval sequences, we
can avail ourselves of the second relative interpretation of R over G
referred to above, toward the end of section 2, viz representing reals
as certain intervals of G; viz. fusions of the right-(or left-) increasing
Cauchy interval sequences introduced above. Here is how this helps
in representing the isomorphisms of the recovery theorems without set-
theoretic machinery.
As in the non-set-theoretic reconstruction just sketched, we recon-
struct interval sequences via an atomic N-structure. But now instead of
treating quantication over reals as plural quantication over the wholes,
n + j; coding the (canonical) Cauchy interval sequences dening them,
instead we quantify singularly over the fusions of the intervals making
up such a sequence, which, as noted, are themselves intervals of G.
Before we can introduce functions from such real intervals of G
(as we may now call them) to reals of the classical continuum, we need
(or at least prefer) to identify a suitable target structure that is itself
not essentially set-theoretic. Here we can appeal to arithmetic methods
applied to our given N-structure. Coding signed integers +m ( m) con-
ventionally as certain pairs of naturals, e.g. as 21  3m (22  3m); and then
21This is modeled on the way countably many real numbers can be coded as a
single real number.
23
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -416-
rationals as (reduced) pairs of signed integers, we then have canonical
Cauchy sequences < qj > of rationals coded as number-theoretic ordered
pairs of the form < j; qj >; where qj is the number coding the rational
qj:
22 Any two distinct such sequences di¤er at some place; thus, the fu-
sion of any such sequence is just a uniquely determined whole of atoms
of our original N-structure, with di¤erent sequences yielding di¤erent
fusions. These fusions then can serve as our classical reals (which we
call reals over N). It is tedious, but routine, to dene linear ordering
and the eld operations on these.
We still need a way of representing or coding mappings between
real-intervals of G and fusions over the N-structure serving as classical
reals . First, how can we code an ordered pair of the form < k;  >;
where k is a real-interval of G and  is a (nominalistic) sum of nat-
urals (atoms of the N-structure) coding a canonical Cauchy sequence
of rationals representing a real? Well, if we stipulate that the mapping
goes in the direction k  , we can make do with an unordered pair.
But that can simply be taken as the fusion of k and , as these are
always non-overlapping, as they are from di¤erent structures, one atom-
less, the other atomic. Finally, by quantifying plurally over fusions of
this form (k + ), we achieve the e¤ect of quantifying over mappings or
functions from our G-structure to the reals over N. In this manner, we
can reconstruct the isomorphisms of the recovery theorems and prove
their required properties within our theory of G together with an atomic
N-structure, without ever using set-membership or quantifying over sets.
Finally, there is a readily available way of further reinforcing the idea
that real numbers as points exist only potentially: the above exten-
sion of the universe of G by an N-structure and the whole subsequent
development of an R-structure over it can be carried out under the sup-
position that such an extension is merely logically possible.23 Indeed,
even the theory of G itself can be carried out relative to the assumption
that such a mereological-interval structure is merely a logical possibil-
ity. Even so, extensions of G by further structures, e.g. an atomic
N-structure as above, are taken as further possibilities, relative to any
given hypothetical G-structure, so that the merely possible status of
real numbers as points is still recognized even within a thorough-going
modal-structural treatment.
22Here, of course, j is a numerical index referring to an atom of our N-structure,
not an interval of G:
23Thus, the above development of an extension of G by an atomic N-structure,
etc., can be set in the modal-structural framework of Hellman [7], as improved in
[8] and subsequent presentations. We do not claim that this captures what Aristotle
meant by potentially innite.
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7 Comparisons with Some Other Constructions
Without attempting anything like complete coverage of alternatives al-
ready in the literature, we present some comparisons that we hope will
be instructive.
As our title states, we are concentrating on point-free constructions of
the classical continuum, R, and in further work we will develop a recovery
of RR, which extends to higher dimensions, without primitives for any
objects of lower dimension. In addition to forming the basis of classical
functional analysis, these systems can be enriched to study geometric
spaces of various sorts. So we are clearly working in the area (category)
of metric spaces, not purely topological spaces. There have, indeed,
been a number of e¤orts to develop topological spaces based on axioms
governing regions, rather than sets of points, going back at least to
work of Karl Menger.24 Our own work only touches indirectly on these
precedents, insofar as well-known topological spaces can be constructed
from R, R2,.and higher dimensions. But those are derivative from the
metrical structure of these spaces, and so arent purely topological.
Focusing, then, on point-free geometries, there is the noteworthy
reconstruction of three-dimensional Euclidean geometry by Tarski [14].
This explicitly uses (atomless) mereology, to which is added the single
primitive sphere. (In addition, the construction uses some set theory,
e.g. in the key denition of point as the set of all spheres concentric with
a given sphere, and also in recovering denitions of various kinds of sets
of points, e.g. regular open, etc.) A few clever denitions introduce
the notions sphere A is externally tangent to sphere B, sphere A
is internally tangent to sphere B, spheres A and B are externally
diametrical to sphere C, spheres A and B are internally diametrical
to sphere C, leading nally to sphere A is concentric with sphere B:
where A 6= B, and where, say A, is proper part of B; given two spheres,
X; Y; externally diametrical to A and internally tangent to B, X and
Y are also internally diametrical to B: Then point  is introduced as
already explained, and then the notion of two points being equidistant
from a third is dened.
What about axioms? As his Postulate I, Tarski stipulates that The
notion of point and that of equidistant from satisfy all the postulates
of ordinary Euclidean geometry of three dimensions. Then follow three
auxiliary postulates governing solids, connecting solid and part with
regular open set and inclusion. He then writes: The postulate system
given above is far from being simple and elegant; it seems very likely that
24See, e.g. Menger [11]. For further references and recent developments, see Roeper
[12] and Gruszczyn´ski and Pietruszczak [6].
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this postulate system can be essentially simplied by using intrinsic prop-
erties of the geometry of solids. For the one-dimnesional case, that is
precisely what our system above accomplishes. We may call an approach
such as our own, in which no axioms govening even dened points are
listed (or, in higher dimensional cases, governing dened concepts for
any lower-dimensional objects), one of honest toil. When it comes
to two-dimensions, we will present a recovery of the key Archimedean
property meriting the honoric honest toil. Another departs from this
but only fairly modestly; we can describe this as an instance of petty
theft (rst o¢ense). In comparison, Tarskis method seems an instance
of grand larceny. As his self-critical remark suggests, it is one thing
to show that key primitive notions can be adequately dened by terms
designating objects and relations of a given level (dimension); it is quite
another to achieve a full-scale reduction of a point-based theory by de-
riving translations of its axioms induced by the denitions as theorems
from axioms governing concepts pertaining entirely to the given level.
In fairness, it should be mentioned that, as Tarski states, his postulates
can be proved categorical, and they can be proved mutually relatively
interpretable with standard point-based Euclidean geometry. Neverthe-
less, the achievement of a full-scale reduction is clearly more desirable,
not only for the unitiy it achieves, but for establishing the autonomy
and su¢ciency of the conceptual machinery operating at a given level or
dimension.
Much closer in content and method to the reconstructions of con-
tinua presented here is the recent work of Roeper [13], on what he calls
the Aristotelian continuum. Like the system presented above, his sys-
tem charcacterizes a linear continuum on a point-free basis in terms of
a structure of regions and intervals, and it is shown categorical and iso-
morphic to a classical, point-based continuum. The following are the
main points of comparison:
(1) Roepers axioms describe a continuum as a certain kind of region-
based topological space, connected, locally connected, second-countable,
also linearly ordered, complete, and separable. Our axioms do this but
also describe the metrical structure of an ordered eld. Thus, we have
congruence of intervals as one of our primitives, whereas Roepers system
omits this.
(2) As part of his logic, in place of mereology and logic of plurals,
Roeper uses a (rst- and second-order) logic of mass terms. Thus, where
we would express, e.g., region r is entirely to the left of region s as
any part of r is left of every part of s, Roepers language expresses r is
everywhere left of s (everywhere). Probably the two languages, as used
in these respective reconstructions of continua, that is, in the presence
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of other primitives and axioms governing them, are inter-translatable.
(3) Roeper draws heavily on region-based topology, a theory with
two non-logical primitives, limited (that is, bounded or nite in ex-
tent) and  is connected with , written  1 , intuitively meaning
either  and  overlap or they abut one another, along with thir-
teen axioms governing these, including Coherence (if  =  [ , then
 1 ), Continuity (a topological version of a least-upper-bound or
greatest-lower-bound principle), and Countable Convex Cover (akin to
Separability). It should be emphasized that these topological axioms
are not axioms of the Aristotelian continuum, but are instead (required
and shown to be) derivable therefrom. However, the two primitives just
listed are taken over in axioms 6, 7, and 8 of the latter system. Axiom 6
is essentially our denition of bounded ; axiom 7 is a version of continu-
ity; and axiom 8 is a version of separability. For purposes of describing
the classical linear continuum, we dene the two primitives, limited and
connected with: for  is limited, see the denition of bounded above,
sec. 2; for connected, we dened Adj(r,s), r; s are adjacent, and of
course we have r  s, from mereology. Moreover, the crucial proper-
ties of coherence, continuity, and separability are not taken as axioms
of our system, but rather proved as theorems, where for the rst two
properties, we use the plurals comprehension scheme of mereology (de-
scribing minimal closures), and for the third we use the representation of
rational-length intervals via the theorem of bisectability. Regarding the
important Archimedean property, Roepers system can derive this from
its version of continuity or completeness (as standardly done in point-
based frameworks, e.g. à la Dedekind), whereas we prove this directly
from our comprehension axioms and Translation.
Indeed, we can claim more: all Roepers axioms are in fact deriv-
able as theorems in our system, under the translation just given of his
primitives, limited and connected. Thus we have a nice unication of
systems, our geometry-cum-classical analysis and Roepers regions-based
topology-cum-ordered continuum. In sum, honest toil has paid o¤.
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Transfer and templates in scientific modeling 
 
 
Abstract 
The notion of (computational) template has recently been discussed in relation to 
cross-disciplinary transfer of modeling efforts and in relation to the representational 
content of models. We further develop and disambiguate the notion of template and 
find that, suitably developed, it is useful in distinguishing and analyzing different 
types of transfer, none of which supports a non-representationalist view of models. 
We illustrate our main findings with the modeling of technology substitution with 
Lotka-Volterra Competition equations. 
 
Ocpwuetkrv
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1. Introduction. One intriguing feature of modeling techniques is that they may be 
applied across scientific disciplines. Harmonic-oscillator models, for instance, are 
seemingly applied wherever there is scientific work to be done. Still, not all models 
are migratory. The Nambu-Goldstone model, for instance, is a staple of quantum field 
theory, but sees no application elsewhere. The evaluation of modeling efforts in 
different contexts of application warrants further analysis – which minimally requires 
a clear identification of what may be transferred between such contexts. On the 
semantic view of models, for instance, transfer could concern the mathematical 
structure (i.e., a system of coupled differential equations), this structure along with its 
interpretation (i.e., the representation of a target system as a harmonic oscillator), or 
anything ‘in between’. 
Recently, (computational) templates have been proposed as the subjects of 
transfer (Humphreys 2002, 2004; Knuuttila 2009, 2011; Knuuttila and Loettgers 
2012). Templates are types of differential equations, such as Lotka-Volterra 
equations, or modeling techniques, such as agent-based modeling, that are primarily 
constructed for their computational tractability, and that can be applied across 
disciplines to phenomena that, in the most extreme case, “may have nothing in 
common ‘physically’” (Humphreys 2002: S4). Remarkably, the notion of template 
has been used to argue for both a “selective” realist and a thoroughgoing 
instrumentalist view of modeling. In particular, the tractability-driven and 
“opportunistic” (Knuuttila 2009: 74) transfer of templates has been used to argue that 
models are epistemic tools, which are constructed and manipulated to contribute to a 
modeler’s understanding, and not (primarily) valued for their representation of target 
systems. Thus, while it seems intuitive to claim that cross-disciplinary modeling 
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efforts
1
 involve transfer of templates, there is a tension in (applications of) the notion 
of template with regard to one of the central philosophical questions regarding 
models. 
In this paper, we argue that the notion of template illuminates cross-
disciplinary modeling efforts, but that it does not support non-representationalism 
with regard to models. We distinguish three types of cross-disciplinary applications of 
modeling efforts, all of which may be understood as transferring templates and not 
interpreted computational models. Where templates are studied independently from 
computational models, there is only transfer in a degenerate sense; and where 
templates are genuinely transferred, this is strongly motivated by applications in 
computational models, valued in their different disciplinary contexts. Still, a marginal, 
but non-negligible role in modeling efforts for studying templates free from any 
specific interpretation shows that templates should not be identified with 
computational models. We illustrate our claims with a case study of transfer: the 
application of Lotka-Volterra Competition (LVC) equations in modeling technology 
substitution. 
 
2. Computational and non-representational templates. The notion of 
computational template was proposed by Paul Humphreys (2002, 2004), in the 
context of emphasizing the importance to science, especially with regard to the 
interconnections between disciplines,
2
 of computational techniques rather than 
                                               
1
 Throughout, “cross-disciplinary modeling efforts” is used where we do not want to 
express commitment about any items (models or templates) that are transferred. 
2
 We use “discipline” to indicate a – not necessarily large – branch of scientific 
research with characteristic subject matter and method(s) of inquiry. 
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theories. Mentioning several examples, including Laplace’s and Lotka-Volterra 
equations and normal distributions, Humphreys argues that some modeling techniques 
see widespread use primarily because of their computational tractability. The notion 
of computational templates is meant to identify what is common to these applications. 
Humphreys distinguishes such templates from computational models: the latter come 
with an interpretation that relates a formalism to a specific subject or target system, 
whereas the former are relatively independent of any specific subject. Thus, 
“templates with different interpretations are not reinterpretations of the same model, 
but are different computational models entirely” (Humphreys 2002: S7). Thus, 
transfer of a modeling technique involves applying the template, not the model, to a 
new subject matter; there is, strictly speaking, no model transfer. 
Humphreys warns against an instrumentalist conception of models, and claims 
that modelers take some parts of their models as true and others as false – in both 
cases expressing ontological commitment rather than the non-commitment that would 
indicate an instrumentalist attitude. Users of a template take a selective-realist 
attitude, by adding to the template (minimally) a subject-dependent correction set, 
which details the effects of relaxing its construction assumptions – the abstractions, 
idealizations, constraints and approximations that went into the construction of the 
template. Moreover, Humphreys maintains that construction of a template is not 
interpretation-free: the template is constructed in the light of its application to specific 
target systems, and at least one (subject-dependent) correction set is co-constructed.
3
 
                                               
3
 “The correction set is also always subject-dependent and so, despite its flexibility, is 
the template itself. This is in part because of the inseparability of the template and its 
interpretation, in part because of the connection between the construction of the 
template and the correction set.” (Humphreys 2002: S10). 
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Tarja Knuuttila uses the notion of template in her epistemic-tool account of 
models (e.g., Knuuttila 2009, 2011). On this account, models are primarily “result-
oriented” instruments for increasing the modeler’s understanding of the world. 
Models are purposefully constructed and manipulated, like tools; in particular, in 
evaluating a model, what matters is not its representational relation to target systems, 
but the contribution that its construction and manipulation makes to the realization of 
a given epistemic purpose (e.g., Knuuttila 2011: 263). 
Knuuttila specifically mentions templates in her discussion of the 
“opportunistic” adoption of models constructed in other disciplines.
4
 She emphasizes 
that the cross-disciplinary application of templates is guided first and foremost by 
considerations of tractability or solvability rather than any ability of the transferred 
item to represent accurately the (new) target system. She then uses the latter feature to 
argue against the view that models provide knowledge in virtue of being 
representational, intrinsically or as determined by modeler’s intentions. The cross-
disciplinary and opportunistic use of templates would show that modelers seek to 
“learn from the construction and manipulation of models quite apart from any 
determinate representational ties to specific real-world systems they might have” 
(Knuuttila 2011: 267). As ‘epistemic tools’, models may provide understanding in a 
variety of contexts, none of which is prevalent over others in terms of intrinsic 
representational content or modeler’s intention. Moreover, opportunism is 
recommended, not restricted, in the light of the result-orientedness of modeling: new 
                                               
4
 “[T]here is an element of opportunism in modelling: the template that has proven 
successful in producing certain features of some phenomenon will be applied to other 
phenomena, often studied within a totally different discipline.” (Knuuttila 2009: 74; 
2011: 268). 
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applications of a template are to be evaluated on the basis of results obtained in the 
new context, not prior to transfer (Knuuttila 2011: 268). Here, a strong positive 
analogy with tools is employed: like tools, models and/or templates may be used for a 
variety of purposes, not all of which are foreseen by the tool’s original designer, and 
many of which require fine-tuning or tinkering on the user’s part before proving their 
true value to the purpose. The only explicit negative analogy is that models serve an 
epistemic, tools a practical purpose.
5
 
Elsewhere, Knuuttila (with Loettgers, 2012) employs the notion of template to 
offer another, more implicit argument for her non-representationalism: templates can 
be constructed without any representational relation to a specific target system in 
mind. To establish this, the construction of Lotka-Volterra models by Volterra and 
Lotka is contrasted. The mathematical biologist Volterra was motivated by empirical 
phenomena regarding a specific target system (marine ecosystems), and only 
constructed a highly idealized set of coupled differential equations to model this 
phenomenon after concluding that a more realistic model would be mathematically 
intractable. By contrast, the general systems theorist Lotka derived the same set of 
differential equations from an abstract theory, irrespective of any specific target 
system, and only then showed that these equations could be applied to model 
oscillations in ecosystems and in concentrations of chemical substances. Thus, the 
very construction of a template may be non-representational – contrary to 
Humphreys’ (2002) claim. 
                                               
5
 This effectively restricts the analogy to a subclass of tools, since measuring 
instruments such as rulers and cognitive artifacts such as abaci do serve an epistemic 
purpose. 
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Summing up, the notion of template seems to offer a view of transfer of 
modeling efforts that is both plausible and at odds with representationalism or even 
realism regarding models. In what follows, we shall show that the template account 
of, in particular, transfer is in need of further development, which retains its 
plausibility and resolves the apparent tension with a representationalist view of 
models. 
 
3. Cross-disciplinary modeling as transfer of templates. In the previous section, we 
noted that there is a tension in the notion of template: for one author, it supports a 
selective-realist, representationalist view regarding models, for another an 
instrumentalist non-representationalism. One might, in response, opt for abandoning 
the notion. To retain it, we shall in this section develop the notion in such a way that 
the tension is resolved. 
To see why the notion needs developing, consider the claim that cross-
disciplinary applications of modeling efforts involve templates, which are primarily 
valued for their computational tractability. As it stands this claim is uninformative. 
That something serves as a cross-disciplinary template does not make clear why some 
modeling efforts (e.g., involving coupled-oscillator models) see cross-disciplinary 
application and others (e.g., involving Nambu-Goldstone models) do not. Moreover, 
computational tractability cannot provide the sole reason: Nambu-Goldstone 
equations are as computationally tractable as Lotka-Volterra equations, but only the 
latter feature in cross-disciplinary templates. 
Now, within each context of application of modeling efforts, computational 
tractability is valued because it allows derivation of specific implications or 
simulation of specific behaviors. Still, in transferring modeling efforts, both 
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disciplinary interests in and the interpretation of implications and behavior change. 
Balancing these evaluatively relevant aspects is difficult. On the one hand, 
emphasizing the versatility of the transferred items, and the necessary change of 
interpretation may underestimate the reason as to why tractability is still valued, viz., 
because of specific implications or behaviors, of new disciplinary interest – which 
may even be a direct counterpart of the original interests. Emphasizing similarities on 
the level of target systems, on the other hand, runs the risk of wrongfully equating 
templates and models and implying that, because representational content changes 
across applications, models are not primarily intended to represent target systems. 
There is an ambiguity in the very notion of a template that is directly related to 
this balancing act. On one reading, it may refer to a purely formal object, the behavior 
of which can be studied independently of any context of application. On another 
reading, a template may be what computational models, valued in different 
disciplinary contexts, have in common. Although representational content is 
necessarily different in these contexts, this does not entail that the template is valued 
exclusively for its formal properties: the applicability of a template in one discipline 
may still be justified by reference to computational models in another discipline. 
Lotka’s construction of the Lotka-Volterra template illustrates this ambiguity: it may 
be read as construction of a mathematical object, valued only for its tractability; or as 
a starting point for constructing multiple computational models, valued (also) for their 
diverse representational content. 
To resolve the ambiguity and improve our understanding of the role of 
templates in modeling, we may distinguish three types of cross-disciplinary 
applications of modeling efforts. All of these may be understood as transferring 
templates, not computational models. Yet the motivations for these application, and 
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consequently the justification for use of the template, are relevantly different – and 
bring to light the role of interpretations in the evaluation of templates. 
In the first type, modelers in one disciplinary context draw on modeling efforts 
in another discipline, not only because these involve application of computationally 
tractable mathematical structures (typically: sets of differential equations), but also – 
and primarily – because they want to apply the same implications of the 
computational models to similar target systems, or behavior of target systems. In such 
‘conformist transfer’, not only the computational template is transferred, but also – in 
Humphreys’ terms – its construction assumptions and correction set, appropriately re-
interpreted, in order to transfer what is taken to be a central result. In justifications for 
this transfer, one would expect modelers to emphasize similarities between target 
systems, on the level of properties and/or behavior, at least as much as computational 
tractability. Possibly, but not necessarily, this emphasis on similarities takes the form 
of suggesting highly abstract models or encompassing theories, as is also 
acknowledged in cognitive theories of analogical reasoning (e.g., Holyoak and 
Thagard 1995). 
In a second type of transfer, modelers draw on efforts in another discipline 
because they are interested in different implications of the same mathematical 
structure. For such ‘creative transfer’, a more general or extensive evaluation of the 
computational tractability of the template may be required, since the sensitivity of 
previously unstudied implications to construction assumptions must be assessed. This 
might lead to reformulation of the correction set. In justifications of creative transfer, 
one would not expect modelers to emphasize similarities between the properties and 
behavior of target systems and, by contrast, a stronger emphasis on formal analysis or 
general robustness of the template. However, this analysis is not independent from an 
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interpretation of the template in its new context of application: its ability to represent 
behavior of a target system motivates application of the template, even if this behavior 
may have no counterpart, or no counterpart of any disciplinary interest, in the original 
context of application. In the extreme, target systems may have “nothing in common 
‘physically’”.
6
 Here, what is transferred is a template plus interpretation potential. 
Extremely creative transfer must be distinguished from a third type of 
extension of modeling efforts, which can only be called ‘transfer’ in a degenerate 
sense. Here, modelers may study the behavior of a mathematical structure that has 
seen application in one disciplinary context purely out of an interest in its 
computational tractability or its formal implications. They may, for instance, relax 
various constructive assumptions or change parameter settings, not in order to make a 
computational model more realistic, but because they want to test the general 
robustness of a template. Here, the template is studied independently of any context of 
application, even the original one – these investigations strictly speaking study 
template behavior, not model behavior. Moreover, although these modeling efforts 
may not involve transfer, they may prove valuable in justifying subsequent creative 
transfer, and may (but need not) be motivated by the possibility of such transfer. 
Templates are thus involved in a variety of modeling efforts, and only seldom 
independently from (the presentational content of) computational models, valued in 
their different disciplinary contexts. Where templates are studied in independence 
from computational models, there is only transfer in a degenerate sense. Thus, 
although templates are strictly speaking without representational content, and they are 
                                               
6
 Note just how extreme such a case is, since similarities must be absent (or remain 
unmentioned) on the level of entities, properties, relations and behavior. Analogical 
reasoning must, in short, play no role whatsoever in such transfer of modeling efforts. 
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what is transferred, the phenomenon of transfer can hardly be used in support of a 
non-representationalism regarding models. Still, that there is a role in modeling efforts 
for studying template behavior free from any specific context of application shows 
that templates should not be identified with computational models. 
 
4. A case study: LVC models of technology substitution. In this section, we look at 
one case of transfer of modeling efforts: the modeling of processes of technology 
diffusion with Lotka-Volterra Competition (LVC) equations. We first give a 
necessarily brief description of these modeling efforts in their disciplinary context. 
Then, we analyze some features of these efforts with the notion of template, as it was 
developed and differentiated in the previous section. In particular, we point out a 
distinction between conformist and creative transfer, the importance of application of 
templates in computational models, and a marginal (but non-negligible) role of 
interpretation-free templates. 
Predicting and explaining how technological innovations capture market share 
is of obvious commercial interest. One model of this process fits the simplest logistic 
curve to the growth rates of technologies (Fisher and Pry, 1971), following the 
observation that these rates tend to follow a sigmoid curve after capture of a small but 
significant market share. The (perhaps surprising) predictive success of these and 
other phenomenological models has led to widespread use in industry, and to an 
increasing focus in research on hybridization of existing models for predictive 
purposes,
7
 as well as attempts to construct more explanatory models. 
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 Meade and Islam (1998) review twenty-nine phenomenological models and show 
that a combination provides a better fit to data sets than each of the individual models. 
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One such attempt follows a suggestion by Fisher and Pry that the diffusion of 
innovations can be understood as, primarily, a process of competition between an 
emerging and an established technology. Several researchers have therefore, for 
explicitly explanatory purposes, sought to apply the LVC equations to the growth 
rates of rival technologies. They describe the merits of these models as providing 
“clearly defined assumptions about the nature of technological growth” (Porter et al. 
1991: 197). Often, the behavior of the LVC model is studied in relation to the various 
phenomenological models, for instance by arguing that, under a range of conditions, 
LVC models reduce to Fisher-Pry models (Bhargava 1989). Occasionally, LVC 
equations are directly fitted to data sets of competing technologies. Farrell (1993), for 
instance, applies them to the substitution of soldered cans by lead-free cans, of 
fountains pens by ballpoint pens; and two other substitution processes. 
These modeling efforts are thus explicitly motivated by explanatory concerns, 
expressed in claims that LVC models should provide an understanding of the 
mechanisms of technology substitution. Moreover, the analytic and computational 
tractability of these models plays an important role, in deriving well-established 
phenomenological models as special cases (e.g., Bhargava 1989), in deriving general 
properties of systems of competing technologies (e.g., Saviotti and Mani 1995), or in 
applications to data sets (e.g., Farrell 1993). 
Yet there are at least two strategies for seeking this understanding, reflecting 
the distinction between conformist and creative transfer made in the previous section. 
The first strategy – explicit in, e.g., Bhargava 1989; Porter et al. 1991; Farrell 
1993 – starts from noting the similarity between the logistic (Pearl-Verhulst) growth 
models of ecology and the Fisher-Pry model, where a ‘technological’ counterpart is 
indicated for each element of the biological model: technologies are likened to yeast 
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cultures, growing in an environment with a maximum carrying capacity 
(corresponding to market saturation), etc. Then, it is noted that LVC models should 
comprise Fisher-Pry models as a special case, just as they comprise logistic growth 
models, the technological interpretation of the latter is carried over to the LVC 
equations, and the behavior of these equations that is familiar from biological 
applications (e.g., a bell-shaped growth curve for the ‘defending’ species/technology 
on emergence of a new species/technology) is found in data sets on technology 
substitution. 
A second strategy – explicit in Saviotti and Mani (1995) – involves the same 
template, but strays further from its ecological context of application. It starts by 
constructing a model that is supposed to capture the microeconomic mechanisms 
behind technology substitution: a set of three equations with an elaborate, detailed 
interpretation in terms of obsolescence, learning-by-doing, and purchase of 
intellectual property rights and other factors that have no obvious counterpart in 
ecology – and even for those factors that do, no such counterpart is mentioned. The 
behavior of these equations is not studied, apart from a qualitative reconstruction of 
various modes of competition (perfect, monopolistic, Schumpeterian and inter- and 
intra-technological), mostly known from the economic literature. Only then, the LVC 
equations are introduced, as an “aggregate representation” of technological change, 
with reference to their similar status for ecological change. After some manipulations, 
counterparts of the microeconomic model – especially of the parameters 
corresponding to its distinction between inter- and intra-technological competition – 
are sought; and the behavior of the manipulated equations is simulated to derive a 
relation between technological variety and the relative strength of modes of 
competition, along with the conditions under which the relation holds. 
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Both strategies involve transfer of the same template, and in each case, its 
adoption is partly motivated by its tractability (analytical or computational) and partly 
by its interpretability in technological terms. However, the first strategy may be 
identified as strongly conformist, and the second as comparatively creative. This is 
revealed both in the interpretation of the template and in what is presented as its 
relevant behavior and assumptions. The first strategy attempts a term-for-term 
translation, and emphasizes behavior that is familiar from applications in ecology.
8
 
The second interprets the LVC equations in the same terms as a microeconomic 
model, and studies behavior that has no obvious counterpart in ecological 
applications.
9
 This difference also shows in remarks made on the sensitivity of results: 
those that follow the first strategy note that applications of the LVC equations assume 
a stable environment, and find a counterpart in fixed-sized markets; the second 
strategy involves explicit analyses of conditions under which the main results obtain, 
formulated as relevant parameter intervals and ceteris paribus conditions. This 
confirms, with qualifications, Humphreys’ claim that conditions on the applicability 
of the template equations do not feature as ceteris paribus conditions in statements of 
results: they do not feature as such in conformist transfer, but they do in creative use. 
Another feature of templates that is revealed in LVC modeling of technology 
substitution is that transfer of the LVC template is strongly motivated by its 
application in (fully interpreted) computational models. In the first strategy, 
                                               
8
 Farrell (1993) also seeks to translate the method of applying LVC equations, in order 
to arrive at familiar results. 
9
 Saviotti and Mani (1995) do note in passing that one of their intermediate results has 
an ecological counterpart. 
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technologically meaningful counterparts of virtually all ecological concepts are 
identified before presentation of the result – which is itself a counterpart of a central 
result in ecology. Thus, there is no discernable study of the behavior of the equations 
apart from a prior, and heavily ‘bio-inspired’ interpretation. The second strategy 
differs from the first, not in being interpretation-free, but in interpreting all concepts, 
as well as the central result, in micro-economic terms. Still, a tension between 
interpretability and tractability shows up occasionally. Most notably, Farrell (1993: 
174) cautions against interpreting the interaction terms in the LVC equations in terms 
of comparative technological performance. Such an interpretation, while tempting, 
would neglect that “[t]here is no specific mechanism behind these equations” 
(emphasis added). Here, the formal character of the template is emphasized in order to 
prevent over-interpretation of the equations.
10
 
Finally, in only one place, we find evidence for some interpretation-free 
manipulation of the LVC template in the literature on technology substitution. Morris 
and Pratt (2003) use a rather sophisticated graphical method to derive analytically that 
the LVC equations may “revert” to the Fisher-Pry curves, but that they can only 
mimic, not match, the behavior of other phenomenological models. Although the 
positive result is the same as in papers that exemplify the first strategy, it is here 
derived without any interpretation of either the LVC or the Fisher-Pry equations – and 
the same goes for the negative result, which is unique to this paper. 
                                               
10
 Farrell goes on to speculate about the possibility to derive a technological model 
from knowledge of the underlying mechanisms – which seems exactly what Saviotti 
and Mani (1995) claim to have done, arriving again at the LVC equations, which are 
now fully (micro-economically) interpreted. 
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There is, summing up, hardly any evidence for an interpretation-free 
application of templates, let alone for non-representational models; in neither of the 
two strategies for transferring the LVC template, the template is applied in isolation 
from computational models. Moreover, the representational content of these models – 
sometimes including a translation of this content from other contexts of application – 
is emphasized by practitioners in their attempts to understand the mechanism(s) of 
technology substitution. Still, we identified a marginal, but non-negligible role in 
these modeling efforts for studying the LVC template free from any specific 
interpretation, illustrating that templates should not be identified with highly abstract 
computational models. 
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Abstract 
In Woodward’s causal model of explanation, explanatory information is information that is 
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explanandum variable by intervening on some other. Accordingly, the depth of an explanation 
is evaluated through the size of the domain of invariance of the generalization involved. 
In this paper, I argue that Woodward’s treatment of explanatory relevance in terms of 
invariant causal relations is still wanting and suggest to evaluate the depth of an explanation 
through the size of the domain of circumstances that it designates as leaving the explanandum 
unchanged. 
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Relevance, not Invariance, Explanatoriness, not Manipulability: 
Discussion of Woodward on Explanatory Relevance. 
  
  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The question of explanatory relevance has been for long a challenge for theorists of 
explanation. It is well-known for example that Hempel’s DN model, Salmon’s SR model or 
Salmon’s causal models fail to characterize philosophically what type of information is 
relevant to the explanation of some fact F and should therefore figure in its explanation. 
In the last two decades, James Woodward has developed a manipulationist model of 
explanation, which seems to fare better than its predecessors about explanatory relevance, if 
not to solve the issue, and that accounts for many of the usual tricky cases. In this model, 
explanatory information is information that is relevant to manipulation or control and that 
affords to change the value of some target explanandum variable by intervening on some 
other. Accordingly, the depth of an explanation is evaluated through the size of the domain of 
invariance of the generalization involved. 
In this paper, I argue that Woodward’s treatment of relevance in terms of invariant causal 
relations is still subtly but unavoidably wanting because it forces one to include within the 
explanation of a fact F much information that may be relevant to account for other facts of a 
same physical type but may be irrelevant to F. I further suggest to evaluate the depth of an 
explanation through the size of the domain of circumstances it describes as leaving the 
explanandum phenomenon unchanged. 
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In section 2, I briefly present Woodward’s account of explanation and his notion of 
explanatory depth. I develop at length in section 3 a test case example dealing with the 
explanation of the law of Areas and describe two ways to explain this physical regularity. I 
show in section 4 that, whereas the first explanation includes clearly irrelevant facts, 
according to Woodward’s account, it cannot be said to be less explanatory than the second. I 
further analyze why satisfying the manipulability requirement may imply to include irrelevant 
facts in explanations in order to make them deeper (in Woodward’s sense). I further describe 
in section 5 a new criterion for judging explanatory depth and argue that this criterion and 
Woodward’s criterion are incompatible. I finally emphasize in section 6 that manipulability is 
still a virtue, even if not an essential virtue of explanations and that, depending on the 
circumstances, one may be interested in developing explanations that are less explanatory 
(because they contain irrelevant facts) but that afford to control physical systems.  
 
2. Woodward’s manipulationist account of explanation 
It may seem weird to challenge Woodward (and Hitchcock) on the question of explanatory 
relevance for they have themselves showed much acumen in diagnosing where existing 
accounts fail and offered new answers to the problem. Indeed, in his 1995 article, Hitchcock 
elegantly shows that the problem of explanatory relevance is still a worry for Salmon’s causal 
model because identifying all the intermingled spatio-temporal causal processes running in 
some physical circumstances falls short of indicating why exactly some phenomenon takes 
place in these circumstances. As Woodward further notes, even if the right causal processes 
are identified, “features of a process P in virtue of which it qualifies as a causal process 
(ability to transmit mark M) may not be the features of P that are causally or explanatorily 
relevant to the outcome E that we want to explain” (Woodward, 2003, 353). 
In this context, it comes as no surprise that Woodward tries to answer the above worries by 
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means of his causal model. Doing justice to all aspects of Woodward’s rich treatment of 
explanatory relevance and explanation would take much longer than can be done within this 
short paper. The next paragraphs are therefore merely devoted to reminding the reader some 
important aspects of Woodward’s account so that what it amounts to when it comes to the 
analysis of the coming example appears clearly. 
For Woodward, “explanation is a matter of exhibiting systematic patterns of counterfactual 
dependence” (2003, 191). Explanatory generalization used in an explanation must indicate 
that the explanandum was to be expected and how it would change, were some changes made 
in the circumstances that obtained; said differently, good explanations “are such that they can 
be used to answer a range of counterfactual questions about the conditions under which their 
explananda would have been different” (ibidem). 
In this perspective, “explanatory relevant information is information that is potentially 
relevant to manipulation and control” (2003, 10). In other words, something is relevant 
information if it essentially figures in an explanation describing how the explanandum was to 
happen and how it would change, were the properties described in the explanans modified. 
This requirement also discards irrelevant circumstances through the identification of 
irrelevant variables: “an explanans variable S is explanatorily irrelevant to the value of an 
explanandum variable M if M would have this value for any value of S produced by an 
intervention” (2003, 200). 
Woodward further defines the notion of invariance of a generalization. A generalization can 
be stable under many changes of conditions not mentioned in it. For example, Coulomb’s law 
holds under changes in the weather. By contrast, a generalization that “continues to hold or is 
stable in this way under some class of interventions that change the conditions described in its 
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antecedent and that tells us how the conditions described in its consequent would change in 
response to these interventions is invariant under such interventions” (1997, S.31)
1
.  
It is then clear that invariance is a gradual notion because a generalization can hold under 
more or less interventions. Accordingly, depending on the degree of invariance of the 
generalization they rely upon, explanations provide patterns for answering more or less what-
if explanatory requests about these counterfactual circumstances and therefore for controlling 
the corresponding systems. 
Woodward further claims that the concept of invariance provides a means for evaluating the 
goodness of explanations – what he calls “explanatory depth”: “We can thus make 
comparative judgments about the size of domains of invariance and this is all that is required 
to motivate comparative judgments of explanatory depth of the sort we have been making” 
(1997, S.39). To put things briefly, the more invariant, the more explanatory, or to use 
Woodward’s own words: “generalizations that are invariant under a larger and more 
important set of changes often can be used to provide better explanations and are valued in 
science for just this reason” (2003, 257). 
At this step, my claim can be precisely formulated: even if they are valued in science, more 
invariant explanations are not always more explanatory because the request for invariance 
may run contrary to the fundamental request for relevance that explanations should primarily 
satisfy. 
 
3. The law of Areas and its explanations 
                                                        
1 More precisely, invariance is defined by means of the notion of “testing intervention”. See 
(2003, 250) for more details. 
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The test case I now want to investigate is the explanation of the law of Areas (also called 
"Kepler's second law"), which states that, “for planets in our solar system, a line joining a 
planet and the sun sweeps out equal areas during equal intervals of time". I shall describe two 
explanations of it and compare them with respects to invariance and relevance. 
 As we shall see, the first explanation (hereafter explanation 1) relies upon the general 
angular momentum theorem. Let us go deeper into it. Let us assume a Galilean reference 
frame, a fixed axis M’ with position given by vector r’ and a moving material point with 
position given by vector r, having mass m and momentum p (bold characters denote vectors). 
The angular momentum of M about M’ is defined by: Lr’ = (r’-r) × p = m (r’-r) × v, where 
the symbol “×” stands for the usual external product. Let F denotes the sum of forces applied 
to M. The momentum of F about axis M’ or torque is defined as µF/M’ = (r’-r) × F. Then, 
deriving the angular momentum yields  
 
dLr'
dt
=
d((r − r') × p)
dt
= (r − r ') ×
dp
dt
+
d(r − r')
dt
× p  
Because the momentum p is collinear to the speed of M, the second term in the right-hand 
part of the equation is null. So far no physics has been used. Newton’s second law says that 
dp/dt = d(mv) / dt= ma = F. So finally, one gets  
(1) 
dL
r'
dt
= (r − r') × F = µ
F /M'  
For a collection of particles, one can also define the total torque µ=Σ µi, which is the sum of 
the torques on each particle, as well as the total angular momentum L, which is the sum of 
momentum of each particle and one gets  
(1.5) µ=Σ µi = dL/dt. 
The total torque is the sum of the momentum of all forces, internal and external. But, because 
of Newton’s law of action and reaction, the torques on two reacting objects compensate and 
therefore, the internal torques balance out pair by pair. In conclusion, “the rate of change of 
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the total angular momentum about any axis is equal to the external torque about that axis”. 
This is the general angular momentum theorem, which is true for any collection of objects, 
whether they form a rigid body or not. 
If one wants to explain the law of Areas, one should finally note that, in the case of the 
Earth/Sun two-body system, if vE denotes the speed of the Earth, rE its position, FG the 
gravitational force, LE the Earth momentum about the Sun, α the angle between rE and vE, 
and AE (t) the swept area in function of time, in virtue of the definition of the outer product, 
(2) 
L
E
m
E
=
r
E
× v
E
m
E
= r
E
. v
E
sin(α) = 2.
dA
E
(t)
dt
. 
Because this relation holds for each mass point, the relation µ=Σ µi = dL/dt can now be seen 
as describing the variation of the variation of the sum of the areas swept by each point of a 
system about an axis, be it a rigid body or a set of independent mass points. 
In the case of the Earth-Sun system, it should further be noted that the momentum of the 
gravitational force FG about the Sun is zero (because the force and the vector r are collinear). 
Therefore, because of (1.5), the angular momentum of the Earth about the Sun is constant and 
because of (2), A(t) grows linearly with time, which demonstrates that the law of Areas 
obtains. 
This explanation perfectly fits Woodward’s account of explanation and one can repeat what 
he says about his paradigmatic case of the theoretical explanation in terms of Coulomb's law 
of the electrostatic relation E=λ/(2πε0r) (203,196-204). The explanation does exhibit the 
features emphasized by DN theorists: it is a deductively valid argument in terms of Newton’s 
second law and the description of the system (positions, speeds and masses of the points, 
forces). But in addition, it does exhibit a systematic pattern of counterfactual dependence, 
which can be summarized by combining (1.5) and (2) into the general relation (3) µ=Σ µi = 
dL/dt=2 Σ mi d/dt (dAi(t)/dt), which the law of Areas is a special case when the right variables 
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are assigned the right values (two bodies, one central gravitational force, etc.). The derivation 
describes how the explanandum law of Areas would change according to (3) and how it 
systematically depends on Newton’s second law, the forces and the particular conditions cited 
in the explanans. More specifically, the explanation makes clear how the total swept area 
would vary were the mass, speed, position of the Earth different, were additional forces at 
play but also were additional bodies included in the system. In short, (3) and the explanation 
including it also indicate how to answer a range of what-if questions about counterfactual 
circumstances in which the explanandum would have changed. Regarding the range of these 
questions and the invariance of the explanation, it is difficult to do better, because Newton’s 
law and (3) cover all situations in classical physics and therefore all classical changes that can 
be brought about to the two-body system case. 
   Let us now turn to the second explanation (hereafter explanation 2). In order to give the 
reader a clearer feeling of why it is better, I shall give two versions of it, one of which more 
pictorial. Let us start with the vectorial derivation. Because of relation (2), the law of Areas 
obtains if the intensity L
E
 of the angular momentum LE of the Earth about the Sun is 
constant. In virtue of relation (1), this happens when (r’-r) × dp/dt = 0, which is the case if 
dp/dt and (r’-r) are collinear. This is so because the only force at play is radial and the 
variation of momentum of a particle is along the direction of the force exerted upon it, that is 
dp/dt = α F, where α is real, not necessarily constant and not specified. Newton provides a 
more geometrical way to see the explanation: 
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Figure 1: Geometrical demonstration of the Law of Areas by Newton (1726/1972) 
 
The Earth’s trajectory goes through A, B, C, etc. and the law of Areas obtains if the area of 
SAB, SBC, etc. are numerically equal. The explanation of each trajectory step is decomposed 
in two parts. On the one hand, if no force was at play, in virtue of the inertia principle, the 
Earth would go straight from B to c in one time interval with AB=Bc. This implies that the 
area of SAB and SBc are numerically equal. On the other hand, if the Earth was motionless in 
B, because of the central gravitational force, it would go somewhere on (SB), say in V. By 
combining the two moves, the Earth finally goes to C, with BV=cC. Because (Cc) and (SB) 
are parallel, the area of SAC and SBc are also numerically equal. By combining the two 
equalities, one gets that that the area of SAB and SAC are numerically equal. The law of 
Areas finally obtains by taking smaller and smaller time intervals. The important point is that 
the numerical equality between the area of SBc and SBC obtains whatever the position of V 
on (SB): in other words, it obtains provided that the change of momentum due to a force is 
along the force direction, that is, provided dp/dt = α F. 
How good is this second explanation? First, it also exhibits the features emphasized by DN 
theorists: it is a deductively valid argument in which some nomological component is 
essentially needed (as well as the description of some particular circumstances). It shows in 
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addition that the whole content of Newton’s second law is not required within the 
explanation. More precisely, the quantitative part of Newton’s second law, which relates the 
values of forces and acceleration, can be removed for the premises without altering the 
validity of the argument. Better, from a physical point of view, this removal brings some 
important piece of explanatory information because it indicates more specifically what in the 
physics is essential for the law of Areas to obtain. The quantitative aspect of the momentum 
variation is shown to be explanatorily irrelevant, which indicates that the law of Areas does 
obtain for all worlds with a dynamical law such that the variation of momentum is along the 
force direction – and this is a piece of explanatory information that explanation 1 does not 
provide because it includes the described irrelevant information. 
Accordingly, explanation 2 is also instrumental to answer what-if questions about what 
would happen should the intensity of the force be different, time be discrete or the 
gravitational constant change with time. So, the corresponding explanatory generalization is 
also invariant under a large range of interventions.  
 
4. Comparison between the two explanations regarding depth and diagnosis about the 
inadequacy of Woodward’s account 
Let us now see how the two explanations comparatively fare according to Woodward’s 
criterion of explanatory depth. As just mentioned, both explanations are invariant under a 
large range of interventions. As we saw, Woodward suggests assessing explanatory depth by 
comparing domains of invariance. In the present case, none of the two explanations can then 
be said to be deeper than the other because none of the two sets is a subset of the other. 
Indeed, explanation 1 directly yields answers to what-if questions about how the total swept 
area quantitatively changes when, say, non radial forces are at play or more bodies involved, 
which explanation 2 does not (because it omits the quantitative part of Newton’s second law). 
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Conversely, explanation 2 explicitly indicates that the law of Areas would still obtain in 
circumstances in which Newton’s second law would be violated, which explanation 1 does 
not, because it designs as explanatory relevant the whole law with its quantitative aspect. 
Overall, from Woodward’s perspective, we have a situation with two good explanations 
which explanatory depth cannot be compared because their domains of invariance only partly 
overlap. And this is a case that is accommodated by Woodward when he notes that the 
comparison of the domains of invariance of explanations “obviously yields only a partial 
ordering” because “for many pairs of generalizations, neither will have a range of invariance 
that is a proper subset of the other” (2003, 262-64). 
My point is that this woodwardian conclusion is not satisfactory: if one focuses upon the 
relevance of the explanatory material regarding the explanandum, explanation 2 is better than 
explanatory 1. It is indeed commonly agreed that an explanation of A should merely include 
explanatory information that is relevant to the occurrence of A (at least if one’s epistemic goal 
is to provide an explanation of A that is as explanatory as possible (see section 6 for more 
comments about this restriction). As mentioned earlier, explanation 2 omits explanatory 
material that is irrelevant to the occurrence of the law of Areas, which explanation 1 does not. 
It is then no surprise that explanation 1 provides an answer to many what-if questions which 
answer depends on this irrelevant material and cannot therefore be given by explanation 1. 
However, while these additional answerable questions contribute to extend the invariance of 
explanation 1, the ability to answer them should not be seen as a sign of the greater goodness 
of explanation 1 (quite the contrary!) because, as the Newtonian investigation described 
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above shows, answering them requires some causal information that is here explanatorily 
irrelevant
2
. 
Let us now try to see more clearly why Woodward’s account leads to include irrelevant 
features in explanations to make them deeper. The reason seems to be that he requires that an 
explanation should account for many counterfactual cases that belong to a same physical type, 
defined in terms of the explanandum variable appearing in the explanatory generalization, and 
which the explanandum fact is an instantiation of. But this compels him to include in the 
explanatory material not only the facts that are explanatorily relevant to the target 
explanandum but also the facts that are explanatory relevant to all the values the explanandum 
variable may take. But as the example shows, the explanatorily relevant facts for the latter and 
the former need not coincide. The moral to draw is that facts belonging to an identical type do 
not always have the same explanations nor explanations of the same type. 
Here, it is important to note that the explanandum type that requires to draw this moral (the 
variation of the swept area) is not the product of some gerrymandering artificially associating 
pears and apples. So the moral should be rephrased more precisely and strongly like this: facts 
belonging to an identical bona fide physical type (corresponding to the explanandum variable 
of a genuine physical generality) do not always have the same set of explanatory relevant 
facts nor explanations of the same type.  
This conclusion has a counterpart in terms of whether domains of invariance are appropriate 
to assess the depth of an explanation and which what-if erotetic requests are appropriate for 
this task (to use a notion Woodward often relies upon). Requiring that an explanation of a 
                                                        
2 Of course, these irrelevant features belong to a fundamental causal law, which is true in all 
models described by classical physics. But this does not imply that they should pop up in all 
our explanations of physical phenomena. 
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target explanandum fact F should allow one to answer what-if questions about counterfactual 
circumstances corresponding to the invariance domain of some general and functionally 
described regularity, which the explanandum case is an instance of, may imply to include in 
the explanatory material physical information that is relevant for these circumstances but not 
for F. Accordingly, even if these explanatory requests are by themselves scientifically 
legitimate, it may be illegitimate to judge the goodness or depth of an explanation of F by the 
ability it provides to answer these requests because the physical information necessary for this 
task may be explanatory irrelevant regarding F - and this information should therefore not be 
included in a good explanation E of F, which removes the possibility of answering these 
requests on the basis of E. In short, being a what-if question about some circumstances in the 
domain of invariance of the explanatory generalization that one uses in the explanation E is 
not a sufficient condition for being an appropriate question for testing the depth of E because 
this criterion is incompatible with a satisfactory treatment of the problem of relevance for 
explanations. 
The conclusion regarding the evaluation of explanatory depth in terms of domain of 
invariance comes naturally. It is not legitimate to evaluate the depth of an explanation by 
assessing the domain of invariance of the generalization used in it. Performing well on the 
invariance criterion leads to promote explanations of individual facts that are special cases of 
general explanatory patterns built on generalizations that are invariant on large domains… but 
it potentially also leads to violate the requirement of relevance for the explanations of these 
individual facts. 
 
5. Another criterion for explanatory depth 
Still, as can be inferred from the discussion of the example, it seems that a good explanation 
(which satisfies the criterion of explanatory relevance) does provide answers to many 
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appropriate what-if questions. Explanation 2 shows that the law of Areas would still obtain in 
many circumstances in which the quantitative part of Newton’s second law or the intensity of 
the gravitational law would be different. It thereby enables one to answer in the affirmative 
the corresponding “would-the-explanandum-still-be-the-case” (in short “would-still” 
questions). For a derivative explanation, this set of circumstances in which the explanandum 
is shown by an explanatory argument to be left unchanged corresponds to the set of situations 
in which the premises of the explanatory argument are true. Further, the more irrelevant 
information is removed from the premises, the weaker these explanatory premises and the 
wider the class of situations to which they apply. Let us call this class of situations the domain 
of strict invariance of the explanation (by contrasts with Woodward’s notion of domain of 
(large) invariance of the generalization employed in the explanation, hereafter “large 
invariance”). Then, the above discussion leads to the following suggestion:  
(S) The wider the domain of strict invariance of an explanation, the deeper the 
explanation. 
 It would take much more that can be said here to develop this suggestion into a fully-
fledged proposal about the nature of explanation. In particular, a critical comparison with 
notions discussed by Reichenbach or Salmon in different contexts such as the notions of 
broadest homogeneous reference class, maximal class of maximal specificity or 
exhaustiveness (Salmon, 1989, 69, 104, 193) would be helpful. Nevertheless, the following 
remarks are in order. First, (S) indicates how an explanation can be turned into a better one by 
expurgating its premises from irrelevant information; but it does not however indicates in 
general what type of information can be present in the premises for something to count as a 
potential explanation. Therefore, it should not be seen as something standing on its own 
(otherwise, the best explanation would be the self-explanation of one fact by itself). Second, 
the domain that is here described should be distinguished from the scope of the laws or the 
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domain of invariance of the generalization present in the premises, which characterize 
statements: strict invariance characterizes the explanation itself.  Alternatively it can be seen 
as the domain of the explanatory generalization saying that when the premises hold (in this or 
different worlds), so does the explanandum. Third, just as for Woodward’s account, this 
criterion is likely to describe only a partial order over explanations. Finally, it should be noted 
that the criteria of having a large domain of large invariance and of having a large domain of 
strict invariance go into two opposite directions. Indeed, explanations with large domains of 
general invariance require generalization with much physical information packed in it; 
whereas explanations with large domains of strict invariance require premises with as little 
physical information as possible in their premises. So it does not seem possible to try to 
conciliate both criteria about the nature of explanatory depth. 
 
6. Concluding remarks: generality and manipulability versus specificity and relevance 
or the contextual choice of epistemic virtues in scientific practice 
I have criticized in this article the use of the size of the domains of invariance of the 
generalizations used in explanation to describe the depth of these explanations. I have argued 
that this characterization of the goodness of explanations fares badly by the requirement of 
relevance, which explanatory explanations should primarily satisfy. To describe the goodness 
of explanations I have proposed a different criterion based on the notion of strict invariance 
and the ability to answer “would-still” questions offered by explanations. And I have 
emphasized that satisfying one criterion may run contra the satisfaction of the other.  
One final word of caution is needed here. The above analysis dealt with the explanatory 
character of explanations of specific individual facts, which relevance is a clear component 
of. Now, like all other things, explanations may also have unspecific additional virtues, which 
may be philosophically unessential to them but practically crucial to their use. In the present 
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case, having a wide large invariance is no doubt such an unessential virtue. Indeed, an 
explanation with wide large invariance, even if it is of average quality regarding explanatory 
relevance, does provide a functional pattern for a family of similar explanations: it offers the 
opportunity to explain many similar phenomena with the same pattern of reasoning, which 
yields some significant economy of scientific and cognitive means. As any versatile tool, 
because it is general, such an explanation may prove useful, even if it is not optimal for 
specific explanatory tasks. Finding such explanations is therefore a scientifically legitimate 
(and difficult) task. 
So should scientists favor in practice specific relevant explanations with wide domains of 
strict invariance over general explanations with wide domains of large invariance? I think 
there is no general answer to this question. Pace the philosophical interest for essential 
epistemic virtues, contextual interests are to prevail depending on what scientific needs are. 
Suppose that you are interested in controlling optical rays within optical fibers or the 
trajectory of a car in various circumstances; then there is little doubt that you will be 
interested in finding explanations with wide domains of large invariance so that you can 
determine how the rays or the cars will behave in a wide range of circumstances with one 
single functional relation and control them by adopting the external forcing. For some of these 
covered circumstances, it is likely that this single functional relation will contain unnecessary 
(irrelevant) information and for some specific cases you may even be using a sledgehammer 
to crack a nut; but why should you care? For control purposes, it may be more convenient to 
use one single relation covering all cases than a cumbersome wealth of them, each 
specifically targeted at some subset of circumstances. 
 Suppose now that you are interested is observing a green flash effect (some optical 
phenomena occurring after sunset or before sunrise, when a green spot is visible above the 
sun). Then, what you want to learn about the circumstances in which you stand a good choice 
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to observe a green flash effect and you want to know a set of circumstances that is as large as 
possible. Therefore, knowing which circumstances will not alter the phenomenon (because 
they are irrelevant to the mechanism involved) is crucial. In this case, you will be interested in 
discarding from the explanation any irrelevant information that restricts your knowledge of 
this set, even if it comes at the price of leaving out of the explanans physical information that 
may be useful to answer questions about what would happen in close circumstances (in which 
no green flash effect is observed). So you may end up with an explanation that is not useful 
for manipulationist purposes because it is specifically targeted at the green flash effect; 
perhaps this explanation will not even have a functional form (like above the explanation 2 of 
the law of Areas); but, because its explanans only describes the physical facts that are crucial 
for the green flash effect to happen and discards the other, it will be more explanatory and 
therefore more informative about the whole range of circumstances in which the observation 
can be made.  
In conclusion, Woodward’s criterion for explanatory depth seems more appropriate to 
characterize explanations that are useful for control than the ones that are deeply explanatory. 
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The probabilistic notion of likelihood offers a systematic means of assessing “the relative merits 
of rival hypotheses in the light of observational or experimental data that bear upon them.”1 In 
particular, likelihood allows one to adjudicate among competing hypotheses by way of a two-
part principle: 
  
Law of Likelihood (LL):2 
(i) Evidence E supports hypothesis H1 over H2 just if �(�|�1) > �(�|�2), where �(�|��) is the likelihood of hypothesis Hi given evidence E. 
(ii) The degree to which E supports H1 over H2 is measured by the likelihood ratio, Λ = �(�|�1)�(�|�2).  
 
The claims sanctioned by LL are strictly comparative. The principle does not say what you 
should believe or to what degree you should believe it. Rather, the notion of ‘supporting’ one 
hypothesis over another is contrastive and perhaps best characterized as a relation of ‘favoring’.3 
LL tells you how to determine the degree to which one hypothesis is favored over another on the 
basis of some evidence, E, and nothing more. Proponents of the principle are adamant that LL 
                                                 
1
 A. W. F. Edwards, Likelihood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) p. 1. 
2
 I am using Elliot Sober’s terminology here. The Law of Likelihood as I’ve presented it is to be 
distinguished from the weaker “Likelihood Principle,” which in most formulations is equivalent 
to part (i) of LL. I caution the reader that both the terms “Law of Likelihood” and “Likelihood 
Principle” are used ambiguously in the philosophy of statistics and inductive inference literature. 
3
 Elliott Sober, Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
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cannot provide sufficient grounds for apportioning belief, only ranking hypotheses in a particular 
evidentiary context. 
 
While LL has been defended at length as a general tool for both formal and informal reasoning 
about hypothesis ranking,4 there remains an important ambiguity its application. Intuitively, we 
ought to make use of all available information when assessing the relative merits of two 
hypotheses, not just the particular piece of evidence E under consideration. Any additional 
information already in our possession prior to obtaining E is typically referred to as background 
information. LL does not, on the face of it, tell us how to deal with such information. Some, most 
prominently Elliott Sober5, have argued that we ought to condition on this additional information 
when computing likelihoods. That is, if we denote the background information by B, then the 
likelihood ratio we should use is Λ = �(�|�1,�)�(�|�2,�). Taking this approach, however, means that Λ—
and thus our judgments concerning rival hypotheses H1 and H2—will depend on exactly which 
information is taken to constitute background information, and which is considered evidence and 
thus part of E. Under Sober’s interpretation, LL can be taken to yield different judgments for the 
                                                 
4
 See, for instance, Edwards, Likelihood; Ian Hacking, Logic of Statistical Inference (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1965); Sober, Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the 
Science. 
5
 Elliott Sober, "The Design Argument," God and Design, ed. Neil Manson (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2003) 27-54; Sober, Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science; Elliott 
Sober, "Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: Evidential Transitivity in Connection 
with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-Tuning, and Firing Squads," Philosophical Studies 143 (2009): 63-90. 
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same data when the line between evidence and background information is moved. The use of LL 
is thus encumbered by a “line-drawing problem.”6 
  
This line-drawing problem also appears in a slightly different guise in the literature on statistical 
inference. In this more restricted context, the problem manifests as an apparent ambiguity in the 
likelihood function. Specifically, there appears to be no systematic way of deciding which 
random variables and model parameters should be included in the likelihood function, and no 
principled way of deciding on which side of the conditionalization bar these quantities belong if 
included.7 As in the general case, the problem for the likelihoodist is to provide a principled 
division of propositions into background and evidence. 
  
A variety of solutions have been proposed to both versions of the problem of background 
information, though not always in these terms. Some, e.g. Jonathan Weisberg,8 attempt to 
provide a principled means of distinguishing evidence from background information. Others, e.g. 
Matthew Kotzen,9 attempt to dissolve the problem by scrapping LL. In the context of statistical 
                                                 
6
 M. Kotzen, "Selection Biases in Likelihood Arguments," The British journal for the philosophy 
of science  (2012). 
7
 See M. J. Bayarri, M. H. DeGroot and J. B. Kadane, "What Is the Likelihood Function?," 
Statistical Decision Theory and Related Topics Iv, eds. Shanti S. Gupta and James O. Berger, 
vol. 1 (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1987) 3-27.  
8
 Jonathan Weisberg, "Firing Squads and Fine-Tuning: Sober on the Design Argument," British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2005): 809-21. 
9
 Kotzen, "Selection Biases in Likelihood Arguments." 
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inference, a common strategy is to disambiguate the likelihood function by fiat.10 I argue that 
none of these strategies is well-motivated. Background information is only problematic when 
one fails to distinguish between two related questions: (i) Given that I know B, to what degree 
does the additional piece of evidence E support H1 over H2? and (ii) to what degree does all the 
evidence to hand—B and E—support H1 over H2? My aim is to demonstrate that, once these 
questions are distinguished the very same considerations that motivate the adoption of LL entail 
distinct answers to both questions, thus resolving any ambiguity over the treatment of 
background information. Note that I am emphatically not offering a defense of LL as a general 
inference procedure. Mine is the more modest goal of dissolving an apparent defect of LL using 
the resources to which proponents of the principle already assent. 
 
To draw out the distinction relevant to eliminating the problem of background information, I will 
begin with a detailed example. I will then argue for an expression that represents the degree to 
which a particular piece of evidence supports one hypothesis over another in context, and then 
derive a related expression for the total support provided by all available evidence. Finally, I will 
show how these new expressions dissolve ambiguities in the treatment of background 
information by applying them to the so-called ‘fine-tuning argument’. 
 
I. ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM 
                                                 
10
 See, e.g., Jason Grossman, "The Likelihood Principle," Philosophy of Statistics, eds. Malcolm 
R. Forster and Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay (Oxford, UK; Burlington, MA: North-Holland, 
2011). 
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To draw out the distinction which I claim obviates the problem of background information, it 
will help to have a concrete example in mind. To avoid pre-conceived interpretations, I will 
intentionally eschew standard examples, at least at the outset. So rather than treat of fish or firing 
squads, I’ll consider carnivals.  
 
Suppose that Albert finds himself on the midway of an old-fashioned carnival. He decides to 
play one of the games—the one where contestants try to toss a ball into a milk-can. Albert is 
savvy about carnival games; he knows they are often rigged. In a fair game, there is a 50% 
chance of winning a prize. But when no authorities are around, there is an appreciable chance 
that the carnie running the game will hand him a ball too big to fit in the can, making it 
impossible to win. On the other hand, if there happens to be a police officer in sight the game is 
likely to be rigged in Albert’s favor—the carnies want the police to think the games are fair, so 
they arrange to let people win when the authorities are present. A set of probabilities reflecting 
these facts is provided by the joint distribution of Table 1.  
 
Table 1. 
 P = police present P = police absent
 
 G = fair G = rigged G = fair G = rigged 
O = lose 1/20 1/20 1/10 11/20 
O = win 1/20 1/10 1/10 0 
 
 
San Diego, CA -463-
Knowing all of the probabilities in Table 1, Albert puts his money down, and promptly tosses a 
ball into the can. Given that he has just won, what can Albert conclude about the game? 
Specifically, does he now have grounds to favor the hypothesis that the game is fair over the 
hypothesis that it is rigged? According to LL, Albert needs to compare two probabilities: the 
probability that he would win given that the game is fair, P(win| fair) and the probability that he 
would win given that the game is rigged P(win| rigged). Since P(win | fair) = 1/2  > P(win | 
rigged) = 1/7, LL asserts that Albert’s success in the game supports the hypothesis of a fair 
game—Albert has reason to think that he has played a fair game. 
 
But suppose that, before he tosses the ball, Albert notices a police officer standing near the 
booth. What can be said in light of this additional information? Here is where different 
interpretations of LL begin to diverge. According to Sober’s approach, we must recognize two 
sorts of propositions: evidence and background knowledge. Evidence is whatever fresh 
information we are currently considering when applying LL to distinguish among hypotheses. It 
appears to the left of the conditionalization bar when computing a likelihood. Background 
knowledge constitutes whatever we already know about the world, and is presumed to belong on 
the right side of the conditionalization bar. According to this view then, Albert should treat the 
fact of the police officer’s presence as background knowledge and condition on this information. 
The relevant likelihoods are now P(win| fair, present) = 1/2 and P(win| rigged, present) = 2/3. 
With the additional information, he should now favor the hypothesis that the game is rigged—the 
background information has reversed our ordering on hypotheses.  
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That we should take all available information into account when comparing hypotheses is not 
especially controversial—most authors assume some sort of principle of total evidence.11 What 
is controversial is how and whether ‘evidence’ should be distinguished from background 
information. It is not clear why Albert should treat the information that a police officer was 
present any differently than the information that he won the game. Albert might just have well 
have treated the observation of the police officer as the evidence, and conditioned instead on the 
fact that he won: P(present | rigged, win) = 1 > P(present | fair, win) = 1/3. In this way of 
accounting for all the information, LL still favors the hypothesis that the game is rigged, but does 
so to a much greater degree. Alternatively, Albert might have treated all the information at hand 
as ‘evidence’ and compared the following likelihoods: P(win, present | fair) = 1/6 > P(win, 
present | rigged) = 1/7. Taking this approach once again inverts the ordering of hypotheses, and 
favors the hypothesis that the game was fair. It might appear then that LL must be modified in 
order to provide a principled means of discriminating background information from evidence. 
However, no such modification is required—a careful interpretation of LL as it stands obviates 
the question of evidence versus background information. 
 
II. THE PIECEWISE IMPACT OF EVIDENCE 
To resolve the ambiguity over background information, we need to distinguish between two 
questions: (i) to what degree does learning a particular fact in the context of an additional set of 
facts support a given hypothesis? and (ii) to what degree does learning a particular fact in 
conjunction with an additional set of facts support a given hypothesis? In terms of the midway 
                                                 
11
 Rudolph Carnap, "On the Application of Inductive Logic," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 8, 1 (1947): 133-48. 
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example above, the distinction can be made as follows: (i) to what degree does winning the game 
having already learned that a police officer is present support the hypothesis that the game is 
fair? and (ii) to what degree does the full set of information at hand—that Albert has won the 
game and that a police officer was present—support the hypothesis that the game is fair? 
 
To address question (i), we need to examine the piecewise introduction of evidence, taking care 
to note one important fact: learning the truth of a proposition (or the value of a random variable) 
is effectively an intervention that changes the background distribution describing the ways the 
world might be. To begin with, let’s assume that we are given a full joint distribution reflecting 
all relevant aspects of the world and nothing else—there is nothing given that might qualify as 
either evidence or background information. For ease of exposition, I will further assume that this 
distribution is discrete, though nothing about my derivation hinges on this being the case. 
 
 Since all we have is the distribution and no information to sort out, LL can be applied 
unambiguously upon obtaining our first piece of evidence, I1. According to LL, the degree to 
which this information supports hypothesis H1 over H2 is given by the likelihood ratio Λ(�1) =�(�1|�1) �(�1|�2)⁄ . Furthermore, on learning that I1 is the case, the space of possible events has 
been reduced—acquiring information requires us to update the background distribution with 
which we started. Specifically, the probability of I1 being the case must now be unity, 
irrespective of the value it had prior to learning this outcome. One way to represent the change is 
to construct a new event space by simply removing all the events incompatible with the fact that 
I1 is the case while preserving the relative measure on all remaining events. That is, the new 
distribution �1(α), where α is any event in the original event space compatible with I1, is 
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obtained from the old distribution by the following relation: �1(�) = �(�|�1).12 In the midway 
example, for instance, when Albert learned that a police officer was present he should have 
replaced the original distribution of Table 1 with that of Table 2. 
 
Table 2. 
 P = police present 
 G = fair G = rigged 
O = lose 1/5 1/5 
O = win 1/5 2/5 
 
 
Once we realize that we are working with a new distribution, there is no need to draw a line 
between background information and evidence—our prior information is reflected in the new 
distribution. When additional evidence, I2, is acquired, we need only appeal to LL just as we did 
at the outset. This time, however, we are assessing likelihoods with respect to the currently 
applicable distribution �1(α). So the evidence I2, if we take LL seriously, supports H1 over H2 
just if �1(�2|�1) > �1(�2|�2) and does so to a degree Λ(I2) = �1(�2|�1) �1(�2|�2)⁄ . In terms of 
the original joint distribution, we can express this likelihood ratio as Λ(I2) = �(�2|�1,�1) �(�2|�1,�2)⁄ . 
 
                                                 
12
 This is simply the updating procedure recommended by Bayesian epistemology. It is invoked 
here without any commitment to the subjective or objective status of priors. 
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As before, when we learn I2, we must update our distribution to reflect this restriction of the 
possibilities. This new distribution �2(β) is obtained from the old distribution in the same way as 
above: �2(�) = �1(�|�2) = �(�|�2, �1). This is easy to generalize for an indefinite sequence of 
evidence: once we’ve learned I1, I2, …, In-1, we should compute the likelihoods involving a new 
piece of evidence In using the distribution ��−1(�) = �(�|��−1, … , �1). The new piece of 
information In introduced in the context of prior information I1, I2,…, In-1 supports H1 over H2 
just if �(��|��−1, … , �1,�1) > �(��|��−1, … , �1,�2) and does so to the degree 
 
(1) Λ(��) = �(��|��−1,…,�1,�1)�(��|��−1,…,�1,�2). 
 
The point is that whenever we acquire a piece of information we can apply LL without 
modification, but must do so using a distribution that reflects all of the facts already in evidence. 
Put this way, there is no ambiguity in using LL—we always compute a straightforward 
likelihood. However, when this likelihood is expressed in terms of the original joint distribution 
with which we started, each successive likelihood is conditioned on the previous facts. So by 
applying LL and taking care to note the way in which the acquisition of information forces a 
change in distribution, we have found that in order to determine the relative support of one 
hypothesis over another provided some particular piece of evidence, we must use likelihoods 
conditioned on all previously acquired facts. 
 
Thus far, it may seem that I have been arguing for Sober’s interpretation of LL. However, Sober 
seems to view the likelihood ratio (1) as representing the overall degree to which H1 is supported 
over H2 once In is obtained. I have been urging that, if we take LL at face value, this is not how 
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we should interpret this expression. At every stage in the above derivation, we were applying LL 
to determine the degree to which a particular piece of evidence supported one hypothesis over 
another. Other information was relevant, but only in determining the epistemic context in which 
this degree of support was determined. I am suggesting that Sober has the right expression but 
gives it in answer to the wrong question—in what follows, I’ll show that LL leads us to a very 
different expression for the degree of support for H1 over H2 provided by the totality of evidence. 
 
III. TOTAL SUPPORT 
There are two ways to argue for an expression of the likelihood ratio pertaining to the totality of 
available evidence. In one approach, we could take the expression given in (1) for the degree to 
which a particular piece of evidence supports H1 over H2 and couple this with a function for 
combining likelihood ratios—a function measuring the overall degree to which two pieces of 
evidence support H1 over H2. Strictly speaking, this means adding to LL since the principle does 
not provide such a rule. However, there are some reasonable constraints we can put on such a 
function without begging the question concerning background information. For starters, 
whatever function f we choose should itself yield a likelihood ratio, meaning that it must map 
pairs of likelihoods to the interval [0, ∞). Furthermore, if either likelihood in the combination is 
zero—implying that one hypothesis has been entirely ruled out—then the joint likelihood should 
also be zero. The function should be symmetric since it ought not to matter in what order we give 
the likelihoods to be combined, and it should be an increasing function of both arguments. An 
obvious choice satisfying all of these constraints is simply the product of the component 
likelihoods. That is, given Λ1 and Λ2, the combined likelihood is given by �(Λ1,Λ2) = Λ1Λ2. 
With this rule for combining likelihoods, we can use the results of the last section to derive an 
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expression for the overall degree to which the facts I1, I2, …, In support one hypothesis over 
another, assuming they were learned in sequence: 
(2) Λ(�1, �2, … , ��) = Λ(�1)Λ(�2)⋯Λ(��) = �(�1|�1)�(�2|�1,�1)⋯�(��|�1 ,�1,…,��−1)�(�1|�2)�(�2|�2,�1)⋯�(��|�2 ,�1,…,��−1) 
Using nothing but the rules of probability, the right hand side of equation (2) can be written 
much more compactly to give the following expression for the total support of the facts I1, I2, …, 
In:  
(3) Λ(�1, �2, … , ��) = �( �1,…,��|�1)�( �1,…,��|�2) 
Of course, the right-hand side of equation (3) is just the expression we would have gotten by 
applying LL to the proposition I1^I2^…^In with respect to the initial joint distribution—in a 
straightforward reading, it is just the total support for H1 over H2 provided by the conjunction of 
all available evidence. 
 
The form of Equation (3) suggests that it might have been derived more directly by appealing to 
LL without worrying about how to determine the contextual support provided by each piece of 
information or introducing a way to combine these (thus justifying my claim that we need not 
modify LL). All we had to do was note that, if we let � = �1^�2^ … ^��, then LL immediately 
yields (3). From (3) we could then deduce (2) just from the rules of the probability calculus. 
Once we identified the factors of the right-hand side of Equation (2) with individual likelihood 
ratios, we could have used this fact to justify a rule for combining likelihoods. In fact, this is 
what A. F. Edwards does, at least in the special case of independent evidence, in his development 
of the likelihood framework.13 Viewed from this perspective, Equation (3) is implicit in LL. 
                                                 
13
 Edwards, Likelihood. 
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Whichever approach we take to justifying this rule for assessing total support, we are led to the 
following amplified form of LL: 
 
 
Amplified Law of Likelihoods (ALL): 
(i) If it is already known to be that case that I1^I2^…^ In, then learning evidence E 
supports hypothesis H1 over H2 just if �(�|�1, �1, �2, … , ��) > �(�|�2, �1, �2, … , ��), 
where �(�|�� , �1, �2, … , ��) is the likelihood of hypothesis Hi given evidence E in the 
context of I1^I2^…^ In. 
(ii) The degree to which E supports H1 over H2 in the context of I1^I2^…^ In is measured 
by the likelihood ratio Λ = �(�|�1,�1,�2,…,��)�(�|�2,�1,�2,…,��).  
(iii) The total evidence E^ I1^I2^…^ In supports hypothesis H1 over H2 just if �(�, �1, �2, … , ��|�1) > �(�, �1, �2, … , ��|�2). 
(iv) The degree to which the total evidence E^ I1^I2^…^ In supports H1 over H2 is 
measured by the likelihood ratio Λ = �(�,�1,�2,…,��|�1)�(�,�1,�2,…,��|�2).  
 
With ALL, we can answer the questions posed above concerning the midway example. The 
information that Albert has won the game, acquired after learning that a police officer is present, 
supports the hypothesis that the game is rigged because �(win|present, rigged) >�(win|present, fair). According to ALL (ii), this information favors the rigged hypothesis over 
its rival to a degree Λ = �(win|present, rigged)�(win|present, fair) = 2312 = 43. This one piece of information, in the context 
of previously established information about the presence of police officers, tends to favor the 
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hypothesis of a rigged game. However, the aggregate information—that a police officer is 
present and Albert has won the game—favors the hypothesis that the game is fair. This follows 
from ALL (iii) and (iv) since �(win, present| fair)�(win, present| rigged) = 1617 = 76. This looks like a contradiction until we 
realize that the first piece of information obtained—that the police officer is present—strongly 
favored the hypothesis that the game is fair: �(present|fair)�(present|rigged) = 149 . The upshot is that the aggregate 
effect of the totality of evidence can differ from the piecewise impact of each bit of evidence. 
Rather than being a contradiction, this is precisely how one would expect these two distinct 
measures to relate—the total support for the fair hypothesis is simply the product of the 
contextual likelihood ratios for each piece of evidence.14  
 
IV. KICKING AWAY THE FULL DISTRIBUTION LADDER 
In the preceding arguments, I made extensive use of full probability distributions. This appears 
problematic since the appealing feature of the likelihood approach—and that which sets it apart 
from Bayesianism—is its disregard for prior probabilities. However, I claim that the likelihoodist 
who thinks that prior probabilities are often absent or unattainable might nonetheless justify LL 
or ALL. To see how, let’s reconsider the case in which we start with a full prior distribution 
P(α), and then obtain evidence I1. Once we acquire the evidence, we should update the 
probabilities assigned to H1 and H2 by setting each new probability equal to the corresponding 
conditional probability assigned by the original distribution: 
                                                 
14
 It should be noted that, while the order in which information is learned determines the degree 
to which each additional piece of information favors one hypothesis over another, order is 
irrelevant when considering the overall support conferred by the totality of evidence. 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 21 1 1 1 2 1 1 21 1,  P H P HP H I P I H P H I P I HP I P I==  
What can we now say about the degree to which I1 favors H1 over H2? One way we might 
understand this question is in terms of a hypothetical. Suppose that either H1 or H2 is true. Then 
the initial odds in favor of H1 are simply P(H1|H1∨H2)/P(~H1|H1∨H2) = P(H1)/P(H2). How does 
the new information change the odds in favor of H1? In this case, the posterior odds are given by: 
(4) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 2 1 1 1 11 21 1 1 2 1 2 2,~ ,P H I H H P I H P H P HI P HP H I H H P I H P H∨ = = Λ∨  
The right-hand equality in Equation (4) indicates that all of the work to shift the posterior odds 
up or down relative to our prior odds is being done by the likelihood ratio, Λ(I1). In other words, 
the change in posterior odds is a function of Λ(I1). To put it still another way, the effect of I1 on 
the odds is entirely determined by Λ(I1). This fact motivates adopting the likelihood function as a 
measure of relative support. While the likelihood ratio cannot tell us which posterior probability 
is higher, it can tell us how the odds shift in favor of one hypothesis or the other, assuming that 
one or the other is right. Furthermore, it does so whether or not we know the prior probabilities. 
In this sense, LL is a general guide to differential support, and in those cases in which we have 
no objective basis for assigning priors, the likelihoodist claims it is our only guide.  
 
By considering effects on posterior odds, we can motivate ALL in much the same way as LL. As 
before, the full distribution (if we knew it to begin with) after learning I1 would be given by 
P1(α) = P(α|I1). If we now learn that I2 is the case, then we must change our posterior odds in 
favor of H1 over H2 to the following: 
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(5) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 12 1 21 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2,,P H I H H P I H P H P HI P HP H I H H P I H P H∨ = = Λ∨  
Once again, it is the likelihood function that increases (or decreases) the posterior over the prior 
odds. This time, however, it is in the context of the new distribution P1(α), a distribution 
reflecting prior knowledge of I1. If the motivation offered for LL in the first place is compelling, 
then it seems we must also accept ALL (i) and (ii)—the relative support for H1 over H2 conferred 
by the new piece of evidence I2 after already learning I1 is indicated by the likelihood function, 
Λ(I2) = P1(I2|H1)/P1(I2|H2) = P(I2|I1, H1)/P(I2|I1,H2). But what about the overall support for H1 
over H2 given our epistemic starting point? How should our posterior odds have changed relative 
to our initial odds as a result of learning I1 and I2? We can rewrite the right-hand side of Equation 
(5) as follows: 
(6) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1
1 2 1 1
1 2 2 2
1
1 2
2
,
,
,
,
,
P I H P H P I H I P H I
P I H P H P I H I P H I
P I I H P H
P I I H P H
P H
I I
P H
=
=
= Λ
 
Written this way, we can see that the combined likelihood function Λ(I1, I2) determines the 
change in odds relative to what they were before learning anything at all. So once again, we can 
kick away the ladder of the full distribution. If we did know the distribution, then learning I1 and 
I2 would change the odds in favor of H1 over H2 by an amount given by the likelihood ratio. 
Since this is true irrespective of what the priors are, we can always take the likelihood alone to 
indicate differential support, in this case the degree of support for H1 over H2 conferred by the 
totality of evidence. 
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Of course, one might object to my interpretation of what it is to favor one hypothesis over 
another. Instead, one might attempt to prove LL(i) from other premises15 and take the 
quantitative measure of contrastive support given by LL (ii) to be a postulate that stands or falls 
with how well the results coincide with our intuitions.16 ALL could then be motivated by the 
second line of argument I suggested in the previous section: treat all information as evidence and 
note that the resulting likelihood ratio factors into a product of likelihoods, each of which can be 
consistently interpreted as corresponding to the impact of a single piece of information. 
 
The point is that insofar as LL is well-motivated, so too is ALL. My use of full distributions 
above was strictly heuristic. Once we’ve seen what role the likelihood function plays and which 
likelihood function is relevant to which question, we can ignore the full distribution. Of course, 
the proponent of LL or ALL can only claim to be free of worrisome priors if conditional 
probabilities can be taken as primitive.17 It is not my task here to defend that claim and thus 
rescue likelihoodism from the charge of subjectivity. My more modest assertion is simply that if 
we have grounds to take LL seriously, then we should really embrace ALL. Once we’ve done so, 
it becomes clear that whatever problems likelihoodism has, line-drawing isn’t one of them. 
 
V. BUT WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION? 
                                                 
15
 See Grossman, "The Likelihood Principle." 
16
 See Sober, Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science. 
17
 For a defense of taking conditional probabilities as primitives, see ibid. 
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My arguments so far have concerned the problem of background information as it appears in the 
literature on LL in its broadest epistemic use. As I mentioned above, the same problem arises in 
the more restricted context of statistical inference. Addressing this narrower community, Bayarri, 
De Groot, and Kadane famously asked, “What is the likelihood function?”18 To illustrate the 
ambiguity in answering that question, the authors consider a case analogous to one in which, 
with respect to each possible value of some discrete parameter θ characterizing a statistical 
model, a random variable X has a conditional probability distribution P(x|θ).19 Furthermore, it is 
not the random variable X that is observed, but rather some other random variable Y for which 
P(y|x, θ). The authors then ask, “What is the [likelihood function] in this problem?”.20 They 
claim that there are three candidates, P(y|θ), P(x, y|θ), and P(y|x, θ), and that a “subjective 
judgment must be made in order to decide which of the functions…to use in a given problem.”21 
The thesis I’ve been defending is that this is simply false. The question has two parts: (i) which 
random variables and parameters are to be included in the likelihood function, and (ii) which side 
of the conditionalization bar each belongs on. The answer to both parts, according to ALL, 
depends on two things: what hypotheses we wish to consider and whether we wish to assess the 
impact of a particular piece of data in context or the aggregate of all data. So, for instance, 
suppose we wish to ask about hypotheses concerning the value of θ in light of the only piece of 
                                                 
18
 Bayarri, DeGroot and Kadane, "What Is the Likelihood Function?." 
19
 The original example was stated in terms of probability densities since θ typically takes a 
continuum of values. To keep the discussion consistent, I’ve assumed that θ is discrete, and thus 
the distributions in question are discrete as well. 
20
 Bayarri, DeGroot and Kadane, "What Is the Likelihood Function?,"   at p. 6. 
21
 Ibid., 6. 
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evidence available, namely a value y of Y. Then the relevant likelihood function must have the 
form P(y|θ). If on the other hand, we wanted to consider finer-grained hypotheses concerning 
both the value of θ and the unobserved random variable X, then we would have functions of the 
form P(y|x, θ). Under no circumstances would ALL entail the use of a likelihood function of the 
form P(x|…) unless a value of the random variable X was observed (or otherwise learned) and 
thus added to our store of facts. Suppose X and Y were both observed and we wish to know the 
relative support given to hypotheses about θ. Then our likelihood functions would look like 
P(x,y|θ). Suppose instead, we learned the value of Y and then the value of X and wish to know 
what impact learning X = x has given what we already know about Y. Then the likelihood 
functions would have the form P(x|y, θ). I’m belaboring the point, but I want to make it clear that 
ALL unambiguously selects a set of variables and parameter values and distributes these around 
the conditionalization bar. There are many further objections raised by Bayarri et al to the use of 
LL as a statistical inference method, in particular problems with prediction. However, many of 
these objections conflate LL (or ALL) with the method of maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE). A discussion of the relation of MLE to ALL is beyond the scope of this paper, and so too 
are the remaining objections to likelihoodism. It suffices here to note that there is no ambiguity 
in factoring the likelihood function as far as ALL is concerned. The principle may not be right, 
but it is unambiguous.22 
                                                 
22
 The authors might object that in my initial discussion of ALL, I used a full distribution which 
dictates all the relevant quantities and so implicitly settles the question of which likelihood 
function to use. But as I argued in the last section, a full distribution is unnecessary for 
motivating ALL. Rather, in the likelihoodist view, specifying a question of interest specifies a 
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VI. FISH, FIRING SQUADS, AND FINE-TUNING 
The question of how to handle background information is especially pressing in the context of 
the fine-tuning argument (FTA). The FTA attempts to establish the existence of a cosmic 
designer by noting that various physical constants have values within a narrow range amenable 
to the occurrence of carbon-based life—the laws appear ‘fine-tuned’ for life. For instance, had 
the 7.65 MeV energy level of the C12 nucleus been slightly lower or higher, then the process that 
produces carbon and the other heavy elements essential to life in the interior of stars would not 
have occurred.23 Denote by E the observation that many constants occurring in physical laws 
take values within a comparatively narrow range that permits life to exist, and consider the 
following two hypotheses: 
HC:  The relevant physical constants acquired their values by chance. 
HD: The relevant physical constants acquired their values by design. 
The FTA is usually presented as a likelihood argument. If we appeal to LP and note that �(�|��) > �(�|��), then we must conclude that the evidence favors design over chance. 
A prominent objection to the fine-tuning argument notes that we have left out an important piece 
of information: all knowledge concerning physical constants has been acquired by carbon-based 
                                                                                                                                                             
likelihood ratio which in turn constrains what full distributions the Bayesian (or anyone else 
committed to using full distributions) may consider. 
23
 John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986) pp. 252-53. 
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life forms.24 Call this fact I. We must account for all available background information—so the 
objection goes—and so we must condition our likelihoods on I. However, since I entails E, both 
hypotheses have the same likelihood given the evidence: �(�|�� , �) = �(�|�� , �) = 1. Thus, 
the evidence cannot favor design over chance (or any other hypothesis for that matter). This 
objection, however, conflates the two questions with which we began and emphasizes the need 
for the clarification provided by ALL.  
 
To motivate an analysis of the FTA in terms of ALL, it will help to first consider a pair of 
structurally similar examples endemic in the literature. The first of these, due originally to Sir 
Arthur Eddington,25 asks us to think about fishing. Suppose we are confronted with the following 
observation: 
Ef: All 10 of the fish caught in the lake today were longer than 10 inches. 
For the sake of simplicity, suppose that we consider only two hypotheses that might account for 
this evidence: 
 H100:  All of the fish in the lake are longer than 10 inches. 
 H50: Half of the fish in the lake are longer 10 inches. 
If this was all the information we had, LP would urge us to favor H100 since ������100� ≫������50�. However, suppose we had some additional information: 
 I>10: The net used has holes 10 inches wide. 
                                                 
24
 Sober, "The Design Argument."; Sober, "Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: 
Evidential Transitivity in Connection with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-Tuning, and Firing Squads." 
25
 A. Eddington, The Philosophy of Physical Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1947). 
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This new information I>10 entails Ef. Thus, if we account for this new information by 
conditioning on it as Sober would urge, we find that the evidence fails to distinguish between the 
hypotheses at all: ������100, �>10 � = ������50, �>10 � = 1. According to Sober, this constitutes 
an Observation Selection Effect (OSE) because the method by which the observation was 
obtained biased the outcome. One is faced with an OSE whenever accounting for the process by 
which an observation was made alters the likelihoods that determine the degree to which the 
observation favors one hypothesis over another. In this case, the effect is extreme.  
 
The picture changes dramatically when we analyze this scenario using ALL. It becomes 
immediately obvious that the likelihoods being compared— ������100, �>10 � and ������50, �>10 �—represent only the degree to which learning about the day’s catch supports 
either H100 or H50 in the context of information about the net used. These do not represent the 
degree to which the aggregate evidence supports one or the other hypothesis. It is true that 
learning E after learning what net was used fails to further discriminate between H100 and H50. 
But learning I>10 may have already discriminated between the two, and thus, according to ALL, 
the aggregate information might also discriminate between the two hypotheses.  
 
To illustrate the point, consider the joint distribution in Table 3. I’ve added a proposition, I>0, 
which is the claim that the net used had very tiny holes capable of catching the smallest fish. 
With this additional possibility added, the probabilities given are compatible with all of the facts 
above. In particular, ������100� = 1 ≫ ������50� = .003 and  ������100, �>10� =������50, �>10� = 1.  
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Table 3. 
 H
100 
H
50 
 I>0 I>10 I>0 I>10 
Ef .001 .002 .001 .002 
¬ Ef 0 0 .994 0 
 
However, we can see that learning I>10 at the outset strongly favored the hypothesis H100 since �(�>10|�100) = 0.67 ≫ �(�>10|�50) = 0.002. Likewise, according to ALL (iv), the aggregate 
information overwhelmingly favors H100 over H50 to a degree given by Λ = ���� , �>10��100� ���� , �>10��50� = 334� . This conclusion is not surprising given the 
details of the example. The distribution given in Table 3 is plausible in that those who frequently 
fish a particular lake are more likely to use nets with large holes if the lake contains mostly large 
fish—they may not know the distribution of fish in the lake, but they know what works. 
Whatever story one might tell to account for the particular probabilities in this case, the upshot is 
that if an OSE renders a particular observation irrelevant in a particular context it is still possible 
for the aggregate information to discriminate between hypotheses. 
 
While Eddington’s fishing example illustrates the way in which previously acquired information 
can deprive subsequent evidence of relevance, there is another example in the literature more 
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closely analogous to the fine-tuning case.26 This scenario involves firing squads. We are asked to 
imagine that a firing squad staffed by twelve expert marksmen takes aim at the prisoner to be 
executed. Each marksman fires twelve times when given the signal. When the smoke clears, we 
discover that the prisoner is still unharmed. Call the fact of this surprising survival Es. In this 
case, we are interested in what the prisoner can infer from Es concerning the following two 
hypotheses: 
Hcon:  The marksmen conspired at time t1 to spare the prisoner’s life when they fired  
at t2. 
 Hmiss: The marksmen decided at time t1 to shoot the prisoner when they fired at t2 but  
missed by chance. 
 
At first we might think that the prisoner has ample reason to favor Hcon over Hmiss since, given 
that these are expert marksmen, �(��|����) ≫ �(��|�����). However, in making his analysis 
the prisoner left out some pertinent information about the manner in which the observation of Es 
was made: 
IO: At t3 the prisoner made the observation that he is still alive. 
According to those who would single out background information, we must incorporate IO into 
the likelihoods by conditioning. In this view, the prisoner suffers from an OSE and cannot 
distinguish between the two hypotheses at all since �(��|����, ��) = �(��|����� , ��) = 1. 
Because IO entails Es, so the argument goes, learning Es can tell the prisoner nothing about which 
                                                 
26
 The scenario was introduced in John Leslie, Universes (London: Routledge, 1989). and 
elaborated in Richard Swinburne, "Arguments from the Fine-Tuning of the Universe," Physical 
Cosmology and Philosophy, ed. J. Leslie (New York: MacMillan, 1990) 160-79. 
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hypothesis to favor. Thus, the prisoner in the grip of a strong OSE cannot reasonably conclude 
there was a conspiracy to save his life. 
 
At this point, the tight analogy with the FTA should be clear. The prisoner stands in for us 
carbon-based life forms. While the prisoner is attempting to assess whether design or chance is 
responsible for his survival, in the FTA we are attempting to infer design in the cosmos. In both 
cases, it has been objected that the observer suffers from an OSE that prevents discrimination 
between hypotheses. Supporters of the FTA invoke the firing-squad scenario because they think 
that our intuition strongly opposes the OSE objection—surely the prisoner can reasonably 
conclude that conspiracy is the better hypothesis. By analogy, they claim that we can conclude 
that an OSE is not a problem for the FTA.  
 
In both cases, ALL tells us that the role of the OSE has been misinterpreted. It is true that, in the 
context of knowing that it was himself who made the observation, the prisoner learns nothing 
further by noting that he is alive. Likewise, it is the case that, knowing that all physics is done by 
carbon-based life forms, we learn nothing further by discovering that the constants of physical 
law are just right to sustain carbon-based life. Nonetheless, the aggregate information might still 
favor one hypothesis over the other. In the firing-squad scenario, it is eminently plausible that �(��, ��|����) ≫ �(��, ��|�����). In the case of fine-tuning, it may be that �(�, �|��) >�(�, �|��). This will be the case if �(�|��) > �(�|��). I certainly do not wish to argue that this 
is in fact the case—there seem to be insurmountable difficulties in providing a well-defined 
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measure corresponding to �(�|��).27 My point is just that, when one distinguishes between 
contextual and total support, the presence of an OSE does not prove fatal to design arguments in 
either the firing-squad or FTA case. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Insofar as one is inclined to accept LL as a framework for inference, no modification is 
necessary in order to deal with background information—unpacking LL leads to ALL. The 
interpretive key  is the discrimination of two questions, one concerning the immediate support 
provided by a piece of evidence in context and one concerning the overall support provided by 
the total set of evidence. Looked at in this way, it becomes clear that objections based on 
observer bias are not necessarily fatal to the FTA. It is true that we, as carbon-based life-forms, 
cannot use the fact that some physical constants are just right for the existence of carbon-based 
life to discriminate between design hypotheses and their rivals. However, it may be the case that 
the aggregate evidence (including the fact of our existence) might permit such discrimination. 
Whether this is the case must be settled on other grounds. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 It is not clear that the question of fine-tuning is even well-posed. There is reason to reject the 
strong metaphysical assumptions necessary to make the possibility of different ‘constants’ in the 
laws of nature meaningful or to entertain the existence of processes—whether physical or 
divine—that determined those constants in the past. 
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Abstract: Participatory research in anthropology attempts to turn informants into 
collaborators, even colleagues. Researchers generally accept the idea of different 
knowledge systems, and the practice of avoiding critical appraisal of alien knowledge 
systems, common in ethnography, is continued within participatory research. 
However, if the aim of participatory research is to turn informants into collaborators, 
or ideally colleagues, the ethical imperative of offering constructive criticism to 
colleagues should apply to them, too, even if they are seen as representing different 
knowledge systems than the researchers. Avoiding appraisal of alien knowledge 
systems is problematic when the knowledge systems of the researcher and the 
researched are in constant contact.
1
 
 
                                                        
1 I would like to thank the staff of Sámi Allaskuvla, especially Nils Oskal, for their 
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I owe her many thanks. I am also grateful for having had the opportunity to hear some 
presentations and discuss with some staff members at The First Nations University of 
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on 25.-26.8.2011, in the Finnish Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences' seminar in Helsinki on 16.1.2012 and in the VII Ethnology Days on 16.-
17.3.2012 in Jyväskylä. 
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1. Introduction 
The last few decades have witnessed the proliferation of different kinds of 
participatory, collaborative, ethnocritical and co-operative research methods in many 
disciplines. What the greater part of these methods have in common, is the attempt to 
change the relationship between the researcher and the researched from one between 
subject and object to one between subject and subject (Smith 1997, 178), and to turn 
informants, or local non-academic interest groups, into collaborators, even colleagues. 
The main focus here is on the use of these methods in ethnographic research. For the 
purposes of this paper I will call these forms of "academic engagement with outside 
communities" (Petras, Porpora 1993, 107) participatory research. Participatory 
research is mostly very down-to-earth and deals with questions and social problems 
that have weight in the daily lives of the communities the researchers work with. The 
reasons given for the adoption of such methods are mainly ethical, and when also 
epistemic grounds for the need of participatory research are discussed, they tend to be 
strongly attached to discussions concerning power inequalities: The position of a 
researcher is seen as a position of power, and researchers should be aware of the 
power structures they might consolidate by their work. The importance of the research 
subject's own knowledge is emphasized. Researchers should relinquish the idea of 
holding knowledge that would be privileged compared to that of the researched, who 
typically have a much lower social status than the researcher. Oppressed groups can, 
according to this vein of thought, be epistemically privileged, and researchers can 
benefit from their knowledge. (Finnis 2004, Hall 2005, Kurelek 1992, Park 2006, 
Wylie 2003.) Theoretical discussions about participatory research focus strongly on 
ethical issues. This paper takes an epistemic point of view, though the argument is 
nevertheless partly ethical. 
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Ethnographers generally accept the idea of there being different knowledge systems: 
people around the world have differing criteria for what is considered as a good 
argument and what is accepted as knowledge, or an acceptable way of producing 
knowledge claims. According to a widespread interpretation, these criteria are seen as 
stemming from - and as an integral part of – a conceptual framework. And the 
conceptual frameworks have especially earlier on been understood as chiming with 
cultures, understood as holistic systems that ethnographers could interpret. In trying 
to avoid ethnocentrism, ethnographers have developed research practices in which 
hasty comparisons between statements made in different knowledge systems are 
avoided: comparison as well as adjudication can be meaningful only when the 
position of the statement within its proper framework is understood. Shortly, many 
ethnographers avoid appraisal of alien knowledge systems. 
The practice of avoiding appraisal is often linked to some form of relativism. As Mark 
Risjord has noted (1998), relativism does not necessarily lead to the impossibility of 
criticism, or avoiding appraisal of alien knowledge systems. But as shall be shown, 
avoiding appraisal follows easily from methodological conceptual relativism. It can 
be discerned also from recent ethnographic research inspired by postmodern 
epistemic relativism – notably, participatory research. The ethical and power-related 
arguments given for the adoption of participatory methods do not seem to lead to the 
abandoning of the practice of avoiding appraisal. Rather, researchers are encouraged 
to adopt a strictly positive attitude towards the local knowledge of the communities 
they are studying (Finnis 2004). The main goals of this kind of research are often 
social change, emancipation and 'giving back to the communities'. Accordingly, it 
seems much more interesting to use local knowledge in research when possible, than 
to critically appraise it. The ideal situation would be one where local knowledge and 
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"western" academic knowledge could be seamlessly incorporated, and the informant 
would thus turn into a co-author and effectively a colleague. But, as I will argue, 
postmodern epistemic relativism does not offer tools to analyse and deal with 
situations where the local and academic knowledge systems clash. 
Avoiding appraisal is practicable only as long as the research subjects go along with it 
and the different knowledge systems stay at least somewhat apart. This is not always 
the case. The typical research subjects of cultural research have become more critical 
of their role as research subjects than they used to be in the heyday of 20th century 
anthropology. This change is by no means limited to cultural research; the general 
public's attitudes towards science and research have become more distrustful than it 
used to be (Carrier & Weingart 2009). In cultural research this change nevertheless 
has some unique features. An extreme demonstration of how research subjects have 
become critical of their role is the birth of a new and heterogeneous discipline called 
indigenous studies. Indigenous researchers wish to base their research methods on 
their own peoples' knowledge systems, which they hold to be different from the 
"western" ones (Tuhiwai Smith 1999). When such critical subjects enter academia, it 
becomes impractical to avoid appraisal of different knowledge systems, and it seems 
to become ethically questionable, too: constructive criticism is a researchers' due, and 
giving it is an obligation. Constructive criticism and avoiding appraisal are not 
compatible, so the practice of avoiding appraisal of different knowledge systems is 
ethically problematic when the alleged different knowledge systems enter academia. 
Moreover, if the aim of participatory research is to incorporate local knowledge with 
academic knowledge and turn informants into collaborators, and effectively even 
colleagues, the same ethical imperative applies to them, too, even if they are seen as 
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representing different knowledge systems. Their knowledge should be critically 
appraised. 
To argue for this position, I shall start by discussing the practice of avoiding appraisal 
of different knowledge systems in ethnographic research. Then I shortly describe the 
development that has lead to the establishment of indigenous studies, and the general 
aims of the discipline. Finally I try to illustrate both the practical and the ethical limits 
of avoiding appraisal of alien knowledge systems in a world where the conceptual 
frameworks and knowledge systems of the researcher and the researched are in 
constant contact.  
 
2. Avoiding Appraisal 
Maria Baghramian (2010) divides the different kinds of relativism that have been 
influential during the last century into three main groups: conceptual, cultural and 
postmodern relativism. I shall use this distinction when focusing on the ways in which 
one particular question is treated in ethnography: How does a researcher encounter 
different knowledge systems? And, to be precise, how does one treat them in 
publications? Especially some insights related to conceptual relativism have formed 
ethnographic research practices into the direction of avoiding appraisal of knowledge 
systems alien to the researchers' own communities. As postmodern relativism has had 
an impact on the development of ethnography and pointed cultural research into new 
directions, it has indeed challenged some earlier practices, but not the one of avoiding 
appraisal. 
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Let us understand cultural relativism as the claim that "there can be no such thing as a 
culturally neutral criterion for adjudicating between conflicting claims arising from 
different cultural contexts" (Baghramian 2010, 31), and conceptual relativism as the 
holistic view according to which conceptual frameworks influence thought so 
strongly that "insofar as it is a question of truth or falsity, one cannot legitimately 
compare statements made in one [framework] with those made within another" 
(Mandelbaum 2010, 68). In other words, cultural relativists start the comparison of 
statements arising from different contexts from a point where it is possible to find 
them conflicting, whereas conceptual relativists question the possibility of this 
finding. The first has had a significant role in public discussions about moral and 
political issues, but the latter has perhaps had a stronger impact on the development of 
ethnographic research methods and practices. It may be said that whereas some earlier 
cultural researchers have been (and some contemporary ones still are) cultural 
relativists and some not, fairly many have been and are – when one looks at their 
research practices – methodological conceptual relativists. 
Wittgenstein and Winch emphasized the need to doubt the applicability of our 
terminology and norms of rationality when evaluating other knowledge systems. 
According to them, it is not wise to treat religious practices as mistakes (Wittgenstein 
1967) or as unsuccessful scientific hypotheses: "Oracular revelations are not treated 
as hypotheses and, since their sense derives from the way they are treated in their 
context, they therefore are not hypotheses." (Winch 1964, 312.) Wittgenstein's 
remarks were leveled against James Frazer, who did make this kind of comparisons, 
but much before Wittgenstein wrote his comments, anthropologists had questioned 
the idea of universal cultural evolution, endorsed by Frazer, as ethnocentric and 
largely adopted methods where the kind of comparison Wittgenstein criticized is 
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avoided. Different formulations of conceptual relativism fell into fertile ground 
amongst ethnographers, and in a moderate form conceptual relativism can be 
recognized in the ways in which ethnographic research was, and often still is, 
conducted: Researchers, firstly, accepted the idea that different conceptual 
frameworks and knowledge systems exist, and secondly, they kept the different 
systems strictly apart and did not make comparisons between claims made in different 
systems. The rationale behind this was methodological: Propositions that seem prima 
facie to be very similar to ones we could make, can, in fact, when made within the 
unfamiliar conceptual framework, considerably differ from our ways of thinking, and 
if we presume to be able to understand them well enough right away to make 
comparisons to our own beliefs, we might not just make a mistake, but in fact hinder 
our own understanding of the differences in question.2  
Strong forms of conceptual relativism are problematic, since they can lead to the 
claim that different conceptual frameworks are incommensurable, which claim turns 
out to be difficult to defend (Davidson 1974). Ethnographers, who aim precisely at 
understanding different cultures, and translating between them, cannot accept the idea 
of full incommensurability and untranslatability between different frameworks. One 
of the solutions to this problem is to resort to a hermeneutical notion of understanding 
and interpreting: though the conceptual frameworks of the researcher and that of the 
researched are different, it is possible to expand the language of the former so as to 
express the meanings and nuances of the local expressions of the latter – think of 
Clifford Geertz's "thick descriptions" (Geertz 1973, Risjord 2007). Thus comparisons 
                                                        
2 On this point even ethnographers who disagree with all forms of relativism, 
generally agree. For example Dan Sperber, who hardly can be called a relativist, 
agrees that "resemblances across cultures may well be superficial; failure to 
understand this leads to poor ethnography" (Sperber 1982, 161). 
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between statements made in different conceptual frameworks are possible, but only 
after the slow research process that bridges the gap between the frameworks. 
However, since the hermeneutic process is often seen as never-ending, and because 
the research questions of ethnographers often do not necessitate many comparisons, 
the initial methodological abstinence from critical evaluation can develop into a status 
quo. 
By stressing the significant differences between different conceptual frameworks, and 
accordingly also different knowledge systems, researchers can at the same time treat 
their informants' beliefs, ways of argumentation etc. in a respectful manner, and still 
not take them seriously as propositions that should be accepted, refuted, or compared 
to the researcher's own claims: for example a Native American myth must not be 
compared to a scientific hypothesis even if they at first sight might seem to contradict 
each other. It is the researcher's own academic knowledge system within which 
theoretical debates happen. One of the most beautifully explicit formulations of this 
stance comes from Talal Asad: 
Why have I tried to insist in this paper that anyone concerned with translating 
from other cultures must look for coherence in discourses, and yet devoted so 
many pages to showing that Gellner's text is largely incoherent? The reason is 
quite simple: Gellner and I speak the same language, belong to the same 
academic profession, live in the same society. In taking up a critical stance 
toward his text I am contesting what he says, not translating it, and the radical 
difference between these two activities is precisely what I insist on. (Asad 1986, 
156.) 
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I would like to draw attention to two consequences of this differentiation. Firstly, 
when the beliefs, arguments and ways of producing knowledge claims of the 
researched are not appraised, they also cannot be adopted and used by the researcher. 
Of course it is possible to borrow concepts from other conceptual frameworks and add 
them to the academic arsenal; mana and potlatch are well-known examples of this. 
However, academic theoretical discussions do not happen within the informants' 
conceptual frameworks, nor do ways of knowledge production glide from their 
knowledge systems to academic argumentation. We do not see for example 
researchers invoking their age to back up their arguments, even if amongst their 
informants epistemic authority would be defined by age, nor do we encounter 
shamanistic research methods. The different knowledge systems are kept quite strictly 
apart. 
Secondly, methodological conceptual relativism is not a practicable stance for 
researchers who wish to use participatory methods and blur the difference between 
informants and colleagues. It can indeed be adopted by those who aim at multivocal 
research: all relevant interest groups are somehow involved in the research process, 
and get their voice to be heard, but the different stories nevertheless are left clearly 
apart (e.g. Rountree 2007). However, if participatory research aims further than this, 
or if the interest groups want more than just to have their story told, too – if they insist 
on having it accepted as the truth, not just listened to – then methodological 
conceptual relativism will not do. A methodological conceptual relativist will treat 
colleagues and informants (or other interest groups) differently. 
As noted earlier, it is easy to see how for example Geertz's ideas fit into the 
description offered here. But avoiding appraisal seems to be a prevalent practice even 
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example, in the more recent constructionistically oriented3 anthropology and cultural 
research the focus has been turned towards the researchers' own societies, their 
conceptual frameworks and knowledge systems. One of the often-criticized concepts 
is that of culture, especially when used by ethnographers (Wagner 1975), and with it 
the idea of different knowledge systems being disconnected. Despite this critique, the 
knowledge systems of the traditional research subjects of ethnography are mostly 
(though indeed not entirely) left unapprised. The sharp edge of the often social, but 
sometimes also epistemic critique points to "our", not "their" beliefs and ways of 
argumentation (Nader 2011). The practice of avoiding appraisal can be and has often 
been continued within constructionist ethnography. 
As mentioned, it is easy to find ethnographic research that incorporates 
methodological conceptual relativism in its practices. At the same time it seems to be 
virtually impossible to find ethnographers who would, on the level of their research 
practices, be consistent epistemic relativists. A consistent epistemic relativist would 
have no reason not to invoke their age to back up their arguments, if amongst their 
informants epistemic authority would be defined by age, or to use shamanistic ways 
of knowledge production in their research. This does not happen. (Koskinen 2011.) 
Nevertheless, postmodern epistemic relativism has had a strong impact on ethically 
motivated theoretical debates in anthropology and the neighboring disciplines. It has 
engendered much discussion on social and cultural inequalities, and it has had an 
important role in the development of participatory research. This is because of it 
highlights the relationship between knowledge and power. 
                                                        
3 By this characterization I refer to Ian Hacking's loose definition. When Marilyn 
Strathern studies parenthood (2011), or when Regina Bendix studies authenticity 
(1997), they focus mainly on "our" concepts, tell something about how those concepts 
have been constructed, and hold that they "need not have existed, or need not be at all 
as [they are]." (Hacking 1999, 6.) 
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As Baghramian notes, postmodern relativism is Nietzschean: all knowledge is seen as 
partial, perspective and tied to power structures, which leads to the conclusion that 
"we can do little more than insist on the legitimacy of our own perspective and try to 
impose it on other people." (Baghramian 2010, 45.) Research is seen as inevitably 
bolstering up one perspective or another, and with it, some power structure. Many 
cultural researchers inspired by postmodern ideas have concluded that if research is 
unavoidably political, it should try to unravel existing inequalities and give a voice to 
the oppressed. This is in dissonance with methodological conceptual relativism, since 
researchers who actively try to defend marginal ways of thinking and knowing, and 
empower the communities they are studying, of course take sides and commit 
themselves much more than a methodological conceptual relativist would find 
acceptable: knowledge systems are kept less strictly apart, and clearly less emphasis is 
put on the difficulty of translating. Nevertheless, if appraisal is understood as the act 
of estimating whether a belief, an argument, or a way of producing knowledge claims 
is valid or not, postmodern relativism does not encourage researchers to appraise the 
local thinking they are studying. It does not materially challenge the practice of 
avoiding appraisal, since the aim is not to appraise beliefs and ways of argumentation, 
but to empower communities and look for ways in which they could beneficially use 
their local knowledge. The postmodern researcher quite methodologically supports 
the local knowledge systems, and supporting differs from appraisal. 
 
3. Indigenous Studies: From Research Subjects to Critical Subjects 
Avoiding appraisal is possible for researchers as long as the knowledge systems they 
study can be kept at least somewhat apart from their own knowledge systems. This 
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was clearly the case in earlier anthropology, where the academic discussion happened 
far away from the studied people, and it is still the case when the postmodern 
researchers get to choose what parts of the studied local knowledge they might use in 
their publications. But the situation is not symmetrical: it has been and continues to be 
much more difficult for the research subjects to avoid appraisal of the knowledge 
systems of the researchers. The knowledge produced by researchers is often used in 
decision-making that affects the lives of the researched, so avoiding appraisal of this 
knowledge is impracticable. It is not surprising that when the researched have become 
more acquainted with academic research, some of them have become critical of their 
role as research subjects. Let us now turn to an extreme example of what happens 
when research subjects refuse to stay in their role, and want to be treated as simply 
subjects: the heterogeneous discipline called indigenous studies that claims to bring 
indigenous knowledge systems into academy. 
The notion of indigenous peoples has gained significant political weight during the 
last few decades, much because of the active co-operation of the different activist 
groups who see themselves as representing the different indigenous peoples around 
the world. One of their most important agendas has been that of taking control of the 
ways in which indigenous children and young people are educated.  The aim is "the 
establishment of systems of education which reflect, respect and embrace indigenous 
cultural values, philosophies and ideologies which have shaped, nurtured and 
sustained our people for tens of thousands of years." (Seurujärvi-Kari 1996, 171-172.) 
This includes also higher education and research, and so in different parts of the world 
there are nowadays colleges and research centers such as the First Nations University 
of Canada and the Sámi University College, dedicated to research based on 
indigenous knowledge systems.  
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The idea of different knowledge systems is generally accepted in indigenous studies, 
and the prevailing interpretation of it is postmodern4: Knowledge is inherently tied to 
power structures, and researchers who belong to the dominant group and produce 
knowledge about indigenous people can not easily avoid bolstering up the existing 
power inequalities. This outlook often involves the Nietzschean idea of understanding 
a different conceptual framework as a violent act of conceptual appropriation: 
frameworks are seen as rigid and all-embracing, and understanding means the ruling 
using their own framework and forcing the ruled to the slots that already exist in it. 
(Kuokkanen 2006, Tuhiwai Smith 1999, Meretoja 2007.) Despite this it is difficult to 
find indigenous researchers who would question the applicability of the strongly 
"western" concept of culture when studying indigenous peoples. Quite the contrary, 
the notion is used widely and hardly problematised, and it is not difficult even to find 
"generalizations about the culture as a whole" (Risjord 2007, 416) from indigenous 
researchers' publications. Given the political force of the concept this is hardly 
surprising. 
The methods used by indigenous researchers often resemble participatory research 
methods and many research projects are very down-to-earth developmental projects 
that aspire to engage with the community. Nevertheless, in the theoretical discussions 
much more controversial ideas have been promoted, such as developing shamanistic 
research methods (Kuokkanen 2000). The message is altogether clear: indigenous 
thinking – or "indigenous philosophies" – should be accepted within academy, not 
"simply as interesting objects of study (claims that some believe to be true) but as 
                                                        
4 There are nevertheless also indigenous researchers who tend to prefer a more 
Wittgensteinian or hermeneutical approach to the alleged different knowledge 
systems, and are inclined more towards conceptual than postmodern relativism 
(Turner 2006, Oskal 2008). 
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intellectual orientations that map out ways of discovering things about the world" 
(Garroutte 2003, 10). 
The most important aim of indigenous studies is advancing the indigenous identity 
and self-determination of the indigenous peoples. The main audience is the 
researcher's own people, so for example a Sámi researcher's work should be directed 
according to Sámi interests and preferably published in the Sámi language. The 
openly expressed goal of many of the Sámi researchers is nation-building. (Porsanger 
2005, Stordahl 2008, Seurujärvi-Kari 2011.) 
Even though indigenous researchers usually understand nation-building as a process 
of social construction, the building of "imagined communities" (Anderson 1983), the 
idea of researchers actively building nations is not new. Disciplines such as ethnology 
and folklore studies have historically had a significant role in the building of some 
European nation states. Folklorists were notably active in the building of the Finnish 
nation in the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Since then the 
discipline has gone through an extensive self-critique due to its nationalist history 
(Anttonen 2005, Wilson 1976). The earlier nationalist research has been deemed 
dubious in many ways, and the essentialist grounds of the ways in which earlier 
folklorists represented the Finnish people are seen as especially problematic. 
Indigenous studies has been criticized similarly: indigenous researchers are said to 
take cultures and peoples for granted, and make essentialist assumptions about the 
studied groups and their local knowledge (Kuper 2003, McGhee 2008). 
If an indigenous researcher and a folklorist meet in a conference, it is likely that the 
latter would like to question some of the theoretical premises of the former. The 
practical limits of avoiding appraisal become clear: avoiding appraisal of the 
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indigenous researcher's ideas is in this case not a viable option, even if the folklorist 
accepts the claim that his ideas stem from an indigenous knowledge system. Either 
the folklorists expresses her reasons for not agreeing with the indigenous researchers' 
ideas – thus treating him as a colleague, but taking the risk of apprising a knowledge 
system which is not her own. Or she stays silent – thus denying the indigenous 
researcher the status of a colleague who deserves constructive criticism. 
 
4. Participatory Research Needs to Make Room for Debate 
Indigenous researchers have achieved something very similar to what participatory 
research strives for. People belonging to groups that formerly would have been 
studied by outsider researchers, are now researchers themselves, study their own 
communities and aspire to base their research methods on their own communities' 
knowledge systems. Clearly they are not objects of study, but subjects, vis-à-vis other 
researchers. This has significant consequences for a researcher who accepts the idea 
of different knowledge systems: indigenous knowledge systems have entered 
academia, that is, the sphere where critical appraisal of other researchers' ideas is 
usually encouraged, not avoided. I believe most researchers would agree that 
"subjecting hypotheses, data, reasoning and background assumptions to criticism 
from a variety of perspectives" (Longino 2002, 205) is an indispensable part of 
academic knowledge production, and, accordingly, that it is a researcher's duty to 
offer criticism to fellow researchers. When indigenous knowledge systems enter 
academia, the partly ethically motivated practice of avoiding appraisal collides with 
the ethical obligation of offering criticism to colleagues. 
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The practice of avoiding appraisal has been continued in participatory research in the 
name of the ethical imperative of endorsing the knowledge systems of the oppressed. 
Nevertheless, if the aim of participatory research is to change the relationship between 
the researcher and the research subject from one between subject and object to one 
between subject and subject, and to turn informants into collaborators, or effectively 
even colleagues, the ethical imperative of offering criticism applies to them, too.  
When different conceptual frameworks and knowledge systems are in constant 
contact, research methods and practices that enable the people who see themselves as 
belonging to different knowledge systems to communicate with each other on a fairly 
equal footing, subject to subject, are clearly needed. That is, participatory methods 
and practices are needed. But at the same time, when different conceptual frameworks 
and knowledge systems are in constant contact, the practice of avoiding appraisal 
becomes both practically and ethically problematic. In other words, such notions of 
conceptual frameworks and knowledge systems, as well as such theoretical stances 
towards them, that do not enable criticism between and across the borders of the 
different frameworks and systems, are less and less usable in ethnography. They do 
not lend themselves well to the articulation of the aims of participatory research. 
Methodological conceptual relativism suffices well for the needs of multivocal 
research, but not further than that. Postmodern epistemic relativism is inadequate in 
situations of epistemic conflict. To paraphrase Bernard Williams (1974), when 
shamanistic ways of producing knowledge claims are no longer only in notional 
confrontation with academic knowledge production, but have become a real option 
for researchers, there has to be room for genuine disagreement and debate between 
the researcher and the shaman.
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       Laszlo Kosolosky & Dagmar Provijn 
Harvey’s ďloody ŵotioŶ: Creativity in science 
Abstract: In this paper, we show how the discovery of the circulation of the blood by William Harvey 
(1578-1657) sheds new light on traditional models of creativity in science. In particular, the example 
illustrates where both the enlightenment and the romantic view on creativity go astray. In the first 
section, we sketch the two views and present a (non-exhaustive) list of problems for both. In the 
remainder of the paper, we demonstrate hoǁ Williaŵ HarǀeǇ’s discovery, as a historical case study of 
creativity in science, gives firmer ground to these objections.  
Our argument goes as follows: First, we show that Harvey is a child of his time as his reasoning is 
influenced by Aristotle, Galen and the school of Padua (section 2). Second, we indicate how analogies 
play a ĐoŶsideƌaďle ƌole iŶ HaƌǀeǇ͛s reasoning aside from their usual argumentative value (section 3). 
Third, HaƌǀeǇ͛s ͚ƋuaŶtitatiǀe aƌguŵeŶt͛ Đaptuƌes an inherent struggle and reveals a new take on 
experiments (section 4). Fourth, we elaborate on the dimension of touch in Harvey͛s use of eǆpeƌiŵeŶts 
(section 5). Fifth, vivisection as a research method places Harvey for a dilemma (section 6). Sixth, we 
engage in the discussion of whether Harvey was an Aristotelian or not, not to solve it, but to argue for his 
particular historical position (section 7). To conclude (section 8), we spell out the effect of this brief 
analysis for (A) traditional models of creativity in science and (B) HaƌǀeǇ͛s historical position. 
1. Models of creativity in science 
When talking about creativity, one traditionally draws the line between a context of discovery
1
, which 
displaǇs aŶ iƌƌatioŶal oƌ ͚Euƌeka͛ ŵoŵeŶt, and a context of justification, which exhibits a purely rational 
dynamic. Over the years several critical remarks arose against Hans ‘eiĐheŶďaĐh͛s distiŶĐtioŶ 
(Reichenbach, 1938).  
On the one hand, from 1958 onwards with Norwood Russell HaŶsoŶ͛s iŶflueŶtial ͚PatteƌŶs of disĐoǀeƌǇ͛, 
the distinction came under attack. Many argued that this distinction needed to be refined by introducing 
an intermediate step.  A third context was supposed to cover both the initial theory formation as well as 
its preliminary evaluation. Richard Tursman speaks of ͞the logiĐ of pursuit aŶd/or of preliŵiŶarǇ 
eǀaluatioŶ of hǇpotheses͟ (Tursman, 1987: 13-14). Ernan McMullin speaks of a ͞heuristiĐ appraisal͟, 
which regards the research-potential of a theory (McMullin, 1976). Larry Laudan describes the 
intermediate step as ͞the ĐoŶteǆt of pursuit͟ (Laudan, 1977), and Laurie Anne Whitt as ͞theorǇ proŵise͟ 
or ͞theorǇ pursuit͟ (Whitt, 1992) (Seselja & Kosolosky, 2012: 1-2). On the other hand, especially since the 
ϭϵϯϬ͛s Karl Popper and several logical positivists (such as Rudolf Carnap and Carl G. Hempel) took over 
the distinction and insisted that only matters of justification, and not questions of discovery, obtain its 
place in philosophical discussion (Nickles, 1980: 1-2).  
                                                          
1
 We understand discovery here rather straightforward as ͞a proĐess of thought that leads froŵ ;at least partiallǇͿ 
observational premises to cognitive ĐoŶĐlusioŶs, geŶerallǇ iŶ the forŵ of laǁs or theories͟ (Pera, 1987: 177).  
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The distinction between context of discovery and context of justification translated itself in two models 
of creativity in science: Enlightenment and Romantic. In the enlightenment (or classical) model the 
rational discoverer is endowed with exceptional reasoning skills. Information is sufficient to logically 
deduce or induce a solution. Behind it lies the idea of the autonomous, individual agent who, in principle, 
accepts nothing on faith and makes decisions only after an independent application of critical reasoning. 
The romantic model portrays the discoverer as someone who is sensitive to patterned wholes and a lack 
of overall fit. At crucial moments in time (s)he experiences a brilliant flash of insight (Eureka) distancing 
oneself in this manner of common people (Nickles, 1994: 277-278). Standard objections against both 
models are: (1) they are too individualistic, since they discard the difficulty of locating major historical 
discoveries. ͞The bigger the discovery, the more time it typically takes to work out and articulate the 
conceptual and instrumental breakthroughs in question, an activity that normally involves many 
members of the community, including critics͟ (Nickles, 1994: 279). (2) They endorse a Whiggish view on 
science by reading recent developments back into the original observations and concepts. They leave out 
the role of critical discussion by the larger community over a certain period of time (Nickles, 1994: 279-
280). (3) They misrepresent what assigning credit for a discovery entails: ͞WheŶ sĐieŶtists assigŶ Đredit 
for a discovery, they are doing more than stating an historical fact (that person P discovered that D), they 
are simultaneously legitimating the corresponding claim and technique, which are usually presented as 
an extension of an older practice, a continuation of an older tradition͟ (Nickles, 1994: 279). (4) There is 
more not less innovation in science than commonly thought (Nickles, 1994: 280). In the remainder of the 
paper we investigate in detail how Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood and what brought him 
to this idea in the first place. This case study serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, it illustrates the 
theoretically conceived shortcomings of both models of creativity from an historical viewpoint, and, on 
the other hand, zooming in on these objections allows us to pinpoint the historical Harvey 
2
. 
2. IŶflueŶĐed ďy… 
Harvey, being a child of his time, was influenced by important figures
3
, such as Aristotle, Galen, Colombo 
and Fabricius
4
. According to Aristotle (384-322 BC) the problem of the movement of the heart is the 
central project for a physician (Pagel, 1944: 145). HaƌǀeǇ, iŶ puƌsuiŶg this pƌojeĐt, took Aƌistotle͛s ǀieǁ of 
the heart as the center of the physiological mechanism (Aird, 2011: 119) and was acquainted with the 
Aristotelian idea of circular motion as the perfect motion, since there is no motion contrary to it (Pagel, 
1944: 145). GaleŶ͛s (131-207/216) medical doctrine influenced Harvey in at least four ways: (1) Galen 
introduced the distinction between the venal and arterial system. (2) He endorsed Hippocratic dietetic 
                                                          
2
 We focus oŶ HaƌǀeǇ͛s main works: ͚PƌeleĐtioŶis AŶatoŵiae UŶiǀeƌsalis͛ ;ϭϲϭϲͿ aŶd ͚EǆeƌĐitatio AŶatoŵiĐa de 
Motu Coƌdis et SaŶguiŶis iŶ AŶiŵaliďus͛ ;ϭϲϮϴͿ aŶd ͚De GeŶeƌatioŶe AŶiŵaliuŵ͛ ;ϭϲ5ϭͿ. 
3
 Not only people influenced Harvey, but also tangible inventions in engineering. Boyle claims, in his paper, that a 
prototype of the sluice gate (the Porte Contarine lock), together with the first pound lock constructed on the 
Thames, provided Harvey with the decisive model for the function of the venous membranes to obstruct reflux of 
the blood (Boyle, 2008). 
4
 Other examples are Andreas Vesalius (1514-64), Michael Servetus (1511-1553), Andrea Casalpino (1519-1603), 
Salomon Alberti (1540-1600) and Sanctorius (1561-1636). 
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and humoral theory in medical practice, based on the ͚normality interpretation͛5. Physicians were thus 
cautious of learning from dissection (= concerns dead bodies that are not representative for the normal 
state of the living body) and vivisection (= causes a violent disruption of the normal state of the body). 
(3) Galen stressed that organs have an attractive force or faculty. In the case of the heart the active 
process, according to Galen, is the diastole (or expansion) ͞΀…΁ during which the heart snatches up or 
suĐks iŶ the iŶfloǁiŶg ďlood like a sŵith’s ďelloǁ or spoŶge.͟ (Aird, 2011: 121) (4) Galen pinpointed the 
centrifugal flow of the venal blood, or the flow of the blood from the liver and the heart to outer parts of 
the body. Another major influence on Harvey was the time spent at the School of Padua, where he 
interacted with Realdo Colombo (1516-59) and Girolamo Fabricius (1537-1619) (Aird, 2011: 123). 
Colombo was the first person to portray the pulmonary transit of blood from the right ventricle of the 
heart to the left. He thus had prior insight in the heart, although his writing was rather ambiguous
6
. 
Colombo had a dual impact on Harvey: (1) He deŵoŶstƌated that GaleŶ͛s ǁoƌk ǁas Ŷot deǀoid of 
mistakes and (2) he used vivisection as a method to trace these mistakes
7
. Fabricius was the one who 
prior to Harvey discovered the valves in the veins
8
. This section sketched out some ideas and (minor) 
disĐoǀeƌies oƌigiŶatiŶg iŶ HaƌǀeǇ͛s ;iŵŵediate) environment, which, as we will show in the following 
sections, influenced Harvey in devising the circulation of the blood. 
3. Analogies at play 
The reason we briefly touch upon HaƌǀeǇ͛s use of aŶalogies is that they play a crucial role in his 
reasoning, which surpasses their ordinary argumentative value. We present two examples to illustrate 
this claim:
9
 
 
I. Analogy as a means to extrapolate 
 
Harvey was able to discern the movement and the action of the heart in fish. But, these observations 
could not automatically lead to the construction of universals or generalization towards the heart of 
                                                          
5
 A body is considered healthy (or normal) if there is a balance of the four humors, i.e. black bile, yellow bile, 
phlegm and blood. ͞Disease ǁas attriďuted to aŶ iŵďalaŶĐe of huŵors or a shift iŶ the patterns of flow within the 
body͟ (Aird, 2011: 118). 
6
 Colombo confused systole, which is now regarded to be the active movement of the heart (or contraction) with a 
moment of rest. Diastole was understood as the constriction of the heart (Provijn, under review: 6-7). 
7
 We get back to this in section 6. 
8
 Both Coloŵďo aŶd FaďƌiĐius ŵodified GaleŶ͛s paƌadigŵ, so the ͞΀…΁ reǀiǀal of eǆperiŵeŶtal iŶǀestigatioŶ iŶ the 
ϭ5ϬϬs, ǁhile opeŶiŶg the door to progress, did Ŷot lead to the doǁŶfall of GaleŶ’s sǇsteŵ of phǇsiologǇ. “o 
persuasiǀe ǁas GaleŶ’s theorǇ that these Ŷeǁ fiŶdiŶgs ǁere siŵplǇ iŶtegrated as sŵall ŵodifiĐatioŶs iŶto the 
aŶĐieŶt sĐheŵe.͟ ;Aiƌd, ϮϬϭϭ: ϭϮϰͿ FaďƌiĐius, foƌ eǆaŵple, ƌeplaĐed GaleŶ͛s ŶotioŶ of aŶ ͚attƌaĐtiǀe poǁeƌ͛, ǁhiĐh 
Galen postulated to keep the blood from falling down into the lower parts of limbs, with a more mechanical 
explanation. Fabricius thought that ostiola or valves function not as one-way valves (as Harvey later on defended), 
ďut oŶlǇ as hiŶdƌaŶĐes to the ďlood͛s outǁaƌd floǁ. Based oŶ this function, Fabricius argued that the purpose of 
the ǀalǀes ǁas to sloǁ the ďlood͛s floǁ, pƌeǀeŶtiŶg it fƌoŵ ĐolleĐtiŶg too ƌapidlǇ iŶ the ďodǇ͛s eǆtƌeŵities 
(McMullen, 1995: 492). 
9
 Other examples are (1) the analogy of the glove (Illustrates the possibility of a passive pulse), and (2) the analogy 
of the pulmonary transit (The transit of blood may have functioned as an analogue that facilitated to conceive of 
the transit of blood from the left ventricle throughout the body back to the heart, considering the pulmonary 
transit as the lesser circulation preceding and contributing to the conception of the full circulation) (Provijn, under 
review: 13-14). 
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man, since the structure of the hearts differed considerably. Harvey, guided by the supposition that all 
hearts have the same function and display analogous processes
10
, extrapolates his findings from animal 
vivisections. To justify this extrapolation, Harvey made use of analogies: 
 
The same thing is also not difficult of demonstration in those animals that have, as it were, no 
more than a single ventricle to the heart, such as toads, frogs, serpents, and lizards, which have 
lungs in a certain sense, as they have a voice. ΀…΁ Their anatomy plainly shows us that the blood 
is transferred in them from the veins to the arteries in the same manner as in higher animals, 
viz., by the action of the heart; the way, in fact, is patent, open, manifest; there is no difficulty, 
no room for doubt about it; for in them the matter stands precisely as it would in man were the 
septum of his heart perforated or removed, or one ventricle made out of two; and this being the 
case, I imagine that no one will doubt as to the way by which the blood may pass from the veins 
into the arteries (Harvey, De Motu Cordis, ch.6: 19, own emphasis).  
 
This extrapolation is unique since Harvey extensively vivisected cold-blooded animals and relied on an 
unseen number of data to draw conclusions on the possible movement and action of the heart in warm-
blooded animals and man, which was a dangerous route to pursue at that time (section 2 and 5). 
 
II. The analogy of the muscle 
 
Harvey draws an analogy between the movement of the heart and the contraction of a muscle: 
 
΀…΁ the ŵotioŶ is plainly of the same nature as that of the muscles when they contract in the line 
of their sinews and fibres; for the muscles, when in action, acquire vigor and tenseness, and from 
soft become hard, prominent, and thickened: and in the same manner the heart (Harvey, De 
Motu Cordis, ch.2: 10, own emphasis).  
 
This analogy was never drawn by Colombo and was even opposed by Galen. Galen believed that the 
heart could not be a muscle since all muscles are held to move with a voluntary motion (Aird, 2011). In 
this manner Harvey opposed tradition, since the analogy allowed him to suppose the contrary claim that 
the cavities of the heart must become smaller during systole and that blood is trusted out. He could 
support this further by the observations he made in fish and other cold-blooded animals. 
 
Analogical reasoning thus serves a larger purpose iŶ HaƌǀeǇ͛s ƌeasoŶiŶg: Harvey uses analogical 
reasoning to draw conclusions on the movement of the heart that certainly occurs in cold-blooded 
animals (i.e. II) and uses extrapolation to draw the same conclusion for warm-blooded animals (i.e. I). So 
(I) and (II) combined enabled Harvey to describe the proper movement of the heart and how it related to 
the propulsive action of the heart, more convincingly than Colombo managed to do before. 
 
4. Quantitative argument
11
 
 
                                                          
10
 Despite there being morphological differences. 
11
 The ͚ƋuaŶtitatiǀe aƌguŵeŶt͛ ƌefeƌs to HaƌǀeǇ͛s aƌguŵeŶt against Galen that no matter how much blood is 
injected into the artery if you multiply this amount by the number of beats per hour of a typical heart it becomes 
clear that more blood than present in the entire body passes through the heart in a single hour (Lennox, 2006: 18-
21). 
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Harvey experienced drawbacks and difficulties in an attempt to match his new findings on the heart 
(section 3) with the dominant Galenic cardio-vascular system: 
 
΀…΁ ǁhat ƌeŵaiŶs to ďe said upoŶ the ƋuaŶtitǇ aŶd souƌĐe of the ďlood ǁhiĐh thus passes is of a 
character so novel and unheard-of that I not only fear injury to myself from the envy of a few, 
ďut I tƌeŵďle lest I haǀe ŵaŶkiŶd at laƌge fƌoŵ ŵǇ eŶeŵies, ΀…΁ And sooth to say, (a) when I 
surveyed my mass of evidence, whether derived from (b) vivisections, and my various reflections 
on them, or from the study of the ventricles of the heart and the vessels that enter into and 
issue from them, the symmetry and size of these conduits, - (d) for nature doing nothing in vain, 
would never have given them so large a relative size without a purpose, - or (c) from observing 
the arrangement and intimate structure of the valves in particular, and of the other parts of the 
heart in general, with many things besides,  
 
I frequently and seriously bethought me, and long revolved in my mind, what might be the 
quantity of blood which was transmitted, in how short a time its passage might be effected, and 
the like. But not finding it possible that this could be supplied by the juices of the ingested 
aliment without the veins on the one hand becoming drained, and the arteries on the other 
getting ruptured through the excessive charge of blood, unless the blood should somehow find 
its way from the arteries into the veins, and so return to the right side of the heart, ΀…΁ (De Motu 
Cordis, ch.8: 25, own emphasis and introduction of (a), (b), (c) and (d)). 
 
The second half of the quote shows how Harvey, in safeguarding his own theses on the forceful systole 
and the propulsive action of the heart, had to find a solution to this quantitative problem. His solution: 
the circulation of the blood, which ͞΀…΁ iŵplied that ďlood ǁas Ŷot ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ ďeiŶg ĐoŶsuŵed iŶ the 
peripherǇ aŶd repleŶished ďǇ iŶgested ŶutrieŶts, ďut rather that ďlood ǁas ĐoŶserǀed.͟ (Aird, 2011: 119) 
Strikingly Harvey argued for his solution by using a thought experiment. He explicitly requests his readers 
to take an educated guess on the amount of blood that is injected into the arteries. No matter what the 
answer would be, if we calculate the amount of blood that is to pass through the heart each hour, the 
eǆuďeƌaŶt Ŷuŵďeƌ shoǁs GaleŶ͛s sǇsteŵ to ďe flaǁed (Lennox, 2006: 18-19)12. This thought experiment 
must have played a major role in the actual discovery process, for at least two reasons: First, when we 
judge HaƌǀeǇ͛s testiŵoŶǇ aďoǀe as trustworthy it illustrates to the historian of science how the thought 
experiment played a central role in discovery. Second, because Harvey requests an input from the reader 
by endorsing a ͚try this for yourself aŶd see ǁhat happeŶs͛-mentality (Salter & Wolfe, 2009: 117), we are 
safe to say that Harvey performed it many times himself (De Mey, 2006: 234-235).  
 
This first half of the quote, however, sheds new light on the empiricist toolbox Harvey considered to be 
available to him. Harvey uses various (a) equal means of searching for possible solutions, such as (b) 
experiments, (c) observations and (d) philosophical principles (Salter & Wolfe, 2009: 120). HarveǇ͛s view 
prevents us from pinpointing hiŵ as a ͚staŶdaƌd͛ empiricist supporting the distinction between 
experiments as valuable and observations as inferior knowledge. According to Harvey ͞ďoth involve the 
inspection of nature by sensory perception, both involve active intervention and both require repetition to 
validate and justify the conclusions they suggest͟ (Salter & Wolfe, 2009: 119). Salter & Wolfe argue that 
labeling Harvey as an empiricist thus calls for a new notion of empiricism, namely medical/embodied 
empiricism, as opposed to the standard proof-and-validation experimentalism of Royal Society 
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 If ǁe ĐoŶĐeiǀe of it this ǁaǇ, oŶe Đould saǇ HaƌǀeǇ͛s aƌguŵeŶt is aƌithŵetiĐ ǁithout ďeiŶg ƋuaŶtitatiǀe siŶĐe the 
exact quantities do not matter. 
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empiricism (Salter & Wolfe, 2009). Further arguments for this kind of empiricism will be given in the next 
section, as we present the ligature experiment. 
 
5. Experiment by touch 
 
Harvey took notice of the placing of the valves in the veins and, correspondingly, the flow of the blood in 
the body by performing the following experiment, which came to be known as the ligature experiment:  
 
 
Harvey presents this image (Fig. 1) of an arm 
prepared for bloodletting, i.e., with a ligature 
tightly bound around it to make the veins swell – 
with letters marking the position of the valves. In 
Fig. 2 a finger presses on valve H. The section of 
the vein below valve H (nearer to the heart) is 
shown to be empty of blood until the next valve 
along, valve O. The blood does not flow back 
through O to fill the vein. In Fig. 3 one finger 
presses on valve H, stopping the flow towards 
valve O, while another tries to push the blood 
from below valve O towards H; yet this section of 
the vein remains empty – because the valves are 
stopping the blood from flowing in this direction. 
However, (Fig. 4) on the opposite side (section M, 
between valve L and valve N) the vein can fill. 
Harvey has thus proven that blood flows around 
the body in one direction only, from the periphery 
to the heart. 
 
IMAGE OŶlǇ illustƌatioŶ iŶ Williaŵ HaƌǀeǇ͛s De ŵotu Đoƌdis, ϭϲϮϴ  
(Courtesy to the Wellcome Library) 
 
The credibility of touch as an instrument of peƌĐeptioŶ ;iŶ liŶe ǁith HaƌǀeǇ͛s ǁoƌk ethiĐ of doiŶg it 
yourself and feeling it Ǉouƌself, see seĐtioŶ ϰͿ is, ŵoƌeoǀeƌ eŵphatiĐallǇ illustƌated ďǇ HaƌǀeǇ͛s iŶĐlusioŶ 
in De Generatione Animalium (1651) of a nobleman Hugh Montgomery as the subject of HaƌǀeǇ͛s touĐh. 
Harvey recounts his live, beating heart which had been exposed by the injuries from a fall when still a 
child: 
 
I immediately saw a vast hole in his chest into which I could easily put my first three fingers and 
my thumb. At the same time I saw just inside the opening, some fleshy, projecting part which 
was driven backwards and forwards with an alternating movement, and I touched it very 
ĐautiouslǇ ǁith ŵǇ haŶd ΀…΁ ǁheŶ I had iŶǀestigated eǀeƌǇthiŶg ĐaƌefullǇ eŶough, it ǁas eǀideŶt 
that the old ǀast ulĐeƌ ΀…΁ ǁas Đoǀeƌed oǀeƌ oŶ the iŶside ǁith a ŵeŵďƌaŶe aŶd guaƌded all 
round the edges with a hard skin (Harvey, 1651: 250). 
 
The crucial experiment is, again, the experiment of the ligature – but it succeeded because of touch. Only 
touch could reveal the actual outward and inward flow of blood and the effect of the venous valves in 
preventing outward venous flow. Salteƌ & Wolfe͛s ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of eŵpiƌiĐisŵ, as set out iŶ seĐtioŶ ϰ, fits 
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in ŶiĐelǇ ǁith HaƌǀeǇ͛s seŶse of eŵpiƌiĐisŵ, siŶĐe touch is the crucial characteristic in defining his 
particular way of experimenting. This kiŶd of eŵpiƌiĐisŵ Đalls foƌ a ŵoƌe ͚fiƌst peƌsoŶ seŶsitiǀe͛ 
peƌspeĐtiǀe, as ďeĐaŵe eǀideŶt thƌough HaƌǀeǇ͛s use of eǆpeƌiŵeŶts13. 
 
6. Broadening constraint 
 
Vivisection, as a method of reacting against established theories, served a peculiar role for Harvey. 
Observing the fast beating of the heart of warm-blooded animals after vivisection did not generate the 
perspicuous observations needed to draw conclusions on the real active movement of the heart. Harvey 
was just able to discern the two separate phases, i.e. systole and diastole, but it was impossible to 
pinpoint one of these as the proper movement. Harvey solved this observation problem by observing 
cold-blooded animals and dying hearts (section 3 and 4).  
 
From a medical point of view, however, this is both problematic (section 2): (1) The dying heart, plus it 
being observed during vivisection, could hardly count for the normal situation, and (2) the hearts of cold-
blooded animals diverged too much from the ones observed in warm-blooded animals (Provijn, under 
review: 8). As mentioned in section 4, Harvey tried to bridge this gap through the use of analogies. 
Vivisection as a method for Harvey could be characterized as, ǁhat ǁe Đall, a ͚ďƌoadeŶiŶg ĐoŶstƌaiŶt͛. OŶ 
the one hand, as a natural philosopher it opened up opportunities for him to reject old theories and 
ground his observations with supplementary power. On the other hand, as a physician it constrained him 
in using these results and it required supplementary reasoning to convince his fellow physicians, which 
he found in a thought experiment (section 4), ligature experiment (section 5) and use of analogies 
(section 3). Understood in this sense, Harvey had the opportunity to be at the interface between being a 
natural philosopher and being a physician. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Our aŶalǇsis of keǇ faĐtoƌs iŶ HaƌǀeǇ͛s disĐoǀeƌǇ pƌoĐess sheds light on (A) existing models of creativity in 
science and (BͿ HaƌǀeǇ͛s historical position. Broadly conceived, this paper illustrates how we can 
understand a historical case in terms of specific characteristics from a philosophy of science perspective, 
and, vice versa, how a historical case can show us that certain models of scientific discovery and 
creativity are false, or at least not generalizable. 
 
(A) First, throughout the paper we saw the objections raised against the two models of creativity 
reemerging: 
 
(1) Individualistic: HaƌǀeǇ͛s ideas ǁeƌe paƌt of a laƌgeƌ ĐoŵŵuŶity (section 2), governed by critical 
discussion (section 4 and 5) and a difficulty to pinpoint certain discoveries (e.g. Coloŵďo͛s paƌt iŶ 
the discovery of the systole aŶd FaďƌiĐius͛ disĐoǀeƌǇ of the ǀalǀes iŶ the ǀeiŶs). 
(2) Whiggish: Since Harvey used the same terminology (e.g. systole, diastole) as his contemporaries, 
innovation and conceptual change are less straightforward (section 2). His critical interaction 
                                                          
13
 Salter & Wolfe, in understanding empiricism, draw out the following taxonomy: (i) A ͚‘oǇal SoĐietǇ͛, 
eǆpeƌiŵeŶtalist eŵpiƌiĐisŵ, ǁhiĐh ŵaǇ ďe the ĐoŶteǆt iŶ ǁhiĐh aŶ aĐtual ͚philosophǇ of eǆpeƌiŵeŶt͛ eŵeƌges ;i.e. 
Boyle and Bacon), (ii) A moral/practical empiricism, in which themes such as anti-innatism are in fact not 
epistemological, that is, not primarily reducible to concerns about the nature of knowledge or of the cognitive 
states of the knower, but are rather motivated by embedded concerns such as anti-authoritarianism and the desire 
to articulate a notion of toleration (i.e. Locke aŶd HuŵeͿ, aŶd ;iiiͿ A ŵediĐallǇ ŵotiǀated, ͚eŵďodied͛ eŵpiƌiĐisŵ 
(i.e. William Harvey, Pierre Gassendi, Thomas Sydenham) (Salter & Wolfe, 2009). 
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with Hofmann, Colombo and Fabricius illustrates the presence of critical discussion and 
assiŵilatioŶ iŶ HaƌǀeǇ͛s disĐoǀeƌǇ process. 
(3) Assigning credit: Assigning credit to someone for a discovery entails a legitimation and extension 
of an older tradition (e.g. Galen, Aristotle, Colombo, Fabricius), combined with new perspectives 
(e.g. thought experiment, vivisection, role of touch in experiments, analogies). 
(4) More innovation: Innovation goes in smaller steps (section 2) and experiences restrictions and 
drawbacks (section 4, 5 and 6), ascribing innovation to more people, since a discoverer is in 
essence a child of his time. 
 
The example allows us to draw some more general tentative lessons on creativity in science. First, it 
seems that geŶuiŶe disĐoǀeƌies aƌe Ŷot a pƌoduĐt of ͚spaƌks of geŶiuses͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ of loŶg, deŵaŶdiŶg 
and complex problem-solving processes. Second, the study of creativity should focus on processes and 
not on products. We have to reconstruct all the elements underlying the process of invention, both 
historical and formal (i.e. use of analogies) if we aim to address the full extent of the matter. Third, there 
is nothing magically explanatory about the labels ͚eŶlighteŶŵeŶt͛ aŶd ͚ƌoŵaŶtiĐ͛, of Đouƌse ďoth theiƌ 
utility and their potential to mislead should remind us that our ways of describing scientific work, 
especially innovative research, are tied to larger cultural contexts and are themselves historically 
conditioned (Nickles, 1994: 308). 
 
(B) Second, we were able to roughly pinpoint the historical Harvey by stressing his interface position in 
three ways: experimentalist versus Aristotelian (section 2), natural philosopher versus physician (section 
6), and embodied empiricist versus experimentalist empiricist (section 4 and 5). HaƌǀeǇ͛s Aristotelian 
past, on the one hand, helps him in coming up with possible directions (e.g. heart as central, circular 
motion), whereas, on the other hand, it also carries constraints (e.g. search for causa finalis). Moreover 
Harvey was able to combine skills of the natural philosopher and physician in spelling out his circular 
motion of the blood through, what we would call, aŶ ͚experiment/observation grounded thought 
experiment͛ (section 6). Last but not least, Harvey is no ordinary empiricist in the sense of Royal Society 
empiricism, since he places observation and experiment on an equal par (section 4). And so the empirical 
side of his discovery process consisted mainly of (i) the use of (ligature) experiments and vivisections 
(section 5 and 6), (ii) the finding of the symmetry and magnitude of the heart ventricles and associated 
vessels entering and leaving them, (iii) the perceiving of the skillful and careful craftsmanship of the 
heart valves, fibres and other structural artistry of the heart, (iv) knowing the amount and transmission 
time of the blood transmitted by the heart, and the fact that the ingested food could not supply this 
amount without us having the veins (section 4). 
   
It is thus safe to conclude that Harvey represents the struggle between ͚the old and the new͛ and that his 
intermediary/interface position captures the environment that enabled him to discover the circulation of 
the blood. This case study, moreover, calls for renewed attention to the study of creativity and discovery 
in science. 
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University of Helsinki 
 
Abstract 
Evolution is often characterized as a tinkerer that creates efficient but messy solutions to problems. 
We analyze the nature of the problems that arise when we try to explain and understand cognitive 
phenomena created by this haphazard design process. We present a theory of explanation and 
understanding and apply it to a case problem – solutions generated by genetic algorithms. By 
analyzing the nature of solutions that genetic algorithms present to computational problems, we 
show that the reason for why evolutionary designs are often hard to understand is that they exhibit 
non-modular functionality, and that breaches of modularity wreak havoc on our strategies of causal 
and constitutive explanation. 
 
1 Introduction 
The once dominant classical paradigm of cognitive science has been under attack for several 
decades. Connectionism, cognitive neuroscience, dynamical systems theory, and new robotics have 
all questioned whether the classical AI approach to cognition can credibly describe biologically 
evolved cognitive systems such as human minds. Whereas classical AI tends to approach 
computational problems with functional decompositions inspired directly by the programmer’s 
intuitions about possible efficient subroutines, the alternative research programs often emphasize 
that biological evolution is more likely to produce far more complex and messy designs.  
 
In our paper we analyze the nature of the problem that these messy solutions raise to the 
understanding of cognitive phenomena. In general, the problem of understanding non-intuitive 
designs produced by natural selection is well-known in philosophy of psychology (e.g., Clark 1997, 
Ch. 5), philosophy of  biology (Wimsatt  2007), and now even in popular  psychology (Marcus 2008), 
but the problem has proven to be difficult  to articulate without a clear idea of what exactly it  is that 
                                                             
1
 The authors are listed in an alphabetical order. 
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evolutionary tinkering is supposed to hinder. The main challenge for understanding is often framed 
and explained by pointing to the path-dependent nature and the resulting unfamiliarity of the 
evolved design (Jacob 1977). We argue that  this is not  the whole story. We hope that  providing an 
explicit theory of explanation and understanding will move us beyond intuitions towards a more 
systematic analysis and, ultimately, concrete solutions. We also combine our theory of explanatory 
understanding with a computational application of evolutionary design: problem-solutions 
generated by genetic algorithms. By analyzing the nature of solutions that genetic algorithms offer 
to computational problems, we suggest that an important reason for why evolutionary designs are 
often hard to understand is that they can exhibit non-modular functionality, and that breaches of 
modularity wreak havoc on our strategies of causal and constitutive explanation.  
 
2 Explanation and understanding 
The ultimate goal of cognitive neuroscience is to provide mechanistic understanding of system-level 
properties of  the cognitive system in  terms of  the properties of  its parts and  their  organization.  
Probably the most developed account of general strategies for reaching such mechanistic 
understanding is William Bechtel’s and Robert Richardson’s (2010) study of the heuristics of 
decomposition and localization (DL). The DL procedure goes roughly as follows. First, the different  
phenomena that the system of interest exhibits are differentiated. Then the phenomenon of interest 
is functionally decomposed, i.e., analyzed into a set of possible component operations that would be 
sufficient to produce the phenomenon. One can think of this step as a formulation of a preliminary 
set of simple functions that taken together would constitute the more complex input-output relation 
(the system-level phenomenon). The system is also structurally decomposed into a set of component 
parts. The final step is to try to localize the component operations by mapping the operations onto 
appropriate structural component parts. The idea is thus to first come up with a set of more basic 
properties or behaviors which could, taken together, possibly result in the explanandum behavior, 
and then try to find out whether the system is in fact made of such entities that can perform the 
required tasks. If this cannot be done, the fault may lie with the functional and structural 
decompositions or with the very identification of the phenomenon, and these may then have to be 
rethought. The identification and decomposition procedures will in the beginning be guided by 
earlier theories and common sense, but empirical evidence can always suggest that a thorough 
reworking of the basic ontology and the form of the possible explananda may be in order. 
According to Bechtel and Richardson, decomposability is a regulative ideal in such model 
construction because complex systems are psychologically unmanageable for humans. 
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Decomposition allows the explanatory task to be divided into parts that are manageable for 
cognitively limited beings, thereby rendering the system intelligible (Bechtel and Richardson 2010). 
The  idea  comes originally  from  Herbert  Simon  (1962),  who  claimed  that  the  property  of  near-
decomposability is a necessary condition of understandability to any finite cognitive agent. Near-
decomposability means that the system can be decomposed into parts in such a way that the 
intrinsic causal properties of the parts are more important for the behavior of the system than the 
relational causal properties of the components that are constituted also by their environment and 
interaction. Near-decomposable systems are thus hierarchical in the sense that the complex whole 
can be conceived of as made from a limited set of simpler parts and interactions. Hierarchical 
systems are manageable for cognitively limited beings because their ‘complete description’ includes 
irrelevant elements describing similar recurring parts and non-important interactions. The removal 
of such descriptions does not hamper our understanding of the system and thus eases cognitive 
load.  
Although there are a number of arguments that conclusively show that such informational economy  
by itself is not constitutive of understanding2, we agree with Simon in that a property closely related 
to near-decomposability, namely modularity, is a necessary condition for understanding. As a 
conceptual starting point for our argument, we follow Petri Ylikoski and Jaakko Kuorikoski in 
conceiving understanding not as a special mental state or act, but as a regulative label attributed 
according to manifest abilities in action and correctness of reasoning. Understanding is a public, 
behavioral concept. Cognitive processes (comprehension) taking place in the privacy of individual 
minds are a causal prerequisite for possible fulfillment of these criteria, but the processes 
themselves are not the facts in virtue of which somebody understands or not. They are not the 
criteria of understanding in the sense that we would have to know them in order to say whether 
somebody really understands something. (Ylikoski 2009; Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010)  
We take the primary criterion of understanding to be inferential performance: whether someone 
understands a concept is evaluated according to whether he or she can make the right inferential 
connections to other concepts. Likewise, whether someone understands a phenomenon is assessed 
based on whether he or she can make correct inferences related to it. This view can be further 
                                                             
2
 First, nobody has actually succeeded in giving a positive argument for equating understanding with increased 
informational economy (Barnes 1992). Second, successful classification schemes compress information by 
facilitating inferences to properties probably possessed by individuals on the basis of belonging to a certain 
known class. However, classification schemes by themselves are usually taken to be merely descriptive and not 
explanatory. The same general point can be drawn from standard statistical procedures, which by themselves 
only summarize the data, but do not explain it. (Woodward 2003, 362-364.) 
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developed by linking it to James Woodward’s account of scientific explanation in the following way: 
Woodward’s theory of explanation tells us more specifically what kinds of inferences are constitutive 
of specifically explanatory understanding. According to Woodward (2003), explanation consists in 
exhibiting functional dependency relations between variables. Knowledge of explanatory 
relationships facilitates understanding by implying answers to what-if-things-had-been-different 
questions concerning the consequences of counterfactual or hypothetical changes in the values of 
the explanans variable. Whether someone understands a phenomenon is evaluated according to 
whether he or she can make inferences not only about its actual state, but also about possible states 
of the phenomenon or system in question. In the case of causal explanations, these explanatory 
dependencies concern the effects of interventions and knowledge of causal dependencies thus 
enables the possessor of this knowledge to act and possibly manipulate the object of explanation. 
These answers are the basis of the inferential performance constitutive of understanding.  
The limits of inferential performance depend causally on contingencies related to the reasoning 
processes of the agents whose understanding is being evaluated. Thus the limits of understanding 
are dependent on the cognitive make-up of agents and can certainly be investigated psychologically. 
For  example,  if  the space limit  of  our  working memory  is indeed  roughly  seven  items,  then  this 
constitutes an upper boundary for the complexity of our inferences and, consequently, for our 
understanding.  
In order for answers to what-if questions to be well defined, the dependencies grounding the 
answers have to possess some form and degree of independence such that a local change in an 
aspect of the phenomenon under study cannot ramify uncontrollably or intractably. If local 
modifications in a part of a system disrupt other parts (dependencies) in a way that is not explicitly 
specified (endogenized) in the (internal or external) representation of the system according to which 
the what-if inferences are made, the consequences of these changes are impossible to predict and 
counterfactual assertions impossible to evaluate. Things participating in the dependency relations 
also have to be somewhat localized (physically and/or conceptually) in order for the contemplated 
changes  to  be  well  defined  in  the  first  place.  (Woodward  2003,  333.)  Therefore  a  necessary  
condition for a representation to provide understanding of a phenomenon is that the modularity in 
the representation matches the modularity in the phenomenon. 
Let us first discuss the case of causal understanding. If an intervention on a causal system actually 
changes the system in a way that  is not  represented in the model  of  the system, the model  as it  
stands does not give correct answers to what-if-things-had-been-different questions concerning the 
state of the system after the intervention. If we intervened on a causal input corresponding to 
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variable Xi in a model and the intervention, no matter how surgical, also changed the dependencies 
within the system or values of other variables themselves affecting variables causally downstream of 
Xi, the model would give incorrect predictions about the consequences of the intervention. Hence, 
the model would not provide correct causal understanding of the workings of the system and the 
causal role of the variable in it. If the system cannot be correctly modeled on any level of description 
or decomposition so that it is modular in such a way – if the system itself is not causally modular – 
no what-if-things-had-been-different questions concerning interventions in the system can be 
answered and there is no causal understanding of the system to be had. If the system is in fact such 
that every local change brings about intractable changes elsewhere in the system to such an extent 
that there can be no representation that would enable a cognitively finite being to track these 
changes and make correct inferences about their consequences, then the system is beyond the 
limits of understanding.  
The problem of understanding causally non-modular systems has received some attention in the 
philosophy of science literature (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson 2010, Ch. 9). However, according to 
the schema of Bechtel and Richardson, before we can even start thinking about acquiring causal-
mechanical understanding of the system realizing the complex behavior to be understood, we need 
to formulate hypotheses about the possible functional decompositions of the behavior (see also 
Cummins 1983). For example, what kind of simpler subtasks could possibly produce complex 
cognitive capacities such as language production and comprehension, long-term memory, and three-
dimensional vision? Importantly, these hypotheses are separate, though not independent, from 
hypotheses concerning the implementation of the capacity. Although the understanding offered by 
the functional decomposition is not strictly speaking causal – component operations do not cause 
the whole behavior because they are constitutive parts of it3 – the modularity constraint on 
understandability still applies in the following way. We can only understand the complex behavior by 
having knowledge of the component operations if we can make reliable what-if inferences 
concerning the possible consequences of changes in the component operations for the properties of 
the more complex explanandum capacity. We provisionally understand working memory if we can 
infer from possible changes in its hypothesized component operations (such as differences in the 
postulated phonological loop or episodic buffer) to changes in the properties of the capacity. These 
inferences are only possible if the functional decomposition itself is suitably modular, i.e., the 
consequences of “ local“ changes in component operations do not ramify in an intractable way 
                                                             
3
 Although we fully agree with Piccinini and Craver (2011) in that insofar as functional decompositions are 
explanatory, they are to be thought of as mechanism sketches and that the functional hypotheses are not 
independent of the question of mechanistic implementation.  
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making the behavior of the whole completely holistic. We now argue that genetic algorithms 
demonstrate that design by selection can lead to such non-modular complex behavior. 
 
3 Genetic algorithms 
Since the 1960s, there have been attempts to apply insights from evolutionary thinking to computer 
programming. Here we discuss one genre of evolutionary programming: genetic algorithms (cf. 
Holland 1975; Goldberg 1989; Mitchell 1996). In a nutshell, the idea of the genetic-algorithms 
approach is to “breed” randomly generated solutions to computational problems. This is done by 
mimicking the evolutionary mechanisms of inheritance, mutation, selection and crossover in a 
computer simulation. Although genetic algorithms (henceforth GAs) are not the only strand of 
evolutionary programming, they serve our purpose well because their basic principles are easy to 
understand and they are the most well-known kind of evolutionary programming outside computer 
science (Clark 1997, 2001; Mitchell 2009).  
 
From the point of view of AI, genetic algorithms are a form of non-exhaustive but massively parallel 
search in the search space of a problem. They can be used for a number of different purposes: for 
evolving behavioral strategies for simulated agents, for finding weights for a connectionist network, 
or  for  evolving  cellular  automata  to  perform  computations.  We  illustrate  the  nature  of  GAs by  
presenting a simple example from Melanie Mitchell (2009, Ch. 9). Mitchell’s original simulation 
showed how GAs can be used to evolve a controlling program for a simulated robot picking up soda 
cans in a 10x10 grid. Robby the robot  can only see squares that  are adjacent  to its location (center, 
North, South, East, West), and each turn it  can either move one step to a particular direction, move 
at random, try to pick up a can, or do nothing. Each simulation run lasts for a predetermined amount 
of time steps (originally 200), and Robby's task is to pick up as many randomly situated soda cans as 
possible.  
 
 Genome G: 
254355153256235251056355461151336154151034156110550150052030256256132252350325112
052333054055231255051336154150665264150266506012264453605631520256431054354632404
350334153250253251352352045150130156213436252353223135051260513356201524514343432 
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Figure 1. (taken from Mitchell 2009, 137). Each “locus”  in the genome G corresponds to one of the 
possible immediate environmental states of Robby and each digit (the allele) to a move in that 
situation (e.g. ‘0’ å ‘move north’, ‘5’ å ‘pick up’).  
 
Initially a random population of software individuals is generated, each with a “genome” consisting 
of 243 random numbers. Each locus in the genome guides Robby’s behavior in a particular situation 
(Fig 1). The fitness score of each candidate program in the population is calculated by running 
several simulation trials: crudely, the more cans the robot is able to pick up by average, the higher its 
fitness. Programs with the highest fitness scores are then used to form the next generation of 
programs:  they are paired randomly,  and the genomes of  the two parents are crossed over  at  a 
randomly chosen point to create the genomes of new individuals. Finally, for each descendant, there 
is a small probability (.05) that a mutation occurs in its chromosome. As a result, the new generation 
is based on the most successful variants among the previous generation and the process loops back 
to the fitness-calculation phase. Thus the GA continues searching for efficient solutions to the 
problem by investigating the surrounding areas in the search space.  
 
After a few hundred generations, the evolved strategies start to achieve impressing results in the 
simulated task. As we replicated Mitchell’s simulation, we observed that after the 800th generation, 
the best strategies among evolved Robbys started to have higher fitness scores than a simple 
“rational” solution programmed by a human designer (ultimately 480 vs. 420 points). However, 
although solutions found with GAs are efficient, their behavior is often hard to understand. The 
ingenious heuristics that the programs employ cannot be deciphered by simply looking at individual 
genes or sets of genes. Instead, looking holistically at the broad phenotypic behavior of the robot is 
necessary. A nice illustration of this impenetrability of such evolved solutions is the fact that in some 
cases when a highly evolved Robby is in the same square with a can, it  decides not to pick it  up, but 
rather chooses to move away from the square. While this behavior seems prima facie irrational, 
looking at  the total behavioral profile of the robot  uncovers a cunning strategy: Robby uses cans as 
markers to remember that there are cans on its side and explores the adjacent squares for extra 
cans  before  picking  up  the  marker  can.  Thus  by  not  treating  cans  only  as  targets  but  also  as  
navigational tools, Robby uses its environment to extend its severely limited visual capacities and to 
compensate for its total lack of memory. 
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Moreover, by examining the behavior of a 1500th generation Robby that has the highest fitness score 
in  its population,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  marker  strategy  manifests in  slightly  different  ways in  
different environmental situations. It is therefore not a discrete adaptation, but rather a collection of 
independently evolved sub-strategies. Furthermore, the marker strategy appears to tightly 
intertwine with other environment-employing “hacks” that the sophisticated Robby uses: when 
there is already a lot of empty space on the grid, Robby employs a “vacuum-cleaner” movement 
strategy.  It  follows the  walls of  the  board,  departing  toward  the  center  when  it  detects a  can,  
employs the marker  strategy if  possible, and immediately after  cleaning up its local  environment, 
returns directly to the south wall to continue its round around the board. 
 
Such kluges are common to designs created by GAs. Like biological evolution, GAs can come up with 
solutions that a human designer would not usually think of. These solutions often offload parts of 
problem solving to the environment, and thus rely on a tight coupling between the system and its 
environment. And as pointed out by Clark (1997, 2001), recurrent circuitry and complex feedback 
loops between different levels of processing often feature in systems designed by GAs. Such designs 
are often difficult to understand. We claim that such difficulties in understanding are often created 
by the lack of modularity in the functional decomposition of the behavior. This point can be 
illustrated by looking again at the genome of our most successful Robby (genome G in Fig 1). Robby 
is leaving cans as markers only in specific situations and only the totality of this selective marking 
strategy, together with navigational strategies utilizing cans and walls, constitutes the effectiveness 
of the search procedure. Looking at isolated genes in Robby’s genome only reveals trivially modular 
elements corresponding to elementary subtasks in Robby’s behavior: one gene corresponds to an 
elementary move in a specific environmental situation. But we cannot make inferences from local 
hypothetical changes in these elemental behaviors to consequent effects on fitness. The connection 
between any single elementary behavioral rule and the strategy is simply too complex and context 
dependent. A change in a single rule (in situation B and a can present, whether to pick or not to pick 
the can up) has consequences for the effectiveness of the other elementary behavioral rules 
constituting the navigational strategy. Explanatorily relevant inferences would require an extra 
“level” of modular sub-operations between the individual movements and the strategy as a whole. 
The marker and vacuum-cleaner strategies mentioned above are examples of such middle-level sub-
operations, but they are by themselves insufficient to yield understanding of the whole behavior of 
our most successful Robby, since the effectiveness of leaving a can is a result of the evolved match 
between the specific situations in which Robby leaves a can and the rest of the navigation behavior. 
And genetic algorithms do not, in general, produce such easily discernible designs. Rather, only by 
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simultaneously looking at constellations of different genes, and eventually the whole genome, the 
interesting heuristics in the system’s behavior can be revealed - if at all.  
 
To recapitulate, our example exhibits several distinct (yet related) challenges to understanding: 
1. The discernible middle-level strategies (marker, vacuum cleaner) do not have a dedicated 
structural basis. Instead, the nature of the design process leaves all atomic structural 
elements (the 243 DNA elements) open for  exploitation by all  capacities serving the main 
goal. In consequence, the system is not structurally or behaviorally nearly-decomposable, 
but instead has ”a flat hierarchy.” Strategies are implemented in highly distributed 
structures, and as pointed out in section 2, this raises a challenge for human cognitive 
capacities. 
2. Challenge 1 above means that the interactions between subtasks tend to be strong: a 
change in one subtask constituting a part of the marker-behavior affects also the functioning 
of the vacuum-cleaner navigation. In general the middle-level strategies can only be 
discerned and defined in a very abstract way and the interaction-effect in their contribution 
to the overall fitness is so large as to make any inferences about the consequence of partial 
changes in one strategy next to impossible. 
3. The way in which operations contribute to the fitness of the individual is highly context-
dependent and depends on the properties of the environment as well as the DNA of the 
agent. For instance, merely detecting the existence of the marker strategy requires that 
there are suitable clusters of  cans in the environment. Moreover, even small modifications 
to  the  environment  can  lead  to  drastic  changes  in  the  performance  of  a  strategy.  For  
instance, adding only a few randomly placed extra walls on the grid radically collapses the 
average score of the successful Robby described above. 
 
Extrapolating from this very simple case, GAs may yield functional decompositions of the problem 
that do not follow a tidy hierarchical decomposition into modular subtasks, whose individual 
contributions would be easy to understand (i.e., we could infer how a change in a sub-routine would 
affect the behavior of the mother-task). Instead, feedback, many tasks using same subtasks as 
resources, and environment couplings lead to holistic design where almost “everything is relevant 
for everything.”  The evolved functional architecture is flat in that there are few discernible levels of 
order between the elementary operations and the complex whole. The counter-intuitiveness of such 
flat architectures is apparent in the deep mistrust faced by connectionist suggestions for non-
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hierarchical design of cognitive capacities (see e.g., Rumelhart and McClelland 1986 vs. Pinker and 
Prince 1988). 
 
Furthermore, GAs underscore the path dependence of evolutionary problem solving. For sufficiently 
complex computational problems there are often several local maxima in the fitness landscape of 
the problem, and the population can converge to different maxima in different runs of the 
simulation. The functional decomposition that a human designer comes up with is just one possible 
solution among several others. Perhaps our biological evolution actually ended up with a radically 
different one. 
 
4 Lessons for the study of mind 
 
Genetic algorithms seem to demonstrate that evolution can in principle lead to non-modular 
functionality. This imposes a limit on our ability to understand such behavior: if we cannot trace the 
consequences of changes in the sub-operations, we cannot answer what-if questions concerning the 
complex behavior. Such behavior also constitutes a thorny problem for mechanistic understanding 
of the implementation of the said behavioral capacities, since the DL heuristic cannot even get off 
the ground. We can now ask two questions: should we expect to find such non-modular functionality 
in nature, especially in human cognition, and if so, what attitude should we adopt with respect to 
this problem. Should the aim of causal-mechanistic understanding of the brain be given up and 
replaced with a program of instrumentally interpreted dynamical models and modeling the 
dynamics of the mind with a few macro-variables? 
 
There are important disanalogies between GAs and biological evolution. (1) in GAs, there usually is 
no genotype–phenotype distinction. In biological evolution, however, genes do not directly cause 
properties of the phenotype, but rather participate in guiding ontogenesis. There have been 
suggestions that ontogenesis itself favors modular design. GAs may also seem a problematic 
platform for exploring the possibilities of DL heuristics, since the lowest level of functional 
organization and the level of implementation are the same (i.e., the genome). However, we see no 
reasons why this would affect our argument. Moreover, the argument developed here is about 
selection in general, and failures of functional modularity may in principle also arise in the course of 
development  –  at  least  if  the  idea  of  neuronal  group  selection  or  “neural  Darwinism”  is taken  
seriously. 
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(2) Most  studies on genetic algorithms are carried out  by using a single fixed goal  or  a fixed task 
type. In the Robby example, although the distribution of the cans was generated at random, the task 
itself remained essentially the same from generation to generation. However, Nadav Kashtan and 
Uri Alon (2005, see also Kashtan et al.  2007) have demonstrated that when the goals themselves are 
composed of modularly varying sub-goals, evolution produces modular functionality. It is easy to see 
why this is the case. If the tasks to which the system has to adapt to remains the same, the selection 
environment is stable and the peaks in the fitness landscape are immovable, then selection favors 
strategies which offload problem solving to that particular environment as much as possible. But if 
the task itself is composed of changing subtasks, it makes sense to design the adaptive response in 
such a way that a particular sub-operation can locally adapt to a local change in a subtask without 
altering the totality of the otherwise well functioning behavior. 
It seems likely that cognition has evolved in such a modularly changing selection environment, but 
the extent to which we should expect to find modular functionality in human cognition is hard to 
estimate and is most probably a purely empirical matter. Moreover, as a response to Simon’s (1962) 
Tempus and Hora argument, it has been argued that componential specialization in complex systems 
is a  force  that  works against  the  development  of  strictly  modular  structures (e.g.,  Levins 1973,  
Wimsatt 2007, 186–192). Nonetheless, these arguments as such give us no reason to believe that 
the produced functional decomposition should respect any intuitive constraints, such as those 
derived from introspection on our thought processes or the way in which we would program a 
strategy to tackle similar cognitive challenges. 
Genetic algorithms demonstrate that evolution can create designs which are in principle beyond the 
understanding of unaided cognitive beings such as us. Yet there is nothing mysterious in such 
designs. Simon pondered whether the relative abundance of hierarchical nearly decomposable 
complexity was due to our selective attention to precisely such systems, but we believe this to be a 
somewhat hasty conjecture. We have no trouble finding and delineating systems, such as Robby or 
possibly ourselves, with behaviors which are functionally non-decomposable and constituted by a 
flat architecture. However, there certainly might be a psychological bias that makes us see 
hierarchical design also where there is none. One way of coping with this impasse is to realize that 
there are no fundamental reasons to limit the relevant understanding epistemic agent  to  be  an  
unaided human. Although only a human agent can experience a sense of understanding, this feeling 
should not be confused with understanding itself. Therefore brute computational approaches can 
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produce understanding as long as the understanding subject, the cognitive unit whose inferential 
abilities are to be evaluated, is conceived as the human-computer pair. 
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Abstract
There are two senses of ‘what scientists know’: An individual sense
in which scientists report their own opinions, and a collective sense in
which one reports the state of the discipline. The latter is what is of in-
terest for the purpose of policy and planning. Yet an expert, although
she can report the former directly (her opinion on some question),
can only report her considered opinion of the latter (the community
opinion on the question). Formal judgement aggregation functions
offer more rigorous frameworks for assessing the community opinion.
They take the individual judgements of experts as inputs and yield a
collective judgement as an output. This paper argues that scientific
opinion is not effectively captured by a function of this kind. In order
to yield consistent results, the function must take into account the
inferential relationships between different judgements. Yet the infer-
ential relationships are themselves matters to be judged by experts
involving risks which must be weighed, and the significance of the risk
depends on value judgements.
In one sense, ‘what scientists know’ just means the claims which are the
determination of our best science. Yet science is a collective enterprise; there
∗Thanks to John Milanese, Heather Douglas, and Jon Mandle for comments on various
parts of this project.
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are many scientists who have individual and disparate beliefs. So ‘what scien-
tists know’, in another sense, means the omnibus comprised of the epistemic
state of scientist #1, the epistemic state of scientist #2, and so on for the
rest of the community. The phrase is ambiguous between a collective and an
individual meaning.
If we consult a scientific expert, either because we want to plan policy
or just because we are curious, we are typically interested in the collective
sense. We want to know what our best present science has to say about
the matter. And the expert we consult can differentiate the two senses, too.
She can relate what she as a particular scientists knows (what she herself
thinks, where here sympathies lie in controversies, and so on), but she can
also take a step back from those commitments to give her sense of what the
community consensus or dominant opinion is on the same matters. If it is
simply curiosity that has led us to consult an expert, this may be enough.
When policy hangs on the judgement, however, we want more than just one
expert’s report on the state of the entire field.
This distinction between their personal commitments and the state of the
field in their discipline is one that any scholar can make. If you think (as
tradition has it) that only individuals can have beliefs in a strict sense, then
take the expression ‘opinion of the scientific community’ as a fac¸on de par-
ler. If you think (as Lynn Hankinson Nelson does [10]) that the community
rather than the individual knows in a strict sense, then suitably reinterpret
‘what an individual knows’ in terms of belief. The distinction I have in mind
is neutral with respect to the metaphysics of social epistemology. The ques-
tion is simply how we could use consultation with individuals to generate a
composite, collective judgement.
Formal judgement aggregation offers rigorous frameworks which seem to
provide what we want. In the abstract, it defines a function that takes
individual scientists’ judgements as inputs and yields collective judgement
as an output. This assumes that the collective judgement of the scientific
community depends on the separate individual judgments of the scientists
— i.e., that what scientists know in the collective sense is a function of what
scientists know in the individual sense.
Taking a recent proposal by Hartmann et al. [6][7] as an exemplar, I argue
that judgement aggregation does a poor job of representing what scientists
know in the collective sense. I survey several difficulties. The deepest stems
from the fact that judgements of fact necessarily involve (perhaps implicit)
value judgements. Where values and risks might be contentious, this entails
2
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that individual judgements cannot merely be inputs to a function. Judgement
aggregation is not enough.
1 The majority and premise-majority rules
As a judgement aggregation procedure, one might na¨ıvely survey scientists
about factual matters and take any answer given by the majority of scientists
to reflect the state of science. Of course, scientists would agree about a great
many things that are simply not within their purview. Physicists would say
that Sacramento is the capital of California, but that does not make it part
of physics. So the survey should be confined to matters that are properly
scientific. The survey must also include only legitimate scientists and exclude
ignorant rabble. These restrictions are somewhat slippery, but let’s accept
them.
The na¨ıve procedure is a simple function from individual judgements to
an aggregate judgement: Return the judgement endorsed by a majority of
the judges. Call this the majority rule.
The majority rule has the nice features that it treats every judge equally
and that it does not bias the conclusion toward one judgement or another.
Yet it suffers from what’s called the discursive dilemma: It can lead to incon-
sistent collective judgements, even if all the judges considered individually
have consistent beliefs. In the following schematic example, there are three
judges: Alice, Bob, and Charles. Each has the consistent beliefs on the mat-
ters P , Q, and (P&Q) indicated in the table below. The majority rule yields
the inconsistent combination of affirming P and Q but denying (P&Q).
P Q (P&Q)
Alice T F F
Bob F T F
Charles T T T
majority T T F
The nice features of majority rule seem like desiderata for a judgement
aggregation rule, but avoiding the discursive dilemma is another such desider-
atum. A good deal of ink has been spilled specifying precisely the desiderata
and proving that they are together inconsistent. However, even where it can
be proven that a set of desiderata cannot be satisfied in all cases, they may
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still be jointly satisfied in some instances. The majority rule can lead to con-
tradiction, it does not do so in every case. As a practical matter, we might
begin by trying out a simple rule (like majority) and add sophistication only
if the actual community has judgements like those in schematic example.1
Even so, more sophisticated rules would be needed for corner cases.
Stephan Hartmann, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Jan Sprenger [6][7] develop
a judgement aggregation rule specifically to escape the discursive dilemma.
Their procedure involves polling judges only regarding matters of indepen-
dent evidence. For matters which are consequences of the evidence, the
procedure derives consequences from the aggregated judgements. In the sim-
ple case given in the table above, for example, the procedure would affirm P
and Q (because each is affirmed by a majority) and also P&Q (because it
is a consequence of P and Q). Call this the premise-majority rule. When it
can be applied, premise-majority generates a consistent set of judgements.
There are several difficulties with premise-majority, as a way of aggregat-
ing expert scientific opinion.2
First, premise-majority inevitably produces some determinate answer. As
Brams et al. [3] show, it is possible for a combination of separate elections
to result in an overall outcome that would not be affirmed by any of the
voters. Moreover, a judge’s inconsistency will necessarily be between some
belief about evidence and some belief about the consequences of the evidence
— since the evidence claims are stipulated to be independent — but premise-
majority does not query their beliefs about consequences at all. So it will
generate a consistent set of judgements even if many or all judges are in-
consistent. As such, premise-majority will generate determinate results even
when the community is confused or fractured into competing camps. But,
in considering scientific opinion, we certainly only want to say that there is
something ‘scientists know’ when there is a coherent scientific community.
Second, applying the rule requires a division between the judgements that
are evidence and the ones that are conclusions. As Fabrizio Cariana notes,
premise-majority “requires us to isolate, for each issue, a distinguished set
1The strategy of adding complications only as necessary can be applied generally to
decision problems. For example, intransitive preferences wreck dominance reasoning. Yet
one might presumptively employ dominance reasoning until one actually faces a case where
there are intransitive preferences.
2Since Hartmann et al. are thinking about the general problem of judgement aggrega-
tion, rather than the problem of expert elicitation, these are objections to the application
of the rule rather than to the rule as such.
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of logically independent premises” [4, p. 28]. He constructs a case involving
three separate, contentious claims and an agreed upon constraint, such that
any two of the three claims logically determines the third. It would be arbi-
trary to treat two of the claims as evidence (and so suitable for polling) and
the third as a consequence (and so fixed by inference). The premise-majority
rule simply is not applicable in cases where the line between premises and
conclusions is so fluid. This difficulty leads Cariani to conclude only that
premise-majority will sometimes be inapplicable; so he suggests, “Different
specific aggregation problems may call for different aggregation rules” [4,
p. 29]. Yet the problem is especially acute for scientific judgement, because
inference can be parsed at different levels. Individual measurements like ‘35◦
at 1:07 AM’ are not the sort of thing that would appear in a scientific pub-
lication; individual data points are unrepeatable and not something about
which you would query the whole community. Yet they do, of course, play
a roˆle in inference. At the same time, scientists may take things like the
constancy of the speed of light to be evidence for a theory; the evidence here
is itself an inference from experiments and observations. There are different
labels for these different levels. Trevor Pinch [12] calls them observations
of differing externality. James Bogen and James Woodward [2] distinguish
data from phenomena. Since we might treat the same claims as premises or
conclusions, in different contexts, it is unclear what we would poll scientists
about if we applied premise-majority.
Third, premise-majority is constructed for cases where the conclusion is
a deductive consequence of the premises. In science, this is almost never the
case.3 Scientific inference is ampliative, and there is uncertainty not only
about which evidence statements to accept but also about which inferences
ought to be made on their basis. One might avoid this difficulty by including
inferential relations among the evidential judgements. To take a schematic
case, judges could be asked about R and (R → S); if the majority affirms
both, then premise-majority yields an affirmative judgement for S.
One might worry that this suggestion treats ampliative, scientific infer-
ence too much like deductive consequence. The worry is that actual scientists
might accept a premise of the form ‘If R, then typically S’ but nothing so
strong as R → S. It is possible for inferences based on weaker conditionals
3I say ‘almost’ because sufficiently strong background commitments can transform an
ampliative inference into a deduction from phenomena. Of course, we accept equivalent
inductive risk when we adopt the background commitments; cf. [9].
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about what is merely typical to lead from consistent premises to inconsistent
conclusions. To answer the worry, one might appeal to what John Norton
[11] calls a material theory of induction. The central idea is that most of
inductive risk in ampliative inferences is shouldered by conditional premises;
Norton calls the premises material postulates. So — in answer to the worry
— one might think that asking about material postulates would allow us to
use the premise-majority rule to aggregate scientific judgements about many
even though not absolutely all matters.
A deeper problem with the suggestion is that it presumes that scientists
can say, independently of everything else, whether the inference from R to S
is appropriate. That is, it assumes that material postulates can be evaluated
on a ballot separately from everything else. In the remainder of the paper, I
argue that this idealizes science too much. Whether a scientific inference is
appropriate must be informed by more than just the particular evidence —
the appropriate scientific conclusion depends (at least in some cases) on the
risks and values involved.
In the next section, I spell out more clearly the way in which inference
can be entangled with values and risk. In the subsequent section, I return to
it as a problem for premise-majority. As we’ll see, it becomes a problem for
more than just Hartmann et al.’s specific proposal. It is a problem for any
formal judgement aggregation rule whatsoever.
2 The James-Rudner-Douglas thesis
Here is a quick argument for the entanglement of judgement and values:
There is a tension between different epistemic duties. The appropriate bal-
ance between these duties is a matter of value commitments rather than a
matter of transcendent rationality. So making a judgement of fact necessarily
depends on value commitments.
The argument goes back at least to William James, who puts the point
this way: “We must know the truth; and we must avoid error — these are
our first and great commandments as would-be knowers; but they are not
two ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two separable laws”
[8, p. 99]. Although James has in mind personal matters of conscience (such
as religious belief), Richard Rudner makes a similar argument for scientific
judgement. Rudner argues that
the scientist must make the decision that the evidence is suf-
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ficiently strong. . . to warrant the acceptance of the hypothesis.
Obviously our decision regarding the evidence and respecting how
strong is “strong enough”, is going to be a function of the im-
portance, in the typically ethical sense, of making a mistake in
accepting or rejecting the hypothesis. [13, p. 2]
There is not only a tension between finding truth and avoiding error, but
also between risking one kind of error and risking another. Any particular
test involves a trade-off between making the standards too permissive (and
so mistakenly giving a positive answer) or making them too strict (and so
mistakenly giving a negative answer). The former mistake is a false positive
or type I error; the latter a false negative or type II error. There is an
inevitable tradeoff between the risk of each mistake, and so there is a point
at which the only way to reduce the risk of both is to collect more evidence
and perform more tests. Yet the decision to do so is itself a practical as
well as an epistemic decision. In any case, it leaves the realm of judgement
aggregation — having more evidence would mean having different science,
rather than discerning the best answer our present science has to a question.
As such, values come into play. Heather Douglas puts the point this way,
“Within the parameters of available resources and methods, some choices
must be made, and that choice should weigh the costs of false positives versus
false negatives. Weighing these costs legitimately involves social, ethical, and
cognitive values” [5, p. 104].
Plotting a curve through these 19th, 20th, and 21st-century formulations,
call this the James-Rudner-Douglas or JRD thesis : Anytime a scientist an-
nounces a judgement of fact, they are making a tradeoff between the risk of
different kinds of error. This balancing act depends on the costs of each kind
of error, so scientific judgement involves assessments of the value of different
outcomes.
The standard objection to the thesis is that responsible scientists should
not be making categorical judgements. They should never simply announce
‘P ’ (the objection says) but instead should say things like ‘The available
evidence justifies x% confidence in P .’ This response fails to undercut the
thesis, because procedures for assigning confidence levels also involve a bal-
ance between different kinds of risk. This is clearest if the confidence is given
as an interval, like x±e%. Error can be avoided, at the cost of precision, by
making e very large. Yet a tremendous interval, although safe, is tantamount
to no answer at all.
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Eric Winsberg and Justin Biddle [1] give a substantially more subtle reply
to the standard objection. Regarding the specific case of climate modeling,
Winsberg and Biddle show that scientists’ estimates both of particular quan-
tities and of confidence intervals depend on the histories of their models. For
example, the results are different if scientists model ocean dynamics and
then add a module for ice formation rather than vice-versa. The history of a
model reflects decisions about what was considered to be important enough
to model first, and so it depends on prior value judgements.
But why should the JRD thesis have consequences for expert elicitation?
After all, James does not apply it to empirical scientific matters. He is
concerned with religious and personal matters, and he concludes merely that
we should “respect one another’s mental freedom” [8, p. 109]. He does not
apply it at all scientific matters where there is a community of legitimate
experts.
Rudner, who does apply the thesis to empirical judgements, nevertheless
hopes that the requisite values might themselves be objective. What we need,
he concludes, is “a science of ethics” [13, p. 6]. Rudner calls this a “task of
stupendous magnitude” [13, p. 6], but he is too optimistic. Searching for an
objective ethics in order to resolve the weight of values and risks is a fool’s
errand. A regress would ensue: The judgements of ethical science would
need to be informed by the ethically correct values so as to properly balance
inductive risks, but assurance that we have the correct values would only be
available as the product of ethical science. One might invoke pragmatism
and reflective equilibrium, but such invocations would not give Rudner final
or utterly objective values. If responsible judgement aggregation were to wait
on an utterly objective, scientific ethics, then it would wait forever.
Douglas accepts that the thesis matters for expert elicitation. So she
considers the concrete question of how to determine the importance of the
relevant dangers. She argues for an analytic-deliberative process which would
include both scientists and stakeholders [5, ch. 8]. Such a process is required
when the scientific question has a bearing on public policy, and there are
further conditions which must obtain in order for such processes to be suc-
cessful. For one, “policymakers [must be] fully committed to taking seriously
the public input and advice they receive and to be guided by the results of
such deliberation” [5, p. 166]. For another, the public must be “engaged
and manageable in size, so that stakeholders can be identified and involved”
[5, p. 166]. Where there are too many stakeholders and scientists for di-
rect interaction, there can still be vigorous public examination of the values
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involved. Rather than pretending that there is any all-purpose procedure,
Douglas calls for “experiment with social mechanisms to achieve a robust
dialog and potential consensus about values” [5, p. 169]. Where consensus
is impossible, we can still try to elucidate and narrow the range of options.
Douglas’ approach is both a matter of policy (trying to increase trust in
science, rather than alienating policymakers and stakeholders) and a matter
of normative politics (claiming that stakeholders’ values are ones that sci-
entists should take into consideration). In cases where these concerns are
salient, saying what scientists know will depend on more than just the prior
isolated judgements of scientists — but moreover on facts about the actual
communities of scientists, policymakers, and stakeholders.
Arguably, Douglas’ concerns will not be salient in all cases. Some science
is far removed from questions of policy. So the significance of the JRD thesis
may depend on the question being asked.
3 Our fallible selves
I argued above that the premise-majority rule was inapplicable in many sci-
entific contexts because it only worked for cases of deductive consequence.
Formally, this worry could be resolved by asking scientists about which in-
ferences would be justified; we poll them about claims like (E → H) at the
same time as we poll them about E. The JRD thesis undercuts this formal
trick. Where the judgement has consequences, the inference itself is an ac-
tion under uncertainty. So the appropriate inference depends on the values
at stake. Schematically, whether one should assent to (E → H) depends on
the risks involved in inferring H from E. Concretely, questions of science
that matter for policy are not entirely separable from questions of the policy
implications.
If we merely poll scientists, then we will be accepting whatever judge-
ments accord with their unstated values. We instead want the procedure
to reflect the right values, which in a democratic society means including
communities effected by the science. Importantly, this does not mean that
stakeholders get to decide matters of fact themselves; they merely help de-
termine how the risks involved in reaching a judgement should be weighed.
Nor does it mean that politicized scientific questions should be answered by
political means; climate scientists can confidently identify general trends and
connections, even allowing for disagreement about the values involved. What
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it does mean is that scientists cannot provide an account that is value-neutral
in all its precise details.4
This is fatal to premise-majority as a method of determining what sci-
entists know collectively. Moreover, it is fatal to any judgement aggregation
rule that treats judges merely as separate inputs to an algorithm. The prob-
lem extends to practical policies of expert elicitation, insofar as they are
procedures for enacting judgement aggregation rules. Where there are im-
portant values at stake that scientists are not taking into account or where
the value commitments of scientists are different than those of stakehold-
ers, the present judgements of individual scientists can not just be taken as
givens.
An analytic-deliberative process is required, but the appropriate mecha-
nisms are not ones which we can derive a priori. As Douglas argues, we need
to experiment with different possibilities [5, p. 169, cited above]. There is not
likely to be one universally applicable process. It will depend on facts about
the communities involved. Moreover, the inference from social experiments in
deliberation will itself be an inductive inference about a question that effects
policy. So the inference depends importantly on value judgements about the
inductive risks involved, and that means an analytic-deliberative process will
be required. It would be a mistake to hope, in parallel with Rudner’s appeal
to a science of ethics, for an objective set of procedural norms. How best
to resolve meta-level judgement about experiments in social arrangements is
as much a contingent matter as how to socially arrange object-level expert
consultation. We start with the best processes we can muster up now, and
we try to improve them going forward. Minimally, however, we can say that
future improvements should not elide the roˆle of values, as formal judgment
aggregation functions do, but explicitly accommodate it.
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Abstract
Advocates of the counterfactual approach to causal inference argue that race isn’t a cause.
I object that their argument is invalid and that its key premise is unwarranted. I also criticize
the criterion, which I call ‘Holland’s rule’, the counterfactual approach relies on to distinguish
causes from non-causes. Finally, I argue that racial discrimination cannot be causally explained
unless one assumes race to be a cause. I conclude that the view that race is not a cause lacks
support and that there are good reasons to adopt the opposite view that race is a cause.
1 Introduction
Scientists in many disciplines (economics, epidemiology, etc.) routinely treat race as a cause.
Economists who study labor market discrimination, for instance, commonly build models involving
race as an independent variable and give a causal interpretation of the coefficient attached to it.1
Are scientists who treat race as a cause fundamentally confused? Do policies based on their con-
clusions rest on shoddy evidence? This is what leading advocates of the counterfactual approach to
causal inference (henceforth ‘CFA’) claim, arguing that since race is an “immutable characteristic”
of individuals, one cannot coherently treat it as a cause.
After a brief introduction to the CFA (§2), I present the argument against race being a cause
(§3). I then raise two objections to it (§4) and proceed to sketch a positive argument for race being
a cause (§5). I conclude that advocates of the CFA lack justification for denying race the status of
cause, and that there are good reasons to adopt the opposite view that race is a cause (§6).
2 The counterfactual approach
The CFA, first introduced by Rubin (1974), is the dominant approach to causal inference in statistics
and in many social sciences. It has roots in the work of Fisher and Neyman on agricultural
experiments.
1See e.g. (Kahn and Sherer, 1988) for a classic example that is representative of many studies in labor economics.
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When only one cause is considered, counterfactual causal models essentially have the following
components:2
• A population of units i ∈ U
• A binary causal exposure variable D taking value di = 1 when i is exposed to the cause (is
in the ‘treatment’ state) and di = 0 when i is not (is in the ‘control’ state).
• Two potential outcome variables Y 1 and Y 0, where y1
i
represents the value of the effect for i
when i is exposed to the cause and y0
i
, the value of the effect for i when i is not exposed to
the cause.
The individual-level causal effect (ICE) of D for i is typically defined as follows:
δi = y
1
i
− y0
i
This causal effect is equal to the difference between the value of the effect when i is exposed to
the cause and the value of the effect when i is not. Since a given unit cannot be both exposed to
the cause and not exposed to it at once, only one of y1
i
and y0
i
can be observed for any unit. If i
is exposed to the cause, the value of y1
i
is observable while the value of y0
i
is counterfactual: It is
the value the effect would have taken had i not been exposed to the cause; hence the name of the
approach. Because only one of y1
i
and y0
i
can be observed, δi cannot be observed either. Holland
dubs this the “fundamental problem of causal inference” (1986, 947).
There are various solutions to this problem, both in experimental and in observational contexts.
These solutions provide techniques for estimating the ICE and other causal effects, or parameters,
built upon it. My concern here is not with the problems that race might raise for the application
of these estimation techniques.3 It is, rather, with the problems that race allegedly raises for the
very definition of causal effects, and of the ICE in particular.
3 The argument against race being a cause
The argument developed by leading advocates of the CFA against race being a cause can be
reconstructed as follows:
1. Race is a necessary property of units
2. If a unit is of race r, then it is impossible for it to have been of another race r′ (from 1)
3. Counterfactuals of the form ‘Had i been of race r′ instead of r, then. . . ’ cannot be (non-
vacuously) true (from 2).
2I adopt the terminology and notation from (Morgan and Winship, 2007).
3Rubin (1986; 2011) argues that estimating the causal effects of race is difficult enough to warrant its dismissal
as a cause. I agree with Heckman (2005) that arguments of this kind conflate definition and estimation: That it is
difficult to estimate the causal effect of race does not warrant the conclusion that it is not a cause.
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4. The ICE of race is undefined (from 3 and the definition of ICE).
∴ Race is not a cause (from 4).
Let me illustrate this argument. Assume that there are only two races, that D represents race,
and that di = 1 when i is White and di = 0 when i is Black. To say that race is a necessary
property, “immutable characteristic” (Greiner and Rubin, 2011), or “attribute” (Holland, 1986,
955) of units is to say that if di = 1 (resp. 0), then it could not have been the case that di = 0
(resp. 1). Because this is so, counterfactuals of the form ‘Had it been the case that di = 0 instead
of di = 1, then the value of Y
0 for i would have been y0
i
’ cannot be non-vacuously true when di = 1.
Because no such counterfactual can be non-vacuously true, the causal effect of race is undefined,
and this regardless of what effect the variables Y 1 and Y 0 represent (wages, education, etc.).4
In Holland’s words, “attributes of units [like race] are not the types of variables that lend
themselves to plausible states of counterfactuality.” (2003, 14, emphasis original) He adds: “Because
I am a White person, it would be close to ridiculous to ask what would have happened to me had
I been Black.” (ibid.) And because the causal effect of race cannot be defined unless there is a
non-vacuously true answer to such a counterfactual query, Holland concludes that race is not a
cause.
The consequences of this view are important. If race is not a cause, then as Greiner and
Rubin point out, “attempts to infer the causal effects of such traits [as race] are incoherent.” (2011,
775) Holland goes further by claiming that, “Attributing cause to RACE is merely confusing and
unhelpful in an area where scientific study is already difficult” and that, “Obscuring [the topics of
discrimination and bias] with simplistic calculations that do not attend to the proper role of RACE
in a causal study helps no one.” (2003, 24)
So, do the many scientists who treat race as a cause waste time and resources on incoherent
studies that only obscure important topics like racial discrimination? I do not believe so and
develop two objections to the argument against race being a cause.
4 Against the argument against race being a cause
4.1 The argument is invalid
The most straightforward objection to the argument presented in §2 is that its conclusion does not
follow from its premises. The fact that the ICE of race is undefined only entails that race is not a
cause if the following premise is added to the argument:
4′. For all x, if x is a cause, then its ICE is defined.
4The same point applies mutatis mutandis to other causal effects defined in the CFA, e.g. the average causal effect
defined over U as E[Y 1]− E[Y 0]. Because ICE is the fundamental causal effect for the CFA, however, I focus on it
in the present paper.
3
San Diego, CA -541-
If one adds this premise, then the argument is valid. There are good reasons, however, to believe
that this premise is false, i.e. there are good reasons to think that some genuine causes cannot be
handled by the CFA.
Holland himself claims, for instance, that scholastic achievement in primary school cannot be
treated as a cause of the choice of secondary school by the CFA (1986, 955). Setting aside the
question of the justification for this claim, the right conclusion to draw here is not that scholastic
achievement is not a cause of school choice: There are good reasons to think that how well a
student does in primary school has an effect on what secondary school she chooses to attend (e.g.
by determining what schools she’s admitted to). Rather, the conclusion to draw is that some
genuine causes cannot be handled by the CFA, and so that premise 4′ is false.
This conclusion is bolstered by the existence of frameworks for causal inference, e.g. Ragin’s
qualitative comparative analysis framework (1987), that do not rely on counterfactuals to define
causal effects and which can thus treat variables whose ICE is undefined as causes.
4.2 Why believe premise 1?
How do advocates of the CFA justify the claim that race is an attribute, i.e. a necessary property,
of units?5 Their justification for this claim derives entirely from an application of what I will call
‘Holland’s rule’ (or ‘HR’). According to HR,
If the variable could be a treatment in an experiment (even one that might be impossible
to actually pull off due to ethical or practical issues), then the variable is [. . . ] correctly
called a causal variable. (2003, 9, emphasis original)
It is important to note that, for Holland, attributes and causal variables form a partition of the
set of properties of a unit: If a property is not a causal variable, then it is an attribute. Holland
claims that race could not be a treatment in an experiment and, applying HR, he thus concludes
that it is not a causal variable but, rather, an attribute (ibid.).6 Greiner and Rubin agree and
invoke “the impossibility of manipulating such traits [as race] in a way analogous to administering
a treatment in a randomized experiment” (2011, 775) as one of the sources of the incoherence of
studies purporting to estimate the effect of race.
There are two important problems with HR. First, it is the wrong rule for advocates of the
CFA to follow. According to the CFA, for the ICE of D on i to be defined, there must be some
counterfactual state in which i is not exposed to D, assuming that i actually was exposed to D.
5Glymour has objected to Holland that, “If counterparts [in the sense of (Lewis, 1968)] are conceivable – and why
not? – then counterfactuals that violate identity conditions are intelligible, and if counterfactuals are intelligible, then
causal relations are as well.” (Glymour, 1986) Holland, however, can answer this objection by saying that the problem
with attributes is not that they engender counterfactuals which violate identity conditions, but that they engender
counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. In other words, Holland could answer that though counterparts are
conceivable, no counterpart of a White unit can be, e.g., Black. Because race is a necessary property, all counterparts
of a White unit also are White.
6Note that Holland’s argument is fallacious given the way HR is formulated: It denies the antecedent of HR and
infers the negation of its consequent. I’m here adopting a charitable reading according to which it is necessary for a
property of units to be a causal variable that it be a treatment in some possible experiment.
4
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In other words, it must be possible for i not to have been exposed to D. But why think that the
possibility of such a state requires the possibility of an experiment resulting in it being the case that
i is not exposed to D? To hold this view is to hold the implausible view that it is possible that p
only if it is possible for there to be an experiment of the right kind resulting in it being the case that
p. The right slogan for the CFA thus isn’t “No causation without [some hypothetical experimental]
manipulation” (Holland, 1986, 959) but, rather, ‘No causation without counterfactual states’. This
slogan is less catchy but more faithful to the way the CFA defines causal effects (e.g. the ICE).
One might object that HR was intended by Holland not as a strict rule but as a heuristic. It
is true that he prefaces his presentation of HR by saying that, “There is no cut-and-dried rule for
deciding which variables in a study are causal and which are not.” (2003, 9) It should be noted,
however, that despite this caveat, Holland does apply HR as a “cut-and-dried” rule, since he takes
the supposed violation of HR by race to be sufficient to establish the conclusion that race is an
attribute and so cannot be a cause (op. cit., 10). It should also be noted that HR fares no better
as a heuristic rule than it does as a strict rule. I have claimed above that the possibility of an
experiment resulting in i not being exposed to D is not necessary for it to be possible that i is
not exposed to D. If so, however, then there is no reason to take the inconceivability of such an
experiment to be a reliable guide to the impossibility of a state in which i is not exposed to D.
The second issue is that HR is vague – What kinds of experiments are admissible? What does
it mean to say that a variable could be a treatment in an experiment? – and that, as a result, it is
unclear that it is genuinely impossible for there to be an experiment in which race is the treatment.
Indeed, let me argue against this impossibility claim by describing a hypothetical randomized
experiment in which race is the treatment:7 Assume that the race ri of i is a function ri = f(bi, ei)
of biological (bi) and environmental (including social and cultural) factors (ei).
8 Imagine that values
of bi and ei, and thus also of ri, are randomly assigned to embryos 30 days after conception. The
biological factors are assigned via genetic engineering and the environmental factors are assigned
by swapping embryos between mothers.9
This experiment has not been carried out, is morally objectionable, and might be practically
impossible given present science and technology. But this does not mean that this experiment is
impossible. Indeed, the experiment described seems to be nomologically possible, i.e. carrying it out
would not seem to require the violation of any laws of nature. This experiment also clarifies what
the antecedents of counterfactuals of the form ‘Had i been of race r′ instead of r, then. . . ’ claim.
The race of i would have been different just in case i had been randomly assigned a combination
of values of bi and ei giving rise to a value r
′ of ri that differs from its actual value r.
7Note that HR does not require the relevant hypothetical experiments to be randomized. I am offering more than
is required here.
8What the relative weights of bi and ei are is no concern of mine. If you think that race is entirely determined
by biological factors, then give zero weight to ei; and if you think that race is entirely determined by environmental
(including social) factors, then give zero weight to bi.
9Note that this experiment will not work if, among the biological factors represented by bi, are ‘genealogical’
properties of i (e.g. who i’s parents are). Thus, if you think that races are biological groups unified by genealogical
relations (see e.g. Hardimon 2012), then you should think that the experiment described above does not randomly
assign race.
5
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It thus seems that, despite what Holland and Greiner and Rubin assume, it is possible for race
to be a treatment in an experiment, even a randomized experiment, and so it is not the case that
race violates HR. Even if HR was the right rule for advocates of the CFA to follow (a view I have
argued against), then, its application to the case of race would not support the claim that race is
an attribute of units rather than a causal variable, i.e. it would not support premise 1. So, not only
is the argument against race being a cause invalid, as I have argued in §4.1, but its key premise
also lacks proper support.
5 A positive argument for race being a cause: Explaining racial discrimination
Consider an imaginary society in which there are two exclusive and exhaustive racial groups, A
and B. Assume that in this society there is a wage gap between As and Bs: As receive wages
that are uniformly 30% lower than the wages received by Bs occupying equivalent jobs. Assume,
further, that all the units in the population, be they A or B, are perfectly homogeneous regarding
the causes of wages (other than, possibly, race), e.g. they received the same degree from the same
school, they have the same number of years of experience, they have the same IT skills, they have
the same interpersonal skills, they work equally hard, they have the same preferences regarding
wages, etc. Assume, finally, that there is only one employer in this society, and that this employer
fixes the wages of the workers hired.
What is the mechanism generating this wage gap, i.e. what causally explains the fact that As
receive wages that are 30% lower than those of Bs? The seemingly obvious answer is that As
receive lower wages precisely because they are As and because the employer believes that the work
of As is worth 30% less than that of Bs. In other words, what causes As to receive lower wages is
the fact that they are As combined with the fact that the employer believes the work of As to be
worth 30% less than that of Bs.
This commonsensical causal explanation is unavailable to somebody who claims that race is not
a cause. If being an A is not a cause, then being an A cannot, in combination with the employer’s
belief about the worth of the work of As, cause one to receive lower wages. But, then, what causally
explains the wage gap between As and Bs? Let me consider two alternative ways one might answer
this question below.10
The first alternative answer, defended by Holland (2003), consists in claiming that what causally
explains the wage gap is not the racial difference between As and Bs but, rather, the (racially)
discriminatory nature of the society I described. This answer, however, faces an immediate difficulty.
For advocates of the CFA, ‘being discriminatory’ must satisfy HR in order for the discriminatory
nature of society to be a cause of the wage gap. In other words, it must be possible for ‘being
discriminatory’ to be assigned as a treatment to societies in some experiment. Is such an experiment
10I leave aside two implausible solutions: First, the solution which consists in claiming that the wage gap is a brute
fact, i.e. has no causal explanation. Second, the solution which consists in claiming that a society of the kind I’ve
described is impossible, and that As and Bs must differ in some respect other than their race in order for the wage
gap to arise.
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possible?
Holland attempts to justify his claim that it is by describing “a parallel world [. . . ] in which
things are so different that what we recognize in our own world as racial discrimination does not
exist in this other world.” (2003, 16, emphasis original) Though Holland attempts to further flesh
out this “little fantasy” (ibid.), his description falls far short of a precise description of a hypothetical
experiment. He does not specify, for instance, the hypothetical experimental manipulations involved
in making a society discriminatory.11
The claim that ‘being discriminatory’ satisfies HR, and so might be a cause of the wage gap
between As and Bs, thus lacks proper justification while, as I argued in §4.2, there are good reasons
to think that race does satisfy HR. If HR is the right rule for advocates of the CFA to follow, then,
there does not seem to be any good reason to favor Holland’s alternative explanation of the wage
gap over the commonsensical explanation I presented above. And if, as I argued in §4.1, HR is not
the right rule for advocates of the CFA to follow, then one can simply object to Holland that, absent
an account of what it means exactly for a society to be discriminatory, his proposed explanation
is little more than a vague suggestion while the commonsensical explanation given above clearly
identifies a mechanism that is sufficient to generate the wage gap between As and Bs. Whether
HR is the right rule for advocates of the CFA to follow, then, there are good reasons to favor the
commonsensical explanation over Holland’s alternative.
The second alternative answer, defended by Greiner and Rubin (2011), among others, claims
that what causes As to receive lower wages is not their race in combination with the employer’s belief
regarding the worth of their work, but the perception of their race by the employer in combination
with this same belief. There are several problems with this answer. I here examine three.
First, in the imaginary case at hand, it is simple enough to pin down who’s perception it is
that’s relevant to explaining the wage gap, since there is only one employer. But what if there
were many employers, and what if the wages of As were on average, rather than uniformly, 30%
lower than those of Bs? Who’s perception would then be relevant? The collective perception of
all the employers? Or the collective perception of only those employers who falsely believe the
work of As to be worth less than that of Bs? If one is to appeal to perceptions of race to explain
any real wage gap between racial groups, then one needs answers to these questions. Greiner and
Rubin themselves point out the difficulty of answering these questions as one limitation of this
approach (ibid., 783-784). And the problem is more severe even when one considers studies of the
effect of race on education or access to health care: What is the proper interpretation in terms of
perceptions of race of the causal effects estimated by these studies?
Second, if the move to perceptions is legitimate in the case of race, then why not adopt it for
other properties of units? Why not think that perceptions of education or work experience, rather
than education or work experience, are what’s causally relevant to an individual’s wages? The move
from race to perceptions of race seems ad hoc and motivated entirely by the assumption, which I
11It seems that, in order to describe such hypothetical experimental manipulations, one would first have to pin
down what it means for a society to be (racially) discriminatory, something Holland does not do.
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have argued to be mistaken in §4, that race cannot be a cause according to the CFA.
Third, and this is the most pressing problem, what causes the employer in the imaginary society
I have described to perceive A workers to be As? If race is not a cause, then one cannot claim
that the cause at work is the fact that As are of race A. Leaving aside the implausible claim that
perceptions of race are uncaused, the most plausible solution seems to be to claim that what causes
the employer to perceive A workers to be As is the perception of some set of features F the presence
of which is strongly correlated with being a A. This solution faces a dilemma. Either the features
in set F constitute what it is to be an A, in which case being an A is, after all, a cause of the
employer’s perception of As as As. Or the features in F do not constitute what it means to be a
A.
In this latter case, the belief the employer must have in order for the wage gap to appear is not
the belief that the work of As is worth less than that of Bs, but the belief that the work of units
exemplifying features F is worth less than the work of units which do not exemplify these features.
If this is so, then describing the discrimination against As as racial discrimination is inappropriate:
As are discriminated against not on the basis of their race but on the basis of features that happen
to be strongly correlated with being an A. More generally, this solution amounts to denying that
there can be genuinely racial (direct) discrimination, i.e. “differential treatment on the basis of
race that disadvantages a racial group”, as a panel of the US National Research Council defines it
(Blank et al., 2004, 39, emphasis original).
Neither the alternative explanation defended by Holland nor that defended by Greiner and
Rubin thus seem as satisfactory as the commonsensical explanation presented at the beginning of
this section, and which assumes race to be among the causes of the wage gap between As and Bs.
This provides some support for the claim that one needs to assume race to be a cause in order
to explain racial discrimination. Of course, the explanations offered by Holland and Greiner and
Rubin, though they are the most prominent alternatives in the literature (especially the latter), do
not exhaust the space of possible alternatives to the commonsensical explanation of the wage gap.
This is why, in the introduction to this paper, I described the discussion in the present section as
sketching an argument for race being a cause.
6 Conclusion
Are the attempts of labor economists to infer the causal effect of race on, e.g., wages “incoherent”,
as Greiner and Rubin (2011, 775) claim? Is it the case that “Attributing cause to RACE is merely
confusing and unhelpful”, as Holland (2003, 24) maintains? I have here argued that there is no
reason to think these claims to be true.
First, the argument advanced by advocates of the CFA against race being a cause is invalid.
Second, its key premise, that race is an attribute of units, is not justified by the application of
Holland’s rule, a rule that advocates of the CFA should reject anyway. Third, there are good
reasons to think that explaining racial discrimination requires one to treat race as a cause.
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I have said nothing up to now about debates in the philosophy of race. The view defended in
this paper bears on these debates in the following way: Whatever concept of race one thinks is
fit for use by labor economists studying racial discrimination, one’s account of this concept should
imply that races can be causes.
The debate over the causal status of race examined in this paper also gives a useful example
of a case where philosophers of science can, and should, contribute to clarifying the debate and
critically examine the assumption made by the scientists involved. This is what I have tried to do
above.
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Abstract: Debates between contingentists and inevitabilists contest whether the results of 
successful science are contingent or inevitable. This paper addresses lingering ambiguity in the 
way contingency is defined in these debates. I argue that contingency in science can be 
understood as a collection of distinct concepts, distinguished by how they hold science 
contingent, by what elements of science they hold contingent, and by what those elements are 
contingent upon. I present a preliminary taxonomy designed to characterize the full range 
positions available and illustrate that these constitute a diverse array, rather than a spectrum. 
 
1. Introduction 
Ian Hacking, in The Social Construction of What?, asks his readers to assign themselves a 
number from one to five to describe how central contingency is to their personal conceptions of 
science. If you rate yourself at one, then you are a strong inevitabilitst, whereas if you choose 
five, you are highly contingentist and probably have strong constructionist sympathies (Hacking 
1999, 99). In response, Léna Soler questions whether this is the correct approach, and asks: 
“should we introduce degrees of contingentism depending on the kind of contingent factors that 
are supposed to play a role?” (Soler 2008a, 223). 
Herein, I answer Soler’s question in the emphatic affirmative, and therefore the question 
posed in the title with a resounding “no.” Contingency in science can be understood as a 
collection of distinct concepts, distinguished by how they hold science contingent, by what 
elements of science they hold contingent, and by what those elements are contingent upon. What 
separates one contingentist from another is not that one tags herself a two and the other fancies 
himself a five according with how strongly each believes science might have developed
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differently. Their disagreement arises from the fact that they understand contingency-producing 
factors to act differently on different aspects of the scientific process. Contingency is a “what” 
question, not a “how much” question. 
Before beginning this discussion I review the contingentist/inevitabilist (C/I) debate in 
Section 2 by reconstructing positions the debate’s central figures stake out. Ian Hacking, who 
coined the terms “contingentism” and “inevitabilism,” figures centrally. I also discuss several 
scholars who were retrospectively cast as interlocutors in the debate, such as Andrew Pickering, 
Sheldon Glashow, and James Cushing, and those who responded to Hacking directly, namely 
Léna Soler and Howard Sankey. After demonstrating how their conceptions of contingency have 
defined the debate, I argue that the conversation wants for a clear understanding of contingency 
and suggest how this ambiguity might be clarified by more rigorous classification of the concepts 
it groups together. 
Section 3 presents a detailed discussion of the nature of contingency in science, in which 
I outline a fresh taxonomy of the concept. The taxonomy builds on John Beatty’s distinction 
between unpredictability contingency and causal dependence contingency (Beatty 2006). This 
distinction clarifies the debate substantially, but I argue that a second step is required. Further 
decomposing unpredictability contingency and sub-classifying causal dependence contingency—
based on the things within science considered to be contingent and the factors they are presumed 
to be contingent upon—allows more precise characterization of the views under discussion. A 
detailed picture of ways different authors use contingency serves as a basis from which to 
examine how a nuanced account of the concept can clarify some persistent ambiguities in the C/I 
debate. 
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2. Contingency and Inevitability 
Ian Hacking coined “contingentism” and “inevitabilism” in the same book in which he 
hinted that contingency might be understood as a spectrum. Contingency appears as a feature of 
his effort to understand the philosophical stakes of social constructionism. Hacking casts 
contingency as a sticking points between constructionists and their opponents. He identifies the 
constructionist program as seeking to undermine claims about the inevitability of ideas. When 
generalized, according to Hacking, the constructionist argument takes the form “X need not have 
existed, or need not be at all as it is, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not 
inevitable.” It often proceeds to two other more advanced stages, which contend a) that X is bad 
in its current form, and therefore b) should be eliminated or radically altered (Hacking 1999, 6). 
The constructionist program meets irreconcilable opposition from inevitabilists when it claims 
that the results of scientific investigation are contingent, and therefore unconstrained by the 
structure and properties of the natural world. 
Andrew Pickering, author of 1995’s Constructing Quarks, is Hacking’s paradigm 
contingentist. Pickering advanced the view that high energy physics’ Standard Model resulted 
from an exegesis of data, which could have produced any one of numerous, ontologically 
incompatible interpretations. He concludes that physics might have escaped the twentieth century 
quark free, and that if it had, it would not be any less successful (Pickering 1984). Hacking 
interprets this argument in light of later work, The Mangle of Practice (Pickering 1995), wherein 
Pickering argued that scientific consensus arises from negotiation between theory applied to the 
world, theory applied to instruments, and the construction of the instruments themselves to 
develop a robust fit with observed data. The results of science are contingent from this 
perspective because the negotiation could be carried out in any number of ways, each resulting in 
San Diego, CA -551-
  4 
the same degree of self-described success. Pickering’s punch line is that twentieth-century 
physics could have been just as successful if, for example, cyclotrons had not supplanted 
traditional cloud-chamber technology and the resulting theory of the micro-world had not been 
dominated by quarks, which he contends are the peculiar progeny of the particle accelerator. 
Hacking elaborates the inevitabilist stance in “How Inevitable Are the Results of 
Successful Science?,” writing: “We ask: If the results R of a scientific investigation are correct, 
would any investigation of roughly the same subject matter, if successful, at least implicitly 
contain or imply the same results? If so, there is a significant sense in which the results are 
inevitable” (Hacking 2000, 61). Pickering would deny that equal success implies equivalence of 
any sort. By contrast, Hacking casts Sheldon Glashow as arch inevitabilist. Glashow holds that 
any investigation into the natural world starting from reasonable initial assumptions would 
produce not only the same answers, but also a similar set of questions to ask. Glashow imagines 
intelligent aliens as hypothetical scientists whose physical laws should be isomorphic with ours. 
In doing so, Hacking charges, Glashow tacitly makes crucial assumptions about the “reasonable” 
initial conditions necessary for alien science to produce the same results. How do we know, for 
example, that aliens would identify proton structure as an interesting question? Hacking segues 
from Glashow into the difficulties with strong inevitability claims: how stringently can you set 
the initial conditions before the argument dissolves into tautology? If the inevitabilist asserts that 
a successful alternate scientific enterprise will produce the same results by stipulating that 
success requires asking the same questions, using the same instruments to observe the same 
entities, and starting from the same assumptions, then we are left with the trivial observation that 
effectively identical scientific investigations produce effectively identical results (2000, 66). 
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Pickering and Glashow represent extremes; Hacking seeks a middle way. His 
compromise locates contingency at the level of the questions scientists ask. It is contingent, he 
argues, which questions are “live.” Live questions are those that make sense within the 
contemporary theoretical framework. Once science satisfactorily answers a live question we can 
take that result to be inevitable in some meaningful sense, but we have no guarantee that it would 
have been asked in the first place.
1
 Contingency, for Hacking, enters into science by allowing 
historical and socio-cultural factors to define what questions scientists find interesting and what 
questions they are allowed to ask. These questions are not necessarily answerable, and they 
might not make sense in any theory-independent sense, but once nature proves forthcoming with 
an answer, that answer has the tinge of inevitability. Science could have developed differently, 
but only because it could have addressed a different set of questions. Possible alternate results 
are never logically incompatible with current successful science (2000, 71). 
When distinguishing contingency from inevitability, Hacking observes the debate’s 
independence from the realism/anti-realism issue: “the contingency thesis itself is perfectly 
consistent with […] scientific realism, and indeed anti-realists […] might dislike the contingency 
thesis wholeheartedly,” (Hacking 1999, 80). Howard Sankey (2008) maintains the same 
separation between the debates. He defends weak fallibilism, consistent with an inevitabilist 
viewpoint, holding that individual results of science are contingent—individual instances of 
scientific investigation are fallible—but we can be confident that statistically inevitabilist 
tendencies will wash out local contingencies. 
Sankey defends his fallabilist stance’s compatibility with a contingency thesis, which he 
says is an epistemic claim about scientific practice and the way investigators engage with the 
                                                
1
 Hacking does not offer an account of just how scientists can determine when a live question has been adequately 
answered, an issue that is not unproblematic (see Galison 1987). 
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world: “Scientist might collect different evidence from the evidence they in fact do collect. They 
might have developed different instruments and techniques from the ones which have been 
developed and put to use” (Sankey 2008, 259). A geological example, the discovery of 
continental drift, illustrates his point: “The epistemic situation is […] dependent on contingent 
factors such as the availability of evidence and relevant knowledge, the development of 
instrumentation and the provision of research funding” (2008, 262). Sankey’s contingency 
differs from both Pickering’s and Hacking’s. Pickering would not contest that the factors Sankey 
identifies are contingent, but he would compile a list of additional contingencies much longer 
than Sankey would admit. Hacking argues for contingency of form rather than content of 
science: difference without incompatibility. Sankey points to the empirical content of science as 
contingent. These perspectives are not incompatible, but they have different emphases—Sankey 
focuses on evidence, Hacking on inquiry. 
Sankey subtly contrasts James Cushing, who argues that contingency has an 
“ineliminable role in the construction and selection of a successful scientific theory from among 
its observationally equivalent and unrefuted competitors” (Cushing 1994, xi). Cushing uses 
“theory” equivocally, as his prime example is the choice between Bohr’s and Bohm’s 
interpretations of quantum mechanics, which can be construed as competing window dressings 
of the theory of quantum mechanics rather than as theories themselves. Quibbling aside, Cushing 
argues that choices between observationally equivalent theories are contingent. He does not 
claim that such choices are irrational, but that they are guided by philosophical and other external 
criteria. In the case of Bohm versus Bohr, the interpretive question hinges on whether one 
abandons strict determinacy or strict locality in the quantum realm. Evidence suggests that either 
particles in quantum states, obeying the probabilities assigned by their wave functions, assume 
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classically observable values for their key properties—charge, spin etc.—during an observation 
event, or some “hidden variables” determine these properties, but instantaneous signaling across 
finite distances is permitted. The first violates an ingrained philosophical preference for 
deterministic processes in physics, while the second flaunts a tradition of skepticism about 
instantaneous action at a distance. Cushing’s view, exemplified by the claim that the Bohmian 
view’s defeat at the hands of Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation was contingent, involves no 
change in the empirical content of the theories in question. Nor does Cushingtonian contingency 
act on the data collection process—the crux of Sankey’s argument. 
Most who deploy contingency do so in pursuit of goals other than defining it. Sankey 
wants to show the independence of the C/I debate from discussions of realism. Léna Soler 
identifies this argument as a premature, writing: “the ‘contingentism versus inevitabilism’ 
contrast does not exist as an autonomous, well identified issue of significance,” (Soler 2008b, 
232). On the basis of this ambiguity she sets out to clarify the issue, employing a thought 
experiment involving two, isolated communities of physicists, starting with the same initial 
conditions, asking their own questions, unguided by the work of the other scientists:  
Human beings might have succeeded in developing a physics as successful and 
progressive as ours, and yet asked completely different physical questions from the ones 
that have actually been asked, with the result that the accepted answers—in other words 
the content of the accepted physical theories and experimentally established physical 
facts—would be at the same time robust and different from ours. (2008b, 232) 
 
Any non-trivial contingency, Soler contends, requires that two isolated scientific communities 
starting from the same point produce “irreducibly different” results, while still satisfying a 
reasonable set of criteria for success (2008b, 232). 
Soler’s contingency involves deep and irreconcilable oppositions between competing 
physical theories. Given the constancy of the initial conditions in Soler’s thought experiment, it 
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tests only whether science is contingent irrespective of the initial conditions, and does not 
consider to what extent science might be contingent upon antecedent conditions.
2
 Soler’s thought 
experiment does not assess the relative contributions of contingency to the collection of internal 
and external factors that influence the trajectory of science. 
Each scholar mentioned here questions how science might be contingent. In doing so, 
each employs a different understanding of what contingency means and at what point the claim 
becomes meaningful. They cast contingency in a qualitatively different ways rather than with 
differing intensities, representing diversity of kind, not of degree: 
Hacking: It is contingent what questions scientists decide are interesting. 
Pickering: It is contingent what ontological entities scientists claim to find in the natural 
world. 
Glashow: The theoretical structure of science is not contingent. 
Sankey: It is contingent what instruments and techniques are available to scientists. 
Cushing: It is contingent how scientists arbitrate between empirically equivalent 
theories. 
Soler: Science is contingent only if it has available at least two equally successful, but 
irreducibly different paths from any given starting point. 
A smooth scale of contingentism cannot capture their differences, even superficially. The next 
section systematizes the diversity of views sheltered within the contingency concept. 
 
3. Taxonomizing Contingency 
3.1. A Preliminary Distinction 
                                                
2
 Here I implicitly distinguish “contingent per se” from “contingent upon,” borrowing from Beatty (2006). See 
Section 3 below for a more thoroughgoing discussion. 
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Contingency is a wildly diverse concept. How can we refine our understanding of 
contingency so it can be applied with less ambiguity? John Beatty offers a crucial distinction 
between “contingent per se” and “contingent upon” (Beatty 2006). “Per se” contingency 
describes stochasticity in the historical process; it implies that the process of history itself is 
unpredictable. “Upon” contingency requires no unpredictability, but rather describes a historical 
process that is far from robust with respect initial conditions, indicating that outcomes have a 
measure of causal dependence on the relevant antecedent factors. Any change in initial 
conditions could lead to a different outcome, even if the outcome of the process is, in principle, 
predictable from any given set of initial conditions.  
In drawing this distinction, Beatty invokes Stephen J. Gould’s thought experiment: restart 
the story of evolution from the Cambrian explosion, and ask if “replaying the tape” in this way 
directs the history of life down a different path (Gould 1989). Gould argues that evolution is 
highly contingent, and the rerun would differ dramatically from the initial broadcast. As Beatty 
observes, Gould alternates between the unpredictability and causal dependence senses of 
contingency. Beatty argues that these two conceptions are compatible, but have different 
consequences for our understanding of the historical process. 
How should recognizing the distinction between these two varieties of contingency 
inform the C/I debate? Take Pickering: his 1984 claim that physics might have proceeded in a 
direction that did not include quarks is an unpredictability claim about scientific knowledge. He 
holds there that scientific knowledge is contingent per se. His view as reinterpreted by Hacking 
is an “upon” contingency claim. If the response to new data is a negotiation between existing 
theories, auxiliary theories about instruments, and the instruments themselves, then the 
consequent theory is contingent upon each of those three factors. In the second version of the 
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argument, Pickering’s stance gets its bite from the factors it identifies as causally relevant rather 
than from the unpredictability of the scientific process. 
Hacking, Soler, and Sankey, all observe that even the strongest inevitabilist admits that a 
benign form of historical contingency shapes the course of science. The Bragg family might have 
gone into sheep shearing rather than physics, and the resulting disturbance in the development of 
x-ray crystallography would likely have substantially altered the story of the discovery of DNA’s 
structure. The Cold War might have dragged on a few years longer, the United States Congress 
might have been friendlier towards basic research expenditures, the Superconducting Super 
Collider might have been built, and high energy physicists might no longer be looking for the 
Higgs boson. In Beatty’s language, inevitabilists are happy with the claim that scientific 
knowledge is contingent upon some historical factors, while denying the stronger claim that it is 
contingent per se. 
Beatty’s distinction substantially clarifies disagreements between inevitabilists and 
contingentists. They do not disagree about the extent to which scientific knowledge is contingent; 
they disagree about what kind of contingency influences the scientific process. Contingentists, as 
described by Hacking, admit both unpredictability and causal dependence contingency, while 
inevitabilists see no trouble from some types of causal dependence contingency, but draw the 
line at its more consequential sibling. This distinction does not exhaust the possible positions in 
the contingency debate. It demonstrates that Hacking’s method of rating contingency on a 
spectrum inadequately describes the commitments involved, but it only begins to capture the full 
range contingency claims available. Those who allow causal dependence contingency might 
have reasonable disagreements about what aspects of science are subject to contingency claims 
and what science can be reasonably said to be contingent upon. 
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3.2. Towards a Taxonomy of Contingency 
Each of Beatty’s categories might be decomposed further. First, consider unpredictability 
contingency. Beatty defines it as the belief that “the occurrence of a particular prior state is 
insufficient to bring about a particular outcome,” (Beatty 2006, 339). It appears that the 
unpredictability contingentist makes a strong metaphysical claim about the historical process: it 
is indeterministic. Indeed, Gould does appear to be making such indeterminacy claims. Should 
we replay the exact same tape of life from the exact same initial conditions and get a different 
result, then the process by which life develops exhibits intrinsic stochasticity. 
Indeterminacy is not, however, the only way to understand per se contingency. Beatty 
observes that contingency is the lynchpin of Gould’s argument that selection should not be the 
only causal agent evolutionary biologists invoke to explain the features and behaviors of present-
day organisms (see Gould and Lewontin 1979). This suggests that unpredictability, as applied to 
contingency, can be understood as a methodological argument. This weaker understanding 
would suggest that outcomes are contingent (per se) with respect to some specified set of causal 
factors. It does not rule out the ability of other causal factors to provide an exhaustive, 
deterministic explanation. In fact, it often suggests such factors. Such is Gould’s case against 
what he calls pan-selectionism—the assumption that selection can be invoked to explain any 
feature of an organism. The weaker version of unpredictability contingency he employs suggests 
that the features of organisms are contingent (unpredictable) with respect to selection effects. 
Such a view is consistent with deterministic evolution; it merely implies that factors other than 
selection are partly responsible. 
The strong version of unpredictability contingency, which we might call indeterminist 
contingency, implies randomness in the historical process. The weaker version, incompleteness 
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contingency, claims that some set of causal factors is inadequate offer a complete explanation of 
the historical process, and that outcomes are unpredictable with respect to that set of factors. 
These two forms do different types of philosophical work. Indeterminist contingency says 
something about how the world is. Incompleteness contingency brands a set of explanatory tools 
inadequate, and so depends on the state of scientific practice and must refer to established 
explanatory orthodoxy. 
Causal-dependence contingency is a more complicated case than unpredictability because 
the objects of “upon” might be expounded ad nauseam. The first step towards a classification 
requires identifying suitably distinct parts of science that might be held contingent. Science, like 
contingency, is heterogeneous and the claim that science is contingent can mean different things 
depending on what parts of science that claim specifies. Science makes ontological claims, 
formulates methodological procedures, develops models, adopts interpretations, and builds 
communities. Causal dependence contingency can be initially differentiated based on which of 
these many aspects of science are claimed contingent. I propose five categories: 
(1) Trivial contingency – Science is part of a historical process, and so is contingent in 
the same way human history is contingent. This weak claim covers individual 
scientists and the details of their everyday existences. 
All non-Laplacian parties are happy to admit this form of contingency. A claim that 
science is contingent in the trivial sense, however, offers the hard-boiled contingentist little 
succor. Trivial contingency is agnostic about the aspects of science that are typically of interest 
to philosophers, and so has little bearing on the debate. This type of contingency is frequently 
invoked to argue that contingency need not be repugnant to the sophisticated inevitabilist. 
Sankey, for instance, argues that continental drift did not gain traction within the geology 
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community until the 1950s and 1960s, when the U.S. Department of Naval Research began 
funding ocean floor research to bolster its submarine program (Sankey 2008, 262). Naturally, if 
the research had not been funded, and had not been conducted, the trajectory taken by the science 
would have been different, but this does not bear on the claim that successful science should pass 
through stages resembling ours. Trivial contingency alters the route science takes, but remains 
silent about its destination. 
(2) Sociocultural contingency – The social structures that constitute scientific activity 
and science’s interaction with culture are contingent. 
At first glance this slightly stronger form of contingency might seem similarly innocuous. 
Like trivial contingency, it is agnostic about the content of science, acting instead on institutions, 
disciplines, communities, political relationships, and laboratory cultures. It is more complicated 
than trivial contingency, however, because it is the point where some strong contingentists dig in 
their heels. Forms of contingency that cut closer to the bone (see below) often rest on social 
determinism. A contingentist claiming that theoretical entities are contingent upon (causally 
determined by) social structures might want to deny that those social structures are themselves 
contingent. Similarly, inevitabilists might flinch when sociocultural contingency is used in 
conjunction with a stronger form, as in, for example, the controversial Forman thesis, which 
asserts that quantum indeterminacy was contingent upon the distinctive social conditions of the 
Weimar Republic (Forman 1971). 
(3) Methodological contingency – The way in which we do science might have been 
different. This moderately weak variety holds experimental and theoretical 
techniques, laboratory practice, instruments, apparatus, and heuristic devices 
contingent. 
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Contingency claims frequently target the way science functions. Sankey approximates 
this version of contingency when he describes evidence collection and instrumentation as sources 
of contingency and claims that the development of plate tectonics could only come about when 
specific instrumentation came into common use (Sankey 2008). Many historical studies have 
examined how tool selection influences the way theories develop. The literature on model 
organisms is an obvious example. Robert Kohler’s Lords of the Fly contends that the choice of 
drosophila melanogaster as the model organism for experimental genetics shaped the field’s 
development (Kohler 1994). Experimental apparatus influences the collection, packaging, and 
inflection of data, while the available mathematics, heuristics, and analogies guide how that data 
is analyzed. This type of contingency is not trivial, but it does not directly imply 
incompatibilities between existing science and science that might have proceeded with different 
experimental or analytical tools. As with sociocultural contingency it can be combined with more 
potent forms. 
(4) Interpretive contingency – The way in which we expound data in order to fill 
theoretical gaps is contingent. 
Understanding theoretical implications requires interpreting data. Data, even if they 
motivate a particular theory, often do not compel one interpretation of that theory. Take 
Cushing’s claim about the contingency of the Copenhagen interpretation: Quantum mechanics 
allows multiple logically consistent interpretations of what happens when quantum systems are 
observed. Building a satisfying ontological explanation requires physicists to interpret 
measurements that, by the very nature of the theory, do not provide the whole story. Given this 
necessary appeal to factors other than data, the interpretation we choose is contingent upon the 
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context in which the theory emerges, and an alternate interpretation might well have emerged 
given different conditions (Cushing 1994). 
(5) Theoretical contingency – This is the strongest form of contingency. In the 
constructionist mold, it holds that scientific theories themselves and the claims they 
make about the world, are contingent. 
This form postulates deep incompatibility between two possible scientific trajectories. 
While theoretical contingency can be parsed in “upon” syntax, it approximates a per se claim. 
The main difference between theoretical contingency and the in-principle unpredictability of 
scientific results is the frequent postulation by its advocates of a causal arrow from specific 
historical or cultural factors to theories. Forman’s argument that cultural instability in the 
Weimar Republic compelled physicists to accept indeterminacy, for instance, makes quantum 
mechanics’ ontological claims contingent upon the Weimar cultural environment (Forman 1971). 
This is not the same as describing science as unpredictable, but the factors on which it is 
contingent make the claim equivalent with the incompleteness contingency claim that science is 
unpredictable from internal factors alone. The per se claim and the theoretical contingency claim 
often go hand in hand, as the argument often holds that theoretical contingency works because 
theory is either almost infinitely malleable (indeterminist), and/or subject to pressures that are 
currently underappreciated (incompleteness). 
It might appear that this constitutes a spectrum given a description beginning with 
“trivial” and graduating into increasingly more serious claims, but the relationships between the 
elements are not so straightforward. Trivial contingency does not require a commitment to any of 
the other four, and theoretical contingency often implies several of the others a fortiori, but 
middle-of-the-road contingency claims cannot be so easily ranked. It would be consistent to hold 
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an inevitabilist stance about methodology, arguing that mature science motivates an optimal 
form of investigation and modeling, while maintaining interpretive contingency. It would be 
equally consistent to be inevitabilist about interpretation while contingentist about methodology. 
These examples elucidate why contingency is a “what sort” question as opposed to a “how 
much” question. If I claim that one part of the scientific process is contingent while holding that 
another is not, that does not make me more or less contingent than I would be if I held the 
inverse view. 
The categories above provide only half the picture. To complete the taxonomy a second 
layer is required. Distinctions based on what parts of science are contingent are critical, but we 
can also, invoking Beatty, draw further distinctions based on what they consider those factors to 
be contingent upon. Thus, while two people might agree that the methodological components of 
science are contingent, they might also disagree substantively about the factors upon which 
methodology is contingent. The factors upon which science, in all its aspects, might be 
contingent map onto the aspects that can themselves be held contingent: everyday events, 
sociocultural contexts, methods, interpretations, theories. 
 
4. Summary 
I have argued that the debate between contingentists and inevitabilists can be recast as an 
array of positions that directly oppose one another only over a small range of their total 
implications. Within the framework provided by Beatty, I have decomposed contingency into 
seven types, two under unpredictability and five under causal dependence. Each of these latter 
five might be further decomposed based on the “upon” relation of the contingency in question. 
These views of contingency can be held alone or in conjunction with others, and each 
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combination constitutes a distinct position, which carries different assumptions about how 
science engages with the natural world. 
Statements that science is contingent or inevitable are cumbersome when not identifying 
the area of science on which that property acts and specifying how that property operates within 
it. Science might be interpretively contingent without being methodologically contingent. It 
might be both without being theoretically contingent. Many processes play a role in the 
production of scientific knowledge. Contingency may enter through many doors; it will adopt a 
different character, with different consequences, when entering through each. The framework I 
have outlined demonstrates how science can be considered contingent and inevitable in 
qualitatively different ways and exposes assumptions about the causal structure of the scientific 
process that would otherwise remain implicit. 
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Reconsidering the Argument from Underconsideration1 
Moti Mizrahi 
St. John’s University 
Abstract 
According to the argument from underconsideration, since theory evaluation is comparative, and 
since scientists do not have good reasons to believe that they are epistemically privileged, it is 
unlikely that our best theories are true. In this paper, I examine two formulations of this 
argument, one based on van Fraassen’s “bad lot” premise and another based on what Lipton 
called the “no-privilege” premise. I consider several moves that scientific realists might make in 
response to these arguments. I then offer a revised argument that is a middle ground between 
realism and anti-realism, or so I argue. 
Keywords 
anti-realism, argument from underconsideration, bad lot, epistemic privilege, scientific realism 
1. Introduction 
The argument from underconsideration is advanced by anti-realists as an argument against 
scientific realism. According to this argument, it is unlikely that our best scientific theories are 
true, since theory evaluation is comparative, and since scientists have no good reasons to believe 
they are selecting from a set of theories that contains a true theory. As Lipton (1993, 89) points 
out, this argument has two premises. The first is the ranking premise, which states that theory 
testing yields comparative warrant. As Lipton (1993, 89) puts it: “testing enables scientists to say 
which of the competing theories they have generated is likeliest to be correct, but does not itself 
reveal how likely the likeliest theory is.” 
The second is the no-privilege premise, which states that “scientists have no reason to 
suppose that the process by which they generate theories for testing makes it likely that a true 
theory will be among those generated” (Lipton 1993, 89). From these two premises, anti-realists 
conclude that, “while the best of the generated theories may be true, scientists can never have 
good reason to believe this” (Lipton 1993, 89). In other words, although they might have good 
reasons to believe that they have selected the theory that is likeliest to be true from a set of 
competing theories, scientists have no good reason to believe that any of the competing theories 
is likely true. The argument from underconsideration is thus aimed against the epistemic thesis of 
scientific realisms, which is the claim that “Mature and predictively successful scientific theories 
are well-confirmed and approximately true of the world. So, the entities posited by them, or, at 
any rate, entities very similar to those posited, inhabit the world” (Psillos 1999, xix). 
In what follows, I examine two formulations of this argument, one based on van 
Fraassen’s “bad lot” premise and another based on the “no-privilege” premise. I consider several 
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moves that scientific realists might make in response to these arguments. I then offer a revised 
argument that is a middle ground between realism and anti-realism, or so I argue. 
2. The Bad Lot Premise 
According to van Fraassen (1989, 149), scientists may be choosing the best theory of a bad lot. 
Following Wray’s (2010) recent discussion of the argument, van Fraassen’s “bad lot” version of 
the argument can be stated as follows: 
(F1) In evaluating theories scientists merely rank the competitors comparatively. [The 
Ranking Premise] 
(F2) There is no reason to suppose that a true theory will be among the theories 
evaluated. [The Bad Lot Premise] 
(F3) Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the theory that is judged to be 
superior is likely true. 
Accordingly, anti-realists claim that there is no reason to suppose that the set of theories to be 
evaluated contains a true theory. In reply, realists might wonder: why do we need to suppose that? 
Isn’t that what theory testing is all about? Realists might argue that we don’t need a reason to 
think that the set of competing theories contains a true theory before we begin testing. For 
realists, the testing itself will separate the good theories, if there are any, from the bad ones. If all 
the theories in the set fail their tests, then it is a bad lot. But if at least one theory passes its tests, 
then it is not a bad lot after all. 
To see why (F2) might seem odd to scientific realists, consider the following analogous 
argument: 
(T1) In evaluating contestants on talent shows, judges merely rank the contestants 
comparatively.2 
(T2) There is no reason to suppose that a talented person will be among the contestants 
evaluated. 
(T3) Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the person that is judged to be the 
winner is likely talented. 
Premise (T2) seems rather odd. We do not need to suppose that a talented person is among the 
contestants. That is what the competition is all about. The competition is supposed to separate 
the talented from the untalented and weed out the untalented. Like in the case of theory testing, 
the criterion of selection has to do with success. That is to say, the judges assume that 
performing excellently on a consistent basis, under the strict conditions of a competition, is a 
reliable indicator of talent. Again, like in the case of theory testing, if all the contestants fail to 
perform excellently on a consistent basis throughout the competition, then the lot of contestants 
is probably a bad one. In any case, it is the competition that will separate the talented from the 
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untalented. Similarly, realists would argue, it is experimental and observational testing that will 
separate the (approximately) true theories from the false ones. 
3. The No-Privilege Premise 
More recently, Wray (2010) has proposed a revised version of van Fraassen’s “bad lot” argument, 
which was labeled the argument from underconsideration by Lipton (1993). According to Wray 
(2010, 3), anti-realists argue as follows: 
(W1) In evaluating theories scientists merely rank the competitors comparatively. [The 
Ranking Premise] 
(W2) Scientists are not epistemically privileged, that is, they are not especially prone to 
develop theories that are true with respect to what they say about unobservable 
entities and processes. [The No-Privilege Premise] 
(W3) Hence, we have little reason to believe that the theory that is judged to be superior 
is likely true. 
In response, realists might complain that the no-privilege premise, i.e., (W2), which talks about 
“epistemic privilege” and scientists being “especially prone,” makes it sound as if scientists have 
a special gift of some sort. But, realists would argue, that is a rather strange way of talking about 
science. Coming up with good explanations for natural phenomena is a complex human endeavor 
that involves many factors, having to do with talent, skills, diligence, training, and so on. In 
addition to the human aspect of theory generation, there is also a methodological aspect 
involving observation instruments, experimentation techniques, patterns of inference, etc. The 
no-privilege premise—(W2)—seems to assume that these aspects of theory generation do not 
change and that scientists never get better at what they do. 
To see why (W2) might seem odd to scientific realists, consider the following analogous 
argument: 
(B1) In evaluating desserts, chefs merely rank the competitors comparatively. 
(B2) Chefs are not “culinarily privileged,” i.e., they are not especially prone to make 
desserts that are delicious. 
(B3) Therefore, we have little reason to believe that the dessert that is judged to be 
superior is likely delicious. 
Premise (B2) seems rather odd. To say that chefs are “culinarily privileged” seems like a strange 
way of talking about the culinary arts. Chefs get better at making desserts through training and 
practice. Similarly, realists might argue, scientists get better at developing theories through 
training and practice. For realists, there is nothing mysterious about “epistemic privilege” going 
on here. So realists would find (W2) odd for the same reasons that (B2) seems odd. 
In reply, anti-realists could appeal to the pessimistic induction. Wray (2010, 6) writes that 
the “no-privilege thesis […] asks us to acknowledge the similarities between contemporary 
scientists and their predecessors.” He quotes Mary Hesse who argues that the support for the no-
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privilege premise comes from an “induction from the history of science.” Wray also points out in 
a footnote that “this is a pessimistic induction of the sort that Laudan (1984) develops.” For 
realists, however, the problem with the pessimistic induction is that it overemphasizes the 
similarities and underemphasizes the dissimilarities between contemporary theories and their 
predecessors. Similarly, realists might argue, the problem with Wray’s formulation of the 
argument from underconsideration is that it overemphasizes the similarities and underemphasizes 
the dissimilarities between contemporary scientists and their predecessors. As Bird (2007, 80) 
puts it: 
The falsity of earlier theories is the very reason for developing the new ones—with a 
view to avoiding that falsity. It would be folly to argue that because no man has run 100 
m in under 9.5 seconds no man ever will. On the contrary, improvements in times spur on 
other competitors, encourage improvements in training techniques and so forth, that make 
a sub 9.5 second 100 m quite a high probability in the near future. The analogy is 
imperfect, but sufficiently close to cast doubt on Laudan’s pessimistic inference. Later 
scientific theories are not invented independently of the successes and failures of their 
predecessors. New theories avoid the pitfalls of their falsified predecessors and seek to 
incorporate their successes. 
Likewise, Lipton (2000, 197) argues that we cannot infer “future theories are likely to be false” 
from “past theories turned out to be false” by induction because of the “Darwinian” evolution of 
theories. A similar point, realists might argue, applies to scientists as well. Contemporary 
scientists learn from their predecessors and they seek to avoid their predecessors’ mistakes. 
Furthermore, contemporary scientists have access to instruments and technologies that were not 
available to their predecessors. For realists, these aspects of scientific change make a difference 
insofar as the ability of scientists to select theories that are (approximately) true is concerned. 
4. Truth vs. Approximate Truth 
To this anti-realists might object that the analogous arguments sketched above fail to show that 
(W2) and (T2) should be rejected, for deliciousness and being talented, which are supposed to be 
traits analogous to truth, are not analogues to truth at all. Deliciousness and being talented are 
relative qualities. For example, in the case of deliciousness, whatever cakes we have in a 
particular lot, we can always imagine being led to consider one of the cakes as delicious, 
especially if we never tasted a better cake before. But truth is not a relative quality, the objection 
continues. Propositions are categorically true or false. 
In reply, realists might concede that propositions are categorically true or false. However, 
they might insist that, strictly speaking, only singular propositions can be true or false (Kvanvig 
2003, 191), and since theories (whatever they are) are not singular propositions, they cannot be 
said to be true or false. Accordingly, a theory, expressed as a set of propositions, can have true 
and/or false propositions as its parts. However, realists might protest, it seems that anti-realists 
assume that even one false proposition taints a whole theory. For instance, Kitcher points out that 
the pessimistic induction assumes this kind of implicit holism about theories. As Kitcher (2002, 
388) writes: 
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We are invited to think of whole theories as the proper objects of knowledge, and thus, 
because the theory, taken as a whole, turns out to be false, we have the basis for a 
“pessimistic induction.” It doesn’t follow from the fact that a past theory isn’t completely 
true that every part of that theory is false (emphasis added). 
Since only singular propositions can be true or false, and since theories are not singular 
propositions, it follows that, strictly speaking, whole theories cannot be true or false (Cf. Kitcher 
1993, 118). 
By way of illustration, consider the following example, which is adapted from Leplin 
(1997, 133). Suppose that there is a power outage in my house. Upon looking outside my 
window, I see a utility truck parked nearby and some workers digging in the yard. Since I made a 
call to the phone company earlier about a problem with my phone line, I infer that telephone 
repairmen, who have responded to my earlier call, inadvertently cut the power line to my house. 
Unbeknownst to me, however, it is not telephone repairmen who have cut the power line but 
cable repairmen whom I had not expected. Now, if we take this “theory,” i.e., that there is a 
power outage in my house because telephone repairmen have inadvertently cut the power line to 
my house, as a monolithic whole, then it is strictly false. However, this theory involves several 
claims, some are true and some are false. On the one hand, it is not the case that telephone 
repairmen working in the backyard have inadvertently cut the power line. On the other hand, it is 
true that repairmen working in the backyard have inadvertently cut the power line. I may not 
know the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about this state of affairs. But I do 
know some parts about it, and those parts are themselves true. 
Consider another example from the history of science. In his An Inquiry into the Causes 
and Effects of the Variolae Vaccinae (1798), Edward Jenner argues that cowpox originated as 
grease, a disease common in horses. He claims that it was transmitted to cows when horse 
handlers helped with milking on occasion. In addition, Jenner (1800, 7) claims not only that 
cowpox protected against smallpox but also that “what renders the Cow Pox virus so extremely 
singular, is, that the person who has been thus affected is for ever after secure from the infection 
of the Small Pox.” 
Now, if we take the entire Inquiry as Jenner’s “theory,” then it is strictly false as a whole. 
He was wrong about grease being the origin of cowpox. He mistakenly took horsepox for grease, 
and there was no intermediate passage through cows either. Even though he got some things 
wrong, he was right about others. His hypothesis, properly construed, is correct. While it is not 
the case that vaccination provides lifelong protection, as Jenner thought, it is the case that 
repeated vaccination, properly done, contributes to the control of smallpox. Indeed, Jenner paved 
the way for this knowledge, and the know-how for selection of correct material for vaccination, 
with his distinction between true and spurious cowpox. Nowadays, pseudocowpox (milker’s 
nodes) is recognized as a type of spurious cowpox (Baxby 1999). According to the World Health 
Organization, “Publication of the Inquiry and the subsequent promulgation by Jenner of the idea 
of vaccination with a virus other than variola virus constituted a watershed in the control of 
smallpox, for which he more than anyone else deserves the credit” (Fenner, et al. 1988, 264). 
Another example is Paul Ehrlich’s side-chain theory of antibody formation. Ehrlich 
proposed that harmful compounds can mimic nutrients for which cells express specific receptors. 
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However, he considered these receptors to be on all cell types. He also did not realize that there 
are specialized producer cells, such as B lymphocytes. He thought of the entire spectrum of 
receptors as a single cell because he considered their main task as the uptake of different 
nutrients. These are parts of Ehrlich’s side-chain theory that turned out to be incorrect. It does 
not follow, however, that the entire theory is wrong. Despite these errors, the theory is based on a 
correct principle, which is that “specific receptors on cells interact with foreign material in a 
highly specific way, and this triggers their increased production and release from the cell surface 
so that they can inactivate foreign material as antibodies” (Kaufmann 2008, 707). 
If this is correct, then it seems that we should abandon talk of whole theories as being 
true or false. Instead, we should talk about theoretical claims as being true or false. Indeed, Wray 
seems to acknowledge this point. Wray (2008, 323) writes: 
For the sake of clarity, let me call H1 the Tychonic hypothesis, rather than the Tychonic 
theory. After all, the Tychonic theory includes an array of other claims (emphasis added). 
And, more recently, Wray (2010, 6) writes: 
But our theories, consisting of many theoretical claims, that is, a conjunction of 
numerous theoretical claims, are most likely false (original emphasis). 
If this is correct, then we can distinguish between truth and approximate truth. Articulating a 
precise notion of approximate truth is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, on most 
accounts of approximate truth, this notion is cashed out in terms of a theory being close to the 
truth. Hence, to say that T is approximately true is to say that T is close to the truth.3 How do we 
know that T is close to the truth? Well, realists would argue, we test it. But anti-realists would 
insist that theory evaluation is comparative. So when we test theories, we compare them. From a 
set of competing theories, if one theory T passes the tests, then that is a reason to believe that T is 
closer to that truth than its competitors. If this is correct, then approximate truth, which is a 
property of theories, is not like truth, which is a property of propositions, insofar as the former is 
relative, whereas the latter is categorical. 
To sum up, then, truth is a property of propositions, since only propositions can be 
categorically true, whereas approximate truth is a relation between theories, since a theory can be 
closer to the truth only relative to its competitors. Some might object, however, that theories, 
expressed as sets of propositions, are simply conjunctions, and conjunctions are categorically 
truth or false. In reply, I would argue that the truth/approximate truth distinction is analogous to 
the logical distinction between truth and validity. In logic courses, we teach our students that 
deductive arguments can be valid or invalid, but not true or false. Even though, in principle, a 
deductive argument can be expressed as a conditional (i.e., if the premises are true, then the 
conclusion must be true), which is categorically true or false. In logic, we reserve the terms ‘true’ 
and ‘false’ to premises and conclusions, and the terms ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ to arguments to 
capture the difference between truth as a property of propositions and validity as a relation 
between propositions (more specifically, a relation between premises and a conclusion). 
Similarly, I submit, we should reserve the term ‘true’ to theoretical claims, which are singular 
                                                          
3
 See, e.g., Leplin (1981), Boyd (1990), Weston (1992), Smith (1998), and Chakravartty (2010). 
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propositions that can be categorically true or false, and the term ‘approximately true’ to theories, 
which is a relation between theories, even though, in principle, theories can be expressed as 
conjunctions. 
5. A Middle-Ground Argument 
In Section 3, I have said that realists might find the no-privilege premise—(W2)—in Wray’s 
version of the argument from underconsideration rather odd, since it seems to assume that 
scientists never get better at theory generation. However, anti-realists might object to that and 
argue that scientists do get better at theory generation, but they never become good enough such 
that it is reasonable to believe that their theories are likely true. It seems to me that anti-realists 
would be correct in arguing that there may not be good reasons to believe that scientists become 
good enough such that it is reasonable to believe that their theories are likely true. For one thing, 
the logical space of possible theories is so vast that it seems rather unlikely that scientists would 
stumble on those competing theories that are closest to the truth. However, I think that anti-
realists are wrong in concluding from this that there are no good reasons to believe that certain 
theories are closer to the truth than others. In this section, then, I will try to carve out a middle 
ground between realism and anti-realism. 
If the aforementioned considerations are correct, then I think it is safe to say that the 
following claims are true: 
(1) Theoretical claims, expressed as singular propositions, can be categorically true or 
false. 
(2) Theories, expressed as sets of propositions, have theoretical claims as their parts. 
(3) Scientific theories can be said to be approximately true (i.e., T1 is closer to the truth 
than T2). 
(4) Theory evaluation is comparative (i.e., to say that T is approximately true is to say 
that T is closer to the truth than its competitors). 
If these claims are indeed true, as I have argued above, then I think that the following argument 
can be made, which is a middle ground between scientific realism and anti-realism: 
(R1) In evaluating theories, scientists rank the competitors comparatively. [The 
Ranking Premise]. 
(R2) If scientists rank competing theories comparatively, then they can only make 
comparative judgments about competing theories, not absolute judgments (i.e., T1 
is likely true). 
(R3) Hence, scientists can only make comparative judgments about competing theories, 
not absolute judgments (i.e., T1 is likely true). 
(R4) If ‘approximate truth’ (closeness to the truth) is a relation between theories, then 
to make comparative judgments about competing theories is to say that a theory is 
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closer to the truth than its competitors (i.e., T1 is closer to the truth than T2, T3,…, 
Tn). 
(R5) ‘Approximate truth’ (closeness to the truth) is a relation between theories, not a 
property of theoretical claims. 
(R6) Hence, to make comparative judgments about competing theories is to say that a 
theory is closer to the truth than its competitors (i.e., T1 is closer to the truth than 
T2, T3,…, Tn). 
(R7) If the logical space of possible theories is vast, then there are no good reasons to 
believe that scientists have stumbled upon competing theories that are closest to 
the truth. 
(R8) The logical space of possible theories is vast. 
(R9) Therefore, there are no good reasons to believe that scientists have stumbled upon 
competing theories that are closest to the truth. 
The upshot of this argument is that theory evaluation can give us reasons to believe that a theory 
is approximately true (i.e., that T1 is closer to the truth than T2, T3,…, Tn) but it cannot give us 
reasons to believe that a theory is closest to the truth (i.e., that T1 is likely true). For example, if 
scientists evaluate T2 and T3 by observational and experimental testing, they could reasonably 
make the comparative judgment that T3 is closer to the truth than T2 (Figure 1). However, a 
theory can be closer to the truth relative to its competitors but still be quite far off from the truth. 
Theory evaluation cannot tell us which theory is closest to the truth, unless we have reasons to 
believe that the theories we are testing are those that are closest to the truth (i.e., T7 and T8 in 
Figure 1). But, since we do not have reasons to believe that, as anti-realists argue, we cannot 
reasonably claim that the theories we have tested are closest to the truth (i.e., likely true), 
although we can reasonably claim that one of them is closer to the truth than its competitors. In 
other words, theory evaluation can tell us which theory among competing theories is closer to the 
truth (e.g., that T3 is closer to the truth than T2). However, theory evaluation cannot tell us which 
theory among competing theories is closest to the truth (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. T3 is closer to the truth than T2 but still quite far off from the truth. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I examined two formulations of the argument from underconsideration, one based 
on van Fraassen’s “bad lot” premise and another based on what Lipton called the “no-privilege” 
premise. I considered several moves that scientific realists might make in response to these 
arguments. I offered a revised argument that I take to be a middle ground between realism and 
anti-realism, since it adopts the realist thesis that theory evaluation can tell us which theory 
among competing theories is closer to the truth, and the anti-realist thesis that the lot of 
competing theories could consist of theories that are far off from the truth, and so theory 
evaluation cannot tell us which theory is closest to the truth. 
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Bias and Conditioning in Sequential Medical Trials
Cecilia Nardini∗ Jan Sprenger†
Abstract
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) are currently the gold standard within evidence-
based medicine. Usually, they are conducted as sequential trials allowing for monitoring
for early signs of effectiveness or harm. However, evidence from early stopped trials is
often charged with being biased towards implausibly large effects (e.g., Bassler et al. 2010).
To our mind, this skeptical attitude is unfounded and caused by the failure to perform
appropriate conditioning in the statistical analysis of the evidence. We contend that a shift
from unconditional hypothesis tests in the style of Neyman and Pearson to conditional
hypothesis tests (Berger, Brown and Wolpert 1994) gives a superior appreciation of the
obtained evidence and significantly improves the practice of sequential medical trials,
while staying firmly rooted in frequentist methodology.
1 Introduction
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) – trials where patients are randomly assigned to a
treatment and a control group, while controlling for possible confounders – are currently the
gold standard within evidence-based medicine (Worrall 2007). Usually, they are conducted
as sequential trials allowing for monitoring for early signs of effectiveness or harm.
Monitoring refers to the analysis of data in sequential trials carried out as they accumulate,
open to the possibility of stopping the trial before the planned conclusion. By terminating
a trial when overwhelming evidence for the effectiveness or harmfulness of a new drug is
available we can bound the prohibitive costs of a medical trial and protect in-trial patients
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against receiving inferior treatments. Thus, monitoring contributes to meeting ethical and
epistemic requirements that clinical investigators are confronted with.
However, monitoring in sequential trials also gives rise to a number of fascinating method-
ological debates. First, the two grand schools of statistical inference – Bayesian and frequentist
inference – are in outright conflict about how to plan and to evaluate a sequential trial. Sec-
ond, the early termination of sequential trials raises a bulk of concerns: For instance, is it
ethically mandatory to stop a trial that indicates the possibility of serious adverse effects,
jeopardizing the health of actual patients? Or should the treatment be continued in order to
avoid that a successful drug is prematurely rejected, which would deprive future patients of
an effective cure?
While we cannot adjudicate these far-reaching questions, we follow Worrall (2008: 418)
that “no informed view of the ethical issues [...] can be adopted without first taking an
informed view of the evidential-epistemological ones”. Thus, we will analyze the statistical
methodology of sequential medical trials, focussing on evidence provided by trials stopped
early for benefit. In the medical literature, such evidence often meets skeptical reactions:
RCTs stopped early for benefit [...] show implausibly large treatment effects,
particularly when the number of events is small. These findings suggest clinicians
should view the results of such trials with skepticism. (Montori et al. 2005: 2203)
This standpoint is affirmed by the recent STOPIT-2 metastudy where Bassler et al. (2010:
1187) blame truncated RCTs with “appreciable overestimates of effect”. However, we do
not share the pessimistic conclusion of these authors. While we believe that some of their
criticisms of experimental practice in medicine are valid, we believe that the main issue is
not a bias inherent in stopping early for benefit, but the fallacious statistical interpretation of
such trials. These misinterpretations are, to our mind, mainly caused by a lack of awareness
about issues in statistical methodology that also troubles other disciplines, such as economics
and psychology.
Our essay takes the following route. First, we expose the arguments for and against the
presence of bias in early stopped trials and explain why this problem is related to principled
questions in statistical methodology (Sect. 2). Subsequently, we argue that the real problem
is the use of unconditional error assessments in sequential trials, rather than the often-
invoked divide between Bayesians and frequentists (Sect. 3). Then we show that conditional
2
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frequentist tests (e.g., Berger, Brown and Wolpert 1994; Berger 2003) reconcile the need for
valid post-experimental appraisal of the evidence with preference for frequentist methods and
performance measures in the regulatory framework of medical trials (Sect. 4). Finally, we
wrap up our results and sketch how a superior methodological framework can improve the
design and practice of sequential trials and eventually lead to better decisions (Sect. 5).
2 Stopping on a random high?
The practice of stopping RCTs early for benefit has been subject to severe epistemological
criticism: trials stopped early for benefit show implausibly large treatment effects, relative to
what the medical community would be inclined to expect. In a review of 134 trials stopped
early for benefit, Montori et al. (2005) point to an inverse correlation between sample size and
treatment effect: the smaller the sample size achieved by the trial at the moment of stopping,
the larger the estimate it provided for the effect. The more recent study by Bassler et al.
(2010) shows that truncated trials report significantly higher effects than trials that were not
stopped early.
The danger in stopping a trial for apparent benefit consists in promoting a treatment that
is actually less efficacious. For instance, Mueller et al. (2007) report a case of two leukemia
treatments where interim analyses suggested a high relative risk reduction (53% and 45%)
in a particular chemotherapy regimen. However, that assessment had to be reversed after
completion of the trial. In practice, the problem with truncated RCTs is often aggravated
by improper reporting: crucial elements of trial design such as sample size, points of the
interim analysis, or possible ex-post adjustments of effect estimates are missing in a majority
of published trials (Montori et al. 2005).
The aforementioned objections severely threaten the reliability of early stopped trials, as
well as their reputation in the medical community. Thus, if investigators wish to stop a trial
early, they might do so at the risk of ending up with a result that the medical community does
not trust. This situation threatens to nullify the possible advantages of monitoring mentioned
in the introduction.
The claim of bias made against trials that stop early is based upon an argument that
is known in the medical literature under the name of “stopping on a random high”. The
argument builds on the consideration that evidence suggestive of a strong treatment effect
3
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can be observed just by chance. Thus, if several interim analyses are performed, sometimes
the trial will be stopped for benefit just by chance, exaggerating a small or null effect. It may
even be the case that the trend would vanish or even reverse, if the trial were continued, as
happened in the leukemia example mentioned earlier.
The validity of this argument has been questioned by several methodologists, especially
by those that are familiar with a Bayesian framework. Goodman, Berry and Wittes (2010)
argue that the difference observed in the metastudies of Montori et al. (2005) and Bassler
et al. (2010) was actually predictable: highly efficacious treatments will naturally be more
prone to early termination for benefit. Hence, the observed difference in estimated effect size
is precisely what we should expect. Comparing early stopped to completed trials amounts,
as highlighted by Berry, Carlin and Connor (2010), to selecting the trials to be compared on
the basis of their outcome.
Is there a methodologically sound way to account for the worry expressed by the “stopping
on random high” intuition? We think that the uneasiness in the medical community is not
so much about stopping early, but about trials with implausibly large effects – these effects
require, in the words of Mueller et al. (2007), “astute clinicians” to make an appropriate
interpretation of the results. In the upcoming section we will argue that this uneasiness
is caused by the Achilles’ heel of statistical methodology in sequential medical trials: the
subscription to unconditional inference procedures.
3 Problems with unconditional inference in sequential medical
trials
Sequential medical trials usually control the reliability of a testing procedure from a pre-
experimental point of view, by means of Type I and Type II error rates. These error proba-
bilities are extremely important for proper experimental design, and they get a lot of attention
from a regulatory point of view. Moreover, frequentist statisticians and philosophers of science
have argued that if the sampling plan is violated, the error probabilities cannot be properly
controlled and are actually inflated far beyond acceptable (Mayo and Kruse, 2001).
However, adherence to a proper sequential sampling plan is not sufficient to secure a
reliable result. As mentioned at the end of the last section, prior knowledge or empirically-
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based prior expectations are highly relevant for sound decision-making in the medical arena
(cf. Mueller et al. 2007). Yet, at the present state they do not enter the decisions that are
ultimately made, except in a methodologically unsatisfactory ad hoc way.
In this respect, Bayesian methods have the potential to alleviate the problems with mon-
itoring discussed above. Bayesian reasoners assign a prior probability distribution over the
values of the parameter of interest (e.g., relative risk reduction). This distribution represents
their subjective uncertainty about the true value of the parameter. By means of Bayes’ The-
orem, this distribution is updated to a posterior distribution that synthesizes the observed
evidence with the background knowledge.
Goodman (2007) argues that the inclusion of relevant prior information inherent in the
Bayesian framework provides a natural way to account for the relevance of contextual knowl-
edge in medical decision-making. From a Bayesian point of view, successful previous studies
on a treatment make a positive result for the current trial more expected and thus support
the decision to stop early, while on the other hand, negative results of other studies throw a
skeptical light on significant observed effects. Thus, unexpected results will be balanced by
the prior and lead to a more conservative conclusion than if Bayesian methods had not been
used.
In particular, it can be explained that truncated trials provide, ceteris paribus, less confi-
dence than trials with a comparable effect size that were completed. The smaller the actual
sample, the more will the posterior distribution resemble the prior distribution (for a given
effect size). So it appears that the worries of Montori et al. (2005) and Bassler et al. (2010)
– overestimation of treatment effect in truncated RCTs – are naturally accounted for.
Despite the advantages just outlined, there are some serious counterarguments to the
viability of Bayesianism in clinical trials. A first issue is that some of the philosophical
implications of Bayesian inference – such as the evidential, post-experimental irrelevance of
experimental design – conflict with the need to carefully plan and conduct sequential medical
trials. This is unacceptable to regulatory bodies that are keen to promote proper design of
medical trials as a means to ensure the validity of trial results (cf. FDA 2010).
Moye´ (2008) has also highlighted a non-sociological point: the problematic specification
of a prior belief function.1 While “objective”, non-informative priors (Jeffreys 1961; Bernardo
1Similar worries arise regarding the definition of an appropriate loss function required for a Bayesian decision
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1979) respond too easily to implausibly large effect sizes, the history of medical trials shows
that subjective beliefs about the efficacy of a drug are all too often overturned by surprising
findings. The latter problem hampers the use of properly subjective priors and, according to
Moye´, it persists even if data from meta-analyses are taken into account.
We consider these worries legitimate and we think they may represent a crucial counter-
indication to the use of Bayesian methods in healthcare assessment, even though some of the
issues are regulatory rather than epistemological. That said, we believe that the often-cited
antagonism between Bayesians and frequentists rests on the false presumption that either of
the two is right while the other is wrong. In fact, we suggest to replace that antagonism by
the contrast between conditional and unconditional procedures. By “conditional”, we refer
to statistical procedures that quantify the conclusiveness of a test result by conditioning on
part of the observed data, while “unconditional” refers to the absence of such conditioning.
Arguably, what is most disturbing to the medical community is the fact that, according
to current unconditional procedures, a truncated trial has prima facie the same reliability as
a trial carried to the planned end. This is because Neyman and Pearson’s type I and II error
rates are unconditional quantities, that is, they are insensitive to whether the data are just
at the significance boundary or far beyond it. By contrast, in a conditional perspective, the
error associated with a particular conclusion depends on the observed data: the larger the
observed difference is, the lower the probability that the null is rejected erroneously.
Practitioners that rely on unconditional inference have an hard time to find informative
and reliable post-data assessments of the evidence. Often, they report the observed p-value
to quantify the conclusiveness of the rejection of the null. However, p-values really combine
the worst of all worlds. Since comprehensive and devastating criticisms of using p-values in
scientific experiments have been delivered elsewhere (Royall 1997; Goodman 1999), we only
mention their most fundamental failures: they neither possess a valid frequency interpretation
nor do they provide a useful measure of confidence in the null hypothesis.
Moving to confidence intervals is often suggested as a way of circumventing the p-value
problem (e.g., Cumming and Finch 2005). However, “confidence interval” is a misnomer: a
95% confidence interval merely specifies the set of parameter values that are consistent with
the observation at the 95% level. This does not mean that we should have 95% confidence that
model.
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the confidence interval includes the parameter value. In fact, the degree of confidence is just
an average coverage rate over intervals from repeated random samples; it is not the coverage
probability of the one particular interval that the investigator happens to get. Therefore, it
should not come as a surprise that some confidence intervals include the entire sample space,
raising the question of what we have actually learned (cf. Seidenfeld 1981).
Finally, we contend that the unconditional nature of Neyman-Pearson hypothesis tests is
the culprit for their shortcomings. To motivate and to defend this claim, we walk the reader
through an example by Cox (1958) and Royall (1997: 74–75).
Suppose that we test H0 : N (0, σ
2) against H1 : N (1, σ
2) with known σ2, and that the toss
of a fair coin decides whether we draw N=1 or N=100 i.i.d. observations. It seems natural
to apply the most powerful test at the 5% level in either case. However, the probabilistic
mixture of the two most powerful tests at the 5% level is not the most powerful test in the
overall exmperiment. We can do better if we reject H0 for x1 > 1.282 in the case of N=1,
while rejecting H0 if x¯ > 0.508 in the case of N=100. Both procedures are tests at the 5%
level, but the second, “gerrymandered” test has a greater power (69%) than the mixture of
unconditional tests (63%).
Neyman-Pearson methodologists may be inclined to dismiss the second test because not
all of its components are tests at the 5% level. However, from an unconditionalist (pre-
experimental) viewpoint, only the overall error rates should count. Here, the superior power
features speak for the second, gerrymandered test. This problem reveals the tension between
the pre-experimental design of unconditional procedures, and the need to efficiently learn
from the actual data. Unconditional error rates and confidence intervals do not address that
second goal:
Now if the object of the analysis is to make statements by a rule with certain
specified long-run properties, the unconditional test [. . . ] is in order. [. . . ] If,
however, our objective is to say what we can learn from the data we have, the
unconditional test is surely no good. (Cox 1958: 360)
The example can, of course, be easily generalized. It undermines the view that uncondi-
tional, pre-experimental error probabilities can qualify the goodness of an inference. In the
next section we will see how conditioning on the relevant chunks of information overcomes
the problems of unconditional inference and resolves the methodological confusion about
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interpreting truncated RCTs, without altering or abandoning the framework of frequentist
statistics.
4 Conditional Frequentist Inference
Conditional inference tries to improve upon unconditional procedures by quantifying the
degree of confidence that we can have in our conclusions as a function of the observed evidence.
More precisely, conditional inference builds on the strength of the observed evidence. As we
will show in this section, it can be justified from both the Bayesian and the frequentist
perspective. The idea comes up for the first time in Cox’s (1958) seminal paper, and has been
developed later by Kiefer (1977) and Berger (2003), together with various co-authors.
The main idea can be motivated by a very simple example (Kiefer 1977; Berger 2003).
Two observations X1 and X2 are taken with probability law
Xi =


θ + 1 with probability 1/2
θ − 1 with probability 1/2
If we now construct a confidence interval for θ, then the interval Cθ(·, ·) defined by
Cθ(X1, X2) :=


X1 + 1 ifX1 = X2
(X1 +X2)/2 ifX1 6= X2
has an unconditional coverage of 75%. Yet, this does not seem to be a sensible conclusion
regarding the confidence that the data warrant with respect to the true value of θ. Dependent
on whether we observe |X1 −X2| = 0 or |X1 −X2| = 2, we are entitled to a statement with
(a posteriori) confidence 50% and 100%, respectively. The unconditional coverage of 75%
neglects that, after learning the strength of the evidence (that is, the value of |X1 −X2|), we
are in a much better position to assess the confidence which the data grant about our inference.
Thus, conditioning on the value of |X1 −X2| improves the accuracy of our conclusions.
It is also noteworthy that the probability distribution of |X1 − X2| does not depend on
the value of θ. That is, |X1 − X2| is an ancillary statistic with regard to θ. In particular,
conditioning on the value of |X1 − X2| is quite different from Bayesian conditionalization:
where Bayesian change their subjective probability distributions by conditioning on the entire
8
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data, conditioning on the value of |X1 −X2| just helps to better appreciate the (frequentist)
interpretation of the data.
If this idea is applied to hypothesis testing, which is the major issue in medical trials,
unconditional error rates are replaced by a conditional error probability. In the following we
will outline the basic idea of conditional tests, following Berger, Brown and Wolpert (1994).
Consider, for the purpose of mathematical convenience, the case of testing a point null
hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 against the simple alternative H1 : θ = θ1 in some probability model
(X ,B(X ); θ ∈ Θ). Define f0(x) and f1(x) as the probability densities of data x ∈ X under
the hypotheses H0 and H1, and let F0 and F1 be the corresponding cumulative distribution
functions.
F0(x) := PH0(X ≤ x) F1(x) := PH1(X ≤ x)
Let the Bayes factor B(x) := f0(x)/f1(x) be the ratio of the probability density functions,
and let
Xs := {x ∈ X |B(x) = s ∨B(x) = F
−1
0
(1− F1(s))} (1)
It is easy to check that Xs has the same probability density under H0 and H1, for all values
of s. The intuitive idea is that any Xs contains two values that have the same strength of
evidence under H0 and H1. The outcome space is thus partitioned into subsets Xs.
The conditional error probability can now be calculated by conditioning on the particular
set Xs in which the observed data fall. In particular, we can define a conditional frequentist
test by
T ∗(X) =


RejectH0 ifB(X) < 1
AcceptH0 ifB(X) ≥ 1
and for observed B(x) = s, we report conditional error probabilities
α(s) = PH0(rejectH0|X ∈ Xs) =
s
1 + s
β(s) = PH1(acceptH0|X ∈ Xs) =
1
1 + s
where the latter equalities have been proven by Berger, Brown and Wolpert (1994, Theorem
1). Clearly, by using the conditional instead of the unconditional error probabilities, we gain
a much better appreciation of the chance of a wrong decision, given the particular data that
we have observed. The higher the Bayes factor, the more confident we can be about an
9
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acceptance of the null, and vice versa. In particular, the classical, unconditional test just
detects whether the data are within or outside the rejection region (and leaves the rest to the
notorious p-values) whereas the conditional test allows for a fine-grained, properly frequentist
discrimination among trials with significant outcomes.
Before moving to the Bayesian interpretation of conditional tests, we would like to briefly
discuss a couple of objections that could be made from within the frequentist perspective.
First, it could be argued that T ∗ makes it far too easy to reject the null (B(X) < 1)
whereas in medicine, evidence has to be really strong before we are convinced of the efficacy
of a new treatment and approve of the drug. To this we simply respond that T ∗ has been
selected because of its simplicity, but it is of course possible to change the rejection region
according to contextual requirements.
Second, the use of the Bayes factor may indicate that the conditional test is actually a
Bayesian test in frequentist cloths. However, B(X) possesses a frequentist interpretation, too,
since it identifies the most powerful frequentist test in the simple vs. simple testing problem.2
Third, there may be worries about the scope of the above procedure which we have only
explained for the easiest possible case of hypothesis testing. However, Berger, Boukai and
Wang (1997) have extended conditional tests to simple vs. composite testing problems, and in
particular, to the two-sided null hypothesis testing problems that frequently occur in RCTs.
We now explain why T ∗ is also a valid Bayesian test. Assume that the prior probabil-
ities are balanced: P (H0) = P (H1) = 1/2. This may be defended as a useful neutrality
assumption. Then, the posterior probability of H0 and H1 can be written as
P (H0|x) =
(
1 +B(x)−1
)−1
=
B(x)
1 +B(x)
P (H1|x) = (1 +B(x))
−1 =
1
1 +B(x)
Thus, we see that the posterior probabilities of H0 and H1 correspond to the conditional
error probabilities for rejecting H0 and H1, respectively. Indeed, the decision to accept H0
will be wrong whenever H1 is actually true, that is, with probability 1/1 + B(x). Thus,
Bayesians and frequentists can conduct the same (conditional) test and obtain the same nu-
merical conclusions. But for the purposed of medical practice, philosophical questions about
2This is the content of the Neyman-Pearson Lemma. Furthermore Berger (2003) introduced a conditional
test that relies on the p-value as the conditioning statistics and yields the same post-data error probabilities
as T ∗.
10
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the interpretation of probability are clearly secondary as long as there is methodological agree-
ment on procedures and post-experimental data assessment (cf. Berger 2003). In this sense,
conditional inference is a genuine reconciliation of Bayesian and frequentist methodology and
a real asset for practitioners.
As a last point in indicating the advantages provided by the conditional frequentist frame-
work, we discuss its application to sequential analysis. The proponents of conditional testing
have stressed repeatedly that one of the main motivations of conditional inference was the
desire to improve upon the practice of sequential testing, particularly in medicine. Here the
benchmark is Wald’s (1947) famous Sequential Probability Ratio Test, that is
TN (X) :


RejectH0 and stop sampling ifB(X1, . . . , XN ) ≤ C
−
AcceptH0 and stop sampling ifB(X1, . . . , XN ) ≥ C
+
with associated (unconditional) error probabilities
α = PH0(B(X1, . . . , XN ) ≤ C
−)
β = PH1(B(X1, . . . , XN ) ≥ C
+).
While these unconditional error probabilities are (i) misleading and (ii) very hard to calcu-
late, Berger, Brown and Wolpert (1994) have suggested a conditional interpretation of this
test, choosing C+ and C− such that F0(C
−) = 1 − F1(C
+), and reporting conditional error
probabilities
α(B(X1, . . . , XN )) =
B(X1, . . . , XN )
1 +B(X1, . . . , XN )
(2)
β(B(X1, . . . , XN )) =
1
1 +B(X1, . . . , XN )
. (3)
Thus, the conditional framework can be straightforwardly applied to sequential medical trials,
and it has significant advantages. First, the assessment of the error probability depends on
the observed data and is thus way more informative than in the unconditional framework.
This alleviates the interpretational problem mentioned in Section 2, since conditional error
allows medical readers to assess the confidence in the outcome based on the observed data.
It seems reasonable to maintain that medical investigators should be more concerned with
the actual probability of drawing the wrong inference than with the absolute (unconditional)
error rate of the testing procedure.
11
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As a further point, the error probabilities (3) and (4) are independent of the stopping
rule, that is the sampling plan determining when the trial is terminated. In a RCT, the
stopping rule can never be fully specified, since one cannot cover in advance all eventualities
that might happen during a sequential trial. Independence from the stopping rule entails that
interpretation of the results and assessment of error are possible even if the stopping rule was
misspecified or could not be adhered to due to unforeseen circumstances.
This should not be misunderstood as the claim that pre-data analysis and experimental
design are superfluous. Unfortunately, Berger, Brown and Wolpert (1994: 1803) make a claim
into that direction, but given the strong emphasis on careful design by methodologists and
regulatory bodies (cf. Moye´ 2008; FDA 2010), this is unlikely to increase the acceptance of
the conditional approach among medical practitioners. We would like to stress that no such
claim is required for making a case for the superiority of the conditional frequentist approach.
Moreover, since conditional tests can be conducted from both a Bayesian and a frequentist
perspective, practitioners do not have to decide for either camp.
There are also interesting implications for the philosophy of statistics: if the “error statis-
ticians” (Mayo 1996) are right that learning from error is indeed a cornerstone of inductive
inference, then a move to conditional inference may protect their framework against the
objections that we have mentioned in Sect. 3. In particular, there is no need to tie an error-
statistical methodology to unconditional inference. However, further developing this line of
thought goes beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of statistical methodology on a substantive ethical
and societal question, namely data monitoring in sequential medical trials. In the medi-
cal literature, trials stopped early for benefit are often charged with being biased towards
implausibly large treatment effects (e.g., Bassler et al. 2010).
We think that this worry is based upon a misinterpretation of sequential trials that is
in turn due to shortcomings of standard frequentist procedures. It has been argued (e.g.,
Goodman 2007) that a Bayesian perspective overcomes this problem: if a trial is stopped
early because of an implausibly large effect, blending its result with a (conservative) prior
probability distribution naturally mitigates the conclusion. However, as a matter of research
12
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tradition and regulatory requirements – in particular, concerns about individual biases in
generating prior distributions –, the Bayesian framework does not provide an easy way out.
In this essay we contend that the real issue is not the contrast between Bayesian and
frequentist methodology. Rather, we are concerned about the shortcomings of unconditional
inference. We have elaborated that while unconditional error probabilities may be helpful in
the design of an experiment, they do not tell us what we have actually learned from the data.
We have therefore defended proper conditioning – calculating error probabilities conditional
on the strength of the observed evidence – as a way of curing the deficits of unconditional
frequentist inference. This approach has a natural application to sequential testing and both
a valid Bayesian and a valid frequentist interpretation.
This approach holds considerable promise for the interpretation of early stopped trials
in medicine. The possibility of post-data assessments of the probability of an erroneous
conclusion represents an invaluable asset for the practitioner and the decision-maker. The
results of a medical trial tell much more than the simple acceptance or rejection of a scientific
hypothesis: they indicate where evidence is strong and where it is inconclusive, indicating the
need for further research. Conditional inference, we believe, can improve the methodology of
clinical trials because it allows to take this additional information into account. In conclusion,
a clearer view on issues in statistical methodology can help to better appreciate data from
sequential medical trials and lead to more efficient and ethically superior decisions in medical
research.
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The thermodynamics of computation assumes that computational processes at the 
molecular level can be brought arbitrarily close to thermodynamical reversibility; 
and that thermodynamic entropy creation is unavoidable only in data erasure or 
the merging of computational paths, in accord with Landauer’s principle. The no 
go result shows that fluctuations preclude completion of thermodynamically 
reversible processes. Completion can be achieved only by irreversible processes 
that create thermodynamic entropy in excess of the Landauer limit. 
1. Introduction 
 Electronic computers degrade work to heat and the need for its removal sets a practical 
limit to their performance. The study of the thermodynamics of computation, surveyed in 
Bennett (1982), seeks the limits in principle to reduction of this dissipation. Since dissipation 
reduces with size, the most thermodynamically efficient computers are sought among those that 
use individual molecules, charges or magnetic dipoles as memory storage devices. 
 These molecular-scale processes are treated like macroscopic ones in one aspect: they can 
be brought arbitrarily close to the most efficient, non-dissipative processes, those that are 
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thermodynamically reversible. Their defining characteristic is that they are at equilibrium at 
every stage. They are brought slowly from start to finish by the successive nudges of miniscule 
disequilibria. It is assumed that the dissipative effects of these nudges can be made arbitrarily 
small by indefinitely extending the time allowed for the process to reach completion.  
 Some form of dissipation, however, is judged unavoidable. The controlling idea of the 
thermodynamics of computation is that the creation of thermodynamic entropy and the 
associated need to pass heat to the environment arise only with logically irreversible operations. 
These include the erasure of data and the merging of computational paths. The amount of 
thermodynamic entropy created is quantified by Landauer’s principle. It asserts that at least k ln 
2 of thermodynamic entropy is created when one bit of data is erased. The result is an elegant 
account of the bounds to the thermodynamic efficiency of computation. They are independent of 
the physical implementation, but are set by the logical operations comprising the computation.  
 Alas, this image of a well-developed science is an illusion. The thermodynamics of 
computation is an underdeveloped muddle of vague plausibility arguments and misapplications 
of statistical physics. Earman and Norton (1998, 1999) track the science’s history through the 
Maxwell demon problem and find it rife with circular reasoning and question begging.  Norton 
(2005, 2011) urges that the arguments used to support Landauer’s principle are fallacious and 
have never successfully advanced beyond flawed plausibility arguments. Erasure may reduce the 
range of possible values for data in a memory. But this reduction is not a compression of the 
accessible phase space of thermodynamic components that can be associated with a change of 
thermodynamic entropy. The volume of accessible phase space remains unchanged in erasure. 
Prior to erasure we may also be unsure as to the data stored and assign probabilities to the 
possibilities. That sort of probability, however, is not associated with a thermodynamic entropy. 
 Finally, Norton (2011) describes a “no go” result—that thermodynamically reversible 
processes at molecular scales are precluded from proceeding to completion by fluctuations. 
Individual computational steps can only be completed if they are sufficiently far from 
equilibrium to overcome fluctuations. As a result they create quantities of thermodynamic 
entropy in excess of those tracked by Landauer’s principle. It follows that the lower limit to 
thermodynamic entropy creation is not set by the logical specification of the computation, but by 
the details of the particular physical implementation and the number of discrete steps it employs, 
whatever their function. 
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 This paper will develop the no go result. It is motivated and then stated in the next 
section. In Section 3, it is illustrated; and in Section 4 a possible loophole is described and 
closed. 
2. The No Go Result 
2.1 A Preliminary Form 
 In a thermodynamically reversible process,1 all component systems are in perfect 
equilibrium with one another at all stages. As result, they are impossible processes.2 Nothing 
changes. Heat will not spontaneously pass from one body to another if they are at the same 
temperature. In ordinary thermodynamics, this awkwardness is overcome by introducing a slight 
disequilibrium. We minutely raise the temperature of the first body and let that minute 
temperature gradient drive the heat transfer, slowly. Because heat is now passing spontaneously 
from hot to cold, this is a dissipative process. The thermodynamic entropy created measures the 
amount of dissipation. For theoretical analyses, this entropy creation can be neglected since it 
can be made as small as we like by making the driving temperature difference appropriately 
small. The process will still go forward, but more slowly. 
 Matters are different when we allow for the molecular constitution of matter. For now the 
equilibrium of a thermodynamically reversible process is dynamic. If two bodies at the same 
temperature are in thermal contact, energy will spontaneously pass to and fro between them as 
energy fluctuations due to random, molecular-scale events. If we are to assure that heat passes 
                                                
1 Typical erasure processes begin with a thermodynamically irreversible process in which the 
memory device is thermalized. For example, the wall dividing a two-chamber memory cell is 
raised so the molecule can access both chambers. The resulting uncontrolled, thermodynamically 
irreversible expansion creates the k ln 2 of thermodynamic entropy tracked by Landauer’s 
principle. As Norton (2005, Section 3.2) argues, a mistaken tradition misidentifies this 
thermalization as thermodynamically reversible since the replacing of the partition supposedly 
returns the original state of “random data.” 
2 For an analysis of thermodynamically reversible processes, see Norton (forthcoming, §3). 
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from the one to the other, we must arrange for a disequilibrium that is sufficiently great to 
overcome the fluctuations. 
 Boltzmann’s Principle, “S = k ln W,” that is, “entropy = k ln probability,” measures the 
dissipation needed. An isolated system is to pass from state 1 with total thermodynamic entropy 
S1 to state 2 with total entropy S2. The inverted principle tells us that, if the system can 
spontaneously move between the two states, then the probabilities P1 and P2 of the two states are 
related by 
P2/P1 = exp ((S2- S1)/k)                                                                (1) 
In macroscopic terms, negligible thermodynamic entropy creation is sufficient to drive processes 
to completion. If S2- S1 = 10k, a macroscopically negligible amount, we find P2/P1 = 22,026, so 
that the final state 2 is strongly favored. 
 At the molecular level, these amounts of thermodynamic entropy are large. They exceed 
the entropy change of k ln2 = 0.69k tracked by Landauer’s principle. They must exceed it, for 
creation of merely k ln 2 of entropy is insufficient to assure completion of a process. Then P2/P1 
= exp (k ln 2/2) = 2. The process is only twice as likely to be in its final state 2 as in its initial 
state 1. This is a fatal result for the thermodynamics of computation. If we have any computing 
process with multiple steps operating at molecular scales, we must create thermodynamic 
entropy in each step if the process is to go forward, quite aside from any issues of logical 
irreversibility. 
2.2 The Main Result 
 Boltzmann’s Principle in the form (1) applies to isolated systems. In the thermodynamics 
of computation, the computing systems are treated as open systems, in equilibrium with a heat 
bath at the ambient temperature T. The main result arises when we adapt these considerations to 
such systems. 
 A computer is a system consisting of many interacting components, including memory 
cells, systems that read and write to the memory cells and other control components to 
implement the computer’s program. At any moment, the combined system is in thermal 
equilibrium with the environment at temperature T. Hence, the system is canonically distributed 
over its phase space, according to the probability density 
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p(x, π) = exp(-E(x, π)/kT)/ Z 
where Z is the normalizing partition function and x and π  are multi-component generalized 
configuration and momentum coordinates. 
 Each computational step is carried out by a thermodynamically reversible process, whose 
stages are parameterized by λ. Fluctuations will carry the system spontaneously from one stage 
to another. As a result, the system is probabilistically distributed over the different stages. The 
probabilities are computed by Einstein’s methods, as adapted by Tolman  (1938, pp. 637-38), 
and conform to the probability density 
p(λ) = constant. Z(λ)                                                       (2) 
where Z(λ) is given by 
Z(λ) =  ∫
λ
 exp(-E(x, π)/kT) dxdπ  
This last integral extends over the volume of phase space accessible to the system when the 
process is at stage λ. 
 In the Einstein-Tolman analysis, each of these stages is given a thermodynamic 
description as if it were an equilibrium state, even though it may have arisen through a 
fluctuation. The canonically distributed system at stage λ is assigned a canonical free energy 
F(λ) = -kT ln Z(λ)                                                         (3) 
treating Z(λ) as a partitition function, where the free energy is defined as 
F(λ) = E(λ) – TS(λ) 
Here E(λ) and S(λ) are the mean energy and the thermodynamic entropy assigned to the system 
in stage λ. It now follows from (2) and (3) that  
p(λ) = constant. exp(-F(λ)/kT) 
and that the probability densities for the system fluctuating between stages λ1 and λ2 satisfy 
p(λ2)/ p(λ1) = exp(-(F(λ2) - F(λ1))/kT)                                       (4) 
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 The process is thermodynamically reversible. Hence it is in equilibrium at every stage. 
Equilibrium requires the vanishing of the generalized thermodynamic force X(λ) acting on the 
system:3 
X(λ) = - ∂/∂λ|T F(λ) = 0 
Integrating over λ, we find that the free energy F(λ) is constant over the stages of the process: 
F(λ) = constant              F(λ1) = F(λ2)                                             (5) 
 From (4), we have that 
p(λ) = constant              p(λ1) = p(λ2)                                               (6) 
 This last result (6) is the no go result. It precludes thermodynamically reversible 
processes proceeding as we expect. 
 Our default expectation is that these processes are in a quiescent equilibrium at every 
stage λ, perhaps with a slight disturbance due to fluctuations. We expect to bring the process 
from its initial to its final stage by minute disequilibrium nudges that advance the process 
arbitrarily slowly in the tiniest of steps. What (6) tells us is that fluctuations obliterate the 
quiescent equilibrium. If the system is in one stage λ at some moment, it is equally likely to be 
found at the next moment at any other stage. If we set up the process in its initial stage, it is as 
likely to leap by a fluctuation to the final stage as it is to stay where it is. If the process has 
arrived at the final stage, it is as likely to be flung by a fluctuation back to its initial stage, as it is 
to stay where it is. In a slogan, fluctuations obliterate thermodynamically reversible processes. 
 Fluctuations are temperature sensitive. Hence we might expect the confounding effects of 
fluctuations to be calmed and controlled by cooling the processes, perhaps even close to absolute 
                                                
3 At equilibrium, the total entropy Stot of the system Ssys and the environment Senv is stationary. 
Writing d = ∂/∂λ|T, that amounts to 0 = dStot = dSsys + dSenv. By supposition, the computer 
system exchanges no work with the environment, but only heat in a thermodynamically 
reversible process. Hence dSenv = dEenv/T = - dEsys/T, where the last equality follows from 
conservation of energy: dEenv+ dEsys = 0. Combining, we have 0 = dSsys- dEsys/T. Hence the 
condition for equilibrium is 0 = d(Esys – TSsys) = -Xsys. 
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zero. A review of the calculation above shows that the no go result (6) obtains no matter what the 
temperature, even if it close to absolute zero.4 
2.2 What It Takes to Beat Fluctuations 
 If fluctuations obliterate thermodynamically reversible processes, how is it possible for 
these processes to figure in thermodynamic analysis at all? The answer is that the disequilibrium 
required to overcome fluctuations is negligible macroscopically. While the no go result applies to 
macroscopic systems, it is overcome by disequilibria too small to trouble us. However, at the 
molecular scale explored by the thermodynamics of computation, the situation is reversed. 
There, the disequilibria needed to overcome fluctuations dominate. Most importantly, it requires 
thermodynamic entropy creation in amounts that well exceed those tracked by Landauer’s 
principle.  
 A few computations illustrate this answer. Relation (4) tells us that we can 
probabilistically favor the end stage λ2 over the initial stage λ1 if the end stage free energy F(λ2) 
is smaller than the initial stage free energy F(λ1). A decrease of 3kT is sufficient for a modest 
favoring in the ratio of 20:1, for then 
p(λ2)/p(λ1) = exp(-(-3kT)/kT) = exp(3) = 20 
The dissipation associated with the reduction in free energy F(λ2) - F(λ1) = -3kT is a minimum 
increase in the thermodynamic entropy of5 
                                                
4 Temperature does affect the free energy needed to override the fluctuations. We see below that 
a probabilistic favoring of 20:1 is achieved by a free energy reduction of 3kT. This reduction 
diminishes as T decreases. However the thermodynamic entropy created remains at least 3k, 
independent of the temperature. 
5 To see this, use F=E-TS to rewrite F(λ2) - F(λ1) = -3kT as 
S(λ2) - S(λ1) - (E(λ2) - E(λ1))/T = 3k  
We have ΔSsys = S(λ2) - S(λ1). By conservation of energy, -(E(λ2) - E(λ1)) is the energy gained 
by the environment. By supposition, this energy is passed by heat transfer only. In the least 
dissipative case of a thermodynamically reversible heat transfer that corresponds to the minimum 
increase of entropy ΔSenv = -(E(λ2) - E(λ1))/T. 
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ΔStot = ΔSsys + ΔSenv = 3k 
where the change Δ is applied to the entropy of the universe as a whole Stot, which is the sum of 
the system entropy Ssys and the environment entropy Senv. Even though this modest probabilistic 
favoring by no means assures completion of the process, the entropy creation of at least 3k is 
many times greater than the k ln 2 = 0.69k of entropy tracked by Landauer’s principle in a single 
bit erasure. 
 Since the ratio of probability densities grows exponentially with free energy differences 
in (4), further creation of thermodynamic entropy can bring probability density ratios that 
strongly favor completion of the process. For example, if we increase the free energy difference 
to 25kT, then the end stage is strongly favored, for 
p(λ2)/p(λ1) = exp(-(-25kT)/kT) = exp(25) = 7.2 x 10
10. 
In macroscopic terms, however, 25kT of free energy is negligible. This quantity, 25kT, is the 
mean thermal energy of ten diatomic molecules, such as ten oxygen molecules. Hence, there is 
no obstacle to introducing a slight disequilibrium in a macroscopic system in order to nudge a 
thermodynamically reversible process to completion. 
3. Illustrations of the No Go Result for a One‐Molecule Gas 
 This no go result applies to all thermodynamically reversible processes in systems in 
thermal equilibrium with their environment. However its derivation and its statement as (6) is 
remote from its implementation in specific systems. It is helpful to illustrate how fluctuations 
obliterate a  simple process described in the thermodynamics of computation, the 
thermodynamically reversible, isothermal expansion and compression of a one-molecule gas. 
The analysis of the last section provides the precise computation. Here I give simpler estimates 
of the disturbing effects of fluctuations. 
3.1 Reversible, Isothermal Expansion and Compression 
 A monatomic one-molecule gas is confined to a vertically oriented cylinder and the gas 
pressure is contained by the weight of the piston. The process intended is a thermodynamically 
reversible, isothermal expansion or compression of the gas. Our expectation is that this process 
will proceed indefinitely slowly, with the weight of the piston maintained just minutely away 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -600-
from the equilibrium weight so that the expansion or compression is only just favored. As the 
piston is raised in an expansion, it draws work energy from the one-molecule gas; and this 
energy is restored to the one-molecule gas as heat from the environment. The gas exerts a 
pressure P=kT/V, for V the volume of the gas. Thus the work extracted in a doubling of the 
volume and thus also the heat passed to the gas is given by kT /V 'dV '
V
2V
∫  = kT ln 2. The 
thermodynamic entropy change in the gas is the familiar k ln 2. 
 That is our expectation. It is confounded by fluctuations. Consider the piston first. It is a 
thermal system that is Boltzmann distributed over its height h ≥ 0 above the piston floor 
according to 
p(h)  =  (Mg/kT) exp ( -Mgh/kT) 
where M is the piston mass. The mean of this distribution is kT/Mg and its standard deviation is 
also kT/Mg. 
 This latter number measures the extent of thermal fluctuations in the height of the piston. 
For a macroscopic piston, M will be very much larger than kT/g and the extent of fluctuations in 
height will be negligible. However in this case of a one-molecule gas, the piston must be very 
light if it is to be suspended at equilibrium by the pressure of the one-molecule gas. Hence its M 
is small and the fluctuations in height will be great. They can be estimated quantitatively as 
follows. The weight of the piston is Mg. The mean force exerted by the gas pressure is (kT/V).A 
= kT/h, where A is the area of the piston and h its height above the base of the cylinder, so that V 
= Ah. Setting these two forces equal as the condition for equilibrium, we recover the equilibrium 
height as6 
heq = kT/Mg 
Remarkably, this quantity heq is just the same as the mean height and standard deviation of the 
above distribution, both of which are also given by kT/Mg.  
                                                
6 Hence the mean energy of height is Mgheq = kT. While this energy is associated with a single 
degree of freedom of the moving piston, it differs from the familiar equipartition mean energy 
per degree of freedom (1/2)kT, because the relevant term of the piston’s Hamiltonian, Mgh, is 
linear in h and not quadratic, as the equipartition theorem assumes. 
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 This extraordinary result can be expressed more picturesquely as follows. If we set up the 
piston so that its weight perfectly balances the mean pressure force of the one-molecule gas, it 
will not remain at the equilibrium height, but will fluctuate immediately through the entire 
volume of the gas. It will perhaps be suddenly flung skyward by a collision with molecule; and it 
may then fall precipitously between collisions. The intended process of a gentle, indefinitely 
slow expansion or contraction is lost completely behind the wild gyrations of the piston over the 
full volume of the one-molecule gas. 
 Similar results hold for heat transfer between the one-molecule gas and its environment. 
Since it is monatomic, the Boltzmann distribution of the gas energy E is 
p(E) = 2(E/π)1/2 (kT) -3/2 exp(-E/kT) 
The mean of this distribution is the familiar equipartition energy (3/2) kT and the standard 
deviation is (3/2)1/2 kT = 1.225 kT.7 Hence, simply by virtue of its contact with the environment 
at temperature T, the one-molecule gas energy will be swinging wildly through a range 
comparable in size to the total mean energy of the gas. 
 We had expected that we would track a quantity of heat kT ln 2 = 0.69 kT while the 
piston slowly and gently moves to halve or double the volume of the gas. What we find is that 
the piston is wildly and randomly flung to and fro through the entire volume of the gas, while the 
gas energy fluctuates similarly wildly over a range greater than the 0.69 kT of heat transfer we 
track. We had expected a process that proceeds calmly at arbitrarily slow speed from start to 
finish. Instead we find a chaos of wild gyrations with no discernible start or finish. 
 This is a rough analysis. To maintain the equilibrium of a thermodynamically reversible 
process would require that the weight Mg be adjusted as the volume V changes since the gas 
pressure will vary inversely with volume. Norton (2011, Section 7.5) replaces the uniform force 
field of gravity with another force field that varies with height in precisely the way needed to 
maintain mean quantities at equilibrium. 
                                                
7 This and the earlier energy standard deviation can be computed most rapidly from Einstein’s 
energy fluctuation theorem, which identifies the variance of the energy with kT2 d<E>/dT, where 
<E> is the mean energy. For the piston, <E>=kT, so the variance is (kT)2 = (Mgheq)
2. For the 
monatomic gas, <E>=(3/2)kT, so the variance is  (3/2)(kT)2. The standard deviation is the square 
root of the variance. 
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3.2 Generality 
 A one-molecule gas confined in a cylinder by a piston is fanciful and cannot be realized 
practically. It is, however, one of the most discussed examples in the thermodynamics of 
computation because it is easy to visualize. Its statistical and thermodynamic properties mimic 
those of more realistic systems with few degrees of freedom. We may model a memory device as 
a two-chambered cell with a single molecule trapped in one part. A more realistic 
implementation of the memory device is a single electric charge trapped by a potential well in a 
solid state medium; or a magnetic dipole aligned into a specific orientation by a magnetic field. 
 The thermodynamic operations carried out on the one-molecule gas have analogs in the 
more realistic implementations. Mechanical variables such as volume and pressure are replaced 
by electric and magnetic correlates. The general results remain the same. If we halve the range of 
possible states of a memory device, we reduce its thermodynamic entropy by k ln 2, just as we 
do when we halve the volume of a one-molecule gas. The large fluctuations exhibited by the 
one-molecule gas derive from its small number of degrees of freedom. Correspondingly, the 
more realistic implementations will exhibit similarly large fluctuations. 
 The two processes investigated were heating/cooling and expansion/contraction of the 
gas. These are instances of the two processes that appear in all thermodynamically reversible 
processes: heat transfer and exchange of generalized work energy. As a result, the analysis here 
has a quite broad scope. Consider thermodynamically reversible measurement, in which one 
device reads the state of another. For example, a magnetic dipole reads the state of a second 
dipole when the two slowly approach and align in a process that maintains equilibrium 
throughout. This detection or measurement process is a reversible compression of the phase 
space of the reader dipole and is thermodynamically analogous to compression of a one-
molecule gas. As a result, this measurement process will be fatally disrupted by fluctuations. 
While a standard claim of the thermodynamics literature is that these measurements can be 
performed without dissipation, the no go result shows that dissipation is required if the 
fluctuations are to be overcome and the process driven to a correct reading. 
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4. A Loophole? 
 Each computation consists of many steps. Dissipation, significant at the molecular level, 
is required by the no go result to bring each of these steps to completion. Bennett (1973, 1982) 
proposes an ingenious loophole for computations with very many steps. The very many 
thermodynamically reversible steps are chained together to form one large thermodynamically 
reversible process. The computer’s state wanders back and forth through the various stages in a 
generalization of Brownian motion. The no go result affirms that the state will be uniformly 
distributed over all the stages of the computation. Bennett now makes the step to the final state 
highly dissipative, so that it can be favored with arbitrarily high probability. Hence the 
computation will eventually terminate in this final state with high probability. The 
thermodynamic entropy created in this final, irreversible step may be large. However, if there are 
very many steps combined into the overall computation, the entropy created per step can be quite 
small.  
 Whether this loophole can succeed depends on whether the many steps of a computation 
can be chained together in such a way that achieving the final state also assures that all the 
computer’s components are in the intended final states. The danger point is when the computer 
completes one step and initiates the next. The initiation of the second step must arise only when 
the first step is completed and the state of the computer conforms to what the logical 
specification of the program requires for that first step. We need to be assured that the disrupting 
effects of fluctuations will not trigger the second step before these conditions are met. 
 In an attempt to assure this, Bennett (1982) describes a Brownian clockwork computer, a 
mechanical implementation of a Turing machine. Its parts are mechanically interlocked so that 
when the tape manipulator head reaches its final state, each of the cells of the tape are in the final 
states intended by the logical specification of the computation.  
 Bennett’s description of the device is detailed with vivid line drawings. However it is 
incomplete in the one aspect that matters most. The statistical mechanical properties of the 
individual components are poorly represented. Here is the easiest way to see that they are 
omitted: the machine is sufficiently powerful that we could set it up with a large tape carrying 
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“random” data of 0s and 1s and then run an erasure program that resets all the cells to zero.8 On 
Bennett’s view, there must be an associated creation of thermodynamic entropy of at least k ln 2 
per bit erased and the passing of kT ln 2 of heat per bit erased to the environment. Yet their 
creation is nowhere apparent in the operation of the machine.9 
 The narrative that describes the machine’s operation depends on our imagining processes 
that are unproblematic if implemented by macroscopic bodies. For example, the branching of the 
program’s execution arises when the path of the manipulator is obstructed by a knob whose 
position encodes the data recorded in the tape cell. Our macroscopic intuitions preclude the 
manipulator ever proceeding with a misread of the data. These same processes may fail if we 
attempt to implement them in a thermodynamically reversible manner at the molecular level. For 
that means that all interactions must be at equilibrium. The components at issue, such as a single 
molecule or a molecular-scale dipole, exert very weak forces on average and these forces are 
confounded by fluctuations comparable in size to the average. Another component interacting 
with them can only apply correspondingly weak forces, else the requirement of equilibrium of 
thermodynamic reversibility would be violated. Once again our intended average behavior would 
be immersed in wild fluctuations. The resulting interaction would be very different from a 
macroscopically pictured manipulator thumping into macroscopic knob and being definitively 
obstructed by it. 
 The following indicates how adding these thermal complications would compromise the 
operation of the clockwork computer. The obstruction of the manipulator head by the data knob 
is equivalent to the reading by a detector of the state of a data cell. The manipulator in effect 
reads the state of the data cell and records the reading by implementing one of several possible 
computational paths. Bennett (1982, pp. 307-308; 1987, p.14) has described two schemes in 
which a reader detects the position of a single component memory device in a reversible 
thermodynamic process. The molecular implementation is quite fragile in comparison with its 
robust macroscopic counterpart and fails precisely because the analysis of both schemes neglects 
                                                
8 The program reads a cell and rewrites its contents to 0, if the cell has a 1. If the cell has a 0, it 
moves one cell to the right and repeats. 
9 Or one could assume that the physical description is complete so that the machine can erase the 
tape without thermodynamic entropy creation. That contradicts Landauer’s principle. 
San Diego, CA -605-
how fluctuations confound the intended behavior of thermodynamically reversible processes at 
the molecular scale. Norton (2011, §7.3) describes how both detection schemes fail. For the case 
of binary data, they are as likely as not to terminate with the detector reading the right as the 
wrong result. 
 We have every reason to expect that these problems would appear were the clockwork, 
Brownian computer somehow implemented with molecular scale storage devices and operated 
by thermodynamically reversible processes. We have no assurance that any step would proceed 
according to its logical specification. If the reading of data in a cell is implemented as Bennett 
describes, they would likely as not return the wrong result. When the manipulator is eventually 
trapped probabilistically in its final state, we should expect the tape to be left in a state of chaos 
that does not reflect the results intended by the logical specification of the program. 
 In short, the loophole fails. It is a conjecture, motivated by macroscopic intuitions that do 
not apply at molecular scales. 
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Abstract
This paper provides a new context for an established metaphysical debate regarding
the problem of persistence. I contend that perdurance (the claim that objects persist by
having temporal parts) can be precisely formulated in quantum mechanics due to an
analogy with spatial parts, which I claim correspond to the decomposition of the quantum
state provided by a localization scheme. However, I present a ‘no-go’ result that rules out
the existence of an analogous temporal localization scheme, and so argue that quantum
objects cannot be said to perdure. I conclude by surveying the remaining metaphysical
options.
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Do Quantum Objects Have Temporal Parts?
1st March, 2012.
1. Introduction This paper provides a new context for an established metaphysical debate
regarding the problem of persistence. Namely, how can it be said that one and the same
physical object persists through time while changing over time? I contend that a popular view
about persistence which maintains that objects persist by perduring – that is, by having
temporal parts – receives a particularly neat formulation in quantum mechanics due to the
existence of a formal analogy between time and space. However, on closer inspection this
analogy fails due to a ‘no-go’ result which demonstrates that quantum systems can’t be said to
have temporal parts in the same way that they have spatial parts. Therefore, if quantum
mechanics describes persisting physical objects, then those objects cannot be said to perdure.
This argument serves two aims. The first is to continue the recent tradition of addressing
the problem of persistence in the context of specific physical theories: Balashov (2010)
considers special relativity; Butterfield (2005, 2006) considers classical mechanics. The
second aim is to provide a novel interpretation of the no-go result mentioned above, which is
well-known in the quantum foundations literature but rarely discussed by philosophers of
physics. The result is often phrased like this: There exists no time observable canonically
conjugate to the Hamiltonian. This fact was first observed by Pauli in 1933, and there are
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various proofs which arrive at this conclusion.1 I claim this result is best understood not as an
argument against the existence of time (Halvorson 2010) but rather as an argument that
quantum systems do not have (proper) temporal parts.2
1.1. Argument Outline The argument takes the form of a modus tollens which I give a
sketch of here, leaving technical details for later sections. I begin with a characterization of
perdurance as the thesis that objects persist through time just as they stretch through space.
perdure The part-whole relation for persisting objects applied to time works just like the
part-whole relation with respect to space. That is, persisting objects have proper
temporal parts associated with an arbitrary division of the times over which the object
persists.
I then argue that ordinary quantum mechanics describes persisting objects. This claim
requires (at least) a robust scientific realism about quantum mechanics.
quantum A quantum object (an isolated system described by a ray in Hilbert space
undergoing unitary evolution) is a persisting object.
Taken together, perdure and quantum imply that quantum objects have temporal parts.
Call this view quantum perdurantism. I further claim that if quantum mechanics does describe
1It was recently observed that Pauli’s proof admits a significant class of counterexamples
(Galapon 2002). The result I will give is instead related to the proofs of Srinivas and
Vijayalakshmi (1981); Halvorson (2010).
2This is not to say that there are not other valid interpretations. For example, Unruh and
Wald (1989) provide an argument against the existence of an ideal quantum clock.
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persisting objects, then it also provides a legitimate account of the spatial parts of such an
object.
spatial The part-whole relation in space for quantum objects is given by the spectral
decomposition of the Hilbert space into orthogonal subspaces, provided by the position
operator Qˆ. This decomposition is unique, and is known as a localization scheme. A
quantum object has spatial parts iff there exists a localization scheme.
Since perdure asserts that the relation of parthood applied to time is just like the relation
of spatial parthood, it follows that a quantum perdurantist is committed the existence of a
temporal localization scheme which operates in an analogous way to spatial. That is,
perdure, quantum and spatial jointly entail the following conditional statement.
temporal If quantum perdurantism is true then every persisting quantum object has a unique
decomposition into temporal parts provided by a temporal localization scheme.
Unfortunately for the perdurantist, the consequent is demonstrably false: The spectral
condition states that the Hamiltonian of every system has a spectrum bounded from below –
roughly, every system has a state of lowest energy – and entails that no quantum objects
possess a temporal localization scheme. Therefore quantum perdurantism is false; quantum
objects have no (proper) temporal parts.
This leaves two possibilities: Either they have no temporal parts (endurantism), or one
temporal part (temporal holism). I argue that, although there is little to choose between these
rival views in the context of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, considerations from
relativity favor temporal holism.
San Diego, CA -611-
2. The Metaphysics of Persisting Objects How does a material object persist through time
while changing with time? There are essentially two schools of thought: Either a persisting
object has no temporal parts, is self-identical at every moment it exists, and its spatial
properties change with time (endurantism), or a persisting object necessarily has temporal
parts which have differing spatial properties (perdurantism). Another common way of
phrasing the distinction is as a conflict between three-dimensionalism and
four-dimensionalism: If an object endures then it exists in three dimensions (since it has no
temporal width); if it perdures then, having temporal width, it exists in four dimensions.3
I will follow Lewis (1986) in using the term perdurance for the latter possibility, which I
take to be a thesis about the existence of temporal parts.
Something perdures iff it persists by having different temporal parts, or stages,
though no one part of it is wholly present at more that one time; whereas it
endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time. Perdurance
corresponds to the way a road persists through space; part of it is here and part of
it is there, and no part is wholly present at two different places. (Lewis 1986, 202)
So for perdurantism to be true, it must be the case that persisting objects be amenable to
decomposition into (proper) temporal parts. It has been complained that the notion of being
wholly present is problematic (e.g. (Sider 1997; McCall and Lowe 2003)) but I will argue that,
within quantum mechanics, it can be given a precise meaning due to a formal analogy with
being wholly located.
3Among four-dimensionalists, there is a further dispute about reference: When we speak
of an object e.g. “the table” do we refer to a particular instantaneous stage, i.e. the table at
time t, (Sider 1997; Hawley 2004) or the entire temporally extended object?
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I take the motivation for perdurantism to be a strong analogy between time and space.
Sider expresses this idea as follows:
As I see it, the heart of four-dimensionalism [perdurantism] is the claim that the
part-whole relation behaves with respect to time analogously to how it behaves
with respect to space ... Applied to time, the idea is that for any way of dividing
up the lifetime of an object into separate intervals of time, there is a
corresponding way of dividing the object into temporal parts that are confined to
those intervals of time. (Sider 1997, 204)
I will argue that the appropriate part-whole relation for spatial parts in quantum mechanics
is provided by a localization scheme (in Section 4), which commits the perdurantist to a thesis
about temporal localizability in quantum mechanics (in Section 5).
3. Persisting Objects in Quantum Mechanics Quantum mechanics provides our best
theory of matter, and its empirical predictions have been startlingly accurate. That much is
uncontroversial. On the other hand, any attempt to assert exactly why it has proved so
successful, or precisely what it tells us about the nature of material objects involves taking
sides on disputes regarding its interpretation that have lasted over 80 years and show little sign
of abating. Therefore, I will proceed by specifying under what conditions one would be
committed to regarding the quantum state as describing a persisting material object.
Nonetheless, I take it that prima facie a realist metaphysician who takes chairs (composed of
complex collections of organic molecules) to be persisting objects would be compelled to
similarly regard, say, a molecule of Buckminsterfullerene (C60) composed of sixty atoms of
carbon, and recently shown to display distinctly quantum behavior (Nairz et al. 2003).
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First, some details about the formalism of ordinary (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics.
As our concern is with spatio-temporal properties, we will consider systems with no internal
degrees of freedom (i.e. spinless particles). Therefore, the state space of the theory is
provided by the space of square integrable functions defined over all of space, that is,
infinite-dimensional (separable) complex Hilbert spaceH = L2(R) (for simplicity we will
consider only one spatial dimension). The pure states |ψ〉 are in one-to-one correspondence
with the one-dimensional subspaces ofH or, equivalently, the set of normalized vectors that
individually span those subspaces. SinceH is a vector space, linear combinations of pure
states are also pure states (this is known as the superposition principle). In what follows I will
only consider pure states.
The first interpretative posit I require is realism, the claim that real physical systems are
authentically described by quantum mechanical states. The next posit I require is
completeness, the claim that a pure state provides a complete description of an individual
quantum system which leaves nothing out (i.e. no hidden variables). So far we would be
justified in claiming that the quantum state describes a physical object. But what about
persisting objects?
We require some facts about quantum dynamics. In the Schro¨dinger picture, the history of
a system is given by a series of (pure) states |ψ(t)〉, where t ∈ R. Once the state |ψ(0)〉 at a
time t = 0 is given, the entire history is determined according to the time-dependent
Schro¨dinger equation in terms of a one-parameter (strongly continuous) group of unitary
operators U(t) = e−iHt, where H is the Hamiltonian of the system. If a pure state |ψ(0)〉
describes a physical object which exists at time t = 0, then a history |ψ(t)〉 describes a
persisting object which exists at each t and changes with time. The infamous measurement
problem arises when we consider the relation of the unitary dynamics of the state to the
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results of laboratory observations.
The observables of the system are self-adjoint operators4 onH associated with
measurable quantities, and the values they may take on measurement correspond to the
spectrum of the operator. For an observable Aˆ with a discrete spectrum (e.g. the Hamiltonian
of a simple harmonic oscillator), each spectral value an has an associated eigenvalue equation
Aˆ|φn〉 = an|φn〉, where |φn〉 is an eigenstate of Aˆ. Distinct eigenvalues are associated with
mutually orthogonal subspaces (eigenspaces) |an〉 which are spanned by the vectors |φn〉 with
zero inner product, 〈φm|φn〉 = 0 form 6= n. Any vector can be written as a weighted sum
|ψ〉 =
∑
n |an〉〈an|ψ〉 =
∑
n cn|ψn〉, where |ψn〉 is the projection of |ψ〉 onto |an〉 and cn are
complex coefficients
∑
n |cn|
2 = 1. This is known as the spectral decomposition or resolution
of the identity ofH with respect to Aˆ, which we can write as Aˆ =
∑
n an|an〉〈an|.
According to the standard story, the probability of obtaining a particular value an in
measurement is given by 〈ψ|ψn〉 = |cn|
2 (the Born Rule) and, having observed a system to
take a particular value, upon repeating the measurement of the observable it will be found to
have the same value an. However, according to the formalism the only way this could happen
is if the system were in an eigenstate of Aˆ (known as the eigenstate-eigenvalue link), but since
(i) in general a system is not in an eigenstate with respect to Aˆ, and (ii) the dynamics provided
by the Schro¨dinger equation are unitary, there is (in general) no reason to think that a system
should ever be found in such a state. This is the measurement problem.
The third posit I will require is, therefore, that we consider isolated quantum systems
which need only unitary evolution for their complete description over time; persisting
quantum objects are isolated systems on this view. This means that we will not need to
4An operator Aˆ is symmetric onH iff 〈ψ|Aˆφ〉 = 〈Aˆψ|φ〉 for all elements in its domain
D(Aˆ) ⊆ H. It is self-adjoint Aˆ = Aˆ† iff it is symmetric and D(Aˆ) = D(Aˆ†).
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concern ourselves with the measurement problem. This invites the worry that very few
systems in the actual world will fall under this criterion. Maybe so, but on at least one
interpretation of quantum mechanics (Everett-style realist ‘no-collapse’) all systems undergo
only unitary evolution.
4. Parts and Spatial Parts What is a part of a quantum object? I contend that a suitable
part-whole relation is provided by considering the subspaces ofH, or equivalently the
projections onto those subspaces. According to classical mereology, the relation of parthood
is (minimally) reflexive (everything is part of itself), transitive (if p is part of q and q is part of
r then p is part of r) and antisymmetric (no two distinct things can be part of each other). As
is well known, the subspaces of a vector space A,B,C... are partially ordered by the relation
of inclusion, which is reflexive (A ⊆ A), transitive (if A ⊆ B and B ⊆ C then A ⊆ C) and
antisymmetric (if A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A then A = B).
I claim that in quantum mechanics the spatial parts are given in terms of the subspaces of
theH associated with the spectral decomposition of the position observable Qˆ. As Qˆ has a
(purely) continuous spectrum, this will require some more details about self-adjoint operators.
Since the pioneering work of von Neumann we have known that any self-adjoint operator
(even an unbounded continuous operator) onH is uniquely associated (up to unitarity) with a
spectral measure which allows us to replace the sum over projections onto eigenspaces with
an integral Qˆ =
∫
R
λ dEλ, where Eλ is a spectral family of projections with λ ∈ R. It is this
which allows us to write the position operator as an integral over space Qˆ =
∫
dx x |x〉〈x|.5
5However, note that the equation Qˆ|q〉 = q|q〉 is a merely formal expression in this case i.e.
|q〉 is a (so-called) improper eigenstate and not an element ofH.
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We may associate with each Borel set6 ∆ ∈ B(R) a projection P Qˆ(∆) =
∫
∆
λdEλ. The
map P Qˆ : ∆ 7→ P Qˆ(∆) is known as a Projection Valued Measure (PVM) and has the
properties (i) P Qˆ(R) = 1 (normalization), and (ii) P Qˆ(
⋃
n∆n) =
∑
n P
Qˆ
n (∆n) (strong
σ-additivity), where ∆n is a sequence of mutually disjoint Borel sets ∆m ∩∆n = ∅ for
m 6= n. We can do this quite generally since the self-adjoint operators onH are in one-to-one
correspondence with the set of PVM’s (Teschl 2009, Thm. 3.7).
What does this have to do with spatial parts? Well, the Borel sets correspond to spatial
regions in a very intuitive way since any two sets of spatial points which occupy the same
volume of space are assigned the same Borel set (of R3 now); a Borel set is an equivalence
class of sets of points under the relation having the same volume. Take an ordinary object that
occupies exactly a cube. Pick four opposite vertexes of the cube which lie in a plane (such
that not all four are on the same face). How many ways are there of dividing the cube into two
parts of equal volume along that plane? Presumably we would want to say: “There is only one
way, straight down the middle!” And this is just the answer we find from looking at the Borel
sets.
However, if we consider instead the set of points that lie in the interior of the cube there
are three ways: one that excludes the points that lie on the plane, one that gives them to the
left hand part, and one that gives them to the right hand part.7 The upshot of these sort of
6
B(R) is the smallest σ-algebra over R containing all open intervals of R. A σ-algebra
over a set is a (nonempty) collection of subsets closed under complementation and countable
union.
7Also note that to allow spatial parts corresponding to non-measurable sets would open the
door to paradoxical results regarding their re-composition, illustrated by the Banach-Tarski
theorem. For a discussion of these issues see Arntzenius (2008).
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considerations, I take it, is that we would rather associate spatial parts with Borel sets rather
than sets of points (or, equivalently, only with sets of points dense in some open interval of R).
So, if you accept the notion of parthood I articulated above, then the PVM P Qˆ associated
with the position observable Qˆ provides a neat assignment of spatial regions to parts of the
state space. It has the attractive property that any spatial region is associated with a unique
projection, and, furthermore, if two regions are disjoint ∆1 ∩∆2 = ∅ then they are associated
with mutually orthogonal projections P Qˆ(∆1)P
Qˆ(∆2) = P
Qˆ(∆2)P
Qˆ(∆1) = 0, while if they
overlap ∆1 ∩∆2 6= ∅ then their intersection has the unique projection
P Qˆ(∆1)P
Qˆ(∆2) = P
Qˆ(∆2)P
Qˆ(∆1) = P
Qˆ(∆1 ∩∆2) (from property (ii)).
This is a localization scheme in the sense that performing a measurement that corresponds
to a projection P Qˆ(∆) has the possible outcomes {0, 1}: either the system is located in ∆ or
the system is not located in ∆. Furthermore, these possibilities are mutually exclusive in that
P Qˆ(R/∆) = I − P Qˆ(∆) (from (ii)). Therefore, the system may be said to be ‘wholly located
in ∆ at t’ on the condition that P Qˆ(∆)|ψ(t)〉 = |ψ(t)〉. Since in general the system will not be
in an eigenstate of any projection P Qˆ(∆) we say not that it is located somewhere but rather
that it is localizable. If a pure state |ψ〉 describes a quantum object then, I claim, the
projections P Qˆ(∆)|ψ〉 denote the spatial parts of the object.
Another characteristic of the PVM P Qˆ which justifies the contention that it provides an
assignment of parts is that it covaries with spatial translations
U(a)−1P Qˆ(∆)U(a) = P Qˆ(∆ + a), where U(a) = e−iPˆ a is the one-parameter unitary group
of spatial translations generated by the total momentum Pˆ . Roughly, this is a consequence of
the fact that Qˆ and Pˆ are canonically conjugate [Qˆ, Pˆ ] = i~. Viewing these transformations
passively as a relabeling of the spatial axis, covariance assures us that we are picking out the
same parts despite having changed their relation to the labels.
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Now, there is something a little disconcerting about these spatial parts. Firstly, (in general)
each quantum object appears to be composed of parts that together cover all of space (from
(i)). Secondly, these spatial parts do not ‘move with the object’ since
U(t)−1P Qˆ(∆)U(t) = P Qˆ(∆). Neither of these features represent genuine problems for this
view. First, there is nothing metaphysically necessary about the view that physical objects
have limited spatial extent. Fields, for example, qualify as genuine physical entities without
being limited to a particular region of space. Moreover, although the localization scheme
necessarily covers all of space, the object itself may be localized in the above sense. Second,
this might be thought of as a boon for the perdurantist since it restores a symmetry between
time and space by removing the need to define spatial parts relative to spatial location (see
Butterfield (1985)).
Another potentially disconcerting feature of these quantum spatial parts is that they are
defined in terms of the position observable for the entire system with state |ψ〉, and so it may
be the case that even though we (naively) suppose the system to be further decomposed into
distinct subsystems |ψ〉 = |η〉 ⊗ |ξ〉, the spatial parts assigned in this way fail to respect this
decomposition such that the spatial degrees of freedom of the subsystems fail to be
independent. This is known as entanglement, and is a pervasive feature of quantum
mechanics. If the subsystems are considered to be spatially separated then entanglement may
result in non-locality, in the sense that the results of local measurements of position on one
subsystem may depend on the results of local (but distant) measurements on the other
subsystem. The view taken here is that this apparent tension results from an incorrect notion
of mereology: subsystems do not correspond to independent spatial parts unless they are
associated with mutually orthogonal projections P Qˆ(∆).
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5. (No) Temporal Parts What is a temporal part of a quantum object? A possible response
might go as follows: Since the instantaneous quantum state determines all the kinematical
properties of the system, we can specify the temporal parts of a quantum object by a simple
assignment of the states |ψ(t)〉 to times t ∈ R . This ‘naive’ scheme would assign to arbitrary
sets of times {T} the temporal part |ψ(t)〉 only if t ∈ {T}. However, the scheme completely
fails to provide a partition of the object into parts. The problem is that the parameter t indexes
a family of temporal translations, so fails to respect the requirement that temporal parts be
‘wholly present’ at t.
By means of analogy, consider the family of states |ψ(a)〉 = U(a)|ψ(0)〉 where U(a) is
again the group of spatial translations by a. The naive spatial location scheme would assign
parts (subspaces ofH) to spatial points {X} according to whether or not value of the index a
lies in {X}. But the claim that |ψ(a)〉 is ‘wholly located’ at the position a doesn’t make sense
since a merely denotes the spatial interval by which the state |ψ(0)〉 was translated. In general
|ψ(0)〉 will not be located anywhere in particular (unless an eigenstate of some P Qˆ(∆)) and
so |ψ(a)〉 picks out the same ‘part’ as |ψ(0)〉.
Exactly the same analysis applies to the temporal translations U(t). So to identify distinct
temporal parts the perdurantist needs a temporal localization scheme which assigns to
temporal intervals (proper) subspaces of the state space of the system, and so parts of |ψ〉: that
is, a Projection Valued Measure P Tˆ (∆) associated with a self-adjoint operator Tˆ . In order that
this scheme picks out genuine temporal parts, we should expect this scheme to covary with
time translations U(t)−1P Tˆ (∆)U(t) = P Tˆ (∆ + t) so that under a relabeling of the time axis
the labels change but not the parts.
Unfortunately for the would-be quantum perdurantist, it turns out that these requirements
are in conflict with the restriction on physical Hamiltonians known as the spectral condition,
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which permits only Hamiltonian operators with a spectrum bounded from below i.e. only
systems with a state of lowest energy. The usual argument for this is that to do otherwise
would allow for systems which may transfer energy to their surroundings indefinitely. While
it is true that all systems we know obey the spectral condition (e.g. a free particle or harmonic
oscillator), we could also view it as a principle of the theory on par with the second law of
thermodynamics.
Now, it is a theorem that if a self-adjoint Hamiltonian onH obeys the spectral condition
then there can be no time PVM that covaries with time translations (see Srinivas and
Vijayalakshmi (1981, Thm. 1) or Halvorson (2010)). Roughly, the spectral condition implies
that any two vectors inH related by a time translation are non-orthogonal, so that the only
assignment of temporal intervals to mutually orthogonal subspaces is P Tˆ (∆) = 0 for all ∆.8
Thus no quantum object has (proper) temporal parts.
It is worth emphasizing that the problem is not that we cannot find a covariant assignment
of temporal intervals to operators, but rather that there is no such assignment to projections on
H. So while it is the case that we can find a covariant mapping of intervals to operators in the
form a Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM), these assignments come without an
associated spectral decomposition ofH and, moreover, are non-unique (Hegerfeldt and Muga
2010). This failure to find a temporal decomposition of the state space into distinct subspaces
means that a quantum object cannot have temporal parts in the same way as it has spatial parts.
However, such POVM’s do provide a generalized resolution of the identity parameterized
by t so giving meaning to the notion of a temporal interval in terms of operators onH (Holevo
1982). Therefore I see no reason to deny that time should be afforded the status of a physical
parameter – although not one associated uniquely with a self-adjoint operator – and in this
8This implies there is no self-adjoint operator Tˆ canonically conjugate to the Hamiltonian.
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sense I disagree with Halvorson’s claim that “time [in quantum theory] is not a quantity at all
– not even an unobservable quantity” (Halvorson 2010, 1).
6. Conclusion For the perdurantist, the failure to find a temporal localization scheme has a
worrying implication for the claim that persisting quantum objects have temporal parts: If an
object has temporal parts then times should be associated uniquely with subspaces ofH just
as spatial regions are uniquely associated with spatial parts through a localization scheme
P Qˆ(∆). The claim that the part-whole relation applied to space is the same as the part-whole
relation applied to time is demonstrably false when applied to quantum objects. To the extent
that we have reason to think that all persisting objects are quantum objects, this provides
reason to doubt that perdurantism is true.9
In fact, the result we have demonstrates that only two temporal partitions are consistent
with the requirements: Either there are no temporal parts, or there is one part corresponding to
the entire history |ψ(t)〉. While I have argued that both these options are problematic for the
perdurantist, the former is consistent with endurantism since the endurantist maintains that
persisting objects have no temporal parts and no temporal width; the endurantist claims there
is exactly one persisting object existing at each moment, and so may consistently attribute to
that object at time t the state |ψ(t)〉.
9Arguably, classical persisting objects are best thought of as “patterns that emerge from an
ubiquitous, continuous, and very efficient process of decoherence.” Butterfield (2006, 41).
Decoherence refers to the process by which interactions between an ‘object’ system (e.g. a
dust particle) and its environment serve to pick out a dynamically ‘preferred’ basis according
to which the object system is approximately diagonalized. My argument concerns the basis
independent description of the entire system of object and environment.
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However, the latter option admits a valid four-dimensional interpretation which I call
temporal holism, corresponding to the idea that the quantum state has exactly one temporal
part comprising its entire history.10 This offers an interesting resolution of the problem of
persistence since it effectively denies that persisting objects change with time. It is distinct
from endurantism in that although the same object is present at each time it is never wholly
present; and distinct from perdurantism in the sense that although the persisting object exists
at many times, no part of it is ever wholly present either.
A similar view has been advocated by Rovelli (2004) on the basis of relativistic
considerations that he traces back to Dirac’s preference for the Heisenberg formulation of
quantum mechanics (in which the observables not the state are regarded as varying in time)
over the Schro¨dinger picture (adopted above, in which the state varies not the observables).
Since the Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg pictures are strictly equivalent within non-relativistic
quantum mechanics the situation there is effectively neutral with respect to temporal holism
and endurantism. Nonetheless, temporal holism may be thought to win out to the extent that
four-dimensionalism is encouraged by relativity, having ruled out perdurantism by the above
argument.
10This is similar to the ‘worm view’ advocated by Balashov (2010) in the context of special
relativity but there are obvious difficulties with describing quantum systems in terms of
world-tubes.
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It's Okay to Call Genetic Drift a Force
Charles H. Pence
Preprint, July 25, 2012
Abstract
One hotly debated philosophical question in the analysis of evolutionary
theory concerns whether or not evolution and the various factors which
constitute it (selection, drift, mutation, and so on) may profitably be consid-
ered to be forces in the traditional, Newtonian sense. Several compelling
arguments assert that the force picture is incoherent, due to the peculiar
nature of genetic drift. I consider two of those arguments here  that drift
lacks a predictable direction, and that drift is constitutive of evolutionary
systems  and show that they both fail to demonstrate that a view of genetic
drift as a force is untenable.
1. Introduction
The evolution of populations in nature is described in many ways, using a whole
host of smaller factors with extensive theories of their own: natural selection,
genetic drift, mutation, migration, linkage disequilibrium, meiotic drive, extinc-
tion, increase in complexity, and so on. The natural philosophical question, then,
is this: what is the relationship between these component theories and the
overall trajectory of evolution in the broad sense?
Work on this question has recently focused on the causal picture implied
by this relationship. Is evolution (as a whole) a causal process? Do some of the
smaller-scale theories describe causal processes? Which ones? And how do those
smaller-scale causal processes combine to produce the resultant trajectory of
populations through time? Two positions on these questions have crystallized.
One, the statisticalist interpretation of evolutionary theory (e.g., Walsh et al.,
2002; Matthen and Ariew, 2002), claims that both evolution as a whole and these
smaller-scale theories do not describe causal processes. Rather, the causal pro-
cesses at work exist at the level of individual organisms and their biochemistry:
individual instances of survivals, deaths, predations, mutations, and so forth. All
these theories, then, constitute quite useful, but not causal, ways in which we
may statistically combine events to enable us to grasp interesting trends within
populations of causally interacting individuals.
The other view, the causalist interpretation (e.g., Millstein, 2002, 2006;
Shapiro and Sober, 2007), considers all of these processes to be genuinely causal.
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Evolution causes changes in populations, as do selection, mutation, migration,
genetic drift, and so forth. How exactly we specify these causal processes varies 
for example, as different varieties of sampling (Hodge, 1987), as population-
level causes (Millstein, 2006), or as supervening on lower-level causes (Shapiro
and Sober, 2007)  but they are causal nonetheless.
This heated debate has produced much work on an allied problem which
will be the topic of my discussion here. It is a common pedagogical trope in the
teaching of biology to describe all of these smaller-scale theories as referring to
forces, each of which propels a population in a different direction through some
space (of morphologies, phenotypes, genotypes, etc.) with a different strength,
adding together in some sense to produce the population's overall evolutionary
trajectory over time. Crow and Kimura introduce a discussion of equilibrium
under selection pressure by noting that ordinarily one regards selection as
the strongest force influencing gene frequencies (1970, p. 262). Hartl and Clark
discuss the possibility of balancing mutation and drift, writing that there are
many forces in population genetics that act in opposition to one another, and it
is this tension that makes for interesting behavior at the population level. [ . . . ]
Merely because these two forces are in opposition, it does not guarantee that
there will be a stable balance between them (1997, p. 294). Strickberger argues
that since mutational equilibrium is not reached in many natural populations,
other forcesmust be responsible for the establishment of gene frequencies (1968,
p. 719). This pedagogical pattern is even common at the high school level: in a
chapter titled The Forces of Evolutionary Change, Lewis summarizes natural
selection, nonrandom mating, mutation, migration, and genetic drift in a force-
like diagram (1997, p. 412).
I have quoted from several textbooks to demonstrate the pervasiveness of
this `force' metaphor at all levels of biological pedagogy. But what of it? Why is
this particular biological turn of phrase of philosophical interest? In his original
introduction of what would become the causalist interpretation, Sober (1984)
described, influentially, evolutionary theory as a theory of forces. Sober'smetaphor
is intended to carry some genuine explanatory weight. Allowing, of course, that
the analogy here is not entirely precise, he claims that just as component, causal
forces are summed together to determine the net force acting on a body in
Newtonian dynamics, a force-like understanding is the right way to picture not
just themetaphorical structure of evolution, but its causal structure as well. Sober
writes that in addition to work on the history of life,
evolutionary biology has also developed a theory of forces. This de-
scribes the possible causes of evolution. The various models provided
by the theory of forces describe how a population will evolve if it be-
gins in a certain initial state and is subject to certain causal influences
along the way. (Sober, 1984, p. 27)
This viewmakes evolution, in the apt terminology deployed by Maudlin, a quasi-
Newtonian theory (2004, p. 431). There are, on the one hand, inertial laws
that describe how some entities behave when nothing acts on them, and then
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there are laws of deviation that specify in what conditions, and in what ways, the
behavior will deviate from the inertial behavior (Maudlin, 2004, p. 431). This is,
Maudlin notes, a very natural way for us to understand the behavior of systems:
whether or not the laws of a given system are amenable to such analysis, we like
to produce quasi-Newtonian theories.
But to deploy force language in this more substantive way brings Sober in
for another line of argument in addition to the critiques aimed at the causal view
in general.1 For we now must ask about the soundness of this appropriation of
Newtonian force. Should selection and drift be treated in this way, or not? One
recurring difficulty with adopting the force metaphor is the issue of genetic drift.
A common refrain in this debate claims that considering drift to be similar to a
Newtonian force is highly problematic.
In what follows, I will argue in favor of the force metaphor, by taking on
two arguments against the tenability of considering drift as a force. The first is
the (by now, well-trodden) claim that genetic drift, though its magnitude may
be determined by the effective population size, lacks a direction specifiable or
predictable in advance. Since all Newtonian forces, it is said,must have specifiable
magnitudes and directions, drift cannot be considered a force, and the metaphor
thus falls apart. The second argument claims that it is a category mistake to
consider drift a force which impinges upon populations. It is, rather, the default
state in which populations find themselves. All evolving populations necessarily
drift, and thus to describe drift as an external force is misleading. Both of these
critiques, I will show, miss the mark.
2. The Direction of Drift
It is by now an old chestnut in this debate that genetic drift lacks a specifiable or
predictable direction. Matthen and Ariew (2002, p. 61) note in a dismissive aside
that in any case, drift is not the sort of thing that can play the role of a force  it
does not have predictable and constant direction. Brandon (2006) adopts the
same argument, and it is one of the central motivations behind his development
of the zero-force evolutionary law (Brandon, 2006, 2010; McShea and Brandon,
2010).
The basic outline is straightforward. Genetic drift, often called random
drift, is a stochastic process. Consider a population which is uniformly heterozy-
gous for some allele Aa  all members of the population possess one copy of
the dominant allele (A) and one copy of the recessive allele (a). Assuming no
selection, mutation, or other evolutionary forces act on the population, genetic
drift will eventually drive this population toward homozygosity, uniformity at
either AA or aa, with one of the two alleles removed from the population. This
1. Early in the debate between causalists and statisticalists, this point was often missed  Matthen
and Ariew (2002), for example, take it to be a point against the causal interpretation itself that
genetic drift cannot be described as a force. This entails, at best, that the forcemetaphor should
be discarded, not that the causal interpretation is untenable, a point stressed by Stephens
(2004) and Millstein (2006).
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is because the homozygous states AA and aa are what we might call absorbing
barriers  once a population has lost all of its A or a alleles (and again, given
that there is no mutation), it is stuck at the uniform homozygous state. The
random walk of genetic drift will, given enough time, eventually arrive and
remain at one or the other of these permanent states.
Here, then, is the rub  the populationwill arrive at one of these states, but it
is impossible in advance to predictwhich onewill be its eventual fate. In this sense,
at least, the population-level outcome of genetic drift is random.2 It is obvious,
the argument concludes, that drift cannot act as a Newtonian force, because
Newtonian forces have directions that may be specified and predicted. Consider
natural selection. The direction in which selection will drive a population is
obvious, and is indeed specifiable in advance: selection will move populations in
the direction of increased fitness. Wemay even visualize the adaptive landscape
in the absence of any actual populations, specifying the direction of the selective
force prior to any actual population's experiencing it.3 Such analysis is clearly
impossible for drift, and drift cannot therefore be described as a force.
Two responses on behalf of the force metaphor have been offered. In our
initial discussion of drift above, drift was described fairly clearly in directional
terms: it drives populations toward homozygosity (Stephens, 2004, pp. 563564).
Insofar as this is a direction,wemay avoid the objection. There are several reasons
that we might be worried about this response, however. First, Filler has argued
persuasively that if we are too liberal with our force metaphor, we run the risk of
sapping the notion of `force' of all its explanatory power. Consider, for example,
Molière's classic satire of opium's dormitive virtue. We could construct a
fatigue-space in which sleep sits at the end of one axis, and then describe a
dormitive force which drives persons up the sleep axis. Ascribe this dormitive
force to opium, and we have come close to completing Molière's folly, providing
a nearly empty explanation for opium's causing sleep (Filler, 2009, pp. 779780).
If heterozygosity-space resembles fatigue-space in Filler's sense too closely,
then the toward homozygosity response to this objection fails.
Another worry about toward homozygosity as a direction for drift is that
it may mischaracterize what it is that drift is intended to describe. As mentioned
above, drift has a direction toward homozygosity insofar as (in the absence of
mutation and migration) homozygosity constitutes a set of absorbing barriers
for the state of a population. What drift is genuinely about, however, is not
the existence of these barriers  which are set by the mutation and migration
constraints  but rather the population's behavior between these barriers. This
toward homozygosity direction of genetic drift, therefore, is not a feature of
drift itself, but defined by other parts of evolutionary theory; thinking that
2. The sense of stochastic and random at work here is, therefore, a subjective one. Whether
or not there exists a stronger type of stochasticity underlying genetic drift, and what exactly
this sense might amount to, seems to hinge in large part on the result of the debate over drift's
causal potency (see Rosenberg, 2001).
3. Though see Pigliucci and Kaplan (2006) for some of the difficulties with the adaptive landscape
metaphor.
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toward homozygosity is a feature of drift thus may be mistaken.
We have several independent reasons, then, for suspecting that the de-
fense of the force view by appeal to drift's direction toward homozygosity is
problematic. If this is true, we must look for another way to resolve the trouble
with drift's direction, and the second available response turns to the definition of
`force' itself. Perhaps the trouble with the objection lies in its rigorous adherence
to the claim that forces must have directions predictable in advance.4 Could we
discard this requirement without discarding the extra explanatory power that
the notion of a `force' provides us?
One attempt to do so is offered by Filler (2009, pp. 780782). He argues that
we may harvest two specific criteria for forces from the literature on Newtonian
systems: namely, that forces be both precisely numerically specifiable in mag-
nitude and able to unify our explanations of a large array of phenomena. Such
criteria, it is presumed (though not argued), would forestall the dormitive force
while permitting genetic drift. Even if they do not, however, Filler notes that
we could still posit a continuum of forces with maximally precise and unifying
forces on one end and mathematically vague and weakly unifying forces on the
other (Filler, 2009, p. 781).
What of this attempt to salvage the force view? In general, I am broadly
sympathetic with the response of carefully weakening the criteria for `force'-
hood. I would like, however, to support the same conclusion by a slightly different
line of argument. While the literature that Filler cites to establish mathemati-
cal specifiability and unifying power as desiderata for forces is valuable, I am
concerned about it for two reasons. First, given that these criteria are offered
by Filler without providing an analysis of genetic drift or any other forces, they
seem dangerously close to being ad-hoc additions to our force concept. Is there a
principled argument for why these criteria should replace that of directionality,
in general? Second, Filler does not offer a direct argument that genetic drift
passes these criteria, so we can't yet be sure that the argument he provides gives
us the result that we're looking for. I believe both of these deficits can be reme-
died by comparing genetic drift to a different force that is standardly invoked in
Newtonian dynamics: Brownian motion.
2.1. Brownian Motion
My claim, then, is this: whatever our general analysis of a force winds up being,
it happens to be the case that we already countenance examples of forces that do,
indeed, have stochastically specified directions, namely, the force of Brownian
motion. This argument is admittedly less ambitious than that of Filler  we do
not, for example, wind up with enough theoretical resources to fully specify
the continuum from paradigm cases of forces to fringe cases. But we do have
precisely what we need to countenance genetic drift as a force, for genetic drift,
4. The claim that forces must have specifiable directions appears, at least, in Matthen and Ariew
(2002); Stephens (2004); Brandon (2005); and Brandon (2006).
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Figure 1: A simulation of a particle released at (0, 0) undergoing Brownian
movement. Inspired by Perrin's drawing of the Brownian motion of colloidal
particles in water, viewed under the microscope (fig. 6 of Perrin, 1909, p. 81).
it turns out, can be formulated precisely analogously to the force of Brownian
motion.
Brownian motion is a common occurrence. The behavior of dust particles
as they float through a sunny window or a glass of water is governed in large
part by the manner in which they collide with the molecules of the fluid in which
they are suspended (see Figure 1). Since the motion of the fluid molecules is itself
modeled stochastically (with the tools of statistical mechanics), it is unsurprising
that Brownian motion in turn is a stochastic force.
What does the formal representation of a stochastic classical force look
like? The now-standard derivation of the mathematics of Brownian motion was
provided by Langevin in 1908 (translated in Lemons and Gythiel, 1997):
m
d2x
dt2
= −6piµa
dx
dt
+ X. (1)
This is a stochastic differential equation, with x representing the location of
the particle within the fluid,m its mass, a damping coefficient −6piµa (which
describes the manner in which the viscosity of the fluid through which the
particle moves slows its travel), and a random noise term X, which describes
the actual effect of the collisions with fluid molecules.
A few observations about this equation are in order. First, it is written as
an equation for a force:m · d2x/dt2 is just mass times acceleration, so we could
equivalently have written F = −6piµa · dx/dt + X. Nor need one quibble that
the differential equation specifying this force references the particle's velocity,
dx/dt. Equations for many other forces do so as well, including friction in air or
6
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water (drag). Secondly, the source of the randomness here is obvious, coming
entirely from the noise term X. About it, Langevin says that we know that
it is indifferently positive and negative and that its magnitude is such that it
maintains the agitation of the particle, which the viscous resistance would stop
without it (Lemons and Gythiel, 1997, p. 1081).
Finally, the force described by this equation bears all of the same prob-
lematic characteristics as genetic drift. Most importantly, its direction can by
no means be predicted in advance: nothing about the direction of the force de-
scribed by equation (1) is determinate in this sense. It depends entirely on the
noise term which, as Langevin notes, indifferently (that is to say, randomly)
changes sign and magnitude as the system evolves. The same is, of course, true
of genetic drift, under which an allele frequency is equally likely to increase
or decrease at each point in time. The example of Brownian motion, therefore,
offers us a case in which the notion of `force' is weakened in precisely the way
required to countenance genetic drift  by admitting forces that vary in direction
stochastically over time.
The opponents of the force view still have one obvious way to respond to
this argument. They might reject outright the extension of force talk to both
Brownian motion and genetic drift. While this is a perfectly coherent choice, I am
not certain what the motivation for it would be. Of course, when we introduce a
stochastic force, we introduce an element of unpredictability into our system,
rendering null one of the primary benefits of a classical, force-based picture: the
ability to use information about component force values to make determinate
advance predictions about the behavior of systems. But we already lack the ability
to make such detailed predictions of individual biological systems  why would
we think that a force-based view of evolutionary theory would somehow make
them possible? The question, rather, is simply whether it is possible to maintain
a net-force picture of evolutionary theory which includes the randomness
of genetic drift, and the example of Brownian motion shows this to be clearly
achievable, should we be inclined to do so.
Further, just because the values are not predictable in advance does not
mean that these stochastic forces somehow cannot be taken into account in the
development of models. The Wright-Fisher model of genetic drift has spawned
much research in population genetics as a computational/mathematical model
of the action of genetic drift, and, similarly, Brownian motion can be taken into
account in models of fluid dynamics when it is taken to be an important factor
(see, e.g., Huilgol and Phan-Thien, 1997).
Finally, it seems that many authors in the debates over the causal structure
of evolution either explicitly tolerate or make room for forces of different sorts
such as these. McShea and Brandon, for example, when discussing how we might
arrive at the correct distribution of evolutionary causes into forces, note their
skepticism that there are objective matters of fact that settle what counts as
forces in a particular science, and so what counts as the zero-force condition
(2010, p. 102). That is, while facts can settle what causal influences are at work in
a given system, they cannot, according to McShea and Brandon, settle how we
7
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partition these causal processes into forces. Even the statisticalist analysis of
Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew describes as a paradigm case of Newtonian, dynamical
explanation the case of a feather, affected not only by the force of gravity but
also by attractive forces from other bodies, electromagnetic forces, forces imparted
by random movements of the air molecules, etc. (2002, p. 454, emph. added). I claim
that without further argument, there is little reason to dogmatically adhere to
the requirement that forces have directions specifiable in advance.
3. Drift as Constitutive of Evolutionary Systems
Another line of attack on the force view, marshaled by Brandon, doesn't turn
on the appropriateness of stochastic-direction forces. Rather, it claims that it
is a category mistake (or something close to it) to consider drift as an external
force that acts on biological systems. Drift, on the contrary, is part and parcel
of a constitutive process of any evolutionary system, and is therefore necessarily
found in any set of circumstances in which evolution is possible. Force talk, on
the other hand, should be reserved for forces which appear in special circum-
stances. In the biological case, mutation, selection, and migration (among others)
are special forces, but drift, as a constitutive component of evolution, is not
 it is part of the zero-force state of evolutionary systems (Brandon, 2006, p.
325).
To help elucidate this argument further, return to Maudlin's discussion
of quasi-Newtonian systems as mentioned in the introduction (2004, p. 431).
Maudlin points out a very valuable psychological or motivational distinction
between our inertial or zero-force laws and our deviation or force laws. Namely,
the zero-force conditions are supposed to be what influences a body when, in
some particularly relevant sense, nothing is happening to it. The appropriate sense
of nothing happening is obviously domain-relative, and Brandon's claim seems
to be precisely that placing drift on the side of the force laws is a poor definition
of nothing happening. When nothing is happening to a biological system, he
argues, it drifts.
Again, let's turn to an analogy with classical mechanics. Classical mechanics
has its own set of highly pervasive forces, and for each of these we have made the
implicit decision to consider that force not as part of the inertial conditions, but as
a deviation from those conditions. Take gravitation, for example. We might reply
to Brandon's objection that gravitation is as universal in Newtonian systems as
genetic drift is in evolutionary systems. Applying the logic of Brandon's objection
here, then, Newton's first law is incorrectly formulated. Gravitation should be
considered part of the default or zero-force state of Newtonian mechanics.
While this isn't an outright reductio, it strikes me that any discussion of forces
which fails to handle the paradigm case of Newtonian gravitation is seriously
flawed.
I suspect, however, that the supporter of this objection would reply that
there is an important and salient difference between genetic drift and gravitation.
8
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While there may be no Newtonian system which in fact exhibits no gravitational
effects, it is possible to describe in Newtonian terms a system that would not
be subject to gravitation  either by dialing the gravitational constant G back
to zero, or by imagining the behavior of an isolated test mass at infinity, in-
finitely distant from all other mass in the universe. Gravitation therefore is not
necessary for the description of a Newtonian system in the way that drift is for an
evolutionary system.
It is not obvious to me, however, that there is any conceptual difficulty in
abstracting genetic drift away from an evolutionary system. Imagine an infinite
population with individuals initially equally distributed among four possible
genotypes, A, B, C, andD. Parents produce offspring identical to themselves,
modulo a small mutation rate. There exists a selective force, which causes types
C andD to have a 10% chance of dying before reaching reproductive age. Finally,
the reproductive output of each type in the next generation is set in advance:
say that all types produce exactly one offspring if they survive to reproductive
age, and then die. Here we have an example of a thought experiment on which
selection exerts an influence (types C and D will clearly eventually die out),
mutation has an influence (due to the non-zero mutation rate), but genetic drift
has none. The population is infinite, so we have no bottleneck effects or effects
of finite population size. Further, each individual has a guaranteed reproductive
outcome from birth, based upon its type  and to the extent that these outcomes
are probabilistic, this is the influence of selection or mutation, not drift. Indeed,
we can predict that in the infinite limit, the population will consist of roughly
halfA organisms and half B.5
Is there anything more outlandish about this drift-free toy model than an
example consisting of a universe containing only one isolated and non-extended
point mass, free of gravitation, or a test mass at infinite distance from all other
masses? Clearly there are no infinite populations in the real world, but here
it seems we have a perfectly tenable thought-experiment on which we may
separate the effect of drift from all the other evolutionary forces, and then
reduce that effect to zero. There is nothing any more constitutive about drift
for evolutionary systems than there is about gravitation for Newtonian systems.
4. Conclusion
I have here considered two arguments against the conceptual tenability of con-
sidering genetic drift as a force like those of Newtonian dynamics. The first
asserted that genetic drift lacks a predictable direction. This argument fails by
virtue of an analogy with Brownian motion: if Brownian motion is a satisfactory
force (and, I have argued, it is), then so is genetic drift. The second argument
against drift-as-force proposed that drift is a constitutive feature of evolutionary
systems. This argument fails because accepting its premises results in a misun-
5. With a small, but predictable, fraction of newly-arisenmutants. I am indebted to Grant Ramsey's
thoughts on drift for helping me devise this example.
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derstanding of the relationship between Newtonian gravitation and inertia.
I have, of course, done nothing here to resolve the overall debate between
the causal and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. But the utility of
the forcemetaphor in the description of evolutionary systemsmakes it something
worth defending  and it continues to survive the host of objections raised against
it.
10
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[Abstract: We show that the common claim that internal validity should be understood as 
prior to external validity has, at least, three epistemologically problematic aspects: 
experimental artefacts, the implications of causal relations, and how the mechanism is 
measured. Each aspect demonstrates how important external validity is for the internal 
validity of the experimental result.] 
 
1) Internal and external validity: perceived tension and claimed priority 
Donald T. Campbell introduced the concepts internal and external validity in the 1950s. 
Originally designed for research related to personality and personality change, the use of 
this conceptual pair was soon extended to educational and social research. Since then it has 
spread to many more disciplines. 
Without a doubt the concepts captures two features of research scientists are aware of in 
their daily practice. Researchers aim to make correct inferences both about that which is 
actually studied (internal validity), for instance in an experiment, and about what the 
results ‘generalize to’ (external validity). Whether or not the language of internal and 
external validity is used in their disciplines, the tension between these two kinds of 
inference is often experienced.  
In addition, it is often claimed that one of the two is prior to the other. And the sense in 
which internal validity is often claimed to be prior to external validity is both temporal and 
epistemic, at least. For instance, Francisco Guala claims that:  
“Problems of internal validity are chronologically and epistemically antecedent to 
problems of external validity: it does not make much sense to ask whether a result is valid 
outside the experimental circumstances unless we are confident that it does therein” 
(Guala, 2003, 1198). 
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The claim about temporal priority is that we first make inferences about the local 
environment under study before making inferences about the surrounding world. The claim 
about epistemic priority is that we come to know the local environment before we come to 
know the surrounding world. 
In the following we problematize the relation between external and internal validity. Our 
claim is that the two types of validity are deeply intertwined. However, we are not going to 
attempt to argue for the full claim. We argue only in favour of the part of the claim that is 
in conflict with the idea behind the internal/external distinction. The argument is directed 
at showing that internal validity understood as prior to external validity has, at least, three 
epistemologically problematic aspects: experimental artefacts, the implications of causal 
relations, and how the mechanism is measured. We exemplify the problems associated 
with experimental artefacts and mechanism measurement by cases from experimental 
psychology. Each aspect demonstrates how important external validity is for the internal 
validity of the experimental result.  
We end the paper by presenting a different kind of test. Lee Cronbach claims that internal 
validity, as interpreted by the later Campbell, is a rather meaningless feature of scientific 
results. If we are right, a Cronbachian attack on internal validity in general must also be 
mistaken. Since on our understanding internal and external validity are intertwined a 
successful attack on internal validity would threaten to have adverse effects on external 
validity. To be consistent with our standpoint the particular conception Cronbach attacks 
should pinpoint other features than the concept of internal validity has traditionally been 
assumed to capture. 
 
2) What is internal and external validity? 
It is impossible to evaluate whether the perceived tension and the claimed priority of 
internal validity are justified unless we know more precisely what it is that we make 
internally valid inferences about and what this validity is supposed to consist in. Below we 
present three formulations of internal and external validity:  
Campbell’s early conception: “First, and as a basic minimum, is what can be called 
internal validity: did in fact the experimental stimulus make some significant difference in 
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this specific instance? The second criterion is that of external validity, representativeness, 
or generalizability: to what populations, settings, and variables can this effect be 
generalized?” (Campbell 1957, 297).  
Guala’s recent conception: “Internal validity is achieved when the structure and behavior 
of a laboratory system (its main causal factors, the ways they interact, and the phenomena 
they bring about) have been properly understood by the experimenter. For example: the 
result of an experiment E is internally valid if the experimenter attributes the production of 
an effect B to a factor (or set of factors) A, and A really is the (or a) cause of B in E. 
Furthermore, it is externally valid if A causes B not only in E, but also in a set of other 
circumstances of interest, F, G, H, etc.” (Guala 2003, 1198).  
Campbell’s later conception: “In the new contrast, external […] validity involve[s] theory. 
Local molar causal validity [, i.e. internal validity,] does not. While this contrast is 
weakened in the principle of proximal similarity [i.e. external validity], I still want to retain 
it. The principle of proximal similarity is normally (and it should be) implemented on the 
basis of expert intuition. […] Our intuitive expectations about what dimensions are 
relevant are theory-like, even if they are not formally theoretical. Moreover, clinical 
experience, prior experimental results, and formal theory are very appropriate guides for 
efforts to make the exploration of the bounds of generalizability more systematic.” 
(Campbell 1986, 76) 
Campbell’s early conception and Guala’s conception show similarity in how they 
understand external validity. It is about how to generalize what has been found internally. 
Campbell’s later conception differs from both in that the connection between local causal 
claims and general claims is weakened. The word “local” emphasizes that the claimed 
validity is limited to “the context of particular treatments, outcomes, times, settings, and 
persons studied” (Shadish et al. 2002, 54). Local causal claims are “molar” as well. 
Campbell exemplifies it in the following way: “For the applied scientist, local molar causal 
validity is a first crucial issue and the starting point for the other validity questions. For 
example, did this complex treatment package make a real difference in this unique 
application at this particular place and time?” (Campbell 1986, 69). There is no guarantee 
that molar claims refer directly to a potential cause. A true molar claim entails merely that 
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something in the complex it captures is a cause. The difference between Campbell’s later 
conception and Guala’s conception is considerable in that respect. Guala’s internal validity 
requires that we understand the causal mechanism that operates in the local case. The later 
Campbell explicitly opposes such a view as generally true of internal validity. Applied 
scientists also need internal validity, but they can normally not analyse causation with such 
precision; “to stay with our problems, we must use techniques that, while improving the 
validity of our research, nonetheless provide less clarity of causal inference than would a 
retreat to narrowly specified variables under laboratory control” (Campbell 1986, 70-71). 
The difference between Campbell’s earlier and later understanding of internal validity 
seems to be one of emphasis primarily. However, the difference between their views of 
external validity is more significant. External validity is not in general established through 
representative sampling, and it is not a matter of simple inductive generalisation. First, a 
cause has to be extracted from the molar situation and then the causal relation is exported 
to proximally similar cases. 
For each of these conceptions there are epistemologically problematic aspects of internal 
validity. We will focus on three: experimental artefacts, the implications of causal 
relations, and the measurement of mechanism. 
 
3) Epistemology—the problem of experimental artefacts  
Can there be such a thing as an internally valid inference? That clearly depends on whether 
the methods we use guarantee that we see clearly, i.e. that what we see in the local 
environment is not in fact an artefact of something else. But some well-known “internally 
valid” results have in fact been generated by, for instance, the method of randomization or 
measurement used.  
 
3a) Overconfidence—experimental artefacts 
Overconfidence is a psychological phenomenon that refers to an overrating of the 
correctness of one’s judgements. Typically, participants are asked knowledge questions 
such as “Which city has more inhabitants? Hyderabad or Islamabad?” and are asked to rate 
how confident they are that their answer on this particular question is correct on a scale 
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from 50% to 100%. Overconfidence occurs when the mean subjective probability assigned 
to how correct responses are is higher than the proportion of correct answers. In contrast a 
participant is calibrated if:  “…over the long run, for all propositions assigned a given 
probability, the proportion that is true equals the probability assigned” (Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff and Philips, 1982). 
The overconfidence effect can, however, be made to disappear under certain experimental 
conditions. Some authors (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting, 1991; Juslin, 1994) 
have claimed that the overconfidence effect is simply an effect of unrepresentative 
sampling. The basic idea behind the critique is that participants need a certain amount of 
information in order to make a correct estimate of their performance on a task. When this 
is not available, they will instead draw on their more general knowledge of the area. If I 
have no clear intuition on whether Islamabad or Hyderabad is the biggest city in the 
question above, I might use the knowledge I have of my general competency in geography 
or what I know about the capitals of Asian countries to produce a confidence judgement. 
That means that if the knowledge questions are sampled in a skewed way so that they 
contain more difficult questions than are normally encountered, participants will exhibit 
overconfidence (i.e. miscalibration). If the knowledge questions posed are instead 
randomly sampled from representative environments, the overconfidence effect disappears 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Juslin, 1994).  
The early experiments investigating overconfidence were clearly internally valid in the 
sense that results were robust: The experimental stimuli produced judgments that had the 
properties of overconfidence. However, they appear to be experimental artefacts, and slight 
variations in the experimental set up will change the results. There are, however, even 
more serious allegations against overconfidence – allegations that are especially interesting 
in this context. In a second set of critique against overconfidence authors such as Ido Erev 
(Erev, Wallsten and Budescu, 1994) and Peter Juslin (Juslin, Winman and Olson, 2000) 
claim that overconfidence (and the related hard-easy effect which we will not discuss here) 
is a product of regression towards the mean. Overconfidence occurs because a participant 
responding to a difficult task (as the one described above) is more likely to overestimate 
correctness than underestimating it. In the extreme, a participant that responds at a chance 
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level cannot be underconfident given the scale 50% to 100% certain that the response is 
correct. This explains also why the representatively sampled knowledge questions (of 
intermediate difficulty) made the overconfidence effect disappear. The artefact is not 
produced by the knowledge questions as such, but depend rather on features inherent in the 
experimental situation: it is difficult to conceptualize a scale measuring certainty that 
would not have endpoints such as these.  
 
4) Epistemology—the problem of causation 
Whether there can be an internally valid inference also depends on the nature of what is 
inferred to. Normally, as we have seen in 2) the inference is causal. Now, there are many 
concepts of causation. Some of these are clearly of a kind that does not support inferences 
that are primarily internally. For instance, someone operating with a notion of causation 
similar to one of those that Kant, Hume, or Mill relied on will judge internally valid 
inferences to causal matters impossible. For each of those causal concepts the implications 
of causation, regardless of whether it has to do with the notion of sufficiency or necessity, 
go beyond the local environment. If there is a causal relation in the local environment it 
follows that this holds also outside this environment. And, trivially, it holds that if it does 
not hold outside the environment it cannot hold inside either. Hence such concepts of 
causation warrant neither the alleged temporal nor epistemological priority of internal 
validity. 
It is in fact a long distance between traditional causal concepts and causation that is 
suitable for being primarily internally validly inferred to. However, more than one 
advocate of randomised controlled trials adopts a view on which an intervention study 
underwrites a positive causal inference. Consider the following quote from David 
Papineau: 
“You take a sample of people with the disease. You divide them into two groups at 
random. You give one group the treatment, withhold it from the other [...] and judge on 
this basis whether the probability of recovery in the former group is higher. If it is, then T 
[treatment] must now cause R [recovery], for the randomization will have eliminated the 
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danger of any confounding factors which might be responsible for a spurious correlation.” 
(Papineau 1994, 439) 
This is excessively optimistic for reasons having to do with the possible artefacts of 
randomization (cf. Shadish et al., 2002, Ch. 2) and the more general points that we have 
already pressed, but that is, not the present point. Let us assume that randomization is 
successful in the desired respect. Papineau’s modified position seems to rely on a concept 
of causation given which in the relevant cases causation is entailed by (i.e. is 
unproblematically inferable from) the fact that the relative frequency of R in the 
intervention group is higher than it is in the control. Thus, for instance, the concept of 
cause employed is not that causes are sufficient in the circumstances, nor that they are 
necessary. This is plainly not so since neither kind of causation is entailed by the 
experimental fact (cf. Persson 2009).  
 
5) Epistemology—the measurement of mechanism 
How mechanisms are measured has a strong impact on the results obtained. As we saw in 
the case of overconfidence the choice of measurements can have unintended side effects, 
but the relation between how stimuli are presented and the effects that are measured is 
more complex than so. An interesting example comes from psychophysics and concerns 
range effects, i.e., effects due to the fact that participants receive more than one 
experimental condition.  
 
5a) Range effects– the measurement of mechanism 
Poulton (1975) presents a number of different range effects demonstrating how the order in 
which stimuli is presented in itself affect the result, or the type of mechanism that is being 
observed (an “unbiased” perceptual judgment, or judgments mediated by range effects – in 
themselves mechanisms).  We will use the simplest example, where the range in which a 
stimulus is presented influences how far apart different stimuli are judged to be. In the case 
of Figure 1 the slope of perceived distances between stimuli is radically different when the 
end points are L1 and L2, rather than S1 and S2 when ∅ represents the physical magnitude 
and ψ the subjective (perceived) magnitude. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 POULTON; SEE LAST PAGE] 
Figure 1. Adapted from Poulton, 1968.  
 
Since participants’ pre-conceptions of what the range of stimuli is will affect their 
responses, the “external validity” of the stimuli (in this context how well the range it 
introduces, or the range the experimenter assumes, matches participants’ pre-conceived 
range of stimuli) determines whether the results obtained in the laboratory correctly 
capture the features of the mechanism operating there. Hence, in cases like these, external 
validity is a requirement for internal validity. Note that this potentially false estimate of the 
function has prefect internal validity. Given the range, the stimuli really do cause the 
response, and we have a fair grasp of what the mechanisms are.  
Poulton himself, however, treats the results differently than we do: “All experimental data 
are not equally valuable. A theoretical model is unlikely to be better than the data which 
has shaped it. If data are of restricted validity as a result of unrepresentative sampling or 
the independent variables or of uncontrolled transfer effects, a model based upon the data 
is not likely to have great generality. This is the case however much data the model can fit, 
provided all the data has been generated using the same inadequate techniques of sampling 
or experimentation” (Poulton 1968, 1). We do not disagree with Poulton, but in contrast to 
him we emphasize that the core issue here is how internal validity is to be guaranteed 
unless range effects are properly understood. And this will happen only when extra-
experimental factors (such as participants’ pre conception of the range that is to be 
introduced) are properly understood. Thus we would like to maintain that the case of the 
perceptual mechanisms at the mercy of range effects internal and external validity cannot 
be treated as separate entities.  
 
6. The difficulty of adapting systems 
A straightforward extension of the above observations about the co-dependence of external 
and internal validity is to be found in Egon Brunswik’s work on representativeness. What 
he adds to the discussion is a focus on the difficulties in observing an organism that adapts 
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to the circumstances in which it exists: “The concept inherent in functionalism that 
psychology is the science dealing with the adjustment of organisms to the environment in 
which they actually live suggest the need of testing any obtained stimulus-response 
relationship in such a way that the habitat of the individual, group, or species is represented 
with all of its variables, and that the specific values of these variables are kept in 
accordance with the frequencies in which they actually happen to be distributed.” 
(Brunswik, 1944, 69).   
Note, however, that here the focus is exclusively on the adaptive character of human 
cognition (in Brunswik’s case the perceptual system). If the aim of an experiment in 
psychology is to understand the functioning of different psychological mechanisms (in the 
form of stimulus-response relations), then the quality of this finding is just as dependent on 
whether the psychological mechanism has been properly activated as it is on whether the 
results can be replicated. This is not only a question about how the result will generalize to 
other settings (external validity) – it is a question about whether a proper result has at all 
been generated (internal validity). Thus, for psychological mechanisms that can be 
assumed to have an adaptive character, external validity (or certain aspects of it) appears to 
be prior to internal validity: It is more important that an experiment measures what it aims 
to measure than that the result internally valid.  
 
6a Is the study object human cognition or the environment? 
Egon Brunswik is one of the psychologists that have most clearly advanced the idea that 
external validity has to be taken into account if we are to understand the human mind at all. 
In his own words:  “psychology has forgotten that it is a science of organism-environment 
relationships, and has become a science of the organism” (Brunswik, 1957, 6). His remedy 
to this difficulty was the notion of representative design (Brunswik, 1955), and, in 
particular, his use of representative sampling while studying perceptual constants 
(Brunswik 1944). 
In his 1944 study, Brunswik wanted to understand whether the retinal size of an object 
could be used to predict its actual size. In order to establish the relationship between retinal 
size and object size, participants were followed for several weeks and stopped at random 
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intervals. For whatever object they were looking at, at that point, retinal size, object size, 
and distance were measured. Since the objects taken into account were the objects actually 
attended to by participants in their daily environments, Brunswik could estimate the real-
life predictive power of retinal size for object size. His conclusion was that the retinal size 
had some predictive power regardless of the distance to the object.  
Note that Brunswik’s method as described here is only a method for understanding the 
environment. In order to explain how participants judge the size of objects, it has to be 
combined with a demonstration that retinal size is used to predict object size. However, the 
controlled experiment that can be used to test this hypothesis will not help us understand 
how predictive retinal size is of object size. This requires a method such as Brunswik’s. 
Note also that the method of representative sampling is only possible in so far as the 
researcher already has a clear understanding of the cognitive process under investigation. 
Unless we have some idea of which aspects of the environment are accessed by the 
cognitive mechanism, methodological shortcuts such as representative sampling are not 
possible. Simply stated, we have to know what to measure in order to measure it, also 
when the measurement is done through random sampling. Campbell, of course, notes this 
problematic issue in the context of random sampling of participants (note the difference in 
emphasis). He points out that: “… the validity of generalizations to other persons, settings, 
and future (or past) times would be a function of the validity of the theory involved, plus 
the accuracy of the theory-relevant knowledge of the persons, settings, and future periods 
to which one wanted to generalize […]. This perspective has already moved us far from 
the widespread concept that one can solve generalizability problems by representative 
sampling from a universe specified in advance” (Campbell 1986, 71).  
Also other methodologically inclined psychologists have reflected upon the co dependency 
of the environment and the agent. Often this is conceptualized as the difficulty of 
understanding whether what is being observed is a feature of the participant’s internal 
processing or a feature of the task environment. Thus Ward Edwards (1971) observes that:  
“My own guess is that most successful models now available [in psychology] are 
successful exactly because of their success in describing tasks, not people …modelling 
tasks is different from modelling people, [we need] to hunt for tools for modelling tasks, 
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and to provide linkages between models of tasks and models of people”. And this difficulty 
has it roots in precisely the difficulty of making controlled experiments that observe 
features of a cognitive system designed for adapting to the circumstances. Or in 
Campbell’s own words: “Both criteria [external and internal validity] are obviously 
important although it turns out that they are to some extent incompatible, in that the 
controls required for internal validity often tend to jeopardize representativeness” 
(Campbell 1957, 297).  
 
7) Cronbach’s challenge 
Let us now set the objections against the possibility of internally valid inferences aside. Let 
us grant that the problems of randomization, measurement and causation can be dissolved 
by appropriate adaptive measures. Even so the question whether internal validity should be 
given priority remains: 
“I consider it pointless to speak of causes when all that can be validly meant by reference 
to a cause in a particular instance is that, on one trial of a partially specified manipulation t 
under conditions A, B, and C, along with other conditions not named, phenomenon P was 
observed. To introduce the word cause seems pointless. Campbell’s writings make internal 
validity a property of trivial, past-tense, and local statements.” (Cronbach 1982, 137) 
Cronbach’s point translates nicely to what we have argued here. To the extent that there is 
a variety of causation that can be fully examined in such a way that it underwrites a 
positive causal inference—for instance, by a randomized controlled trial—then that variety 
of causation is not very scientifically valuable. What should we do with these past tense, 
local statements concerning highly artificial experimental contexts? They seem trivial as 
scientific results. The only way this kind of trivial causal statements could prove useful is 
if they connect with more substantial ones. In other words, internal validity of this kind 
could have a value in relation to external validity as providing one of the instances 
externally valid claims have to be true about. Now, internal validity is not prior to external 
validity in any interesting sense. If anything, it seems secondary. It should be noted that 
Campbell (1986, 70) acknowledges this: “The theories and hunches used by those who put 
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the therapeutic package together must, of course, be regarded as corroborated, however 
tentatively, if there is an effect of local, molar validity in the expected direction”. 
However, this relationship between internal and external validity is important. Cronbach’s 
challenge might be reconstructed as a counter argument to our claim that internal and 
external validity are intertwined. It might be constructed as the view that internal validity is 
redundant. As we have seen our response is: 1) to the extent that the causation internal 
validity concerns is substantial, external validity is needed as part of the evidence; 2) to the 
extent that the causation is of a trivial form, this kind of causation might still be important 
as one of the instances that is needed to prove external validity. (There is, of course, a third 
possibility as well, that all genuine causation is local.) 
 
8) Priorities reconsidered 
However critical we have been of attempts to prioritize internal validity, there is a last 
argument that can be made in its favour, and it is elegantly (and fittingly) made by 
Campbell in the following passage: “If one is in a situation where either internal validity or 
representativeness must be sacrificed, which should it be? The answer is clear. Internal 
validity is the prior and indispensable consideration. The optimal design is, of course, one 
having both internal and external validity. Insofar as such settings are available, they 
should be exploited, without embarrassment from the apparent opportunistic warping of 
the content of studies by the availability of laboratory techniques. In this sense, a science is 
as opportunistic as a bacteria culture and grows only where growth is possible. One basic 
necessity for such growth is the machinery for selecting among alternative hypotheses, no 
matter how limited those hypotheses may have to be.” (Campbell 1957, 310). Although we 
do not believe that internal and external validity can be treated separately – or even chosen 
between in the way suggested by Campbell – we fully agree that scientific research will 
have to take whatever routes are available.  
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Physical Symmetries, Overarching Symmetries, and Consistency
Abstract
In this paper I provide an account of physical symmetries, which are defined relative to a specific 
physical theory, and overarching symmetries, which hold across many different physical 
theories. I outline two general strategies for uniting disparate physical symmetries under the 
same overarching symmetry, calling the first “realist” and the second “conventionalist”. Finally, 
I argue that, should physicists and philosophers be interested in finding symmetries that do 
interesting and helpful physical and metaphysical work, the realist strategy would serve them 
better than the conventionalist strategy.
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1. Introduction
Symmetries play an important role in our understanding of our best physical theories, 
giving us important information both about the world and the physical theories we posit to aptly 
represent the world. The project of this paper is to provide an account of two kinds of 
symmetries and justify a particular approach to investigating these symmetries. I divide 
symmetries into two classes, namely “physical” symmetries defined within the context of a 
specific physical theory and “overarching” symmetries defined across numerous physical 
theories. My first task in this paper is to provide an account of physical symmetries; however, 
most of this paper will focus on overarching symmetries and the relationship between 
overarching and physical symmetries. In particular, I will discuss “realism” and 
“conventionalism”, two different stances towards certain overarching symmetries, and provide 
several examples of how overarching symmetries may guide scientific inquiry. My central claim 
is that should we wish to use overarching symmetries as guides to what theories we should 
accept as the best successors to rejected theories, guides to the underlying metaphysical structure 
of the world, or indicators of inter-theoretic incompatibilities, we ought to take overarching 
symmetries to act “realist”-ically across physical theories. I thus argue that both realists and 
conventionalists have good reason to care about overarching symmetries that act consistently 
across different physical theories.
2. What are Physical Symmetries?
Symmetries are of interest because they reveal meaningful operations under which basic 
structures are preserved. For instance, a starfish's radial symmetry tells us that the starfish's shape 
is preserved under rotations of certain intervals. And so in fundamental physics as well, what 
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counts as a symmetry is a kind of operation that leaves a certain structure invariant1. There are 
essentially three features one must identify in order to understand any symmetry: the objects 
acted on by the symmetry, the way in which the symmetry transforms those objects, and the 
relevant structure(s) left invariant by the symmetry. Theses three features are invariably linked. 
Consider spacetime symmetries in special relativity, for instance. Such symmetries are maps 
from spacetime points to spacetime points that leave the Minkowski spacetime interval invariant. 
These symmetries are thus maps from points defined on a particular topological space 
(spacetime) to points on that same particular topological space that leave some particular feature 
of those points (the spacetime interval between points) invariant. In order to better understand 
theory-relative physical symmetries, then, we should investigate the sorts of topological spaces 
and invariant structures utilized by all physical theories.
Physical theories, as I use the term for the purposes of this paper2, are essentially ordered 
tuples of the form <E,X,U,N>, where E is the set of equations utilized by a particular theory, X is 
the set of all independent variables appearing in the equations in E,3 U is the set of all dependent 
variables appearing in the equations in E, and N is the “interpretation function” of that physical 
1 Something like this general notion of symmetry can be found in, for instance, Belot (2011), 
Brading and Castellani (2007), Healey (2009), Ismael and van Fraassen (2003), and Roberts 
(2008).
2 I am not trying to give a full account of physical theories here; rather, what I refer to as a 
“physical theory" is a set of necessary features that I take all physical theories to have, all of 
which I will exploit shortly.
3 Over the course of this paper I will refer to X as both the set of independent variables and the 
space whose axes correspond to the independent variables in X. Context will determine which of 
the two I mean in each case, and I will similarly equivocate with my usage of U.
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theory (more on that shortly). By dependent variables here I mean variables that can be 
represented as functions of the independent variables and whose derivatives in terms of these 
independent variables we take to be of physical interest. For instance, in Newtonian mechanics 
the variable representing the position of a ball rolling down an inclined plane can be represented 
as a function of the time that has passed since the ball was released, and so the variable 
“position” here is taken to be a dependent variable u and “time” is taken to be an independent 
variable t. There may be some conventional element in selecting which variables are dependent 
and which are independent for any particular physical theory; for instance, because the position u 
can be given in terms of the time t by u=f(t) , it is also the case that, for invertible f , t=f-1(u), so 
we may free to treat position or time here as the dependent variable. Alternatively, we may take 
the velocity of the ball, v=dx/dt, to be more fundamental than its inverse dt/dx and so take there 
to be a principled reason for treating t as the independent variable here instead of x. Typically, 
the variable that is easier for experimenters to control or manipulate is taken to be the 
independent variable, but this need not always be the case. My point here is only that it is up to 
the theory we are interested in to tell us what quantities to care about and whether to treat them 
as independent or dependent.
The equations in E4 are conditions on functions of independent variables, dependent 
variables, and, in the case of differential equations, derivatives of the dependent variables with 
respect to the independent variables, that require these functions be zero5. So, for instance, in 
cases where there is only one independent variable x and one dependent variable u, an algebraic 
4 This account follows the one given by Olver (1993).
5 Though everything I say in this paper can be extended to an account that takes E to include 
differential as well as algebraic equations, due to length considerations, I will restrict my analysis 
in this paper to theories whose equations are all algebraic.
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equation can be represented by the condition that the function e(x,u)=0. An equation can thus be 
characterized by the function it sets equal to zero, so I will take the elements of the set E to be 
the functions that the equations of the physical theory set equal to zero. Equations allow us to 
represent physical constraints rather than mere mathematical peculiarities because we take the 
variables appealed to by our physical theories to represent measurable features of the physical 
world, and so physical theories necessarily contain what I call an interpretation function N, 
which is a map from the variables appealed to by a physical theory and functions of these 
variables to measurement processes in the physical world that provide the values for these 
variables. Interpretations are necessary components of physical theories because two physical 
theories may utilize similar equations and variables to different ends. For instance, the heat 
equation:
d(x,t,u)=∂u/∂t-∂2u/∂x2=0
could represent one-dimensional particle diffusion or the one-dimensional temperature change 
in, say, a metal bar. Since we measure position probability density functions (the “u” appealed to 
in the differential equation in the first case) and temperature (the “u” appealed to in the second 
case) differently, we can rely on N to distinguish these two different applications of the same 
differential equation6.
6 One may object here that physical theories do not all come equipped with particular 
interpretations; after all, many physical theories (most notably quantum mechanics) have 
numerous interpretational difficulties, and so stipulating that a physical theory like quantum 
mechanics comes with “an interpretation” seems strange. Note, however, that my technical usage 
of the “interpretation function” differs from what is typically meant by an interpretation of a 
physical theory: the job of my “interpretations” is only to tell us what measurement processes 
give us the values for the variables postulated by a physical theory, not to tell us anything about 
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Let's turn from my discussion of what physical theories are to the question of what 
topological space the objects of the physical theory live in. Algebraic equations, which are 
functions of independent and dependent variables only, can be represented by n-1-dimensional 
submanifolds of the n-dimensional space of dependent and independent variables X and U, 
which I will henceforth call the variable space X×U. Each point in this space corresponds to a 
set of values for the variables in X∪U, and the theory differentiates between those sets of values 
that are physically possible according to a particular equation, which correspond to points in the 
equation's submanifold, from those sets of values which are not physically possible according to 
that equation. Few theories contain singleton sets of equations, and so we are typically interested 
not in each submanifold on its own but rather the intersections of the submanifolds 
corresponding to all of the equations in a physical theory’s E. It is these submanifolds that 
determine which sets of variable values the theory takes to be physically possible simpliciter and 
which values it does not. We can define a solution of an algebraic equation as a map from the 
space of independent variables X to the space of dependent variables U such that, when this map 
is identified in the obvious way with a subset of the variable space X×U, this subspace lies 
entirely within the submanifold determined by the equations. This notion of a solution extends 
naturally to characterize solutions of differential equations as well7.
Following this definition of a solution, one can now posit a notion of symmetry that lines 
up nicely with the previously discussed notion of a spacetime symmetry. A symmetry8 of a 
the underlying metaphysics of the world described by this theory.
7 See Olver (1993) for the details.
8 I will restrict my talk of symmetries in this paper to point symmetries. Those interested in 
generalized symmetries should consult chapter 5 of Olver (1993).
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physical theory T is a transformation that maps points in X×U to other points in X×U that keeps 
the solution structure the same. That is, a symmetry cannot map the points that lie entirely within 
the submanifold determined by T 's equations to points outside of the submanifold determined by 
T's equations. The objects transformed by a physical symmetry are points in a theory's variable 
space, and the structure preserved by a physical symmetry transformation is the solution 
structure of that space. The set of all transformations of a physical theory, along with a binary 
operation that defines the product of any two such transformations, constitutes a group.
The search for physical symmetries is thus just the search for the group of symmetries 
that leaves the solution structure of a variable space invariant. I will forego some technical 
details here, but there are available mathematical methods that take advantage of the 
infinitesimal generators of groups that allow us to determine what the symmetry group of any 
particular function is9. So, in short, once we restrict our attention to physical theories that utilize 
only algebraic equations and define physical symmetries as I have, there are mathematical results 
that make the calculation of these symmetries (relatively) easy in many cases.
3. The Problem of Overarching Symmetries
My account of physical symmetries in the last section explains what it is to be a 
symmetry of a physical theory, but there are plenty of contexts in which one may speak of a 
symmetry without referring to a particular physical theory. For instance, physicists may speak of 
translations, rotations, parity reversal, and the consequences of these symmetries without 
referring to any particular theory. Call such symmetries “overarching symmetries”. No sooner 
have we defined these symmetries, however, than we are faced with the following problem: 
9 Those who would like more detail on how this process works should consult Section 2.1 Olver 
(1993).
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what, exactly, is the relationship between theory-relative symmetries (physical symmetries) and 
theory-independent symmetries (overarching symmetries)? When should we count two physical 
symmetries as corresponding to the same overarching symmetry? Or, put more formally: 
suppose that some theory T1=<E1,X1,U1,N1> with n independent variables and m dependent 
variables is invariant under the point symmetry transformation S1, which operates on a point 
p=(x11,…,x
n
1,u
1
1,...,u
m
1) , where x
i
1∈X1 and u
i
1∈U1, as follows: S1(p)=(f1(x
1
1,…,x
n
1,u
1
1,…,u
m
1),
…,fn+m(x
1
1,…,x
n
1,u
1
1,…,u
m
1)) for some functions f1,…,fn+m. Now, suppose there is another theory 
T2=<E2,X2,U2,N2> with j independent variables and k dependent variables which is invariant 
under the point symmetry transformation S2, which operates on a point q=(x
1
2,…,x
j
2,u
1
2,…,u
k
2) , 
where xi2∈X2 and u
i
2∈U2, as follows: S2(q)=(h1(x
1
2,…,x
j
2,u
1
2,…,u
k
2),…,hj+k(x
1
2,…,x
j
2,u
1
2,…,u
k
2)) 
for some functions h1,…,hj+k. Under what conditions can we say that T1 and T2 are invariant 
under the same overarching symmetry transformation?10. 
Another complicating feature is the fact that variables that appear in two different 
physical theories may refer to the same feature of the physical world or may be calculated by 
exactly the same methods. For instance, we may refer to the length of a metal bar in the context 
of both classical thermodynamics and special relativity. In both cases the length of the bar can be 
10 I will leave aside for now the question of whether there is any natural property à la 
Lewis (1983) picked out by all overarching symmetries. My account allows that the question “Is 
X really an overarching symmetry?” may or may not be substantive; the real project for those 
investigating overarching symmetries, I take it, isn't to figure out what overarching symmetries 
correspond to the real overarching symmetries in the world (if there are any) but rather to lay 
down a useful criterion for what constitutes a particular overarching symmetry and argue why 
this criterion is the most useful one.
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -660-
calculated by the same measurements because the physical quantity, length, is the same. So, we 
may be especially worried about how to pick out the symmetry corresponding to S2 in the 
formalism above when, for some a in X1∪U1 and b in X2∪U2, N1(a)=N2(b) or N1(f(a))=N2(f(b)) 
for some f. Call any two such variables empirically identical.
Though I cannot address all of the criteria one could lay down as good candidates for 
determining which physical symmetries fall under the same overarching symmetry, I can outline 
two reasonable positions regarding these criteria. The difference between these two positions 
rests on how strong a criterion one utilizes for determining when physical symmetries are related 
to one another by an overarching symmetry and when they are not. For our purposes, I propose 
(but will not defend at length) a criterion based on the following definition, though any equally 
strong criterion should do for the points I will make in the rest of the paper:
(Consistency): Take T1=<E1,X1,U1,N1> to be a physical theory invariant under the 
symmetry transformation S1, which maps each coordinate v
i
1in X1∪U1 to fi1(v11, v21,…), 
and take T2=<E2,X2,U2,N2> to be a physical theory invariant under the symmetry 
transformation S2, which maps each coordinate v
j
2 in X2∪U2 to fj2(v12,v22,…). There are 
two sets of variables A⊇X1∪U1 and B⊇X2∪U2 such that ∀vi1∈X1∪U1, if ∃vj2∈X2∪U2 
such that vi1 and v
j
2are empirically identical, then v
i
1∈A, and ∀vj2∈X2∪U2, if ∃vi1∈X1∪U1 
such that vj2and v
i
1are empirically identical, then v
j
2∈B. S1 and S2 are consistent if and 
only if, ∀vi1∈A and ∀vj2∈B for non-empty A and B, the empirical identity of vi1 and vj2 
implies fi1=fj2 for some fixed values of all the variables v
n
1∉A and vm2∉B for which fn1 
and fm2 are not constant functions.
Despite its formal complexity, Consistency is intuitively easy to understand. Essentially, two 
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physical symmetries are consistent only if both symmetries treat the “same variables” in the 
“same way”. By “same variables” here I mean variables that are empirically identical, and by 
treating these variables in the “same way”, I mean that, S1 and S2 use the same functions to 
transform empirically identical variables, ignoring changes involving the empirically non-
identical variables. To give an example: suppose that one theory has a symmetry S1 that 
transforms points in its variable space as follows: S1(x,y,z)=(z(x+y),y,z) , and suppose that 
another theory has a symmetry S2 that transforms its points as follows: S2(x,y,w)=(x+y+w,y,w), 
where I have used the same variable name to denote variables in different theories that are 
empirically identical to one another. S1 and S2, according to my definition, are consistent since 
S1(x,y,1)=(x+y,y,1) and S2(x,y,0)=(x+y,y,0); however, S3, which acts as follows: 
S3(x,y,w)=(x+y,x+y,w), is not consistent with S1 since y!=x+y.
We can now define at least two positions on overarching symmetries, the first of which 
requires that all physical symmetries associated with some overarching symmetry be consistent11. 
I will call such a position “realist”. The second position denies consistency as a constraint on 
overarching symmetries in favor of some weaker criterion. I will call such a position 
“conventionalist”12. The realist holds, basically, that an overarching symmetry unites consistent 
physical symmetries across physical theories. For instance, if T1 has a coordinate x that refers to 
time and T2 has a coordinate t that refers to time, then if T1 is invariant under “time translation” 
11 Or as I said before, some equally strong or stronger criterion for overarching symmetry-hood. 
For the rest of the paper, interpret all appeals to consistency as appeals to “some criterion at least 
as a strong as consistency”.
12 Note that, as defined, realism and conventionalism are relative to the particular overarching 
symmetry under consideration. There is no reason to disallow, say, simultaneous realism about 
time reversal and conventionalism about gauge transformations.
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via a physical symmetry that takes x to x+a, then T2 can only be invariant under the same 
overarching symmetry of “time translation” if it is invariant under a transformation that takes t to 
t+a (modulo some variables that may appear in one theory but not the other). More importantly, 
if two theories refer to some common set of parameters (e.g. time, position, and momentum), 
then the two theories are invariant under the same overarching symmetry, according to the 
realist, only if there is some symmetry transformation defined on the first theory that treats these 
parameters the same way that some symmetry transformation defined on the second theory does.
Conventionalists, on the other hand, embrace some weaker constraint, making it easier 
for two different symmetries to be identified with the same overarching symmetry. For instance, 
in the previous example, one sort of conventionalist could argue that, despite the fact that T1 is 
only invariant under a symmetry that takes x to x+a and the T2 is only invariant under a 
symmetry that takes t to –t+a, T1 and T2 may still be invariant under the same overarching 
symmetry because both symmetries satisfy the weaker criterion of transforming empirically 
identical variables by some procedure that adds an arbitrary constant. Some conventionalist 
criteria may come quite close to realism’s. For instance, the conventionalist may adopt a criterion 
that overarching symmetries link up physical symmetries that act consistently on one particular 
variable. Regardless of the specific criterion, however, what separates realists and 
conventionalists is that conventionalists allow a strictly larger set of physical symmetries to 
qualify as potential instances of a particular overarching symmetry than realists allow.
The difference between realism and conventionalism clearly becomes salient when trying 
to determine certain important features of physical theories. We may be interested, as many 
philosophers of time and philosophers of physics have been, in the question of whether or not the 
fundamental laws of physics are invariant under time reversal. Realists trying to answer this 
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question will look at each fundamental physical theory to determine whether or not its time 
reversal symmetry (if it exists) can be consistently unified with the time reversal symmetries of 
the other fundamental physical theories. Conventionalists, meanwhile, will likewise examine 
each physical theory to be sure that there is some point symmetry suitably called “time reversal” 
(under some weaker standard) under which it is invariant, and should they find at least one 
transformation for all fundamental physical theories, they will be happy to agree that the 
fundamental laws of physics are invariant under time reversal. Henceforth I will refer to the 
general strategy of looking for a consistent overarching symmetry as the realist strategy and the 
strategy of searching for physical symmetries that satisfy some weaker criterion on overarching 
symmetries as the conventionalist strategy, though I should point out that conventionalists can 
adopt the realist strategy too. In the remainder of this paper, I will argue that the realist strategy 
ought to be the first one that philosophers and physicists pursue when investigating overarching 
symmetries by suggesting some philosophical work that consistent overarching symmetries can 
do for us that inconsistent overarching symmetries cannot.
4. Overarching Symmetries, Theory Change, and Ontology
Overarching symmetries help us to determine which new theories should replace older, 
falsified theories. Typically, when an earlier theory has been rejected and physicists are 
searching for a new theory to replace it, physicists don't just start from scratch. They assume that 
many of the features of the old theory were, in fact, correct, assuming the theory in question had 
a history of empirical successes. The old theory must have gotten something right to be 
successful, so since new theories should be strictly better than the theories they replace, we need 
a way to identify those successful features of our old theories and carry those features over into 
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our new theories. Successful features of older theories can thus constrain what good candidates 
for these theories' replacements should look like.
Symmetries are typically features of the world that carry over from older theories to 
newer theories. Imagine, for instance, a fictitious history of physics in which Newtonian 
mechanics is rejected after observing the behavior of particles traveling close to the speed of 
light. Under such circumstances, we would be justified in searching for a successor to Newtonian 
mechanics like special relativity that isn't invariant under Galilean boosts; however, we have no 
reason to reject the symmetries of spatial and temporal translation under which Newtonian 
mechanics was invariant. So even if our evidence gives us good reason to reject important 
features (including symmetries) of a previous theory, that same evidence may still lead us to 
uphold some symmetries of the old theory.
Realist overarching symmetries are the most likely to yield useful results when trying to 
carry symmetries over from failed theories to their successors. Realist symmetries guarantee that 
the new theory’s overarching symmetries differ as little from their predecessors as possible, as 
least as far as symmetries are concerned. This is not the case with conventionalist symmetries. 
Take theory A, which is invariant under the symmetry S1(x,y,z)=(z(x+y),y,z) and which is to be 
replaced by either theory B, which is invariant under the symmetry S2(x,y,w)=(x+y,y,w), or 
theory C, which is invariant under the symmetry S3(x,y,w)=(x+y,x+y,w). The realist singles out 
B as the best successor to A since they share an overarching symmetry while the conventionalist 
may take both B and C to be equally good successors to A since they share an overarching 
symmetry even though intuitively S1 seems much closer to S2 than S3. If we want symmetries to 
help us choose useful successor theories, then it seems best to adopt the realist strategy.
Overarching symmetries may also serve as guides to extracting metaphysics from our 
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best available theories. In some cases, especially when the symmetries in question are spacetime 
symmetries, the failure of a particular theory to be invariant under an overarching symmetry 
provides us with a good reason to think that there is some special structure in the world whose 
existence keeps the theory in question from being invariant under that overarching symmetry. 
Those who adopt Earman’s (1989) symmetry principles, for instance, maybe take the 
asymmetries of dynamical laws to suggest geometrical features of spacetime.
But symmetries also help to pare down metaphysical commitments; for instance, 
according to a view I will call physical equivalence (PE) embraced by Baker (2010), Ismael and 
van Fraassen (2003), and North (2009), symmetries act as a guide to surplus structure. PE holds 
that the notational differences between two solutions related by a symmetry do not correspond to 
deep physical differences between two physical states while a notational difference between two 
solutions which are not related by a symmetry does. Leibniz shift arguments provide an example 
of PE in action: because our universe is spatial translation invariant, we have good reason to 
believe that there are no physical structures like, say, absolute space that privilege one position in 
space over another. 
Given these examples, one may feel compelled to adopt either the realist or 
conventionalist strategy depending on one’s projects in metaphysics. If one prefers metaphysical 
desert landscapes, one may be tempted to adopt both PE and the conventionalist strategy since 
such an approach will find more solutions to be essentially identical to one another, thus 
eliminating from our fundamental metaphysics interesting properties that could distinguish one 
solution from another13. Those more interested in using PE to find asymmetries and use them to 
13 It is worth noting, though, that some conventionalist strategies may be so permissive as to 
undermine the motivation for PE in the first place and may not provide a rich enough 
metaphysical background to draw the kinds of useful distinctions we want to draw.
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posit metaphysical structures, on the other hand, may be more interested in the realist strategy 
and its stricter criterion on overarching symmetries. At the moment, metaphysical considerations 
alone don’t seem to privilege either account over the other except insofar as one finds one of 
these projects more interesting than the other.
But the relationship between symmetries and metaphysics does give us another reason to 
think that, no matter our projects in metaphysics, we should focus our attention on those 
symmetries that transform the same objects and relations consistently across physical theories. If 
we do think that symmetries can help us determine the ontological commitments of our physical 
theories, and if we think that all of the physical theories are, in fact, representations of the same 
objective world, then the ontologies identified by different physical theories should line up nicely 
with one another. For instance, if one theory is committed to the existence of a preferred inertial 
reference frame (as some formulations of quantum mechanics are) and another theory is 
committed to the physical equivalence of all inertial reference frames (in the way that special 
relativity is if we assert something like PE for velocity boosts), we have good reason to think that 
at least one of these theories is wrong since at most one can accurately represent the way the 
world actually is.
If we want a consistent picture of what the world is like from these theories, and if we 
think that symmetries can tell us something about the ontological commitments of our physical 
theories, then even the conventionalist needs to accept the fact that consistent overarching 
symmetries will be more useful than inconsistent overarching symmetries. Consider the 
following case: take the two theories T1 and T2, both of which are the best currently available 
physical theories with empirically identical variable x, which is position. T1 is invariant only 
under the symmetry S1(x,y)=(-x,y) while T2 is invariant only under S2(x,z)=(-x,1/z). S1 and S2 are 
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consistent, and so they fall under the same realist overarching symmetry. This realist overarching 
symmetry (let’s call it “parity reversal” for short) suggests that there is no fundamental structure 
that distinguishes between “left” and “right” in the universe since for every solution to the 
equations in T1 or T2 there is a “parity reversed counterpart” related to this solution by S1 or S2 
respectively that is also a solution to the equations in T1 or T2. In short, there is no dynamical 
structure that treats objects on the “left” differently from objects on the “right”, and so, since all 
of our best physical theories are invariant under this parity reversal symmetry, we have good 
reason to think that there is no fundamental feature of our universe that distinguishes between 
left and right. Since realists utilize a stricter overarching symmetry criterion than 
conventionalists, the conventionalists agree with the realists about this example of parity 
reversal.
If T2 were instead only under S3(x,z)=(2x,z), the realist would not recognize any 
overarching symmetry uniting S1 and S3, so she would claim that there are important 
inconsistencies between T1 and T2 that warrant further investigation. Such physical symmetries 
reveal that one of these two theories must be getting something about the world wrong, and one 
needs a condition on overarching symmetries like consistency that is sensitive to symmetry 
transformations of empirically identical variables in other physical theories for this interesting 
result. Conventionalists, however, may argue that there is some overarching symmetry that 
unites S1 and S3, perhaps on the grounds that both physical symmetries transform the position 
coordinate by a constant integer scaling factor while leaving the other coordinates unchanged, 
but it is unclear to me what invariance under such an overarching symmetry tells us about the 
world described by T1 and T2. We can no longer say, as we did in the case of parity reversal, that 
the world doesn’t distinguish between left and right since it is not the case that solutions to the 
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equations of T2 have parity-reversed counterparts that are also solutions to the equations of T2. 
Perhaps the conventionalist takes the interesting metaphysical consequence of invariance under 
this symmetry to be that there is no metaphysical structure in the world that distinguishes 
between either “left” solutions and “right” solutions or solutions and their “position-doubled” 
counterparts, but such a weird disjunctive structure seems metaphysically worthless. This toy 
example shows that realist overarching symmetries serve as better guides to both physical and 
metaphysical projects than do conventionalist overarching symmetries, so one could say that, 
despite her conventionalism, if a conventionalist has the inclination to draw a useful connection 
between physical symmetries and ontology, she should be prepared to act as a realist in many 
situations.
5. Conclusion
Given my approach to physical symmetries, we are left with two ways to proceed: when 
searching for overarching symmetries, we can follow the realist and search for consistent 
overarching symmetries, or we can follow the conventionalist and also search for inconsistent 
overarching symmetries that satisfy some other criterion. As I have argued, conducting the 
realist's narrow search is more likely to yield the kinds of results that both scientists and 
philosophers are likely to find pragmatically useful, and as such it may be in the best interest of 
even the conventionalist to carry out the realist's narrow search first before conducting the 
broader search.
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Defusing Ideological Defenses in Biology
Angela Potochnik
Abstract
Ideological language is widespread in biology. Game theory has been defended
as a worldview; sexual selection theory has been criticized for what it posits as
basic to biological nature; and evolutionary developmental biology is advocated
as an alternative, not addition, to traditional evolutionary biology. Views like
these encourage the impression of ideological rift in the field. I advocate an
alternative interpretation, whereby many disagreements between camps of biologists
reflect unproblematic methodological differences. This interpretation provides a more
accurate and more optimistic account of the state of play in the field of biology. It also
helps account for the tendency to embrace ideological positions.
1 Ideology and Dissension in Theoretical Biology
Defenders and critics of one or another approach in theoretical biology sometimes employ
sweeping, ideologically loaded claims in support of their positions. By this I mean that
differences in viewpoint or methodology are construed as resulting from incompatible research
programs, each committed to a different view of biological reality. I witnessed one possible
result of such a construal a few years ago, when two biologists with different research
programs, addressing different types of phenomena, each volunteered an opinion of the other’s
work. In the view of Biologist A, Biologist B was “no longer doing biology.” Biologist
1
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B independently offered the opinion that Biologist A was “not a colleague” of his/hers.
Though this was an extreme version of divisiveness, I have witnessed similar exchanges
play out in other groups of biologists, both in print and over dinner.1 Yet these same
biologists collaborate in a variety of ways. For instance, Biologists A and B have coauthored
publications and shared students. To my mind, this suggests that the presentation of such
differences as commitments to fundamentally opposed views of biological reality is ripe for
reconsideration. Let us begin by considering three examples of disagreements that have been
construed as ideological.
The Optimization Research Program Gould and Lewontin (1979) ushered in an era
of polarization in evolutionary biology between “adaptationists” and their critics. In their
highly influential paper, Gould and Lewontin explicitly cast as ideology the approach of
proposing an adaptive explanation for traits considered individually. They coined an “-
ism” for this approach, and they employed religious metaphors to characterize the view.
Thus adaptationism “is based on faith in the power of natural selection” and employs the
“catechism” that genetic drift is only important in unusual, unimportant circumstances.
The adaptationist refuses to credit other causes like drift with any real influence while
“[congratulating her/himself] for being such an undogmatic and ecumenical chap.” This
construal saddles a type of methodology in evolutionary biology with ideological baggage
and then criticizes it as false dogma.
Optimization models utilize the procedure that Gould and Lewontin draw into question
and are thus one of the primary targets of their criticisms. Many biologists do not
accept Gould and Lewontin’s ideological gloss of optimization modeling, instead subscribing
to Maynard Smith’s (1982) interpretation of their point as simply the methodological
corrective that optimization models should reflect constraints arising from evolutionary
1I do not suggest that such scenarios are more common in biology than other disciplines; the situation in
theoretical biology is simply my focus in this paper.
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influences besides natural selection. However, a number of defenses of the optimization
approach, and evolutionary game theory in particular, have embraced the construal of their
position as ideological. Grafen (1984) coined the term “phenotypic gambit” to describe
commitment to the optimization approach, which he acknowledges is a “leap of faith.”
Mitchell and Valone (1990) endorse what they call the “Optimization Research Program,”
citing Lakatos’s view of research programs, the core hypotheses of which adherents should
protect from disconfirmation at all costs. Brown (2001) accepts this construal and defends
the Optimization Research Program as his “worldview”, with game theory at its center. A
prominent style of defending optimization modeling thus qualifies as ideological in the sense
identified above.
Criticisms of Sexual Selection Theory Sexual selection theory is a well-developed set
of hypotheses for the role of selection in the evolution of a variety of sexual and reproductive
traits. Different versions of the theory vary in important regards, but I will attempt to give
a basic summary that applies to most versions. In many animal species, males (and perhaps
sometimes females) are expected to differ in their mating success, which creates selection
pressure for traits desirable to members of the opposite sex and/or traits useful in competing
with others of the same sex. Thus the peacock’s long, colorful train is explained as the result
of peahens preferentially mating with comely trained peacocks, not any survival advantage
conferred by the trains. Similarly, the evolution of combat among male bighorn sheep is
explained as the result of ewes preferentially mating with the victors. Traits classically
explained as the result of sexual selection range from physical traits, such as ornamentation,
to behavioral traits like combat displays or parental care. The basic tenets of sexual selection
theory are widely accepted in biology, though as I mentioned there are disagreements about
some features, and the hypotheses have been updated and fine-tuned to accommodate ever-
expanding information about animals’ bodies and behavior (e.g., Clutton-Brock, 2009).
3
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Yet past decades have also seen a number of criticisms of sexual selection theory. Here I
will focus on recent criticisms put forth by Roughgarden (2009); see also (Roughgarden, 2004)
and (Roughgarden et al., 2006). Roughgarden analyzes and thoroughly rebuts a wide range of
hypotheses about the evolution of sex, gender, and reproductive behavior that she attributes
to sexual selection theory. Toward the end of the book, Roughgarden argues that she has
shown that all those hypotheses are false, that there is no reason to amend the hypotheses,
but that sexual selection theory is “a philosophy of biological nature” (p. 246) with an
“incorrect foundation.” In Roughgarden’s view, the hypotheses all “derive from a common
view of natural behavior predicated on selfishness, deception, and genetic weeding” (p. 247).
Roughgarden suggest that, instead, kindness and cooperation are “basic to biological nature”
(p. 1). She thus proposes an alternative “social selection theory,” based on the contrary
assumptions of “teamwork, honesty, and genetic equality” (p. 247). Roughgarden, then,
construes her disagreement with sexual selection theorists as fundamental and expansive,
based on beliefs about what is biologically basic. She represents the options as complete
commitment to or else complete rejection of all the hypotheses she identifies with sexual
selection theory.
Evolutionary Developmental Biology Evolutionary developmental biology, frequently
referred to as “evo-devo,” is the subfield of biology devoted to studying the evolution of
developmental processes. Advocates of evo-devo do not view it simply as an extension of
evolutionary biology, but as a needed corrective or even replacement. Mu¨ller (2007) contrasts
evo-devo with the reigning Modern Synthesis, a synthesis of a number of subfields of biology
in the early twentieth century, made possible by the development of population genetics as
a way to reconcile discrete Mendelian genetics and gradual evolution by natural selection.
According to Mu¨ller,
Whereas in the Modern Synthesis framework the burden of explanation rests on
4
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the action of selection, with genetic variation representing the necessary boundary
condition, the evo-devo framework assigns much of the explanatory weight to
the generative properties of development, with natural selection providing the
boundary condition. When natural selection is a general boundary condition, the
specificity of the phenotypic outcome is determined by development. Thus, evo-
devo. . . posits that the causal basis for phenotypic form resides not in population
dynamics or, for that matter, in molecular evolution, but instead in the inherent
properties of evolving developmental systems (p. 947).
This construes evo-devo not as a supplement to other approaches to evolutionary biology, but
as a replacement. The “explanatory weight” goes to development instead of natural selection,
for the causal basis for phenotypic form is evolving developmental systems, not population
dynamics. Carroll et al. (2004) similarly claim that “regulatory evolution is the creative
force underlying morphological diversity across the evolutionary spectrum” (p. 213, emphasis
added). According to Callebaut et al. (2007), evo-devo takes epigenetic considerations as
“primordial for the organismic perspective” (p. 41) and thus as providing a “truer picture
of life on this earth” (p. 62). As in the two previous examples, advocates of evo-devo
present their approach as a view about what is fundamental—in this case, to the evolution
of morphology—and the view is a total commitment, in the sense of positing developmental
processes as the sole causal basis and hence the explanation of these phenomena, to the
exclusion of selection.
In each of these debates, the options are presented as sweeping commitments to bipolar
positions. Either you subscribe to the Optimization Research Program as your worldview,
or you reject it. Either you jettison all of sexual selection theory, or else you commit
to the sexual selectionist view of the basics of biological nature. Either you endorse the
evolution of developmental systems as the sole causal basis of the evolution of form, or
5
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you unquestioningly uphold the tradition of the Modern Synthesis. These positions are
presented as ideological in the sense of involving adherence to a systematic set of ideas, a
comprehensive way of looking at things. The set of ideas in question is viewed as fundamental
to the domain under investigation, and adherence to one side or the other is taken to be a
total commitment. This ideological tenor thus suggests that there is a rift in theory, that
there is dispute regarding the basic understanding of these types of phenomena. Here I
develop an alternative interpretation, according to which these disagreements and ones like
them are more fruitfully seen as rooted in methodological, not ideological, differences (§2).
This methodological interpretation provides a more accurate account of how the field of
biology functions and a more optimistic take on the state of play in the field. It also suggests
a rationale for why some theoretical biologists embrace polarized, ideological positions (§3).
Before proceeding, a couple of clarifications are in order. First, by claiming that these
positions are presented as ideological, I do not mean to suggest that they are necessarily
influenced by broader social ideology. Other research demonstrates that this frequently is
the case; Richardson (1984), for instance, develops this point for two of my examples here—
game theory and sexual selection theory. Yet the focus of this paper is not the influence of
broader social values on theoretical biology, but the construal of debates as ideological in the
sense identified above. Second, though I will argue that many debates in biology presented
as ideological are more fruitfully understood as methodological debates, this may not hold
true for all such debates. Certainly there is room for disagreements in theoretical biology
that really do involve commitments to fundamentally opposed positions. One goal of the
present analysis is thus to provide resources for distinguishing methodological differences
from truly opposed “worldviews.”
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2 Distinguishing Idealizations from Ideology
There is room for an alternative interpretation of debates in theoretical biology like those
surveyed above, despite their ideological tenor. The starting point is philosophical treatments
of the role of modeling in science. The scientific practices that have been termed “model-
based science” account for the persistence of multiple modeling approaches (e.g. Levins, 1966;
Godfrey-Smith, 2006; Weisberg, 2006). On this view, idealized models represent targeted
features of a system at the expense of misrepresenting other features. Different modeling
approaches thus can seem to be incompatible, for they employ different parameters and
opposed assumptions, when instead the exact opposite is true. The limitations of idealized
models make the use of multiple approaches essential. Taking to heart the idea that models
provide a limited representation of only targeted features of a phenomenon makes clear that
no single modeling approach offers an exhaustive, fully accurate account of any phenomenon.
This view of model-based science enables an interpretation of seemingly ideological
debates in biology as instead methodological at root. Despite the rhetoric sometimes
employed, the question to ask about apparently competing modeling approaches is often
not which grounds a more successful worldview, but which method better serves one’s
present research aims. Several aspects of this shift are important. On the methodological
interpretation, proposed modeling approaches should be evaluated not according to universal
ontological considerations—what the world is posited to be like overall—but considerations
of method, especially representational capacity. The evaluation is thus not an absolute
judgment, but is contingent on the aims of representation for the research program at hand.
This means that different methods may very well be called for in different circumstances,
and so a variety of approaches may be warranted. The key features of this interpretation
of a debate are thus (1) the resolution depends on evaluation of methodology; (2) choice of
approach is contingent on research aims; and (3) multiple approaches can coexist without
7
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ideological differences methodological differences
basis of evaluation what the world is like method, representational aims
scope of position complete “worldview” contingent on research program
commitment to approach absolute; either/or multiple approaches can coexist
Table 1: The distinguishing features of ideological and methodological disagreements
difficulty.
These distinguishing characteristics of ideological and methodological disagreements are
represented in Table 1. Some disagreements in biology are patently methodological, but
many disagreements admit of both construals, including ones traditionally interpreted as
ideological. This is so for the three debates I considered above, as I will demonstrate below.
There are also some debates for which an ideological construal will remain appropriate. To
take an extreme example, embracing basic evolutionary theory commits one to a systematic
set of ideas about a type of process and the results it can have. This set of ideas is
fundamentally opposed to intelligent design.2 There is not room for both, for arguments
for intelligent design presume the impossibility of evolution. Intelligent design thus cannot
be defended on the basis of representational aims.
Let us reexamine the three debates from above, to the end of showing that in each
case a methodological interpretation is not only possible but preferable. Although several
defenses of the optimization approach have construed the approach as a commitment to a
worldview, or a matter of faith, another construal is available. Maynard Smith (1982), for
one, attempts to refocus the debate on methodology. This is as strong of a defense as is
needed to justify the modeling approaches of optimization and evolutionary game theory,
and it is a more defensible position than an ideological defense. Biologists know too much
2This example was suggested by a referee for this journal.
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about nonselective influences on evolution to subscribe to the notion that selection is the
only evolutionary influence. To say that selection is often the only important influence, as
some have done, is just to declare a preference for tracking that causal process over others.
It is more straightforward and more promising to instead defend optimization as simply one
modeling approach among many in biology, each with a specific representational focus and
delimited range of application.
Mitchell and Valone (1990) represent the debate over the use of game theory as a
choice between embracing either the assumptions of evolutionary game theory or those of
quantitative genetics, but this is wrong. Certain assumptions of each of these modeling
approaches are undeniably idealized, and there are just as obvious limitations to each
approach’s range of applicability to evolutionary phenomena (Potochnik, 2010). These
considerations indicate that game theory and quantitative genetics are each motivated by
specific, and limited, representational goals. Each facilitates the faithful representation
of some features of some types of evolutionary scenarios. It follows that neither set of
assumptions is sufficient for all projects in population biology, which is why both approaches
persist. The methodological defense thus better accounts for game theory’s role in population
biology than does the ideological defense.
The ideological tenor of Roughgarden’s (2009) criticisms of sexual selection theory plays
an important role for her argument. Advocating the rejection of sexual selection theory in its
entirety draws attention to assumptions shared by many of the theory’s specific hypotheses,
such as competition for mating opportunities and the default traits of each sex, and the
regards in which those assumptions may be problematic. Yet a methodological version
of Roughgarden’s criticisms could still accomplish this. This alternative, methodological
approach would be to point out the range of phenomena treated by sexual selection models
and assumptions/idealizations the models share. This would set up the desired contrast
with Roughgarden’s social selection theory, which groups a different range of phenomena
9
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and employs different assumptions. For instance, whereas sexual selection theory addresses
scenarios where same-sex animals compete for mating opportunities, social selection theory
addresses scenarios where outcomes/selection effects are mediated by social interactions.
These groupings of evolutionary phenomena overlap partially, but not entirely. Further,
whereas sexual selection theory assumes that direct competition is the norm, social selection
theory assumes that a mutually beneficial outcome is within evolutionary reach. It is
possible—even likely—that each assumption is right some of the time.
An advantage of this methodological version of Roughgarden’s criticisms is that it would
provide a less polarizing introduction to the many distinct positive views she advocates,
including the alternative modeling techniques she suggests (Potochnik, 2012). Roughgarden
lumps her suggestions for modeling approaches together with her complete rejection of sexual
selection theory and controversial alternative hypotheses. Faced only with the choice of
wholesale rejection or acceptance of those views, many reject them (e.g. Kavenagh, 2006).
Yet this need not be so. Roughgarden’s suggestions for modeling behavioral evolution, which
emphasize malleable selection effects due to influences like negotiation and punishment, are
distinct from her specific hypotheses for the evolution of traits related to sex, gender, and
reproduction. A methodological approach at once facilitates Roughgarden’s criticisms of
background assumptions shared by many sexual selection hypotheses and also renders her
various ideas separable, and thus potentially palatable to a broader group of biologists.
Evolutionary developmental biology is a valuable field of research, shedding light on an
important type of evolution previously neglected by mainstream evolutionary biology. Its
focus is how systems of development have evolved, sometimes giving rise to novel features
of organisms. To neglect the influence of development on evolved traits and how processes
of development have themselves evolved is to ignore an essential element of evolution. This
methodological point is sound, and worthy of attention from biologists outside of evo-devo.
Yet the idea voiced by advocates of evo-devo that developmental systems are the sole causal
10
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basis for phenotypic form, and that natural selection is merely a “boundary condition”
(Mu¨ller, 2007), is going too far in the opposite direction. Evolution is an incredibly complex,
prolonged process, with a variety of important causal influences that combine and interact in
myriad ways. Different modeling approaches will capture different elements of that process
and employ simplifying assumptions and idealizations to exclude other elements. They
will also apply more aptly to different ranges of evolutionary phenomena. Evo-devo draws
attention to one set of causal influences, viz., developmental processes, that are especially
important for certain types of evolution, viz., morphological evolution. This provides an
important part of the evolutionary story, but it does not replace the stories that instead
feature natural selection (or drift, etc.) Shifting from an ideological to a methodological
defense thus would be a valuable change for advocates of an evo-devo approach as well. As
with the earlier two examples, evo-devo can be motivated more effectively when practitioners
of other methods are not asked to declare a new worldview.
These examples of disagreements about biology thus can be profitably interpreted as
rooted in methodological differences, despite the tendency of many biologists to construe
the differences as ideological in nature. The same is true for other debates in biology
that are similarly structured, such as the longstanding disagreements surrounding group
selection. Recall that I do not expect all apparently ideological debates to be resolved on
methodological grounds. Instead, each debate must be examined to see whether it can be
construed to possess the features of a methodological disagreement, as summarized in Table
1. On the methodological interpretation, competing approaches should not be evaluated
according to which is true, or the basis of a successful worldview, and a complete commitment
to an approach is unwarranted. The evaluation is instead based on which types of systems
and which features of those systems are central to one’s present research program, and which
approach best meets those representational aims.
It is important to note that, even when a methodological interpretation is appropriate,
11
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there still may be disagreements about matters of fact. For instance, two biologists may
well disagree on whether natural selection is a significant causal factor in the evolution of a
particular trait. But such disagreements need not amount to universal commitments, and
they are not the only reason for variation among biologists’ methods. The methodological
interpretation of disagreements in theoretical biology keeps models’ aims and limitations
at center stage, which results in the evaluation of an approach contingent on the aims of
research and the likelihood of the coexistence of multiple approaches in a stable area of
research.
3 Normal Science with a Twist
Features of this methodological interpretation of debates can actually help account for why
some biologists on each side of these issues embrace polarized, ideological positions. In
the section above, I suggested that research programs within biology differ in ways that
warrant employing certain modeling approaches to the exclusion of others. For central as
well as accidental reasons, participants in different research programs focus on different
phenomena; are acquainted with different bodies of past research; and even may have
familiarity with different varieties of organisms. This means that advocates and critics
of a modeling approach address that approach from different locations, for they often differ
in both interests and expertise. Such differences can easily lead to disagreements about the
commonness of types of phenomena and the significance of causal patterns. Those engaged
in optimization research are well familiar with the successes of optimal foraging theory, and
they dismiss the overdominance of malaria-resistance as an uncommon if not unique genetic
situation. Roughgarden’s hypotheses lead her to focus on animal species with extensive social
interactions, such as shared care of young or collective hunting. And evo-devo theorists are
well familiar with the evolution of limbs.
12
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Another ingredient of ideological stances in theoretical biology is an implicit commitment
to the existence of simple causal processes with broad domains of application. A tacit belief
in such “magic bullet” causes enables differences in focus and expertise among researchers
to be interpreted as commitments to different types of causes. If it is agreed that most
phenomena are influenced by a vast array of causal factors, then researchers’ differences are
naturally understood to arise from a difference in focus, not a difference in worldview. In
this case, the claim that certain features of the evolutionary process are more important is
reduced to the claim that some are worthier of investigation than others. Put this way, it
is not an empirical claim, but merely a statement of research interests (see Godfrey-Smith
(2001) on this point regarding adaptationism in particular).
This account of how ideological positions in theoretical biology arise in a sense explains
away such ideological tendencies. Yet I should emphasize that the posited account attributes
more significance to ideological positions than, say, the idea that these stances are simply
adopted as a way to increase recognition or funding. In my view, standoffs between opposed
ideological positions indicate something important about the field of biology. That there are
such entrenched proponents and opponents of different methods indicates that a variety of
modeling approaches have some purchase on the evolutionary process and other biological
phenomena. In my view, this reflects the complex causal processes at work in biology, and
the endless variety in how causal factors combine and interact. There are evolved traits like
foraging behavior that optimization analysis readily predicts; those like sickled red blood
cells with which it can get nowhere; and a whole range of intermediate traits for which it is
partially successful insofar as it represents the causal contribution of natural selection, which
may be just one causal influence among many. The causal influences on social behavior in
animals are likely as diverse as the behaviors themselves, so there is room for sexual selection
theory’s success with some behaviors and failure with others. Development and evolution are
both without question causal influences on organisms’ traits; how these influences interact
13
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is just as certain to be highly variable.
Recasting ideological differences as methodological differences also grounds a more
optimistic interpretation of the current state of play in theoretical biology. The diversity
of approaches does not stem from a clash of worldviews, and so biology is not in a state of
crisis from which one research program will emerge triumphant. Instead, strong ideological
differences persist within a functional field of research. This will continue to be the case so
long as different methodologies are useful in different research programs.
So, then, why does the main point of this paper matter? If ideological differences
are consistent with a fully functional field of science, why concern oneself with the
reinterpretation I suggest? In my view, were more biologists and philosophers of biology
to embrace this interpretation of commitment to favored modeling approaches, real,
advantageous consequences would result. Most basically, less attention would be devoted to
unnecessary arguments that are, as it turns out, about preferred phenomena and modeling
approaches of choice. A prime example is the decades of continuing debate in philosophy
of biology over adaptationism, when optimization approaches can instead be motivated on
much more modest grounds (Potochnik, 2009).
Adopting the methodological interpretation would also promote cooperation among those
who continue to have substantive disagreements about biology. Instead of becoming mired
in ideological impasse, focusing on modeling approaches allows communication and progress
in spite of different views about how the models apply to the real world. Godfrey-Smith
claims that,
When much day-to-day discussion is about model systems, disagreement about
the nature of a target system is less able to impede communication. The model
acts as a buffer, enabling communication and cooperative work across scientists
who have different commitments about the target system (2006, p. 739).
On this view, even continuing disagreements about evolutionary phenomena need not hinder
14
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cooperative work on features of models. If all parties can, at least temporarily, set aside
differences in commitment to broad claims of causal importance, they can further joint
understanding of models’ inner workings and conditions of their application. Indeed, I have
observed this first-hand at meetings of a working group on evolutionary game theory (at the
National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis).
Finally, the refocus facilitated by a shift to the methodological interpretation of disputes
in biology creates more room for activities of significance for theoretical biology and the
philosophical analysis of biology. Recognition of the viability of a range of modeling
approaches and the related idea of complex and variable causal processes should lead to
a diminished focus on isolated, illustrative applications of a type of model. This should be
replaced by an increased focus on determining the range of and conditions for a modeling
approach’s applicability and the limitations of its assumptions, as well as increased attention
to the interplay among multiple causal influences. For philosophers of biology, the lesson is to
expect a continual plurality of methods in biology—methods that can appear contradictory—
and to take with a grain of salt any claim that one or another approach is the key to
understanding biology.
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Human Nature in a Post-Essentialist World 
 
Grant Ramsey 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Notre Dame 
 
1. Introduction. In a Platonic worldview, which species an individual belongs to is 
answered by this question: in which form does it participate? A goat is a goat because it 
participates in the Platonic form goat and not, say, the form horse. The tidiness of this 
answer, however, belies the questionable ontology on which it rests. It is for this reason 
that contemporary philosophers generally eschew the invocation of Platonic forms in 
producing a theory of species natures. 
Nevertheless, species seem to have a nature—perhaps not one founded on 
Platonic forms, but instead on a set of essential properties. If we were given a lineup of a 
random assortment of vertebrates—wildebeest, aardvarks, naked mole rats, vampire bats, 
and humans—we would have no problem picking out the humans. Even if the lineup 
were populated with our closest living relatives, we would have no difficulty picking the 
humans out from the other apes. This is true in part because humans differ in many ways 
from other species of ape. But it is not merely that humans differ from the other related 
species, it is also that individual humans share many traits amongst themselves. This 
similarity—this set of traits that it seems we are able register intuitively to instantly 
recognize an individual as a human being—is, it would seem, what we could use as a 
respectable foundation for human nature: human nature is just that set of traits that are 
possessed by to each individual and essential to their being human. 
But with Darwin’s (1859) publication of On the Origin of Species, an essentialist 
view of species was called into question. Darwin argued that the history of life has a tree 
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structure and that branches on this tree represent biological taxa. A large branch 
represents a high-level taxon, such as a class or phylum, whereas a small branch 
represents a small taxon like a genus or species. For Darwin, species are not ontologically 
sui generis. Instead, there is a continuum from variations within species to genuine 
specieshood. On this view, taxonomists debate the number of species within a taxon—
flowering plants, for example—not (merely) because there is a dearth of taxonomic data, 
but because there are (often well-justified) differing approaches to drawing a line in the 
continuum between variations and species. 
Darwin’s view of species and the origin of species through intraspecific variation 
is mirrored by contemporary biology. The question at hand, then, is whether the concept 
of species nature—and in particular human nature—has any place in this contemporary 
theoretical context. In what follows, I will examine two ways in which philosophers have 
answered this question. I will then show that neither answer is satisfactory and will then 
present my own alternative.  
 
2. Hull’s skepticism about human nature. The main line contemporary taxonomic 
framework, cladistics, recognizes and formalizes Darwin’s insights about the tree 
structure of life. For cladists, the only legitimate taxa are monophyletic clades, which are 
groups formed by encircling an ancestor and all of the branches descended from this 
ancestor. Taxonomic groupings that include multiple clades (polyphyletic groups) or fail 
to include all of the branches within a clade (paraphyletic groups) are not legitimate taxa. 
Thus, a species must be monophyletic, and not polyphyletic or paraphyletic. A corollary 
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of these restrictions is that in order for a new taxon to arise, there must be a branching 
event. No new taxa, no new species, genera, etc., can arise in the absence of branching. 
 It is this aspect of contemporary taxonomy that Hull (1986) uses to make his 
argument that there is no such thing as human nature. Hull’s arguments can be summed 
up in the following way: ‘Human nature’ must pick out intrinsic traits that are exhibited 
by all (and only) humans. This set of traits must be definitive of and essential to 
membership in the species Homo sapiens, just as having eight protons is definitive of and 
essential to being oxygen.  But membership in Homo sapiens, as with membership in any 
biological species is determined not by essential properties shared by each individual, but 
instead by their position within a clade. Thus, such essential properties cannot be 
definitive of species membership. Additionally, these properties are unlikely to be 
exhibited by all Homo Sapiens (individuals with severe developmental disorders are 
members of our species, after all). Further, even if a synchronic time slice of Homo 
sapiens reveals an interesting set of shared traits, the species will keep evolving and these 
traits are unlikely to persist over the entire existence of the species. 
One way to understand Hull’s argument is that he takes a species to be an 
individual whose birth and death are marked by phylogenetic branching events (nodes). 
The organisms belonging to the species are thus all of the organisms existing between the 
nodes. Hull’s synchronic argument says that a synchronic slice in this species is unlikely 
to produce a set of individuals with interesting traits shared by them and only them. And 
the diachronic argument goes further to say that even if the synchronic slice produces 
interesting traits, these traits are probably not going to persist through all intra-nodal 
time. 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -690-
 
4 
 
3. Machery’s reply and its limitations. In the face of Hull’s skepticism, one could either 
concede that there really is no such thing as human nature, or produce a concept of 
human nature that eschews or challenges Hull’s criticisms. Machery (2008) attempts the 
latter. He argues that while Hull’s arguments are devastating to essentialist notions of 
human nature, they do not undermine another concept of human nature, what he is 
labeling the “nomological” view. Machery’s nomological view holds that “human nature 
is the set of properties that humans tend to possess as a result of the evolution of their 
species” (323). 
 Machery’s account addresses Hull’s worries in part by no longer considering 
human nature to be definitional. Thus, because an individual is not defined as being a 
human, that is, belonging to the species Homo sapiens, in virtue of possessing the traits 
that fall under the rubric of human nature, particular individuals can lack one or more of 
these traits while still being human. Instead, Machery merely requires that any trait 
considered part of human nature must be possessed by most humans.  
 Despite the successful dodge of Hull’s arguments, there are difficulties with 
Machery’s view. First, by requiring that the trait be possessed by the majority of humans, 
one looses many traits characteristic of humans. Any traits (psychological, behavioral, 
morphological) that are sexually dimorphic or, say, exhibited only by a particular ethnic 
group, will be excluded. Vivipary, lactation, and menopause, for example, are no part of 
human nature. Machery recognizes this, but holds to his view because “saying that 
humans have a nature entails that humans form a class that is of importance for biology. 
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The members of this class tend to have some properties in common in virtue of 
evolutionary processes” (326).  
 But why does belonging to almost all humans make it an important class for 
biology? Is it not a biologically interesting feature of human nature that the females 
undergo menopause? Furthermore, why should we presume that it is the sameness across 
individuals that is of interest to scientists, and not their variation? As Geertz (1973) 
insightfully pointed out, “[t]he notion that unless a cultural phenomenon is empirically 
universal it cannot reflect anything about the nature of man is about as logical as the 
notion that because sickle-cell anemia is, fortunately, not universal, it cannot tell us 
anything about human genetic processes. It is not whether phenomena are empirically 
common that is critical in science […] but whether they can be made to reveal the 
enduring natural processes that underly them” (44). I am in full agreement with Geertz on 
this point—it a mistake to hold that only traits universal (or nearly universal) in the 
human species are of scientific interest and should be included within human nature.  
 The second difficulty is that Machery takes it to be unproblematic to sort 
properties into two bins, those due to “the evolution of their species” (323) and those 
“exclusively due to enculturation or to social learning” (326). Only the former, asserts 
Machery, are a part of human nature. But what, exactly, is a property “exclusively due to 
enculturation or to social learning”? Any organismic property is going to be due both to 
heritable features of the organism as well as the particular environmental features the 
organism happens to encounter during its life. Some of these environmental features 
could be counted as instances of “enculturation” or  “social learning,” but the fact that 
such environmental features are present in the organism’s life history does not mean that 
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we can point to properties as being “exclusively due” to these environmental inputs. The 
innate-acquired dichotomy has been long challenged (see Lehrman 1953; Bateson and 
Mameli 2007) and I see no way to make Machery’s distinction without a futile attempt at 
reifying this problematic dichotomy.  
 Thus, although Machery successfully dodges Hull’s criticisms, the concept of 
human nature that he ends up proposing accords neither with intuitive notions of human 
nature, nor with scientific practice. It should, therefore, be discarded and be replaced. In 
what follows, I will propose and defend a replacement. The aim of my alternative account 
of human nature will be to fulfill core desiderata for such a concept. Human nature 
should (D1) be the empirically accessible (and thus not based on occult essences) subject 
of the human (psychological, anthropological, economic, biological, etc.) sciences, (D2) 
help clarify related concepts like innateness and naturalness, which are associated with 
human nature, and (D3) characterize human uniqueness. Although for some, an 
additional desideratum that human nature tell us something about what humans should be 
or should strive for is important, the notion of human nature that I offer will not directly 
fulfill this normative desideratum, since I hold that human nature cannot simultaneously 
fulfill this desideratum and D1. 
 
4. The life history trait cluster account of human nature. Consider an individual 
human of a particular genetic constitution in a particular environment. There are many 
different possible outcomes to such an individual’s life. Think of these possible outcomes 
as possible life histories. One life history involves the individual becoming relatively 
prosperous, having a large family, and dying after a long life. Another life history 
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terminates from a fatal disease in childhood. These life histories are populated by a 
multitude of traits. Some of these traits persist over entire life histories (e.g., a core body 
temperature in excess of 90°F), while others are short lived (e.g., a temperature of 
105°F), or momentary (a particular sneeze). ‘Trait’ here thus picks out any feature of a 
life history, no matter its duration or significance.  
 Now consider the totality of traits and how they are dispersed over the totality of 
possible life histories. It is clear that the traits do not populate the possible life histories in 
a random way—instead, there are patterns: Some later (“consequent”) traits will always 
or usually follow certain prior (“antecedent” traits). The consequent trait of speaking 
fluent English will always be linked with antecedent exposure to spoken English. This 
might seem trivially true, but it is important that this is not the case with all individuals 
(human or otherwise). The traits can of course be morphological or physiological or 
psychological and not just behavioral. For individuals lacking the gene for the enzyme 
phenylalanine hydroxylase (PAH), those with (and only with) antecedent exposure to 
phenylalanine will exhibit the consequent trait of phenylketonuria (PKU), a devastating 
neurological disease.  This rather simple observation that traits are non-randomly 
dispersed over this set of life histories (and that there will be robust patterns of 
antecedent-consequent pairs) provides the basis for the notion of individual nature, from 
which I will construct the concept of human nature. Individual nature is defined as the 
pattern of trait clusters within the individual’s set of possible life histories. This concept 
of individual nature, though coherent, points to something that scientists will typically 
want to study only as a means to learning about humans in general—learning, that is, 
about human nature.  
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 Human nature is defined as the pattern of trait clusters within the totality of extant 
human possible life histories. Thus, if one were to take all of the possible life histories 
that form the basis for individual nature, and then combine them, one would possess the 
set of life histories that forms the basis for human nature. The trait distribution patterns in 
this set of life histories constitute human nature. For example, the traits “bearing 
offspring” and “lactating” will be clustered, the former being antecedent to the latter. 
There will be few instances of lactating that are not associated with the antecedent trait 
“bearing offspring.” It is this pattern of human life history trait clusters that I am 
identifying with human nature. 
Note that I am not arguing that these patterns are what define membership in the 
species. I am thus not adopting a homeostatic property cluster conception of the 
definition of species (see Boyd 1999). The trait patterns in an individual’s nature do not 
determine to which species the individual belongs (though they of course serve as 
evidence); it is instead, as Hull and the scientific consensus argues, belonging to a 
particular lineage that determines species membership. This view of human nature is thus 
fully consistent with the cladistic view of specieshood. 
This account of human nature I will label the Life-history Trait Cluster (LTC) 
account. This is to distinguish it from accounts that are essentialist or normative, since it 
is neither based on essential properties, nor, as we will see in section 7, does it imply that 
human nature is in any sense “good.” Instead, characterizations of features of human 
nature are merely descriptions of statistical trends within the collective set of human life 
histories.  
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5. Human nature: the subject of the social and psychological sciences. At first blush, 
the LTC account of human nature might seem to be of little use. It fails to identify a 
property or set of properties essential to (or good for) being human. Furthermore, by 
linking human nature to an infinite set of life histories, it would appear that human nature 
is not even empirically accessible, thus failing D1. In this section, I hope to show that, on 
the contrary, the LTC account identifies just what it is that is the subject of the human 
sciences. 
 To begin, let us consider what kind of results of psychological studies are of 
value. A study merely reporting that humans are sometimes aggressive will be of little 
interest. In the LTC framework, it is uninformative because it is merely calling attention 
to the existence of some traits within the set of human life histories, but is not identifying 
(or quantifying) a pattern of these traits. Such a study would never be published in an 
academic journal. If, instead, the study reports that adults who were abused as children 
will tend to be aggressive toward their own children, then the study is of interest and, if 
executed well, is the sort of research that could be published. What such a study is doing 
is identifying a pattern in the collective life histories. It is making the claim that life 
histories with the antecedent trait “abused as a child” will tend to be associated with the 
consequent trait “aggressive toward one’s children.”  
 Similarly, controlled experiments are seeking to discover life history trait patterns. 
A study that has participants give speeches on unfamiliar topics in front of an unfriendly 
audience and then measures cortisol levels in their saliva are searching for such patterns. 
Here a possible pattern would be an antecedent “uncomfortable public speaking event” 
followed by “high cortisol levels.” Control groups in such studies are used to see whether 
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the presence of the antecedent is causally linked to the consequent. And in the LTC 
framework, the controls are a way of refining our knowledge of the trait patterns and 
projecting into unknown possibilities. The psychologist wants to state, quite generally, 
that public speaking is a source of stress. And making these general statements is to say 
that there is a robust pattern of association between the antecedent and consequent traits. 
Thus, knowledge of human nature (in the LTC sense) is just the aim of psychological 
investigations such as these. 
 By extension, it is easy to see that knowledge in the human sciences more 
generally is, for the most part, knowledge of human nature. An anthropologist who 
describes an unusual behavior among the Yaminawa is going to investigate both the 
meaning of the behavior as well as its causes. Such an investigation is but an 
investigation into trait patterns—what other psychological, behavioral, physiological, etc. 
traits are linked to the unusual behavior? Similarly, the behavioral economist who shows 
that greater choice leads to poorer satisfaction is pointing to a life-history trait pattern: 
antecedent states “decisions with many options” will be associated with consequent states 
like “poor satisfaction.” The degree to which the findings are robust is the degree to 
which there is a strong statistical association between the antecedent and consequent in 
the set of life histories.  
 Non-human animals are often used as models for studying humans. The reason 
why such research can be useful is also accounted for by the LTC. A model (a rat, say) in 
some domain (like cancer research) is going to useful to the extent that the same 
antecedent-consequent pattern exists in both humans and rats—cancer as consequent and 
extensive exposure to benzene as antecedent, for example.  
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6. The quantification of human nature. We have seen that D1 is satisfied: human 
nature is indeed the subject of the human sciences. But it has not yet been made clear 
what the LTC account implies about other ways that the concept of human nature is used, 
i.e., it has not yet been shown to fulfill D2 (the clarification of related concepts like 
innateness and naturalness). We speak of a behavior being “natural,” or it being part of 
“human nature” to behave in a particular way. Are such locutions undermined by the 
LTC account or can they be understood within it? In this section I will show that while it 
is a mistake to understand traits as dichotomously either “natural” or not, a part of 
“human nature” or not, I will show that there is a sense in which traits can be more or less 
natural, more or less central to human nature. In order to accomplish this, I will construct 
a human nature space and suggest that behaviors occupying a particular region are core 
features of human nature, while those in other parts of the space are less central. 
 Human nature, as argued for above, is investigated by determining associations 
between antecedent and consequent traits in the collective human life histories. There are 
two key variables that one could use in characterizing these associations. First, there is 
the proportion of life histories that exhibit the antecedent trait. This could also be 
understood as the probability that an individual drawn at random will exhibit the 
antecedent during their life. Second, there is the proportion of those exhibiting the 
antecedent who also exhibits the consequent. This can also be understood 
probabilistically as the conditional probability of exhibiting the consequent given the 
antecedent. I will label the first the pervasiveness, p, of the antecedent, and I will label 
the second the robustness, r, of the antecedent-consequent association. Some antecedent 
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traits (lacking PAH and consuming phenylalanine) will be rare, but robustly associated 
with their consequent (PKU). And some antecedents can be common (imbibing alcohol) 
but not very robustly associated with particular consequents (like esophageal cancer), 
despite the fact that imbibing alcohol does raise the incidence of such cancer. 
 These examples exhibit two important features of the p-r space. One is that the 
antecedent need not be a single, simple trait, but can instead be complex a trait or cluster 
of traits. The second is that there will generally be a tradeoff between p and r. For a given 
consequent, one can often increase robustness by adding more antecedent traits (or 
replacing a simpler antecedent with a more complex one). Lacking the gene for PAH will 
be associated with PKU, but the realization that individuals can consume diets absent in 
phenylalanine makes the absence of PAH not all that robustly linked with PKU. 
However, the antecedent “lacking PAH + consuming phenylalanine” is more robustly 
linked to the consequent, PKU. The same is true of the alcohol example. Singling out 
heavy drinkers, or heavy drinkers that are also smokers, will increase the robustness of 
the link between the antecedent and esophageal cancer. 
This tradeoff between p and r parallels the tradeoff that Lewis (1973) saw in the 
creation of deductive systems. He argued that “a contingent generalization is a law of 
nature if and only if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive 
systems that achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength” (73). Such deductive 
systems can generally be axiomatized more or less simply, and there is a tradeoff: 
“Simplicity without strength can be had from pure logic, strength without simplicity from 
(the deductive closure of) an almanac” (73). By making the antecedent traits more and 
more complex, one can increase r, but at a cost of decreased p. And one can achieve a 
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high p by simplifying the antecedent, but this usually comes at a cost to r. The analogy of 
Lewis’s almanac is a set of antecedents that picks out the totality of antecedent traits. The 
consequent would have perfect robustness, but the specific set of antecedents will be 
singular, with the lowest possible pervasiveness. 
With the p-r space in mind, we are now in the position of being able to return to 
the question of what it might mean to “behave naturally” or for a behavior to be part of 
human nature. The LTC framework implies that instead of saying that it is natural to C, 
we should instead say that it is natural for As to C, where ‘A’ denotes the antecedent(s) 
and ‘C’ denotes the consequent. Thus, instead of saying that it is natural to develop PKU, 
one should instead say that it is natural for those who (A) lack PAH and consume 
phenylalanine to (C) develop PKU. Similarly, instead of saying that PKU is a part of 
human nature, it is more informative and precise to say that it is part of human nature for 
individuals who lack PAH and consume phenylalanine to develop PKU. Analogously 
instead of stating that “lactation is a part of human nature,” one could state that “lactation 
is a part of female human nature” or that “female lactation is a part of human nature,” 
since the latter descriptions pick out an antecedent (being female) that makes the 
antecedent-consequent association robust. 
If a trait is a part of human nature, then so, too, it might seem that it is innate. As 
discussed above, the innate-acquired distinction is problematic. But there is nevertheless 
a sense in which the LTC framework can provide a revised and improved way of 
understanding this concept. Here are three ways that one could understand innateness in 
the LTC framework. First, the r-value of the trait association is one possible way of 
quantifying innateness—the higher the r-value, the more the consequent is associated 
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with the given the antecedent. Thus, it is not that consequent traits, or traits in general, 
that are innate full stop, but they have a quantifiable degree of innateness provided the 
antecedent. Second, one could restrict innateness to antecedent-consequent associations 
that exhibit both a high r-value and a high p-value. 
Third, although these understandings of innateness harmonize with some of the 
standard ways of understanding the concept (in terms of canalization, for example), they 
do not preserve the “innateness = not learned” definition, since learning can be a part of 
the causes of the consequent. To preserve the “not learned” conception of innateness, one 
could add the restriction that learning must not be causally relevant to the appearance of 
the consequent, given the antecedent, though I imagine that many traits one would be apt 
to call innate would no longer be classified as such under this restricted definition, since 
learning is woven into the causal fabric of so much of development. 
The LTC account of human nature thus fulfills D2 and, as we saw in the previous 
section, D1. But what about D3, namely, the identification of human uniqueness? And, 
furthermore, is there any sense in which the framework can provide insight into human 
goodness—what we should strive for in becoming a good human, or what we should aim 
for through human enhancement?  
 
7. Human uniqueness and the question of normativity. The LTC account is incredibly 
permissive. All sorts of antecedent-consequent links exist, many of which are rather 
trivial. It is human nature for females to lactate, but this is true of all mammals. This does 
not mean that it is not an important feature of human nature, but it does mean that it is not 
uniquely human. And there are countless rather trivial trait associations. “Every human 
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that has mass will die” has maximal r and p-values, but is utterly otiose. In fact, trait 
associations with maximal r and p-values will tend to be trivial. The interesting ones 
often occur when the antecedent is not universal, and when changes in the antecedent are 
causally associated with changes in the consequent. In order to both eliminate the trivial 
associations and to capture human uniqueness, I will define uniquely human nature as the 
subset of the antecedent-consequent associations that are unique to the human species. 
Importantly, uniquely human nature, like human nature, is a property not of each 
individual human, but instead of the set of extant human (actual and possible) life 
histories. Speaking a human language fluently (provided exposure to this language while 
growing up) is part of uniquely human nature. This is true because no other species will 
speak fluently given a similar upbringing. Raising a chimp in the same way as an 
American child does not result in it speaking English. The same will be true of many of 
the consequents that we laude in the human species, such as complex systems of morality 
and the ability for self-reflection. 
 The LTC account’s “uniquely human nature” is thus a way of capturing human 
uniqueness, satisfying D3. But what of normativity, is there a sense in which human 
nature is good, or can be improved upon via human enhancement? The short answer is 
that because the foundations of the LTC framework are trait distribution patterns, it is, 
strictly speaking, descriptive and not normative. Furthermore, there is not some eternal 
“human nature,” like a fixed target in Plato’s heaven, that humans can strive for. Instead, 
human nature simply tracks the form, behavior, etc. of humans. Human nature was 
different in our species’ past and will be different in the future.  
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 But this does not mean that there are no moral implications of human nature under 
the LTC framework. If the study of human nature is the study of patterns of trait 
associations, then studying human nature will provide insight into human goodness and 
evil—if a particular nefarious consequent is robustly associated with a particular set of 
antecedents, then the elimination or reduction of the consequent should be pursued via 
the elimination or alteration of one or more of the antecedents. Similarly good consequent 
traits can be made more common via an increase in the antecedents with which they are 
robustly associated. 
 
8. Conclusions. “Man, in a word, has no nature” (Ortega y Gassett, 1961, 217, emphasis 
in original). Such a sentiment is shared by many in the humanities and human sciences, 
and seems to be based on the reflection that humans are simply too diverse (across 
cultures, genders, times) for there to be some human essence that we could extract from 
this diversity. Such skepticism is warranted if the only notion of human nature on the 
table is an essentialist one. But the LTC framework provides an alternative. It embraces 
the diversity, showing that there are patterns within and across human heterogeneity. If 
there is to be an empirically-accessible human nature that sheds troubling essentialisms, 
then it should be founded on the unique pattern of traits within the collective human life 
histories. Such a concept of human nature cannot play all of the roles that we may desire 
of it—showing us how to be more fully human, for example—but it can play many of the 
other roles. I have shown that it can be understood as the subject of the various human 
sciences, can clarify what we mean when we classify a trait as innate or natural, and can 
also provide a basis for human uniqueness.  
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Abstract Viruses are major drivers of global biogeochemistry and the etiological
agents of many diseases. They are also the winners in the game of life: there are
more viruses on the planet than cellular organisms and they encode most of the
genetic diversity on the planet. In fact, it is reasonable to view life as a viral
incubator. Nevertheless, most ecological and evolutionary theories were developed,
and continue to be developed, without considering the virosphere. This means these
theories need to be to reinterpreted in light of viral knowledge or we need to develop
new theory from the viral point-of-view. Here we briefly introduce our viral planet
and then address a major outstanding question in biology: why is most of life viral?
A key insight is that during an infection cycle the original virus is completely
broken down and only the associated information is passed on to the next genera-
tion. This is different for cellular organisms, which must pass on some physical part
of themselves from generation to generation. Based on this premise, it is proposed
that the thermodynamic consequences of physical information (e.g., Landauer’s
principle) are observed in natural viral populations. This link between physical and
genetic information is then used to develop the Viral Information Hypothesis, which
states that genetic information replicates itself to the detriment of system energy
efficiency (i.e., is viral in nature). Finally, we show how viral information can be
tested, and illustrate how this novel view can explain existing ecological and
evolutionary theories from more fundamental principles.
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Viruses as information
Viruses are the only biological entities that replicate purely as information. When a
virus enters its host, the virion completely disassembles and the nucleic acid is
copied into new genomes, which are then packaged and released as new virions.
Physically, there is nothing in the original form of the virion that has to be passed on
from one generation to another. Not one single molecule, atom, or quark must be
transferred between the old and new. The only thing that must be moved between
viral generations is the information to build the next set of viruses. The rest of
biology operates differently. Every new cell physically shares all of its molecules
with the original mother cell at the moment of division.
Here we propose the Viral Information Hypothesis, which argues that:
(1) Physical information is about position in the Universe.
(2) Biology creates physical information by changing the position of matter,
effectively working as Maxwell’s Demon.
(3) Viral information converts different types of physical information into itself at
the cost of overall energetic efficiency.
(4) There is a thermodynamic cost to destroying physical information, which is
quantified by Landauer’s Principle. Extremely large populations like viruses
experience selection at the Landauer limit and this is observable.
Welcome to the viral world
Humans observe nature at the meso-scale (e.g., mm to km). Our brains are good at
processing this sort of data, from observing blossoming cherry trees, to scuba diving
on a coral reef, to measuring the beaks of finches. But our senses have led us astray
because until recently we have been overlooking most of life. On the cherry tree’s
blossom, roots, branches, and leaves are millions of viruses and their microbial prey.
When swimming over a coral reef, every milliliter of seawater is home to ten
million viruses (Bergh et al. 1989; Hara et al. 1991; Fuhrman 1999) and every
surface, including the mucus on corals and fish, is covered by even more viruses
(Wilson et al. 2005; Marhaver et al. 2008; Patten et al. 2008; Willner et al. 2010).
And much of the DNA flying about in Darwin’s famous finches actually belongs to
microbes and viruses.1
Viruses are particularly easy to overlook because they are completely outside our
sensory range. This is a problem, because by missing the virosphere biologists have
effectively ignored the most abundant and diverse biological entities on Earth.
Conservatively, there are 1.0 9 1031 of them. This is based on estimates of
*1.0 9 1030 microbes on the planet (Whitman et al. 1998) and an average of*10
viruses per prokaryotic cell (Weinbauer 2004). An alien visiting our planet, given a
different sensory range that could directly detect viruses, would likely consider
1 Doing some back-of-the-envelope calculations for the zebra finch, Taeniopygia guttata, we estimated
that about 10 % of the total DNA in a finch is microbial or viral.
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them the dominant form of life. (Note to reader: if you are fluent in the history and
biology of viruses, feel free to skip the following section as we review these topics.)
How do we know that there are this many viruses? Initially, they were counted
using electron microscopes (Bergh et al. 1989). Now they are routinely counted
using epifluorescent microscopy (Noble and Fuhrman 1998). For example, to
enumerate the viruses in a milliliter of seawater, the sample is pulled through a glass
filter with 0.02 micron pores (small enough to capture viruses). Then the filter is
treated with a DNA stain that lights up under fluorescent light on the microscope.
Technically, what biologists actually count are virus-like particles (VLPs). A VLP is
something that looks like a virus but has not formally been characterized and shown
to act like a virus; that is to infect and then replicate inside a host cell. Even though
viruses are incredibly small, 1031 make them a huge crowd. If you line up all the
viruses in single-file, the line would reach a thousand times across our home galaxy.
While the total number of viruses is enormous, what is really incredible is their
dynamics (Weinbauer 2004). Our best estimates are that every week 1031 viruses
fall apart and 1031 new ones are made to replace them. This means that roughly
1.7 9 1025 new viruses are produced every second. For each new virus,
approximately 50,000 base pairs of DNA have to be synthesized (Steward et al.
2000). Thus, each second more than 1030 base pairs of viral DNA are made on
planet Earth. Since the vast majority of these viruses infect microbes (Bacteria and
Archaea, two of the three domains of life), the making of these viruses entails the
death of approximately 1024 microbial cells each second. This enhances the
microbial diversity and productivity of ecosystems. It also is a huge factor in global
energy and nutrient cycling (Fuhrman 1999). The point of these exercises is to show
just how numerous, massive, and dynamic these 1031 viruses really are. When
considering the virosphere, extremely unlikely events become probabilistic
certainties.
Even though viruses dominate our home in the universe, most people consider
them only when they cause some sort of disease.2 But in fact, most viruses are
actually phage: viruses that infect the Bacteria. In 1915 the Englishman Frederick
Twort discovered an ‘‘ultra-microscopic virus’’ that converted bacteria into fine
granules (Twort 1915). In his usage, the word ‘virus’ seems to have meant simply an
infectious agent. He wrote about ‘‘a minute bacterium that will only grow on living
material…or a form of life more lowly organized than the bacterium’’ (1915: 1242).
The virus was destroyed at 60 C and could not be cultured except on the bacteria.
‘‘On the whole it seems probable, though by no means certain, that the active
transparent material is produced by the micrococcus, and since it leads to its own
destruction and can be transmitted to fresh healthy cultures, it might almost be
considered as an acute infectious disease of micrococci’’ (1915:1243). That is, the
bacteria were getting sick.
The French-Canadian Felix d’Herelle went further and showed that a filterable
‘‘antagonistic microbe’’ capable of killing the bacteria Shigella dysenteriae was
2 Attempts to identify the bacteriological pathogen of diseased tobacco plants led to the identification of
the first virus by Beijerinck in 1898. The infectious agent was described as a filterable contagium vivum
fluidum, and was later named the tobacco mosaic virus (Bos 1999).
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isolatable from patients who developed enteritis following dysentery infections
(d’Herelle 1917). He performed the first plaque assays and showed that titers of this
agent were highest during patient recovery. Culturing the agent required living
dysentery bacteria, but under these conditions the agent could be cultured through
50 successive transfers. d’Herelle wrote: ‘‘the disappearance of the dysentery bacilli
is coincident with the appearance of an invisible microbe…This microbe, really a
microbe of immunity, is an obligate bacteriophage’’—the first use of the term
(d’Herelle 1917: 159).
Bacteriophage means ‘‘bacteria eating’’ and is usually shortened to phage. They
are a subclass of viruses that infect the Bacterial domain of life (Woese et al. 1990).
The early virus hunters quickly realized the phage were very diverse, with each one
finicky about which host it would infect. This specificity of phages for specific
strains of bacteria was one of the early ways of microbiological identification, which
was carried out through a procedure called phage typing (Williams and Rippon
1952). Basically, this can be done by culturing bacteria in a test tube and then
adding different phage. If the tube clears, it means all the bacteria have been killed
by the phage. Using this approach, thousands of phage and their host strains have
been classified. Determining host range is one of the most a useful approaches for
characterizing the virosphere.
Another way to characterize viruses is to visualize them with an electron
microscope (EM) (Bradley 1965). Viruses outside a host cell are called virions and
they are some of the most wondrous creatures ever discovered. The archetypical
phage looks like a lunar lander, with a protein capsid protecting the double stranded
DNA genome (Fig. 1). It has a tail, which is used to transfer the viral genome into
the host cell, and tail fibers that help the phage find the correct host (Fig. 1). Viral
capsids usually form one of two basic architectures: rods or icosahedra, the size of
which can vary by more than an order of magnitude, and which can package
genomes that also differ more than 30-fold in size (Fauquet et al. 2005) (Fig. 1). In
forming rod-shaped particles, the capsid proteins are arrayed in a helix around the
viral DNA or RNA. TMV (tobacco mosaic virus) is the classic example of this
shape (Klug 1999). The other common capsid structure is an icosahedron
surrounding a nucleic acid core (Fauquet et al. 2005). Among the five thousand-
plus phages that had been described and viewed under the EM by 2000, 96 % are
‘‘tailed phages’’ (Ackermann 2001), composed of an icosahedral head containing
the genome, and possessing a tail that functions to identify the host and deliver the
genome to the cell interior. The tail structures divided the lunar-lander phage into
three main groups: the lambda-like phage, which have long, flexible tails; the T7-
like phage, which have short, contractile tails; and the T4-like phage, which have
long contractile tails (Ackermann 2007). Often the capsid proteins and genomic
nucleic acids self-assemble in vitro to form infectious virions (Hung et al. 1969;
Kushner 1969; Lebeurier et al. 1977; Klug 1999). Neither additional information
nor an energy source is required. Viruses that infect animals and plant often have the
icosahedral structure enclosed in an envelope of lipids (Fig. 1).
The virions are exquisitely designed predators that seek out and kill their hosts.
Overall, the virions have a slightly negative charge so that they repel each other
when the host cell is lysed (Todd 1927; Krueger et al. 1929; Clifton and Madison
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1931). This allows them to spread out and avoid entanglement in the lysed cell’s
released contents. More subtly, it appears that the charges are arranged so that the
virions are actually dipoles (De Groot et al. 1977); that is they have a negative
charge around the capsid head and a slightly positive charge at the tails (Serwer and
Pichler 1978; Kosturko et al. 1979). This presumably orientates them tail-first when
making an attack on the bacterial host cell (which is slightly negative).
During the attack phase, the virion is first electrostatically attracted to the cell’s
surface (Krueger 1931; Delbru¨ck 1940). It rolls along the outside and the tail
searches for specific receptors. If the host is the correct bacterial species, then the
phage will find the receptor and clamp down on it (Heller 1992). When this happens
the phage’s tail will drill through host cell’s membranes and cell wall so that the
viral genome can be delivered into the cytoplasm (Letellier et al. 2004). To achieve
this, the outside of the contractile tails rearrange their molecular structure so that the
tube inside the sheath can pierce the cell (Kanamaru et al. 2002; Leiman et al.
2004). This allows for the DNA to be injected with incredible force (Kindt et al.
2001; Letellier et al. 2004). The process is not dissimilar to the secondary jaws of
Ridley Scott’s Aliens; terrifying if you happen to be the size of a microbe.
In addition to tails, the phage capsids are often decorated with secondary
structures that facilitate the attack. This includes hooks that grab hold of bacterial
flagella so that the phage is pulled down to the host (Schade et al. 1967; Lotz et al.
1977). Other molecular accessories probably help the virion survive different
environmental conditions or act as camouflage to throw off protective ectoenzymes
produced by the host. The constant war between the virion’s capabilities for finding
and infecting the cell, and the retaliation by the host, leads to evolutionary dynamics
Fig. 1 Examples of the main types of viruses: tailed phage that infect bacteria, filamentous viruses that
infect all domains of life, and enveloped viruses that infect animal and plant cells. There are actually
hundreds of variants on these basic themes and interested readers should look at the International
Committee on Viral Taxonomy (ICTV) website and/or Viral Taxonomy books. Of particular interest are
the numerous novel virions associated with Archaea viruses
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known as Red Queen (Van Valen 1974) and ecological cycles called Lotka-
Volterra/Kill-the-Winner (Bratbak et al. 1990).
There were several problems that had to be circumvented in order to study the
diversity and dynamics of the global virome. To culture a virus you need to grow its
host and at the present time we only routinely cultivate roughly 1 % of the microbes
from the environment (Fuhrman and Campbell 1998). And once conditions to
culture the microbe are identified, they have to be modified to encourage infection
by a virus. Because of these challenges, the culturing route would be a daunting and
defeating path to take. What about sequencing the viral DNA? Sequencing of the
16S ribosomal RNA gene (rDNA) is a common technique used to analyze the
diversity of microbial communities, and it capitalizes on the high conservation of
this one gene amongst all microbes, thereby avoiding comparison of entire genomes
to get at community diversity (Pace et al. 1986; Woese 1987). However, it not
possible to take a similar approach with viruses because there is no gene in common
between all groups (Rohwer and Edwards 2002). To get around this limitation, a
technique for shotgun sequencing random fragments from the pool of all of the viral
genomes in the community was developed (Breitbart et al. 2002). This approach is
called metagenomics.
Analysis of the entire genetic pool (the metagenome) of a sample was first
performed on viral communities isolated from seawater in San Diego (Breitbart
et al. 2002). This early study showed that the vast majority of viral sequences (80 %
or more) were not recognizable using common bioinformatic searches. That is to
say that the uncultured viral DNAs were so dissimilar from every single known
sequence accumulated in various databases of known viral, bacterial, and eukaryotic
sequences (e.g., GenBank) that we have no idea what they do or to whom they
belong. Despite the incredible volume of sequences added to the databases since
these metagenomes were first sequenced, most viruses remain unknown. On the
other hand, microbial metagenomes, which followed closely behind the first viral
metagenomes, were much less mysterious with\20 % of sequences not matching
anything in the databases (Dinsdale et al. 2008). Because viruses are incredibly
abundant, much more so than microbes, and because the majority of the information
contained in viral genomes is unknown, viruses are the final frontier of unexplored
genomic diversity and are the largest genetic repository that exists. We are left with
the question: why are there so many viruses?
Demons and information
Up until this point, we have argued that viruses are extremely abundant, incredibly
diverse, and travel through time and space as information. We propose that this
relationship between viruses and information is the key to their success, but what
does ‘‘information’’ mean? In the communication sense, information is a measure of
‘‘surprisal’’ (Tribus 1961). The greater the surprise at observing an object, the more
information it contains. Gold contains more information than does hydrogen (i.e., it
is more surprising to find gold). Considering this concept more deeply, it becomes
clear that information is actually an accounting of position in the universe. That is,
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the gold is created by compressing protons, neutrons, and electrons together in space
and time. As these particles become locked together, degrees of freedom are lost
and a highly unlikely, and therefore a highly informative event, is created. This
organizing of matter is time and space is physical information.
Physical information does not come for free. The thermodynamic consequence of
physical information was first mathematically defined by Rolf Landauer, who
calculated that the minimum energy (E) stored in one bit of information was equal
to kTln(2), where k = Boltzmann’s constant and T = temperature in Kelvin
(Landauer 1996). Heat released by the erasure of physical information can best be
envisioned by invoking Maxwell’s Demon. Originally presented as a challenge to
the Second Law of Thermodynamics, the Demon is a hypothetical creature that can
pick the ‘‘hot’’ molecules from one container and mover them to another. This
creates a temperature differential, which could be used to drive some sort of engine.
So, with the right Demon, we can create a perpetual motion machine. It was Leo
Szilard who showed that the reason this does not happen is because the Demon is
actually gaining information about the relative position of the molecules (Szilard
1929). This realization killed the perpetual motion machine and Maxwell’s
challenge to the Second Law of Thermodynamics.
Now consider a Maxwell’s Demon in a biochemical system (Fig. 2). At a certain
temperature, the reactant molecules ‘‘A’’ have different velocities, as described by
Boltzmann’s distribution. The fastest/hottest ‘‘A’’ molecules are on the right side of
the distribution. For our purposes, the molecules above the activation energy (EA)
are the ones with sufficient velocity to be active in a chemical reaction. Now
imagine a Maxwell’s Demon that selectively picks ‘‘A’’ molecules within the EA
population and passes them to a second reactant pool ‘‘B’’. This creates the product
and effectively traps both molecules in product ‘‘AB’’. In doing so, the demon has
increased the information of the system. When ‘‘AB’’ degrades into its components,
‘‘A’’ will re-enter the original population and heat it up.3 This increase in
Fig. 2 Illustration of Maxwell’s Demon and Landauer’s principle. The Demon/enzyme selectively picks
‘‘A’’ molecules with sufficient energy to react with reactant ‘‘B’’, which leads to product ‘‘AB’’. This
process slightly cools the ‘‘A’’ population. This loss of heat is put back into the system by the surrounding
Universe. During degradation/erasure of ‘‘AB’’, ‘‘A’’ goes back into its population and this heat can be
measured using methods like isothermal calorimetry
3 Sometimes it is easier to think of this as only two molecules of A. When one molecule is taken away,
the system gets colder. And when the A molecule returns to the system, it gets hotter.
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temperature is described by Landauer’s Principle (Landauer 1996; Toyabe et al.
2010).
We propose that biology behaves as Maxwell’s Demon, where the Demons are
enzymes that selectively grab EA molecules to form products. This creates physical
information, which can be used to do work (Toyabe et al. 2010; Be´rut et al. 2012).
The one caveat to this work-from-information schema is that it requires elaborate
scaffolds like a computer. We suggest that genetic information is the set of
instructions to construct the scaffold for Maxwell’s Demons such that they convert
different types of physical information into more instances of itself. This new
information has a thermodynamic cost when it is erased and the amount of heat
released by the destruction of information is also described by Landauer’s Principle
(Landauer 1996; Toyabe et al. 2010). It should be possible to observe the link
between physical information and thermodynamics and use it to better understand
biology and in particular the success of viruses.
Viral versus physical information
Let us compare and contrast physical and viral information. Gravity organizes the
physical properties of the universe. Gravity clumps matter, which enhances the
importance of the other three fundamental interactions. By organizing matter in time
and space, gravity creates physical information. The cloud of subatomic particles
from the Big Bang could have spread out evenly throughout the universe. Instead,
small imperfections allowed gravity to pull some particles together; and these
attracted others. Accretion discs developed and collapsed into stars, where gravity
fused the matter together forming heavier elements and led to the production of
electromagnetic radiation. These processes increase the physical information
content within the universe through strictly physical processes (Fig. 3a). Gravity
also reinforces itself—bigger things attract more objects, creating a positive
feedback loop. Biology also reinforces itself by organizing compounds and
concentrating them. Just like gravity, life creates organization of particles in the
universe through juxtaposition and rearrangement. The organization of matter by
biology leads to viral information because it converts physical information into
itself at the cost of maximal efficiency from a thermodynamic point of view.
Viral information and the rest of biology
The two primary sources of physical information used for conversion into viral
information are electromagnetic radiation from fusion (the basis for phototrophy)
and the redox byproducts of fission (the basis for chemotrophy) (Fig. 3a). Let us
examine the largest biome on earth (potentially), the deep, hot biosphere that exists
within the Earth’s crust (Gold 1992; Chapelle et al. 2002), as an example of how the
viral information feedback might work. In this ecosystem, a very simple energy
source, split water, provides the energy to create cellular biomass. At the
temperature and pressure of this system, the only known predators of the microbial
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inhabitants are the viruses. From this simple food web, the main ‘‘rules’’ of ecology
and evolution are apparent (Fig. 3b). These are (1) niche exclusion, (2) niche
creation, and (3) Red Queen/Kill-the-Winner (KTW) dynamics, which ultimately
result in and are driven by (4) viral information.
In the first step, one microbial population makes a living by using up resources
from the local environment (e.g., split water). This leaves the system depleted of
these items, generating competition and niche exclusion; the microbe that exploits
these resources the fastest wins. At the same time, the viruses in the system
essentially punish the most successful microbe by killing it (Bratbak et al. 1990;
Rodriguez-Brito et al. 2010). Viral lysis releases cellular debris into the surrounding
environment, and the new microbes that capitalize on this new set of resources then
begin the process anew, excluding others from their new niche, creating a new set of
waste products and resources, and feeding a new population of viruses. Effectively,
the viruses are creating conditions to replicate themselves.
The pressure of predation also leads the microbe to alter parts of itself to avoid
viral recognition (i.e., Red Queen Dynamics, or running to stay in the same place),
Fig. 3 From gravity to viral information: dust to phage. a Schematic of how gravity leads to viral
information. b Schematic of how viruses shape ecology (1-3) and evolution (3), leading to diversification
and an increase of viral information (4)
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while the virus adapts to recognize the new microbes. In other words, viruses drive
the evolution of microbial genomes and niches, ultimately leading to the increase of
viral information. Since viruses can sample more sequence space, they wind up
generating the greatest amount of new genetic information, which can then be
passed along to the host microbes through horizontal gene transfer (HGT).
Ultimately, the community is converting physical information into genetic
information. We hypothesize that this step is viral because it is done at a great
thermodynamic inefficiency; that is a lot of waste heat is produced. Using the rule of
thumb that each trophic transfer loses 90 % of the heat, each joule of viral
information gained costs the system 100 J of physical information.
Measuring viral information
The destruction of physical information, as discussed above, results in the release of
heat according to Landauer’s Principle. This heat can be measured by calorimetry.
Specifically, isothermal calorimetry tells us about the conversion rate of physical
information of a community into heat.4 Genetic information of the same community
can also be measured, in this case by sequencing the DNA. Based on these two
techniques, we propose the following experiment where physical information is
followed using calorimetry, and genetic information is followed using metagenom-
ics. When the two are plotted as shown in Fig. 4, we propose that a community
dominated by viral information occurs in the lower right region of the graph where
Fig. 4 Searching for viral information. The line indicates where the amount of physical information and
genetic information contained within cells are equal. Communities above the line contain more physical
than genetic information due to low genetic diversity (few species but many individuals), with each
individual requiring a certain amount of energy regardless of its genetic composition. Communities below
the line contain more genetic information. It is here that the energetic cost of information becomes
apparent, and where we expect to find viral information
4 In this sense, physical information is the 1/S, where S is entropy. We prefer to use ‘‘information’’ for
our accounting of position, because it better explains the concept. However it is completely compatible to
express this in terms of S.
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genetic information is made at the expense of thermodynamic efficiency (i.e., low
conversion to physical information).
Is there any evidence that viral information is real? Djamali and colleagues used
isothermal calorimetry to study the heat released by marine microbial and viral
communities (Djamali et al. 2012). In this experiment, viruses lowered the standing
stock of the cellular component by*25 %. At the same time, viruses increased the
work output of the system by over 200 %. The decline in cell numbers coupled with
the increase in diversity looks very much like viral information. Future experiments
of this type offer a framework for testing the Viral Information Hypothesis.
Observations of viral information in nature
As one possible example of the consequences of viral information in nature, let us
consider the global conservation of viral sequences. Specific PCR ‘‘hunts’’ for the
same virus and/or virally encoded genes have shown that those viruses/viral genes
are relatively common all over the world (Breitbart et al. 2004; Short and Suttle
2005; Casas et al. 2006). For example, PCR primers were designed to specifically to
amplify two viral sequences named HECTOR and PARIS (Breitbart et al. 2004).
These so-called PUP sequences (Polymerases from Uncultured Podophage) were
present in most environments investigated and were found to be essentially identical
([99 % conserved at the nucleotide level). Similarly, metagenomic samples have
found exactly identical, overlapping viral sequences from widely dispersed parts of
the ocean (Angly et al. 2006). Finally, genomic sequencing of phage has identified
exactly matching sequences in very different phage genomes (Graham Hatfull,
personal communication).
The widespread occurrence of nearly identical sequences across the planet
requires an explanation. We hypothesize that this extremely faithful global
conservation is due to the energy cost associated with information erasure. As we
have seen, there are literally an astronomical number of viruses on the planet. It is
estimated that each viral population (that is the number of individuals of the same
species) is 1023. If each virus in a population has a difference of one bit of
information, then the heat released by destroying that additional information would
be 1,800 J via Landauer’s Principle (Fig. 5). In other words, a viral population that
has one mutation per genome replication costs 1.8 kJ more to replicate than a viral
population that has no mutations. Over the course of a year, the amount of energy
required by the mutating viral population versus the non-mutating population is
approximately 100 kJ, assuming that the whole population is replaced once a week.
Over a billion years, this is 1014 J, which is roughly equivalent to the amount of
energy released by an atomic bomb.5 Energetically efficient populations outcompete
those that are less efficient (Meysman and Bruers 2007; Vallino 2010); therefore,
populations of viruses with reduced mutations rates will outcompete those with
higher mutation rates, all other things being equal.
5 Remember this competition is actually occurring locally for small parts of the total population.
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The extra energetic costs of physical information associated with a mutation
might explain why identical viral sequences are observed on a global scale. Physical
information in the sense of a mutation is an extremely small selection pressure and
we hypothesize that the Landauer limit is the smallest force of selection. Because of
their ‘‘information only’’ life styles, it is easier to observe the thermodynamic
consequences of information in viral communities.6 Furthermore, we only observe
this in Nature because it is extremely hard to raise 1023 phage (or any other
biological entity) in the laboratory.
Conclusion
Envisioning the biosphere as a massive system that ultimately feeds viruses helps us
address a major outstanding question: why is biological diversity dominated by
viruses? This question would not have even occurred to earlier biologists, simply
because they did not know the extent of the virosphere. Modern biology, however,
needs to incorporate this natural phenomenon into its canon. The Viral Information
Hypothesis has the potential to synthesize ecology and evolutionary theory by
incorporating the viruses with the rest of biology in a thermodynamic framework.
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Fig. 5 The Landauer limit and mutations. A mutation in a DNA population creates at least 2 bits of
Physical Information. It costs an extra 3–6 9 10-21 J to erase the ‘‘B’’ population
6 The viruses may not be the only place where Landauer’s limit can be observed. Ultraconserved
Elements (UCE) occur in plant and animal genomes. There are 481 UCEs (200 bp) between human,
mouse and rats, which represents 300 million years of evolution. Reneker et al. identified large numbers
of UCEs ([100 bp) shared between plants and animals (Reneker et al. 2012).
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Was Leibniz the First Spacetime Structuralist?
Abstract
I argue that the standard interpretation of Leibniz as a relationist about space is mistaken, and 
defend a reading according to which his correspondence with Samuel Clarke actually 
suggests that Leibniz holds a view closely resembling modern spacetime structuralism. I 
distinguish my proposal from Belot's recent reading of Leibniz as a modal relationist, arguing 
for the superiority of my reading based on the Clarke correspondence and on Leibniz's 
conception of God's relation to the created world. I note a tension between my proposal and 
Leibniz's ontology, and suggest that a solution is forthcoming and worth pursuing. 
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1. Introduction.  The canonical reading of Leibniz's view of space and time holds that he 
was a thoroughgoing relationist: roughly, he believed that there is nothing to space over and 
above the various relations of coexistence between bodies, and he believed that there is 
nothing to time over and above the relations of succession between events. This reading dates 
back to Russell and is perhaps recapitulated most fully in Earman's World Enough and 
Spacetime (1989); recently, Gordon Belot has suggested a more nuanced variant of it. 
Importantly, the received view relies very heavily on a correspondence between Leibniz and 
Samuel Clarke, in which Leibniz seems to argue transparently and at great length for the 
relationist conception of space that has long been attributed to him. I believe that this reading 
reveals a misunderstanding of what Leibniz says about space in the Correspondence. My 
goal in this paper, accordingly, will be to reconstruct in a somewhat schematic way what 
Leibniz's remarks therein actually tell us about his theory of space. 
In a nutshell, I believe that his actual view looks suspiciously like a modern view 
known as spacetime structuralism, and my investigation will revolve around the claim that a 
plausible reconstruction of his view of space indicates that he was, for all intents and 
purposes, a proto- spacetime structuralist. In other words, Leibniz held a view of space very 
similar to that held by the modern spacetime structuralist, though he formulated it in different 
terms and based it upon his own particular metaphysics. I will proceed in the following 
manner, then: I'll first situate the canonical reading of Leibniz in light of a quick 
reconstruction of the main tenets of Newtonian substantivalism. Next, I'll introduce and 
explain spacetime structuralism, providing background for my discussion of Leibniz's views. 
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After this, I'll launch the promised investigation of Leibniz's view of space as he presents it 
against Clarke. In the course of the investigation, I'll distinguish my reading of Leibniz from 
Belot's and motivate a rejection of Belot's reading in favor of mine. At the very least, I hope 
to show how the machinery of spacetime structuralism enhances our understanding of 
Leibniz's view. But what I really want to establish is that Leibniz was, in a sense, the first 
spacetime structuralist: the lineage of this hotly debated view goes back much further than 
one would have thought. 
2. Newtonian Substantivalism and Spacetime Structuralism.  Let's now examine 
Newton's view of space. In the first Scholium of the Principia, Newton provides perhaps his 
most concise statement of what has come to be known as “substantivalism”, saying that 
“absolute space, of its own nature and without reference to anything external, always remains 
homogeneous and immovable”, and that “place is that part of space that a body occupies” 
(2004, 64-65). Space, in other words, exists over and above bodies; it's a preexisting 
“container” that would still be there even if there were no bodies. It is, in Earman's words, “a 
substratum of points underlying physical events” (1989, 10). Space and its parts “maintain 
their own identities independently of physical bodies”, to quote a recent paper by John 
Roberts (2003, 555). The essence of the Newtonian view is that the parts of space – i.e. 
points – possess intrinsic identity. Now, the standard reading of Leibniz on space commits 
him to the outright denial of Newton's claim: space does not exist prior to, or over and above, 
physical bodies in any sense; the parts of space not only lack intrinsic identity but aren't even 
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properly thought of as locations within a substantival container. This is the essence of what 
has come to be known as “relationism”. Earman puts the claim this way: “spatiotemporal 
relations among bodies... are direct; that is, they are not parasitic on relations among a 
substratum of space points that underlie bodies” (1989, 12). On the standard reading, 
Leibniz's positive claim about space emerges from the negative claim in that space is simply 
the order of bodies, and nothing more, and would not exist without bodies.
Now, as I've said, I'm proposing that Leibniz's actual conception of space becomes 
clear when viewed through the lens of spacetime structuralism, and that there's a good deal of 
evidence that he was actually a proto- spacetime structuralist himself. As background for this 
interpretation, we need to recall the views of the spacetime structuralist. Broadly speaking, 
spacetime structuralism is an instance of a more general view in the philosophy of science 
called ontic structural realism, which is roughly the idea that, in Esfeld's and Lam's words, 
“there are objects, but instead of being characterized by intrinsic properties, all there is to 
[them] are the relations in which they stand” (2008, 31). The view amounts to the claim that 
the relational complexes described by fundamental physics fully individuate the relata that 
they contain; these relata include things like electrons and spacetime points. Wuthrich 
summarizes the view (without advocating it) in a recent paper: “The objects... do not have 
any intrinsic properties but only relational ones. So what is really there... is a network of 
relations among objects that do not possess any intrinsic properties but are purely defined by 
their 'place' in [a relational structure]” (2009, 1042). One can also distinguish, as Wuthrich 
does, two broad variants of the view: one according to which objects and relations are 
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ontologically on a par with each other, and another according to which what's fundamentally 
real is just the set of relations, and objects are only thought of as somehow emerging from 
those relations. This distinction will become important in my discussion of Leibniz's view.
 The spacetime structuralist applies some version of ontic structural realism to the case 
of general relativity. The individuals in the domain of general relativity – the individuals 
participating in the theory's relational complexes – are the points of the spacetime manifold, 
which is the basic object on which fields are defined. For the spacetime structuralist, then, 
these points have no intrinsic properties or intrinsic identity, in accordance with ontic 
structural realism. Now, for the moderate spacetime structuralist, who adopts the view that 
neither objects nor relations are ontologically prior, there are fundamentally real spacetime 
points, but they are only individuated relationally, by the metric field and other key structural 
features of general relativity. In short, “there undoubtedly are space-time points that fulfill 
the function of objects[,] [b]ut instead of these objects having intrinsic properties, all there is 
to them is the relations in which they stand” (Esfeld and Lam 2008, 34). For a more radical 
structuralist, who applies the “relations only” version of ontic structural realism to the case of 
general relativity, there won't be anything like fundamentally real spacetime points; 
spacetime points will be purely emergent features of GR's relational complexes, which carry 
all the fundamental reality we can ascribe to the spacetime manifold. Crucially, both kinds of 
spacetime structuralist will emphatically deny that spacetime is purely relational, lacking 
anything over and above or prior to the relations between bodies. The nature of space lies 
between the substantival and relational extremes: it's structural, in the sense either that points 
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are real, existent individuals lacking identity independently of the relational complexes into 
which they enter, or the sense that points are not fundamentally real but emerge from 
something else that is, namely the relational complexes described by general relativity. 
3. Leibniz's Anticipation of Spacetime Structuralism. With the structuralist view on the 
table, I can now launch my investigation of Leibniz, with two initial points of caution: first, 
showing that Leibniz was the progenitor of spacetime structuralism will necessarily involve a 
fair bit of interpretation and extrapolation, due to the obvious chasm between the physics of 
his day and the modern understanding of space and time as a unified whole described by 
general relativity. What I'm trying to show is that Leibniz holds a view that in the vocabulary 
of his day looks very similar to what today's spacetime structuralists say in their vocabulary. 
Second, the question of the relationship between Leibniz's ontology and his theory of 
phenomenal space is one of the most vexed in all of Leibniz scholarship. For the purposes of 
this paper, I will bracket this issue, though I think its resolution is ultimately relevant to the 
accuracy of the reading I advocate here. The goal of this paper is to motivate a new reading 
of Leibniz's theory of space taken on its own terms; I think that a serious investigation of the 
Correspondence, with these caveats in mind, will strongly suggest that my reading is correct.
 Let's first look at a passage from Leibniz's third letter to Clarke, where he formulates 
perhaps his most famous definition of space:
As for my own opinion, I have said more than once that I hold space to be something 
purely relative... I hold it to be an order of coexistences... For space denotes, in 
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terms of possibility, an order of things that exist at the same time, considered as 
existing together, without entering into their particular manners of existing. And when 
many things are seen together, one consciously perceives this order of things among 
themselves. (2000, 14)
This passage is undoubtedly one of the sources of the canonical reading – Leibniz directly 
states that space is “purely relative”. We ought to construe this remark, though, in light of 
what he says next: space is an order of things that exist at the same time, an order that has 
nothing to do with the “particular manners of existing” of its constituents. This feature of the 
definition is crucial; it already indicates that Leibniz thinks there's more to space than 
“direct” relations between bodies. It indicates, in other words, that relations between bodies 
are not direct, and are parasitic on something more fundamental. So even in his supposedly 
canonically relationist definition of space, we see hints of a more complex view. I also want 
to draw attention to the modal language he uses here: the spatial order has something to do 
with possibility, though the connection is unclear. I will make it more explicit soon, as it's one 
point on which I read Leibniz differently from the way Belot does.
Leibniz's first definition looks extremely suggestive. And what it suggests, other 
passages in the correspondence clarify. In his fourth letter, in response to Clarke's pleas to 
refine his view of space, he elaborates the view in an almost explicitly structuralist manner. I 
reproduce the passage in full here:
The author contends that space does not depend on the situation of bodies. I answer: it 
is true, it does not depend on such or such a situation of bodies, but it is that order 
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which renders bodies capable of being situated, and by which they have a 
situation among themselves when they exist together, as time is that order with respect 
to their successive position. But if there were no creatures, space and time 
would be only in the ideas of God. (2000, 27, emphasis mine)
Earlier, Clarke had challenged the idea that space depends on the particular arrangement of 
bodies; here Leibniz restates his view in light of the challenge, revealing that space in fact 
does not depend on the arrangement of bodies. He almost explicitly says that there's an 
underlying order, and that this underlying order itself is space. Space is the order that 
“renders bodies capable of being situated”: Leibniz seems to think that there's some kind of 
ontologically prior relational complex, and that by virtue of taking certain places in this 
structure, bodies get their particular “situations”. At this point we should note that the English 
word “situation” is a literal rendering of the Latin word “situs”, and the concept of situs plays 
a crucial role in Leibniz's conception of space. In the Metaphysical Foundations of  
Mathematics, Leibniz defines situs as “mode of coexistence” and defines motion as “change 
of situs (1969, 667-668). Situs, in other words, is a relational property that bodies acquire by 
virtue of their particular place in the spatial order. Each body has a unique situs at any given 
time, given its place in the spatial order at that time; but the order that confers situs on bodies 
does not depend on the arrangement of bodies. Instead, the order underlies and makes 
possible the arrangement of bodies by specifying a unique but purely relational property at 
each place in the structure.  
But what are we to make of the remark that “if there were no creatures, space and 
San Diego, CA -727-
time would be only in the ideas of God?” One might take this remark to imply that space 
actually does depend on the arrangement of bodies after all, or that Leibniz is just being 
inconsistent. To see that neither is the case, first recall the modal language that Leibniz uses 
in his first definition of space. The modal element of Leibniz's view, to my mind, connects at 
a fundamental level with his conception of God. To motivate the connection, consider these 
remarks from the Monadology: 
Now, since there is an infinity of possible universes in God's ideas, and since only one 
of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for God's choice, a reason which 
determines him toward one thing rather than another... And this is the cause of the 
existence of the best, which wisdom makes known to God, which his goodness 
makes him choose, and which his power makes him produce. (1989, 220)
On Leibniz's view of God, the latter conceives of all the possible universes and actualizes the 
best one. That the one he actualizes is the best one constitutes a “sufficient reason” for the 
choice to actualize it, in accordance with Leibniz's familiar dictum that there must be a 
sufficient reason for every event. With this view on the table, the remark about space in the 
mind of God makes much more sense, revealing a deep connection between space and God's 
creation of the world. It looks something like this: all of the possible universes exist in God's 
mind; the set of all possible universes includes the set of all possible spatial orders; when 
God actualizes the best possible universe, he also actualizes the best possible spatial order. 
Now, if there “were no creatures”, God wouldn't yet have actualized anything; Leibniz thinks 
the actual world is the best possible world, and the actual world includes various and sundry 
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creatures. So space, considered in an abstract sense, independently of the actual spatial order, 
is an infinite set of possible structures in the mind of God. 
Thus, one potentially confusing aspect of Leibniz's view turns out to be consistent 
with what I see as his proto-structuralism. It's not that if there were no creatures, there would 
be no space because space is nothing over and above relations between bodies; it's rather that 
if there were no creatures, there would be no world in the first place: by hypothesis, our 
world is the best possible world, and it certainly contains many creatures. And if there's no 
world, there's certainly no space. It seems, then, that we've cleared an important hurdle to 
reconstructing Leibniz's view in the way that I think it ought to be reconstructed. 
We encounter another potential obstacle in a passage from his fifth letter, a passage in 
which he seems to propound a view at odds with what we've seen so far. Here are the 
relevant remarks:
I do not say that space is an order or situation which makes things capable of being 
situated; that would be nonsense... I do not say, therefore, that space is an order or 
situation, but an order of situations, or (an order) according to which situations are 
disposed, and that abstract space is that order of situations when they are conceived as 
being possible. (2000, 61)
Leibniz here responds to Clarke's objection to the second definition of space, which I've just 
discussed at length. The first thing to notice is that Leibniz seems to deny directly the view of 
space advanced in that second definition, even seemingly declaring the earlier view to be 
nonsense! If this were the case, then interpretive integrity would demand that I relax my 
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structuralist reading. But we need to look at the way Clarke phrases his objection; in doing 
so, we see that he misreads Leibniz's second definition, and that Leibniz's response in this 
new passage is aimed at the misreading. 
In his fourth reply, Clarke had objected thus: “I do not understand the meaning of 
these words: 'an order (or situation) which makes bodies capable of being situated'. It seems 
to me to amount to this: that situation is the cause of situation” (2000, 34). Notice that he 
does not object to the coherence of saying that an underlying order (structure) confers situs 
on the bodies that participate in it. He only objects to the coherence of claiming that an 
underlying situation confers situs on individual bodies: he thinks that it's incoherent to say 
that situs confers situs. Now, this claim would clearly be incoherent, but Leibniz never makes 
it. To see this, look back to the second definition cited above: Clarke simply inserts the 
parenthesis in his objection, and the parenthesis is what generates the objection in the first 
place. What this passage actually does, to my mind, is to reinforce the structuralist reading 
that I'm advocating. Leibniz agrees that situs can't confer situs, on pain of incoherence. But 
he never denies the claim that he had actually made in the second definition: the claim that 
an underlying spatial order is responsible for conferring situs on individual bodies. And in 
this new passage, he still holds that space is an underlying order: it's the order “according to 
which situations are disposed”. This remark, along with the second definition, indicates that 
Leibniz thinks of the spatial order as ontologically prior to the notion of situs: recall his 
assertion that space does not depend on the particular relations among bodies. 
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4. Spacetime Structuralism or Modal Relationism? At this point, it's hard to escape 
reading Leibniz as committed to space being prior to relations among bodies, in the sense 
that there's a deeper relational complex underwriting the latter. We've seen that situs is 
conferred upon bodies by an order that's prior to them and does not depend on them; bodies 
only acquire their modes of coexistence with each other by occupying places in this order. 
But we now might want to ask what this order really amounts to; I think I've established that 
it has something to do with prior spatial relations, but recently Gordon Belot has suggested 
that it involves a different kind of prior thing, though something that still makes Leibniz 
ultimately a relationist. A brief investigation and criticism of Belot's reading will help clarify 
my own position. 
Belot argues that Leibniz holds a view close to Belot's own “modal relationism”, in 
the sense that Leibniz “employ[s] a notion of geometric possibility in giving content to 
claims about the structure of space” (2011, 173). For Belot, there are two kinds of 
relationists. “Conservative” relationists “identify the geometry of space with material 
geometry” and “give truth conditions for claims about spatial structure that differ from those 
of substantivalists only in quantifying over material points rather than points of space” (2011, 
3). In other words, there's nothing to space prior to the relations between chunks of matter; 
the geometry of existent matter is the geometry of space. Relations between bodies, 
consequently, are direct. “Modal” relationists, by contrast, deny the identification of spatial 
points with material points, instead employing a kind of geometric modality, such that claims 
about the ultimate structure of space are about what geometric relations could possibly be 
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instantiated by any set of material points. For these relationists, in other words, the relations 
between material bodies are no longer direct, but what they're parasitic on is a kind of modal 
structure, rather than a set of real parts or points of physical space. The truth conditions for 
claims about the structure of space, then, come from the facts about geometric possibility. 
For example, to say that space is finite is to say that “there is some number N such that it is 
impossible for material points to be located more than N units away from one another”; to 
say that space is infinite is to say that there is no such number (2011, 4). And the truth of the 
claim that space is finite (or infinite) depends on whether there is (or is not) such a number. 
Belot thinks that Leibniz holds something like the latter view, and the argument for 
this interpretation revolves around two claims: first, that Leibniz is clearly not a conservative 
relationist, since a careful reading of his remarks about space indicates that he thinks the 
structure of space is prior to the structure described by the actual relations between material 
bodies. It should be clear that I fully agree with Belot about this. Secondly, though, Belot 
makes the positive claim that the relevant texts (including some of the same passages in the 
Correspondence on which I'm relying) support the reading that the underlying structure of 
Leibnizian space is modal: it's an  order of geometric possibility rather than any kind of prior 
physical order. One way to think about this is to consider the question whether Leibniz thinks 
“that space can profitably be thought of as composed of geometrically related parts”; Belot 
answers in the negative, claims that this makes Leibniz “some sort of relationist”, and then 
argues for a modal reading of Leibniz's relationism (2011, 173). By way of illustrating my 
reading: I agree that Leibniz denies the “geometrically related parts” view, but I do not agree 
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that this denial makes Leibniz any kind of relationist; I think his view of space involves 
grounding the relations between material bodies on something more than a set of modal 
constraints on geometric relations. 
The following argument will illustrate the difference between my reading and Belot's, 
and will also illustrate the superiority of my reading. In addition to thinking that Leibniz is a 
modal relationist, Belot thinks that Leibniz is committed to the structure of space being 
necessary, or the same in all possible worlds. In any possible world, for Leibniz, space is 
three-dimensional and Euclidean. Now, if the structure of space is the same in all possible 
worlds and is to be understood as nothing more than a network of possible geometric 
relations, then in Leibnizian terms, space must be uncreated. In other words, it must exist 
only in God's mind. But we've canvassed some good reasons to deny that space only exists in 
God's mind: this is what I take the remarks about possibility in the Correspondence to be 
getting at. In the actual world, there is a spatial order; this order is one of the things God 
actualized when he created the actual world. So Leibniz seems to think that in the actual 
world, space does not only exist in God's mind. But equally, we have good reason to deny, 
with Belot, that space is just a consequence of relations between bodies. So it looks like 
Leibniz is neither a conservative relationist nor a modal relationist. 
For Leibniz, there's a sense in which modal relationism, when combined with the 
view that the structure of space is necessary, has to collapse into conservative relationism, 
since there will be nothing in the created world prior to the relations between bodies on the 
former combination of views. But again, Leibniz is not a conservative relationist – he thinks 
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that in the created world, the structure of space is prior to the the structure of material 
relations. Space is part of the created world after all – it doesn't only exist in God's mind – 
and space is prior to the relations between bodies. At the same time, space doesn't consist of 
points that have intrinsic identity; instead, space is an order that confers a specific property – 
namely, situs – upon bodies in the order, by virtue of where they are in the order at a 
particular time. This view bears a striking resemblance to spacetime structuralism.
I can now finally address the question of what the created spatial order really amounts 
to: is it, as the moderate structuralist thinks, a collection of fundamental relations between 
equally fundamental points, but such that the points have no individuality or properties 
except those which the relations confer upon them? Or is it, as the more radical structuralist 
thinks, ultimately just a collection of relations? Leibniz's emphatic denial, in the 
Correspondence and elsewhere, that space has anything like actual parts leads me to 
conclude that he conceives of the underlying spatial order as something like the more radical 
alternative. It's the relations that are fundamental; out of them emerges the notion of situs, 
and out of this notion in turn emerges the notion of relations between material bodies. Space 
only has points, or parts, in a derivative sense: fundamentally, space is an order that allows us 
to talk about the locations of bodies, their relative positions, and the like. Another revealing 
set of remarks from the Correspondence bolsters the suggestion that Leibniz thought of 
ontologically basic relations as perfectly coherent and as fundamental in his theory of space: 
As for the objection that space and time are quantities, or rather things endowed with 
quantity, and that situation and order are not so, I answer that order also has its 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -734-
quantity: there is in it that which goes before and that which follows; there is 
distance or interval. Relative things have their quantity as well as absolute ones... And 
therefore though time and space consist in relations, still they have their quantity. 
(2000, 50) 
This passage, in conjunction with the other passages I've examined, suggests that Leibniz 
thinks of the spatial order as ultimately a set of distance relations that are prior to and make 
possible the distance relations between material bodies. Crucially, this is very similar to the 
situation in modern spacetime structuralism: structuralists commonly take the metric field to 
be the fundamental determinant of the structure of spacetime, though other fields play 
important roles; and the metric field is precisely that field which encodes spatiotemporal 
distance relations within the spacetime manifold. 
5. Does Leibniz's Ontology Allow for a Created Spatial Order? I will conclude by noting 
my awareness of an issue that my reading raises in connection with Leibniz's metaphysics. I 
said earlier that I would bracket the problem of the relationship between Leibniz's theory of 
space, taken on its own terms, and his deeper metaphysical commitments, but I cannot 
entirely avoid it, because a tension may arise between the two in asserting that Leibniz thinks 
spatial relations are part of the created world. It is widely accepted that Leibniz thinks 
relations have only a mental, or ideal, kind of reality. Though the precise meaning of this 
thesis is disputed, it does imply that the spatial order, on my reading, must be ideal and 
created. The only way this is possible, in Leibnizian terms, is if the spatial order ultimately 
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depends on the perceptions of individual substances, or monads. One might think that this 
commits Leibniz to an ultimate denial of the reality of the spatial order, making the 
structuralist reading pointless, unless we can show that dependence on the perceptions of 
monads does not imply unreality for Leibniz. I believe such a solution is forthcoming in 
terms of the mutual coordination of the perceptions of every monad in a world. The spatial 
order's dependence on monadic perceptions doesn't make it “unreal” in any robust sense, for 
every monad's series of perceptions is coordinated with that of every other monad so as to 
make all the monads perceive the same publicly accessible universe – which includes the 
spatial order – from its point of view. In this sense, the spatial order is just as objectively real 
as the monads themselves, and makes possible the arrangement of bodies that each monad 
perceives within that order. This reading is especially plausible when we consider that the 
basic individuating features of Leibniz's monads are just their perceptions; any order that 
depends on their perceptions will only be “ideal” in a very restricted sense. It would take 
another paper, one devoted to Leibniz's ontology of substance, to work out these issues fully; 
but I believe the potential conflict can be resolved, and that the evidence I've examined in the 
body of this paper strongly suggests that it's worth resolving.
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Abstract 
 
Diagrams have distinctive characteristics that make them an effective 
medium for communicating research findings, but they are even more 
impressive as tools for scientific reasoning. Focusing on circadian rhythm 
research in biology to explore these roles, we examine diagrammatic formats 
that have been devised (a) to identify and illuminate circadian phenomena 
and (b) to develop and modify mechanistic explanations of these phenomena.  
 
1. Prevalence and importance of diagrams in biology 
 
If you walk into a talk and do not know beforehand whether it is a philosophy or biology 
talk, a glance at the speaker’s slides will provide the answer. Philosophers favor text, 
whereas biologists shoehorn multiple images and diagrams into most of their slides. 
Likewise, if you attend a philosophy reading group or a biology journal club you can readily 
identify a major difference. Instead of verbally laying out the argument of the paper under 
study, the presenter in a journal club conveys hypotheses, methods, and results largely by 
working through diagrams from the paper. This reflects a more fundamental contrast 
between philosophers and biologists: their affinity for text versus diagrams is not just a 
matter of how they communicate once their work is done, but shapes every stage of inquiry. 
Whereas philosophers construct, evaluate, and revise arguments, and in doing so construct 
and revise sentences that convey the arguments, biologists seek to characterize 
phenomena in nature and to discover the mechanisms responsible for them. Diagrams are 
essential tools for biologists as they put forward, evaluate, and revise their accounts of 
phenomena and mechanisms.  
 
Diagrams play these roles in science more generally, but we have chosen to focus on 
biology – in particular, on the research topic of circadian rhythms – to begin to get traction 
on this understudied aspect of the scientific process. Circadian rhythms are oscillations in 
organisms with an approximately 24‐hour cycle (circa = about + dies = day). They are 
endogenously generated but entrained to the day‐night cycle in specific locales at different 
times of the year. They have been identified in numerous organisms—not only animals but 
also plants, fungi, and even cyanobacteria—and characterize a vast array of physiological 
processes (e.g., basic metabolism and body temperature) and behaviors (e.g., locomotion, 
sleep, and responding to stimuli).  
 
2. Diagrams and mechanistic explanation 
 
Diagrams play a central role in biology because they are highly suited to two key tasks: (1) 
displaying phenomena at various levels of detail, and (2) constructing mechanistic 
explanations for those phenomena., Philosophers of biology have increased their attention 
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to those tasks over the last two decades, construing mechanisms as systems that produce a 
phenomenon of interest by means of the organized and coordinated operations performed 
by their parts (Bechtel and Richardson 1993/2010; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; 
Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000). To advance a mechanistic explanation, biologists 
must characterize the phenomenon of interest (e.g., circadian oscillations in activity),  
identify the mechanism they take to be responsible (e.g., a molecular “clock”), decompose it 
into its parts and operations, and recompose it (conceptually, physically, or 
mathematically) to show that the coordinated performance of these operations does 
indeed generate the phenomenon. Early in the discovery process scientists may identify 
only a few parts and operations, and hypothesize a relatively simple mechanism that can be 
recomposed by mentally imagining a short sequence or cycle of operations (e.g., a single 
gene expression feedback loop was initially posited for the molecular clock). At least in 
biology, further research generally uncovers additional parts and operations with complex 
organization and dynamics (e.g., multiple interacting feedback mechanisms constituting the 
overall molecular clock mechanism).   
 
While a simple mechanistic account might be presented linguistically in the form of a 
narrative about how each part in succession performs its operation, diagrams generally 
provide particularly useful representational formats for conceptualizing and reasoning 
about mechanisms.1 By displaying just a few common graphical elements in two 
dimensions, a diagram can visually depict a phenomenon or the organized parts and 
operations of an explanatory mechanism (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Perini 2005). 
Available elements include labels, line drawings, iconic symbols, noniconic symbols 
( shapes, colors), and – the device most often used for operations – various styles of arrows. 
The spatial arrangement of these elements can convey spatial, temporal, or functional 
relations that help characterize a phenomenon or mechanism. Deploying our spatial 
cognition on diagrams has certain advantages over language‐based reasoning in 
constructing mechanistic explanations. Notably, scientists can mentally animate (Hegarty 
2004) a static diagram to simulate the succession of operations by which a simple 
sequential mechanism produces a phenomenon. Simultaneous operations are more 
challenging.2   
 
The primary role of diagrams for scientists is not to provide a visual format for 
communicating the phenomena discovered or the mechanistic accounts that explain them.  
Rather, diagrams of mechanisms are comparable to the plans a designer develops before 
                                                        
1 Defining and classifying diagrams is beyond the scope of this paper; therefore, we focus 
on clear exemplars and set aside such formats as micrographs and animations. 
2 As researchers recognize the complicated interaction of components in a mechanism and 
the complex dynamics emerging from multiple simultaneous operations, they often turn to 
computational modeling and the tools of dynamic systems analysis to understand how the 
mechanism will behave, giving rise to what Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2011) characterize 
as dynamic mechanistic explanations. Jones and Wolkenhauer (in press) provide a valuable 
account of how diagrams contribute to the construction of such computational models. It is 
also worth noting that linguistic reasoning has its own advantages. We would posit that the 
more complex the mechanism, the more beneficial is a coordinated deployment of 
linguistic, diagrammatic and computational resources.  
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building a new machine. These are used not just to tell those actually constructing the 
machine how to make it; they also figure in the design process. Before producing the final 
plans, the designer tries out different designs and evaluates whether they are likely to 
result in a working and efficient machine. Often the initial sketches of these plans reveal 
serious problems that must be overcome, resulting in revisions to the plans. The biologist is 
not creating the machine (except in fields such as synthetic biology), but is trying to reverse 
engineer it. Still, she needs to go through many of the same processes as a designer—
sketching an initial diagram, identifying ways in which it is inadequate, and modifying the 
diagram repeatedly until it is judged a satisfactory mechanistic account of the targeted 
phenomenon. Moreover, the biologist wants to end up not merely with some possible 
mechanism capable of producing the phenomenon, but rather with the one actually present 
in the biological system. In what follows, we will examine how diagrams are put to work in 
biology, focusing on two key tasks: delineating phenomena, and constructing mechanistic 
accounts to explain them.   
 
3. Diagrams to delineate the phenomenon 
 
An initial delineation of the phenomenon to be explained is a crucial step in mechanistic 
research. This remains true even if, in the course of discovering the mechanism, 
researchers revise their understanding of the phenomenon. Many philosophical accounts of 
mechanistic explanation have focused on linguistic descriptions of phenomena (e.g., “in 
fermentation, sugar is converted into alcohol and carbon dioxide by means of a series of 
intermediate reactions within yeast cells”). However, scientists focus much of their effort 
on obtaining much more specific, often quantitative, accounts of phenomena. Numerical 
data involved in characterizing a phenomenon may be presented in tables. As Bogen and 
Woodward (1988) made clear, however, explanations are directed not at the data but 
rather at the pattern extracted from the data—the phenomenon. Some data patterns can be 
captured in one or a few equations, such as the logarithmic function relating stimulus 
intensity (e.g., amplitude of a tone) to the sensation evoked (e.g., perceived loudness). By 
plotting these values on a graph, the phenomenon of a nonlinear relation between 
amplitude and loudness is immediately evident. The graph takes advantage of spatial 
cognition, whereas the logrithmic equation makes explicit a very precise claim that can and 
has been challenged (e.g., by those who argue for a power function). Scientists move deftly 
between linguistic descriptions, diagrams, and equations when all are available, using each 
to its best advantage.  
 
Diagrams are especially useful for thinking about dynamic phenomena – patterns of change 
over time. Circadian phenomena are dynamic, so diagrams conveying them generally 
incorporate time in some way (as the abscissa on a line graph, as the order of arrows in a 
sketch of a mechanism, as points along the trajectory in a state space, etc.). Moreover, 
research on circadian oscillations often targets the interaction between endogenous 
control (by an internal clock) and exogenous timing cues, commonly referred to as 
Zeitgebers. Hence, what was needed was a way of diagramming the activity of an organism, 
such as a mouse running on a wheel, that revealed at a glance its rhythmicity and the 
impact of Zeitgebers. 
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Circadian researchers settled on a distinctive format, the actogram. Figure 1 illustrates the 
diagrammatic devices that satisfy the desiderata Time of day is represented horizontally 
and successive days are represented vertically (one line of data per day).  Activity is 
tracked along each line—e.g., a single hash mark each time a mouse rotates a wheel. The 
bars at the top use white vs. black to represent the 24‐hour light‐dark conditions. Here the 
mouse was exposed to light from hours 4‐16 during the first phase of the study (specified 
elsewhere as Days 1‐7). During the other twelve hours of Days 1‐7, and all 24 hours 
beginning Day 8, the mouse was kept in darkness. On Day 18, four hours after onset of 
activity, the mouse’s rhythm was perturbed by a pulse of light. The large gray arrow directs 
the reader’s attention to the effects of this isolated Zeitgeber.   .    
 
Figure 1. A basic actogram in which the top bar indicates a normal light‐dark cycle 
for the first phase of the study (Days 1‐7)_and constant darkness thereafter. The 
gray arrow identifies the day a light pulse was administered. (From 
http://www.photosensorybiology.org/id16.html.) 
 
The actogram offers a relatively transparent representation of the animal’s behavior; that 
is, readers who have learned its conventions should be able to see through the diagram to 
the multiple behavioral phenomena that it visually depicts.3 Figure 1 offers this kind of 
access to at least four circadian phenomena. First, in rows 1‐7 it can be seen that the hash 
marks occur in consolidated bands bounded by the black segments of the upper bar. This 
indicates that when Zeitgebers are present (light alternating with dark), virtually all wheel‐
running occurs in the dark: the animal is nocturnal. Second, the fact that the hash marks 
continue to appear in consolidated bands after row 7 (when the animal is free‐running in 
the absence of Zeitgebers) indicates that the animal can endogenously maintain a robust 
division between periods of rest and of activity. Third, these later bands of hash marks 
‘drift’ leftward, indicating that the animal begins its activity a bit earlier each day. 
Maintenance of a free‐running period somewhat less than 24 hours is the core 
phenomenon of circadian rhythmicity. Fourth, the pulse of light flagged by the gray arrow 
brings an abrupt cessation of activity on Day 18 and inserts a phase delay (seen as a 
                                                        
3 See Cheng (2011) for a more extensive discussion of semantic transparency. Note also 
that some phenomena are less transparently conveyed by diagrams than others. 
Presumably, the spatial cognition deployed in less transparent cases is effortful to some 
degree and/or  coordinated with propositional cognition. 
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rightward “jump” in the bands of hash marks) into what was otherwise a continuing 
pattern of phase advance (left‐ward “drift”) under constant darkness. This reset 
phenomenon is one aspect of the more general phenomenon of entrainment.  
 
Thus, actograms make circadian rhythmicity in an animal’s activity visually accessible. But 
when chronobiologists attempt to understand the molecular mechanisms that produce 
such macroscopic rhythmicity, they are confronted with new phenomena that call for 
different diagrammatic formats. Notably, the concentration levels (relative abundance) of 
many types of molecules within cells oscillate. For example, Hardin, Hall, and Rosbash 
(1990) demonstrated the circadian oscillation of period (per) mRNA in Drosophila 
melanogaster (fruit flies).4 In Figure 2 (below) we reproduce a pair of diagrams from their 
paper that illustrate how the same data can be displayed in two formats that differ 
substantially in how they visually depict per mRNA oscillation. Flies had previously been 
kept for three days in a light‐dark cycle of 12 hours light, 12 hours dark. Starting on the 
fourth day (hours 24‐48 in Figure 2), the flies were placed in constant darkness. Every four 
hours a batch of flies was sent for processing to determine per mRNA abundance via a 
molecular probe. The output of this procedure, the Northern blot, is shown at the top of 
Figure 2. Darker regions of the blot visually depict greater presence of per mRNA across the 
four days.  
 
 
Figure 2. Two diagrams from Hardin et al.’s (1990) original portrayal of circadian 
oscillation in per mRNA levels in Drosophila. On top is a series of Northern blots 
(from different flies every 4 hours). Below this is a line graph of the same data. The 
Zeitgeber schedule is shown at the bottom, with white hatched bars depicting the 
intervals in which lights would have been on if the initial light‐dark cycle had 
continued. 
 
                                                        
4 Much of the early research on molecular mechanisms is nonmammalian, including the 
discovery of per mRNA oscillations. A role for per is conserved in the mouse circadian 
mechanism. 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -742-
Sheredos, Burnston, Abrahamsen, and Bechtel    p. 6 
Below the Northern blots, the same data are displayed in a line graph. Here numeric values 
for per MRNA are displayed in a format that makes their oscillation immediately apparent. 
Moreover, a quick check of the horizontal scale confirms that the period of oscillation is 
circadian: there are four peaks in four days. Closer examination reveals that the peak 
occurs slightly earlier on Day 4, indicating a slightly shorter period in the absence of a 
Zeitgeber. Actograms provide a better visual display of such variations in period, but are 
less suitable for conveying variations in amplitude.  
 
4. Diagrams to identify the parts, operations, and organization of a mechanism 
 
A major use of diagrams in mechanistic science is to present a proposed mechanism by 
spatially displaying, at some chosen level of detail, its parts and operations and the way 
they are envisaged as working together to produce a phenomenon. Such diagrams typically 
utilize a two‐dimensional space in which elements representing different parts and 
operations of the mechanism can be laid out so as to depict key aspects of their spatial,  
temporal, and functional organization. As noted in Section 2, a variety of labels, line 
drawings and symbols can be used to distinguish different kinds of parts. Parts perform 
operations that affect other parts and lead to or interact with other operations. One or 
more styles of arrows, often labeled, are typically chosen for displaying these operations.  
 
As static structures, diagrams do not directly show how the mechanism produces the 
phenomenon. Unless a computational model is available, researchers must animate the 
diagram by mentally simulating the different operations and their consequences 
(sometimes off‐loading this effort by developing animated diagrams). Such mental 
simulation lacks quantitative precision and can be highly fallible. A researcher may 
overestimate the capabilities of a component part or neglect important consequences of a 
particular operation, such as how it might alter another part. Moreover, diagrams 
themselves are generally subject to revision and quite often wrong. Since their 
representational content constrains what can be mentally simulated, key gaps in a diagram 
will yield inaccurate simulations. On the positive side, the diagram helps the researcher 
keep track of what must enter into each stage of simulation. In short, diagrams are an 
imperfect but necessary tool.  
 
A crucial step in discovering the molecular mechanism responsible for circadian rhythms 
was Konopka and Benzer’s (1971) discovery of per, the Drosophila gene whose mRNA 
levels became the focus of Hardin, Hall, and Rosbash’s (1990) research. In addition to 
showing circadian oscillations in per mRNA, Hardin et al ascertained that the PER protein 
also oscillated with a period of approximately 24 hours but peaked several hours later than 
per mRNA. Hardin et al. recognized these oscillations as a circadian phenomenon at the 
molecular level, but also had the idea that per mRNA and PER might be parts of the 
mechanism that explained behavioral circadian oscillations. Combining this with their 
knowledge that negative feedback is a mode of organization capable of producing 
oscillations, they proposed three variations of a molecular mechanism whose oscillatory 
dynamics could be responsible for, and thereby explain, behavioral oscillations.  In all three 
variations, PER served to inhibit per transcription or translation in a negative feedback 
loop. These are diagrammed, somewhat idiosyncratically, in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Hardin et al.’s (1990) representation of three versions of their proposed 
molecular mechanism for circadian oscillations in terms of a negative feedback loop. 
Question marks indicate points of uncertainty as to the origin and termination of the 
feedback operation. 
 
As we claimed above, diagrams are not solely vehicles for communicating a proposed 
mechanistic explanation; they also can serve as a representational tool employed in 
reasoning about the proposed mechanism. First, a diagram can be used to envisage how a 
particular mechanism functions to produce a phenomenon. In this case, the phenomenon 
involves regular oscillations. To understand how the mechanism produces such oscillations 
a viewer would begin at the upper left, where the known operations of transcription into 
mRNA and translation into a protein are portrayed. These result in the accumulation of PER 
molecules, represented in the diagram as a small line drawing of one molecule. Once PER 
accumulates, feedback must inhibit either transcription or translation, thereby stopping 
the accumulation of PER.  The existing PER will gradually degrade (an operation not 
explicitly represented, but which molecular biologists would readily infer). As it degrades, 
the concentration of PER will decline. This will release the transcription and translation 
processes from inhibition, and synthesis of PER will begin again. When repeated, this cycle 
of active and repressed per expression will result in the observed pattern of rhythmic 
oscillations in both per mRNA and PER. 
 
A second major way in which such a diagram can serve reasoning about a mechanism is by 
making it clear where there are uncertainties about its operations. Note how little of Figure 
3 is put forth as a depiction of previous discoveries concerning the mechanisms of per 
regulation. The bulk of the diagram serves as a simultaneous depiction of multiple possible 
mechanisms (sketched only in bare outline) that could explain oscillations of per mRNA 
and PER. The diagram is in large part an invitation to explanation, not a record of it. The 
possible mechanisms sketched here as (1) – (3) could each theoretically account for the 
observed oscillations. In (1), PER interacts with some biochemical substrate or process “X”, 
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which then somehow regulates either the per gene itself (transcriptional regulation), or the 
transcribed mRNA (post‐transcriptional regulation). In (2), X interacts with some further 
substrate or process “Y,” which then does the same. In (3), the behavior of the organism 
provides the necessary feedback. What is known is only that the mechanism(s) at work in 
Drosophila must eventuate in regulation of per mRNA abundance.  
 
Third, the constraints presented by what is presented in the diagram serve to guide 
hypothesizing about and investigating of further elements of the proposed mechanism. 
Indeed, both the unknowns represented by the question marks in Figure 3 and the 
operations specified became the focus of subsequent research. For example, researchers 
sought not merely to determine where PER fed back to inhibit formation of more PER, but 
how it did so. This and other inquiries quickly led to the discovery of many additional 
components of the mechanism: by the end of the 1990s at least seven different genes, as 
well as their transcripts and proteins, were viewed as part of the clock mechanism, both in 
Drosophila and in mammals. Many of these were also shown to oscillate, but at different 
phases than PER.  
 
As the list of clock parts expanded and as researchers proposed multiple feedback loops, it 
became ever more crucial to be able to represent how the operations performed by 
individual parts affected other parts, and researchers regularly produced diagrams to 
illustrate and guide their reasoning. On the left in Figure 4 is a fairly typical contemporary 
diagram of the mammalian circadian oscillator.  Key parts are indicated by upper‐case 
labels: italicized for genes vs. enclosed in colored ovals for proteins. When proteins serve 
as transcription factors, they are shown attached to the promoter regions (E‐box, D‐box, 
and RRE) of the respective genes.  
 
In using this diagram to reason about the mechanism, researchers follow the action of 
individual proteins and the ways in which they activate or repress the expression of 
specific genes. At the top right is a further‐specified version of the feedback loop first 
proposed by Hardin et al. in which PER inhibits its own transcription: it does so by 
dimerizing with CRY (Hardin et al.’s substrate “X”) and preventing the CLOCK/BMAL1 
complex (Hardin et al.’s substrate “Y”) from upregulating per transcription at the E‐box 
promoter site. There is also a second feedback loop responsible for the synthesis of CLOCK 
and BMAL1. A second promoter site on the per gene has been identified, and its activator 
(DBP) is part of a positive feedback loop. It should be obvious that as the understanding of 
the mechanism became more complicated, diagrams became ever more crucial both in 
representing the mechanism and in reasoning about it. We should note that research on 
this mechanism is far from complete. The inhibitory operations, in particular, are the focus 
of important ongoing research that is serving to identify yet additional parts and 
operations. Diagrams such as these serve not just to represent and facilitate reasoning 
about the mechanism but also serve as guides to where further investigation is required 
(even if these are not always explicitly signaled by question marks).  
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Figure 4. On the left is an example of a common way of representing the 
mechanism of the mammalian circadian clock, labeling genes in black italics 
and the proteins they express in colored ovals and using arrows to represent 
feedback loops (Zhang and Kay 2010). On the right an alternative 
representation (Ukai and Ueda 2010) which places the three promoter sites 
at the center. A grey line from the promoter to the gene indicates that the 
promoter site is found on the gene, whereas green arrows from the gene to a 
promoter box indicate that the protein synthesized from the gene is an 
activator at that promoter site and a while a squared‐off magenta line 
indicates that the protein in some way inhibits the expression of the gene. 
 
Once a basic diagram format is developed and researchers become familiar with its 
conventions, it is often retained by other researchers, who introduce relatively minor 
modifications to capture specific features of a given account. The choice of a diagrammatic 
format is not neutral, and researchers sometimes find it important to develop alternative 
formats that provide a different perspective on the mechanism. Ueda, for example, has 
introduced the alternative representation shown in the diagram on the right side of Figure 
4. It presents essentially the same information about parts and operations as the diagram 
on the left, but shifts attention away from the genes and proteins to the promoter regions – 
the three boxes placed in the center of the figure. The different genes that are regulated by 
these promoters are shown in colored ovals in the periphery of this diagram. The proteins 
they express are assumed but not depicted. The relation of the boxes to the genes is 
explained in the figure caption.  
 
Ueda adopted this format as part of his argument that the relations between the three 
promoter regions are fundamental to the functioning of the clock. Transcription factors 
bind to particular promoters at different times of day: the E/E’ box in morning, the D box in 
midday, and the RRE at nighttime. For Ueda, the individual genes and proteins involved are 
just the vehicles via which these promoters interact. He made this even more explicit in the 
three diagrams shown in Figure 5. Here he abstracts from the genes and proteins and 
focuses just on the promoters, using arrows to indicate when products from the sites serve 
to activate or repress activity at another promoter. He shows all these interactions in the 
diagram on the left, but further decomposes them into two kinds of circuits (motifs) in the 
other two diagrams. In the middle is a delayed negative feedback motif in which proteins 
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expressed in the morning regulate expression of other genes at midday, which then repress 
the morning element. On the right is a repressilator motif in which products from each 
element repress further operation of the preceding element. Each of these motifs has been 
the subject of experimental, computational, and synthetic biology investigations that show 
how they generate oscillations (Ukai‐Tadenuma et al. 2011).  
 
Importantly, in choosing to represent the mechanism as in Figure 5, different aspects of its 
organization and functioning become salient. By emphasizing the overall structure of the 
mechanism, the overlapping oscillations are made more salient at the expense of detail 
about the proteins involved in the regulatory processes. These different contents provide 
different constraints on the reasoning that can be performed by way of the diagram, and 
can lead to different insights about the mechanism itself, thus helping to provide a more 
complete explanation of the phenomenon. 
 
   
Figure 5. Hogenesch and Ueda’s (2011) diagrams that abstract from the genes and 
proteins of the circadian oscillator to identify the basic causal circuit (left), which he 
then decomposes into two motifs (center and right) that are viewed as explaining 
the oscillatory behavior of the mechanism.  
 
5. Conclusion: Diagrams and Mechanistic Explanation  
 
A major explanation for the prevalence of diagrams in biology is the role they play in 
mechanistic explanation. We have focused on their role in two pursuits—delineating a 
phenomenon of interest and constructing mechanistic accounts to explain the phenomenon. 
A number of diagrams may be generated in making progress from an initial account to the 
one proposed in public. Each specifies the parts, operations, and organization of the current 
conception of the mechanism. Diagrams also play other roles in mechanistic explanation. 
For example, even modestly complex mechanisms, such as those involving negative 
feedback loops, challenge the ability of theorists to figure out their behavior by mentally 
rehearsing their interactions. To visualize dynamic phenomena, scientists often resort to 
other types of diagrams, such as phase spaces in which oscillations appear as limit cycles. 
Such diagrams abstract from mechanistic details to portray how the overall state of the 
system changes over time.  
 
Having identified important roles diagrams play in biology, we conclude by noting three 
ways in which analysis of diagrams contributes to philosophy of science. We have begun to 
address the first:  from diagrams we can gain a (partial) understanding of how scientists 
reason about a phenomenon, specifically by simulating the understood elements of a 
mechanism encoded in a diagram to see if they are adequate to explain the phenomenon.  
Second, diagrams can serve as a vehicle for understanding scientific change when we 
analyze how the diagrams within a field evolve, find acceptance, and are eventually 
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discarded. Third, identifying the cognitive elements of diagram use, including their design 
and the learning processes required to interpret them, can provide insight into the 
cognitive processes involved in scientific reasoning more generally. By directing attention 
to the importance of diagrams in biology, we hope to have set the stage for more sustained 
philosophical inquiry.   
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Abstract. Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable 
alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Craver 
2011; Kaplan and Bechtel 2011). This claim is meant to hold both in principle and in 
practice. The basic claim is that any explanation of a particular feature of a biological 
system, including dynamical explanations, must ultimately be grounded in mechanistic 
explanation. There are several variations on this theme, some stronger and some weaker. 
In order to avoid equivocation and miscommunication, in section 1 we will argue that 
mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. In section 2 we 
will argue that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization 
and decomposition on any non-trivial construal of these concepts. Therefore, in section 3 
we conclude the mechanistic model of explanation either needs to stretch to now include 
explanations wherein localization or decomposition fail, or acknowledge that there are 
counter-examples to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences. We will also 
consider consequences and possible replies on the part of the mechanist in section 3.
1. Introduction. While there are many different accounts of mechanistic explanation, the 
basic idea is that a phenomenon has been explained when the responsible realizing or 
underlying mechanism has been identified. In particular, the relevant parts of the 
mechanism and the operations they perform must be identified, i.e., those 
parts/operations that maintain, produce, or underlie the phenomena in question (Bechtel 
2010; Craver 2007; Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000; Kaplan and Craver 2011; 
Kaplan and Bechtel 2011). Whatever the particular account of mechanistic explanation 
on offer, it is clear that mechanistic explanation is supposed to be fundamental in the 
biological sciences, period. What is less clear is exactly what this explanatory axiom 
entails. What follows is a list of claims pertaining to dynamical and mathematical 
explanations in the biological sciences that some mechanistic thinkers assert are entailed 
by the mechanistic model:
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1) Dynamical and mathematical explanations in systems neuroscience must be grounded 
in or reduced to mechanistic explanations (via localization and decomposition) to be 
explanatory.
2) Dynamical mechanisms are not an alternative to mechanistic explanation but a 
complement.
3) When dynamical and mathematical models do not describe mechanisms by 
appropriately mapping elements of the latter onto the former, then they provide no real 
explanation.
4) At this juncture, dynamical and mathematical models of explanation in biology not 
sufficiently grounded in mechanisms have nothing to offer but “predictivism” by way of 
explanatory force. That is, critics of mechanistic explanation do not have a viable 
alternative research strategy or alternative conception of explanation on offer (Kaplan 
and Bechtel 2011; Kaplan and Craver 2011).
The mechanists in question claim that certain defenders of dynamical and mathematical 
explanation in the biological sciences violate 1-3 and are therefore guilty of 4 (Kaplan 
and Craver 2011; Kaplan and Bechtel 2011). We first we need to get clear on exactly 
how the “dynamicist” is being portrayed. Kaplan and Craver go after the “strong 
dynamicist and functionalist”, which they characterize as follows, “In particular, we 
oppose strong dynamicist and functionalist views according to which mathematical and 
computational models can explain a phenomenon without embracing commitments about 
the causal mechanisms that produce, underlie, or maintain it” (2011, 603). The strong 
dynamicist and functionalist holds that “mechanistic explanation is no longer an 
appropriate goal for cognitive and systems neuroscience” (Ibid). And finally, “If these 
dynamicists are right, such models yield explanations in the total absence of 
commitments regarding the causal mechanisms that produce the cognitive or system 
behavior we seek to explain” (Ibid, 604). According to Kaplan and Craver then, the 
strong dynamicist abandons the mechanistic model of explanation and has nothing 
coherent or cogent to replace it with.
We also reject strong dynamicism and functionalism so characterized. We will show 
however that ‘either mechanistic explanation or dynamical predictivism’ is a false 
dilemma. What we will claim is that systems biology and systems neuroscience contain 
robust dynamical and mathematical explanations of some phenomena in which the 
essential explanatory work is not be being done by localization and decomposition. More 
positively, the explanatory work in these models is being done by their graphical/network 
properties, geometric properties, or dynamical properties.  We mean this claim to be true 
both in practice and in principle. Presumably then, what separates us from the mechanists 
is that they are committed to all such “higher level” explanations ultimately being 
discharged via localization and decomposition and we are not. However, we certainly do 
not think such explanations are incompatible or mutually exclusive, we have no problem 
calling them “complementary.” Nonetheless, we will argue that graphical and dynamical 
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properties for example are “non-decomposable” and non-localizable features of the 
causal and nomological structure of the “mechanisms” in question.  
We want to end this section with a sociological note of caution. A great deal of the 
discussion in the literature strongly suggests that what we have before us is a thinly 
veiled iteration of the ancient philosophical debate between competing ‘isms’ regarding 
the essence of mind and the essence of explanation. Take the following, “It has not 
escaped our attention that 3M [mechanistic model of explanation], should it be found 
acceptable, has dire implications for functionalist theories of cognition that are not, 
ultimately, beholden to details about implementing mechanisms. We count this as 
significant progress in thinking about the explanatory aspirations of cognitive science” 
(Ibid, 612). So in one corner we have the functionalist/dynamist with their usual 
disregard/distaste for implementing mechanisms and in the other corner the mechanist, 
who insists on filling in all the boxes and the equations with the really truly fundamental 
“causal structure.” We think that it’s time to transcend these beleaguered battle lines. 
That is, while we reject strong dynamicism and functionalism, and while we agree that 
dynamical and mechanistic explanations inevitably go hand-in-hand, we are open to the 
possibility that there are explanations in the biological sciences that are not best 
characterized in terms of localization and decomposition. To reject this possibility out of 
hand is as extreme as thinking that implementing mechanisms are irrelevant for 
explaining cognition and behavior. 
When Kaplan and Craver say, “The mechanistic tradition should not be discarded lightly. 
After all, one of the grand achievements in the history of science has been to recognize 
that the diverse phenomena of our world yield to mechanistic explanation” (2011, 613), 
we agree. In fact, we don’t think the mechanistic tradition should be discarded. What we 
do think is that the mechanistic tradition understood in terms of localization and 
decomposition is in principle not the only effective explanatory strategy in the life 
sciences.  
2. Counter-Examples to Localization and Decomposition in Systems Neuroscience
2.1 Defining Localization and Decomposition. Localization and decomposition are 
universally regarded as the sine qua non of mechanistic explanation. Identifying the parts 
of a mechanism and their operations necessitates decomposing the mechanism. One can 
use different methods to decompose a mechanism functionally, into component 
operations, or structurally, into component parts (Bechtel and Richardson 2010). The 
ultimate goal is to line up the parts with the operations they perform, this is known as 
localization (Ibid). Proponents of mechanistic explanation like to emphasize the way it 
differs from the DN-model of explanation, which is based on laws.  Mechanistic 
explanation is not about the derivation of phenomenon from initial conditions and 
dynamical laws, but rather explanation via localization and decomposition.
Mechanistic explanation is reductionist in the sense that explanation is in terms of the 
parts of the mechanism and the operations those parts perform. Parts and operations are at 
a lower level of organization than the mechanism as a whole. Bechtel says that the most 
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conservative mechanistic account is one in which a mechanism is characterized as 
generating a phenomenon via a start-to-finish sequence of qualitatively characterized 
operations performed by identifiable component parts (2011, 534). However, Bechtel, 
Craver and others have recently emphasized how liberal mechanistic accounts have 
become. For example, Bechtel has stressed that the reductionist methodology of 
localization and decomposition must be “complemented” by contextualizing 
parts/operations both within a mechanism at a given level and between the mechanism 
and its environment at a higher level. The context in question includes spatial, temporal, 
causal, hierarchical and organizational.
We applaud and affirm the liberalization of mechanistic explanation.  We assume, 
though, that these mechanists consider localization and decomposition as ultimately 
essential to mechanistic explanation. That said, we wonder what they would count as 
counter-examples in principle. Fortunately, Bechtel and Richardson (2010) give us some 
clues.  They emphasize that localization and decomposition are “heuristic” strategies that 
sometimes fail when a system fails to be decomposable or nearly decomposable (Ibid, 
13). According to them, there are two kinds of failures of decomposability or 
localizability: 1) when there are no component parts or operations that can be 
distinguished (such as a connectionist network), in which case one can only talk about 
organizational features—the best one can hope for here is functional decomposition, and 
2) when there are component parts and operations but their individual behaviors 
systematically and continuously affect one another in a non-linear fashion. In this case 
mechanisms are not sequential but have a cyclic organization rife with oscillations, 
feedback loops, or recurrent connections between components. In these instances there is 
a high-degree of interactivity among the components and the system is non-
decomposable and therefore localization will fail (Ibid, 24). In addition, if the non-
linearity affecting component operations also affects the behavior of the system as a 
whole, such that the component properties/states are dependent on a total state-
independent characterization of the system (i.e., one sufficient to determine the state and 
the dynamics of the system as a whole), then the behavior of the system can be called 
“emergent” (Ibid, 25). They emphasize that when the feedback is system wide such that 
almost all “The operations of component parts in the system will depend on the actual 
behavior and the capacities of other its components” (Ibid, 24), the following obtains. 
First, the behavior of the component parts considered within the system as a whole are 
not predicable in principle from their behavior in isolation. Second, the behavior of the 
system as a whole cannot be predicted even in principle from the separable Hamiltonians 
of the component parts (Ibid). 
We affirm all this and indeed others have stressed these points in illustrating the limits of 
localization and decomposition (Chemero and Silberstein 2008; Stepp, Chemero, and 
Turvey 2011). However, what puzzles us is that Bechtel and Richardson go on to say 
that, “When these conditions are met, the systemic behavior is reasonably counted as 
emergent, even though it is fully explicable mechanistically” (Ibid, 24). Here Bechtel and 
Richardson seem to be saying that even though such “emergent” behavior is not 
amenable to decomposition or localization, it is nonetheless mechanistically explicable. 
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But, in exactly what sense are such systems mechanistically explicable?  We shall return 
to this in section 3, after we consider explanations in systems neuroscience. 
2.2 Explanation in Systems Neuroscience. Systems neuroscience is a rapidly growing 
area devoted to figuring out how the brain engages in the coordination and integration of 
distributed processes at the various length and time scales necessary for cognition and 
action. The assumption is that most of this coordination represents patterns of 
spontaneous, self-organizing, macroscopic spatiotemporal patterns which resemble the 
on-the-fly functional networks recruited during activity. This coordination often occurs at 
extremely fast time scales with short durations and rapid changes. There is a wide 
repertoire of models used to account for these self-orgainzing macroscopic patterns, such 
as oscillations, synchronization, metastability, and nonlinear dynamical coupling. Many 
explanatory models such as synergetics and neural dynamics combine several of these 
features, e.g., phase-locking among oscillations of different frequencies (Sporns 2011).
Despite the differences among these models, there are some important generalizations to 
be had.   First, dynamic coordination is often highly distributed and non-local. Second, 
population coding, cooperative, or collective effects prevail. Third, time and timing is 
essential in a number of ways.  Fourth, these processes exhibit both robustness and 
plasticity.  Fifth, these processes are highly context and task sensitive. Regarding the 
third point, there is a growing consensus that such integrated processes are best viewed 
not as vectors of activity or neural signals, but as dynamically evolving graphs. The 
evidence suggests that standard neural codes such as rate codes and firing frequencies are 
insufficient to explain the rapid and rapidly transitioning coordination. Rather, the 
explanation must involve “temporal codes” or “temporal binding” such as spike timing-
dependent plasticity wherein neural populations are bound by the simultaneity of firing 
and precise timing is essential.  In these cases neurons are bound into a group or 
functional network as a function of synchronization in time. The key explanatory features 
of such models then involves various time-varying properties such as: the exact timing of 
a spike, the ordering or sequencing of processing events, the rich moment-to-moment 
context of real world activity and immediate stimulus environment, an individual’s 
history such as that related to network activation and learning, etc. All of the above can 
be modeled as attractor states that constrain and bias the recruitment of brain networks 
during active tasks and behavior (Von der Malsberg et. al, 2010). 
There is now a branch of systems neuroscience devoted to the application of network 
theory to the brain. The formal tools of network theory are graph theory and dynamical 
system theory, the latter to represent network dynamics—temporally evolving dynamical 
processes unfolding in various kinds of networks.  While these techniques can be applied 
at any scale of brain activity, here we will be concerned with large-scale brain networks. 
These relatively new to neuroscience explanatory tools (i.e., simulations) are enabled by 
large data sets and increased computational power. The brain is modeled as a complex 
system: networks of (often non-linear) interacting components such as neurons, neural 
assemblies and brain regions. In these models, rather than viewing the neurons, cell 
groups or brain regions as the basic unit of explanation, it is brain multiscale networks 
and their large-scale, distributed and non-local connections or interactions that are the 
basic unit of explanation (Sporns 2011). The study of this integrative brain function and 
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connectivity is primarily based in topological features (network architecture) of the 
network that are insensitive to, and multiply realizable with respect to, lower level 
neurochemical and wiring details. More specifically, a graph is a mathematical 
representation of some actual (in this case) biological many-bodied system. The nodes in 
these models represent neurons, cell populations, brain regions, etc., and the edges 
represent connections between the nodes. The edges can represent structural features such 
as synaptic pathways and other wiring diagram type features or they can represent more 
functional topological features such as graphical distance (as opposed to spatial distance). 
Here we focus on the latter wherein the interest is in mapping the interactions (edges) 
between the local neighborhood networks, i.e., global topological features—the 
architecture of the brain as a whole. While there are local networks within networks, it is 
the global connection between these that is of greatest concern in systems neuroscience. 
Graph theory is replete with a zoo of different kinds of network topologies, but one of 
perhaps greatest interest to systems neuroscience are small-world networks as various 
regions of the brain and the brain as a whole are known to instantiate such a network. The 
key topological properties of small-world networks are: 1) a much higher clustering 
coefficient relative to random networks with equal numbers of nodes and edges and 2) 
short (topological) path length. That is, small-world networks exhibit a high degree of 
topological modularity (not to be confused with anatomical or cognitive modularity) and 
non-local or long-range connectivity. Keep in mind that there are many different types of 
small-world networks with unique properties, some with more or less topological  
modularity, higher and lower degrees (as measured by the adjacency or connection 
matrix), etc. (Sporns 2011; Von der Malsberg et. al 2010). 
The explanatory point is that such graphical simulations allow us to derive, predict and 
discover a number of important things such as mappings between structural and 
functional features of the brain, cognitive capacities, organizational features such as 
degeneracy, robustness and plasticity, structural or wiring diagram features, various 
pathologies such as schizophrenia, autism and other “connectivity disorders” when small-
world networks are disrupted, and other essential kinds of brain coordination such as 
neural synchronization, etc. In each case, the evidence is that the mapping between 
structural and topological features is at least many-one. Very different neurochemical 
mechanisms and wiring diagrams can instantiate the same networks and thus perform the 
same cognitive functions. Indeed, it is primarily the topological features of various types 
of small-world networks that explain essential organizational features of brains, as 
opposed to lower level, local purely structural features. Structural and topological 
processes occur at radically different and hard (if not impossible) to relate time-scales. 
The behavior and distribution of various nodes such as local networks are determined by 
their non-local or global connections. As Sporns puts it, “Heterogeneous, multiscale 
patterns of structural connectivity [small-world networks] shape the functional 
interactions of neural units, the spreading of activation and the appearance of synchrony 
and coherence” (2011, 259).
Thanks to its generality and formal power, network neuroscience has also discovered 
various predictive power laws and scale-free invariances, i.e., symmetry principles at 
work in the brain. For example, the probability of finding a node with a degree twice as 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -754-
7
large as an arbitrary number decreases by a constant factor over the entire distribution. 
The explanatory power of small-world networks derives from their organizational 
properties, and not from the independent properties of the entities that are in small-world 
networks.  
3. Consequences. Surprisingly, Bechtel and Richardson themselves use small-world 
networks as an example to illustrate that “mechanisms” of this sort require an addition to 
the mechanistic armament, namely, “dynamic mechanistic explanation” (Bechtel and 
Richardson, 2011, 16). Dynamical mechanistic explanation utilizes the tools of 
dynamical systems theory such as differential equations, network theory, etc., to engage 
in the computer simulation of complex mechanisms wherein the differential equations in 
question cannot be solved analytically. They claim of course that such “dynamical” 
explanations should nonetheless be squarely viewed as mechanistic explanation because:
Reliance on simulations that use equations to understand the behavior of 
mechanisms may appear to depart from the mechanistic perspective and embrace 
something very much like the DN account of explanation. A simulation involves 
deriving values for variables at subsequent times from the equations and values at 
an initial time. However, simulations are crucially different from DN 
explanations. First, the equations are advanced not as general laws but as 
descriptions of the operations of specific parts of a mechanism. Second, the 
purpose of a computational simulation (like mental simulation in the basic 
mechanistic account) is not to derive the phenomenon being explained but to 
determine whether the proposed mechanism would exhibit the phenomenon. 
Finally, an important part of evaluating the adequacy of a computational model is 
that the parts and operations it describes are those that can be discovered through 
traditional techniques for decomposing mechanisms (Bechtel, 2011, 553).  
There are several things that need to be said here. First, we agree that dynamical and 
network-type explanations are not D-N explanation and therefore cannot be guilty of 
“predictivism.” Secondly, we agree that such explanations are nonetheless about 
predicting whether certain causal structures will have certain cognitive, functional or 
other features. Certainly, the fact that these simulations or dynamical/graphical systems 
predict or allow us to derive certain features does not make them explanatory. What does 
make them explanatory? These simulations show why certain causal and nomological  
structures will exhibit said features in virtue of their dynamical and graphical properties. 
Bechtel and company will balk at the word ‘nomological’, because the equations are not 
“advanced as general laws.” When defending law-like explanations and the existence of 
laws in the special sciences, it is customary to point out that even the laws of physics do 
not always meet the ideals of the D-N model. That is, physical laws are often not 
spatiotemporally universal or free of exceptions, ceteris paribus clauses, idealizations and 
approximations. We are happpy however to forgo  the word law in favor of Bechtel’s 
phrase “organizational principles.” For example, in network-based explanations the 
organizing principles include the aforementioned “power laws”,  involving self-
similarity, scale-invariance and fractal patterning in space and time. Thirdly, while it may 
be true that one aspect of evaluating the adequacy of a computational model is that the 
parts and operations it describes are discovered through traditional techniques of 
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decomposition, it should be clear that the brain networks being described here are non-
decomposable and non-localizable. There is a degree of functional decomposition for 
these networks but not structural decomposition.  That is, localization is simply beside 
the point. 
There is no question that graphical and dynamical simulations do describe mechanisms, 
but they are not merely abstract descriptions of structural mechanisms. The key question 
here is what’s really doing the explanatory work and the answer in this case is not in the 
structural or lower level mechanistic details. The simulations are not merely idealizations 
and approximations of such lower level structural interactions. Kaplan and Craver would 
claim that these models are mechanistic because they meet the “3M” criterion.
In successful explanatory models in cognitive and systems neuroscience (a) the 
variables in the model correspond to components, activities, properties, and 
organizational features of the target mechanism that produces, maintains, or 
underlies the phenomenon, and (b) the (perhaps mathematical) dependencies 
posited among these variables in the model correspond to the (perhaps 
quantifiable) causal relations among the components of the target mechanism 
(2011, 611).
If what Kaplan and Craver mean to assert here is that any explanation proffered by a 
mathematical model of a mechanism is only truly explanatory if and only if said 
explanation can be reduced to or simply mapped onto the lower level structural features 
of the mechanism, then such mathematical models fail to be explanatory. Again, these 
graphical and dynamical models are non-decomposable and non-localizable. Otherwise, 
networks-based explanation easily meet the 3M criteria.
The key question is whether brains have the topological architectures they do in virtue of 
their structural mechanisms, or vice-versa? Or put another way, in virtue of what do 
graph theoretic models explain? As Bechtel himself admits, in such non-decomposable 
complex systems, the global topological features act as order-parameters (collective 
variables) that greatly constrain the behavior of the structural elements. As Sporns puts it, 
“a reentrant system operates less as a hierarchy and more as a heterarchy, where super-
and subordinate levels are indistinct, most interactions are circular, and control is 
decentralized” (2011, 193). The dynamical interactions here are recurrent, recursive and 
reentrant. So there is no sense in which the arrow of explanation or determination is in 
principle exclusively from the ‘lower level’ structural to the ‘higher’ level graphical-
dynamical. There is no structural, reductive or “downward-looking” explanation for the 
essential graphical properties of brain networks. Simply put, such global organizational 
principles or features of complex systems are not explicable in principle via localization 
and decomposition.
This is true for many reasons. The aforementioned many-one relationship between the 
structural and graphical features illustrates that specific structural features are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for determining global topological features. That is, topological 
features such as the properties of small-world networks exhibit a kind of “universality” 
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with respect to lower level structural details. This is why in complex systems research 
part of the goal is to discover power laws and other scale-invariant relations.  These laws 
allow us to predict and explain the behavior and future time evolution of the global state 
of the system regardless of its structural implementation. It turns out the reason power 
laws are predictive and unifying is that they show why the macroscopic dynamics and 
topological features obtain across diverse lower level structural details. And the why has 
nothing to do with similar structural details of the disparate systems.  
A very brief and informal characterization of universality might be helpful here. There 
are many cases of universality in physics at diverse scales, but the general idea is that a 
number of microphysically heterogeneous systems, sometimes even obeying different 
fundamental equations of motion, end up exhibiting the same phenomenological 
behavior. When this happens we say such systems share the same critical exponents and 
thus all belong to the same universality class.  The explanandum of universality is the 
uniformity and convergence of large-scale behavior across many very diverse instances. 
That is, universality is a feature of classes of systems, not a specific system. The 
Renormalization Group analysis (RG) explains why specific physical systems divide into 
distinct universality classes in terms of the geometry or topology of the state space of 
systems, i.e., the so-called fixed points of the renormalization flow. Hamiltonians 
describing heterogeneous physical systems fall into the basin of attraction of the same 
renormalization group fixed point. The space of Hamiltonians contains numerous fixed 
points, each of which is describing different universality classes with different critical 
exponents and scaling functions. The microphysically diverse systems in the same 
universality class will exhibit a continuous phase transition, near which, their analogous 
macroscopic quantities will obey power laws possessing exactly the same numerical 
values of the critical exponents. The quantitative behavior near phase transitions exhibits 
this universality wherein the values of the exponents are identical.
What is interesting here is that techniques such as RG methods from statistical mechanics 
are being successfully applied to complex biological systems that don’t have uniform 
parts. The occurrence of scale-invariance and hence self-similarity is the deeper reason 
why microphysically and mechanistically diverse systems can exhibit very similar or 
even identical macroscopic behavior. Thus, there is a direct route from power law 
behavior, scale-invariance and self-similarity to explaining why universality is true even 
in complex biological systems. Global topological features cannot be predicted from or 
derived ab initio from the structural features, because these are qualitatively different 
types of properties.  
We take no position over whether these are genuine laws: we agree with Woodward 
(2003) that there is no need to determine whether something is a genuine law or a mere 
invariance to determine whether it can be used in explanation. The manner of explanation 
involved here is distinctly nomological. The laws found in systems neuroscience have 
more in common with laws found in physics than most special science laws. This is not 
surprising since the formal methods involved are mostly imported from physics. In fact, 
when it comes to the traditional virtues one expects of laws (e.g., quantifiability, 
universality, predictive power, satisfaction of counterfactual conditionals, explanatory 
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power, simplicity, unification, etc.), the laws in systems neuroscience are no worse off 
than most laws in physics.
Explanations in systems neuroscience are highly pluralistic involving aspects of 
mechanistic, dynamical, various causal and statistical-causal explanations.   Many 
explanatory techniques are used in this endeavor including a host of causal and statistical 
modeling techniques and variety of formal/statistical measures of complexity. There are 
various hybrids of these explanatory patterns as well. Therefore systems neuroscience 
embraces explanatory and causal pluralism as a matter of pragmatic explanatory 
practice. However, the norms of such systems neuroscience explanations decidedly 
transcend those of localization. 
Following Woodward (2003), many mechanists such as Kaplan and Craver (2011) have 
adopted an interventionist account of mechanistic explanation in which a mechanistic 
explanation is only explanatory if it allows us to manipulate various “knobs and levers” 
of the mechanism thereby providing us with some control over the manifestation of the 
phenomenon. Said control should allow us to “predict” how the system will behave if 
certain parts are broken, knocked-out, altered, etc. Kaplan and Craver allege that one of 
the things that separates dynamical explanations from real (causal) explanations, is that 
the former do not allow for intervention, manipulation or control.  However, explanations 
in systems neuroscience are consistent with manipulationist or interventionist theories of 
explanation in general. Indeed, not just structural decompositions, but also dynamical and 
graphical explanations, can be and often are interventionist explanations. Mechanistic 
accounts of explanation that focus on localization and decomposition have no monopoly 
on interventionist explanation. There is nothing that says the knobs being tweaked must 
be structural components, they can also be global nomological features such as order-
parameters or laws.  
The kinds of complex biological systems under discussion here present a problem for any 
simplistic interventionist mechanistic model however. For example, often knock-out type 
experiments reveal that because of various types of plasticity, robustness/degeneracy and 
autonomy in complex biological systems, turning specific structural elements on or off, 
such as genes, has no discernable or predictable effect. In other words, we learn that such 
systems are non-decomposable and thus not amenable to localization. Needless to say, 
global organizational features such as plasticity, robustness, degeneracy and autonomy 
are not explicable via localization either. Therefore, very often the type of efficacious and 
informative manipulations one performs on such systems involves not structural 
components but global features such as order-parameters.  
4. Conclusion. We have been arguing that the kinds of explanation common in systems 
neuroscience do not involve decomposition and localization.  This would seem to make 
them non-mechanistic. It makes no difference us whether the mechanists want to stretch 
mechanistic explanation to include explanations wherein localization or decomposition 
fail, or whether they want to acknowledge that there are counter-examples to mechanistic 
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explanation in systems neuroscience. We do think however that these are the only options 
remaining to the mechanist. 
We have seen that: 1) there are mathematical explanations in systems neuroscience that 
are not grounded in localization and decomposition in principle, 2) mathematical 
explanations in systems neuroscience are complementary to explanations via localization 
and decomposition but not reducible to them, 3) while one can sometimes map structural 
elements onto mathematical explanations in systems neuroscience, the mapping is at least 
many-one and does not allow for structural decomposition or localization and 4) systems 
neuroscience really does provide an explanatory alternative to localization and 
decomposition that greatly transcends mere “predictivism.”  
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Abstract
The interpretation of tests of a point null hypothesis against an un-
specified alternative is a classical and yet unresolved issue in statistical
methodology. This paper approaches the problem from the perspective of
Lindley’s Paradox: the divergence of Bayesian and frequentist inference in
hypothesis tests with large sample size. I contend that the standard ap-
proaches in both frameworks fail to resolve the paradox. As an alternative,
I suggest the Bayesian Reference Criterion: (i) it targets the predictive
performance of the null hypothesis in future experiments; (ii) it provides
a proper decision-theoretic model for testing a point null hypothesis and
(iii) it convincingly accounts for Lindley’s Paradox.
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1 Introduction. Lindley’s Paradox.
Lindley’s Paradox is one of the most salient cases where subjective Bayesian
and frequentist inference fall apart. The paradox emerges in statistical tests of
point null hypotheses with high sample sizes.
Instead of starting with a theoretical definition of the paradox, we give an
example with real data (Jahn, Dunne and Nelson 1987). The case at hand
involved the test of a subject’s claim to possess extrasensory capacities (ESP)
that would enable him to affect a series of 0-1 outcomes generated by a randomly
operating machine (θ0 = 0.5). The subject claimed that these capacities would
make the sample mean differ significantly from 0.5.
The sequence of zeros and ones, X1, . . . , XN , was described by a Binomial
model B(θ,N). The null hypothesis asserted that the results were generated
by a machine operating with a chance of H0 : θ = θ0 = 1/2, whereas the
alternative was the unspecified hypothesis H1 : θ 6= θ0. The experimenters
decided to observe a very long series of zeros and ones, which would give us
enough evidence as to judge whether or not the null was compatible with the
data.
Jahn, Dunne and Nelson (1987) report that in 104.490.000 trials, 52.263.471
ones and 52.226.529 zeros were observed. A classical, Fisherian frequentist
would now calculate the z-statistic which is
z(x) :=
√
N
θ0(1− θ0)
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi − θ0
)
≈ 3.61 (1)
and reject the null hypothesis on the grounds of the very low p-value it induces:
p := PH0(|z(X)| ≥ |z(x)|)≪ 0.01 (2)
Thus, the data would be interpreted as strong evidence for extrasensory capac-
ities. Compare this now to the result of a Bayesian analysis. Jefferys (1990)
assigns a conventional positive probability P (H0) = ε > 0 to the null hypoth-
esis and calculates the Bayes factor in favor of the null (the ratio of prior and
posterior odds):
B01(x) :=
P (H0|x)
P (H1|x) ·
P (H1)
P (H0)
≈ 19
Hence, the data strongly favor the null over the alternative and do not provide
evidence for the presence of ESP.
The divergence between Bayesians and frequentists can be generalized. Ar-
guably, what is most distinctive about the above example is the large sample
size. Now assume that we are comparing observation sets of different sample
size N , all of which attain, in frequentist terms, the same p-value, e.g., the
highly significant value of 0.01. This means that the standardized sample mean
2
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z(x) =
√
N(x¯ − θ0)/σ takes the same value for all observation sets, regardless
of the actual sample size. However, in that case, the Bayesian evaluation of the
data will become ever more inclined to the null hypothesis with increasing N .
Thus, a result that speaks highly significantly against the null from a frequentist
point of view can strongly support it from a Bayesian perspective. This prob-
lem has, since the seminal paper of Lindley (1957), been known as Lindley’s
Paradox.
Due to its prominence and its simplicity, Lindley’s Paradox is a suitable
test case for comparing various philosophies of statistical inference, and for re-
considering the goals and methods of testing a precise null hypothesis. In this
paper, I ask the following questions: First, which statistical analysis of the
ESP example is correct? Second, which implications has Lindley’s Paradox for
standard procedures of Bayesian and frequentist inference? Third, is there a
full decision-theoretic framework in which point null hypothesis tests can be
conducted without adopting a fully subjectivist perspective? I will argue that
both the standard Bayesian and the standard frequentist way to conceive of
Lindley’s Paradox are unsatisfactory, and that alternatives have to be explored.
In particular, I believe that Jose´ Bernardo’s Bayesian Reference Criterion holds
considerable promise as a replication-oriented decision model that fits our intu-
itions about Lindley’s Paradox.
2 Testing a precise null: frequentist vs. Bayesian
accounts
Lindley’s Paradox deals with tests of a precise null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0
against an unspecified alternative H1 : θ 6= θ0 for large sample sizes. But why
are we actually testing a precise null hypothesis if we know in advance that
this hypothesis is, in practice, never exactly true? (For instance, in tests for
the efficacy of a medical drug, it can safely be assumed that even the most
unassuming placebo will have some minimal effect, positive or negative.)
The answer is that precise null hypotheses give us a useful idealization of
reality for the purpose at hand. This is also rooted in Popperian philosophy
of science: “only a highly testable or improbable theory is worth testing and
is actually (and not only potentially) satisfactory if it withstands severe tests”
(Popper 1963, 219–220). Accepting such a theory is not understood as endorsing
the theory’s truth, but as choosing it as a guide for future predictions and
theoretical developments.
Frequentists have taken the baton from Popper and explicated the idea of
severe testing by means of statistical hypothesis tests. Their mathematical
rationale is that if the discrepancy between data and null hypothesis is large
3
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enough, we can infer the presence of a significant effect and reject the null
hypothesis. For measuring the discrepancy in the data x := (x1, . . . , xN ) with
respect to postulated mean value θ0 of a Normal model, one canonically uses
the standardized statistic
z(x) :=
√
N
σ
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi − θ0
)
that we have already encountered above. Higher values of z denote a higher
divergence from the null, and vice versa. Since the distribution of z usually
varies with the sample size, some kind of standardization is required. Many
practitioners use the p-value or significance level, that is, the “tail area” of the
null hypothesis under the observed data, namely p := PH0(|z(X)| ≥ |z(x)|).
On that reading, a low p-value indicates evidence against the null: the chance
that z would take a value at least as high as z(x) is very small, if the null were
indeed true. Conventionally, one says that p < 0.05 means significant evidence
against the null, p < 0.01 very significant evidence, or in other words, the null
hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 level, etc. R.A. Fisher has interpreted p-values
as “a measure of the rational grounds for the disbelief [in the null hypothesis]
it augments” (Fisher 1956, 43).
Subjective Bayesians choose a completely different approach to hypothesis
testing. For them, scientific inference obeys the rules of probabilistic calculus.
Probabilities represent honest, subjective degrees of belief, which are updated
by means of Bayesian Conditionalization. A Bayesian inference about a null
hypothesis is based on the posterior probability P (H0|E), the synthesis of data
E and prior P (H0).
It is here that Bayesians and significance testers clash with each other. If
the p-value is supposed to indicate to what extent the null is still tenable,
we get a direct conflict with Bayesian reasoning. The analyses of Berger and
Delampady (1987) and Berger and Sellke (1987) show that p-values tend to
grossly overstate evidence against the null, to the extent that the posterior
probability of the null – and even the minimum of P (H0|x) under a large class
of priors – is typically much higher than the observed p-value. In other words,
even a Bayesian analysis that is maximally biased against the null is still less
biased than a p-value analysis. This has led Bayesian statisticians to conclude
that “almost anything will give a better indication of the evidence provided by
the data against H0” (Berger and Delampady 1987, 330). These findings are
confirmed by methodologists in the sciences who have repeatedly complained
about the illogic of p-values (and significance testing) and their inability to
answer the questions that really matter for science (Cohen 1994; Royall 1997;
Goodman 1999).
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Lindley’s Paradox augments this divergence of a Bayesian and a frequentist
analysis. In a Normal model, if P (H0) > 0 and N → ∞, then the posterior
probability of the null P (H0|x) converges to 1 for almost any prior distribution
over H1. More precisely:
Lindley’s Paradox: Take a Normal model N(θ, σ2) with known
variance σ2, H0 : θ = θ0, H1 : θ 6= θ0, assume P (H0) > 0 and any
regular proper prior distribution on {θ 6= θ0}. Then, for any testing
level α ∈ [0, 1], we can find a sample size N(α) and independent,
identically distributed data x = (x1, . . . , xN ) such that
1. The sample mean x¯ is significantly different from θ0 at level α;
2. P (H0|x), that is, the posterior probability that θ = θ0, is at
least as big as 1− α. Lindley (cf. 1957, 187)
One might conjecture that this Bayesian-frequentist divergence stems from
the unrealistic assumption that P (H0) > 0. But actually, the findings are
confirmed if we switch to an analysis in terms of Bayes factors, the Bayesian’s
standard measure of evidence. The evidence x provides for H0 vis-a`-vis H1 is
written as B01 and defined as the ratio of prior and posterior odds:
B01(x) :=
P (H0|x)
P (H1|x) ·
P (H1)
P (H0)
=
P (x|H0)
P (x|H1) , (3)
which can alternatively be interpreted as an averaged likelihood ratio of H0 vs.
H1. Now, if the prior over H1, that is, the relative weight of alternatives to the
null, follows a N(θ0, σ˜
2)-distribution, then the Bayes factor in favor of the null
can be computed as
B01(x) =
√
1 +
Nσ˜2
σ2
e
−Nz(x)2
2N+2σ2/σ˜2 , (4)
which converges, for increasing N , to infinity as the second factor is bounded
(Bernardo 1999, 102). This demonstrates that the precise value of P (H0) is
immaterial for the outcome of the subjective Bayesian analysis.
This result remarkably diverges from the frequentist finding of significant
evidence against the null. What has happened? If the p-value, and consequently
the value of z(X) = c, remain constant for increasing N , we can make use of the
Central Limit Theorem: z(X) converges, for all underlying distributions with
bounded second moments, in distribution against N(0, 1). Thus, as N →∞, we
obtain that cσ ≈ √N(X¯ − θ0), and X¯ → θ0. In other words, the sample mean
gets ever closer to θ0, favoring the null over the alternatives. For the deviance
between the variance-corrected sample mean z and H0 will be relatively small
compared to the deviance between z and all those hypotheses in H1 that are
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“out there”, in sharp contrast to a frequentist tester who will observe significant
evidence against H0.
In other words: as soon as we take our priors over H1 seriously, as an ex-
pression of our uncertainty about which alternatives to H0 are more likely than
others, we will, in the long run, end up with results favoring θ0 over an unspec-
ified alternative. Bayesians read this as the fatal blow for frequentist inference
since an ever smaller deviance of the sample mean x¯ from the parameter value
θ0 will suffice for a highly significant result. Obviously, this makes no scientific
sense. Small, uncontrollable biases will be present in any record of data, and
frequentist hypothesis tests are unable to distinguish between statistical signifi-
cance (p < 0.05) and scientific significance (a real effect is present). A Bayesian
analysis, on the other hand, accounts for this insight: as X¯ → θ0, an ever greater
chunk of the alternative H1 will diverge from X¯, favoring the null hypothesis.
Still, the subjective Bayesian stance on hypothesis tests leaves us with an
uneasy feeling. Assigning a strictly positive degree of belief P (H0) > 0 to the
point null hypothesis θ = θ0 is a misleading and inaccurate representation of
our subjective uncertainty. In terms of degrees of belief, θ0 is not that different
from any value θ0 ± ε in its neighborhood. Standardly, we would assign a
continuous prior over the real line, and there is no reason why a set of measure
zero, namely {θ = θ0}, should have a strictly positive probability. But if we set
P (H0) = 0, then for most priors (e.g., an improper uniform prior) the posterior
probability distribution will not peak at the null value, but somewhere else.
Thus, the apparently innocuous assumption P (H0) > 0 has a marked impact
on the result of the Bayesian analysis.
A natural reply to this objection contends that H0 is actually an idealization
of the hypothesis |θ− θ0| < ǫ, for some small ǫ, rather than a precise point null
hypothesis θ = θ0. Then, it would make sense to use strictly positive priors.
Indeed, it has been shown that point null hypothesis tests in terms of Bayes
factors approximate a test of whether a small interval around the null contains
the true parameter value (Theorem 1 in Berger and Delampady 1987). Seen
that way, it does make sense to assign a strictly positive prior to H0.
Unfortunately, this won’t help us in the situation of Lindley’s Paradox: when
N →∞, the convergence results break down, and testing a point null is no more
analogous to testing whether a narrow interval contains θ. In the asymptotic
limit, the Bayesian cannot justify the strictly positive probability of H0 as an
approximation to testing the hypothesis that the parameter value is close to θ0
– which is the hypothesis of real scientific interest. Setting P (H0) > 0 may be
regarded as a useful convention, but this move neglects that a hypothesis test
in science asks, in the first place, if H0 is a reasonable simplification of a more
general model, and not if we assign a high degree of belief to this precise value
6
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of θ.
This fact may be the real challenge posed by Lindley’s Paradox. In the
debate with frequentists, the Bayesian likes to appeal to “foundations”, but
working with strictly positive probabilities of the null hypothesis is hard to jus-
tify from a foundational perspective, and also from the perspective of scientific
practice.
The bottom line of all is that the subjective Bayesian analysis fails to explain
why hypothesis tests have such an appeal to scientific practitioners, and even
to those that are statistically sophisticated. Similarly, the Bayesian has a hard
time to explain why informative and precise, but improbable hypotheses should
sometimes be preferred over more general alternatives. How can the subjectivist
model that we are less interested in the truth of H0 than in its usefulness?
3 The BRC approach to hypothesis testing
This section presents a proposal for a fully Bayesian decision model for hypoth-
esis testing that survives the criticisms raised against the subjectivist approach
and gives a satisfactory treatment of Lindley’s Paradox. The main idea is to
decouple the idea of testing a precise null hypothesis H0 from the truth of this
hypothesis. Instead, we view the statistical test as making a decision on whether
or not we should treat the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 as a proxy for the more
general model H1 : θ 6= θ0. In other words, we test whether the null is compat-
ible with the data using a specific utility structure, going back to the roots of
Bayesianism in decision theory.
Thus, we have to extend Bayesian belief revision to Bayesian decision models
and add a proper utility dimension. This allows for much more flexible treat-
ments than the traditional zero-one loss model that is implicitly presupposed
in inference to the most probable hypothesis. In the remainder, I sketch a sim-
plified version of Bernardo’s Reference Bayesian Criterion (1999, section 2-3) in
order to elaborate the main ideas of philosophical interest.
In science, we generally prefer hypotheses on whose predictions we may rely.
Therefore, a central component of the envisioned decision model depends on
the expected predictive accuracy of the null. Hence, we need a function that
evaluates the predictive score of a hypothesis, given some data y. The canonical
approach consists in the logarithmic score logP (y|θ) (Good 1952): if an event
considered to be likely occurs, then the score is high; if an unlikely event occurs,
the score is low. This is a natural way of rewarding good and punishing bad
predictions.
A generalization of this utility function describes the score of data y under
parameter value θ as q(θ, y) = α logP (y|θ)+β(y), where α is a scaling term, and
7
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -770-
β(y) is a function that depends on the data only. Informally speaking, q(·, ·) is
decomposed into a prediction-term and a term that depends on the desirability
of an outcome, where the latter will eventually turn out to be irrelevant. This
is a useful generalization of the logarithmic score. Consequently, if θ is the true
parameter value, the utility of taking H0 as a proxy for the more general model
H1 is∫
q(θ0, Y ) dPY |θ = α
∫
logP (y|θ0)P (y|θ) dy +
∫
β(y)P (y|θ) dy.
The overall utility U of a decision, however, should not only depend on the
predictive score, as captured in q, but also on the cost cj of selecting a specific
hypothesis Hj . Ceteris paribus, H0 should be preferred to H1 because it is
more informative, simpler, and less prone to the risk of overfitting (in case
there are nuisance parameters). Therefore it is fair to set c1 > c0. Writing
U(·, θ) = ∫ q(·, Y ) dPY |θ − cj , we then obtain
U(H0, θ) = α
∫
logP (y|θ0)P (y|θ) dy +
∫
β(y)P (y|θ)dy − c0
U(H1, θ) = α
∫
logP (y|θ)P (y|θ) dy +
∫
β(y)P (y|θ)dy − c1.
Note that the utility of accepting H0 is evaluated against the true parameter
value θ, and that the alternative is not represented by a probabilistic average
(e.g., the posterior mean), but by its best element, namely θ. This is arguably
more faithful than subjective Bayesianism to the essential asymmetry in test-
ing a point null hypothesis. Consequently, the difference in expected utility,
conditional on the posterior density of θ, can be written as∫
θ∈Θ
(U(H1, θ)− U(H0, θ)) P (θ|x) dθ
= α
∫
θ∈Θ
(∫
log
P (y|θ)
P (y|θ0) P (y|θ)
)
P (θ|x) dy dθ +
∫
β(y)P (y|θ) dy
−
∫
β(y)P (y|θ) dy + c0 − c1
= α
∫
θ∈Θ
(∫
log
P (y|θ)
P (y|θ0) P (y|θ) dy
)
P (θ|x) dθ + c0 − c1.
This means that the expected utility difference between inferring to the null hy-
pothesis and keeping the general model is essentially a function of the expected
log-likelihood ratio between the null hypothesis and the true model, calibrated
against a “utility constant” d∗(c0 − c1). For the latter, Bernardo suggests a
conventional choice that recovers the well-probed scientific practice of regarding
three standard deviations as strong evidence against the null. The exact value
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of d∗ depends, of course, on the context: on how much divergence is required to
balance the advantages of working with a simpler, more informative, and more
accessible model (Bernardo 1999, 108).
Wrapping up all this, we will reject the null if and only if Eθ[U(H1, θ)] >
Eθ[U(H0, θ)] which amounts to the
Bayesian Reference Criterion (BRC): Data x are incompatible
with the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0, assuming that they have been
generated from the probability model (P (·|θ), θ ∈ Θ), if and only if∫
θ∈Θ
P (θ|x)
(∫
log
P (y|θ)
P (y|θ0) P (y|θ) dy
)
dθ > d∗(c0 − c1). (5)
This approach has a variety of remarkable features. First, it puts hypothesis
testing on firm decision-theoretic grounds. Second, accepting the null, that is,
using θ0 as a proxy for θ, amounts to claiming that the difference in expected
predictive success of θ0 and the true parameter value θ will be offset by the fact
that H0 is more elegant, more informative and easier to test. Hence, BRC does
not only establish a tradeoff between different epistemic virtues: it is also in
significant agreement with Popper’s view that “science does not aim, primar-
ily, at high probabilities. It aims at high informative content, well backed by
experience.” (Popper 1934/59, 399). Third, the approach is better equipped
than subjective Bayesianism to account for frequentist intuitions, since under
some conditions, e.g., in Lindley’s Paradox, the results of a reference Bayesian
analysis agree with the results of a frequentist analysis, as we shall see below.
Fourth, it is invariant of the particular parametrization, that is, the final infer-
ence does not depend on whether we work with θ or a 1:1-transformation g(θ).
Fifth, it is neutral with respect to the kind of prior probabilities that are fed
into the analysis.1
4 Revisiting Lindley’s Paradox
We now investigate how Bernardo’s approach deals with Lindley’s Paradox and
return to the ESP example from the introduction. It turns out that the BRC
quantifies the expected loss from using θ0 as a proxy for the true value θ as
substantial. Using a β(1/2, 1/2) reference prior for θ (Bernardo 1979), the
expected loss under the null hypothesis is calculated as d(θ = 1/2) ≈ log 1400 ≈
7.24. This establishes that “under the accepted conditions, the precise value
θ0 = 1/2 is rather incompatible with the data” (Bernardo 2012, 18).
1BRC implies that some parameters, such as d∗, which have to be chosen conventionally
or context-dependent. Hence, a charge of “arbitrariness” could be made. However, this
flexibility is, in my opinion, an asset of a general decision-theoretic model, not a drawback, as
a comparison with Expected Utility Theory makes clear.
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We observe that the results of a reference analysis according to BRC agree
with the results of the frequentist analysis, but contradict the subjective Bayesian
results. One might thus object that Bernardo’s Bayesianism is purely instru-
mental : that is, it makes use of Bayesian notation and assigns a “probability”
over θ, but it ends up with conventional, automated inference procedures that
recover frequentist results.
Let us get back to the experiment. Of course, the rejection of the null
hypothesis does not prove the extrasensory capacities of our subject; a much
more plausible explanation is a small bias in the random generator. This is
actually substantiated by looking at the posterior distribution of θ: due to the
huge sample size, we find that for any non-extreme prior probability function,
we obtain the posterior θ ∼ N(0.50018, 0.000049), which shows that most of the
posterior mass is concentrated in a narrow interval that does not contain the
null. These findings agree with a likelihood ratio analysis: if we compute the
log-likelihood ratio L
θˆ,θ0
of the maximum likelihood estimate θˆ(x1, . . . , xn) = x¯
versus the null, we obtain (using the Normal approximation)
logL
θˆ,θ0
(x1, ..., xN ) = log
P (x¯|θˆ)
P (x¯|θ0) = log
P (x1 = θˆ|θˆ)N
P (x1 = θˆ|θ0)N
= log
(
1√
2πσ2
)N
− log
((
1√
2πσ2
)N
e−
N
2σ2
(θˆ−θ0)
2
)
=
N
2σ2
(θˆ − θ0)2 N→∞−→ ∞. (6)
This analysis clearly shows that the likelihood ratio with respect to the maxi-
mum likelihood estimate speaks, for large N , increasingly against the null (in
our case: logL
θˆ,θ
(x1, ..., xN ) ≈ 6.53), in striking disagreement with the Bayes
factor analysis.
If we revisit Jeffery’s analysis in the light of these observations, we note two
contentious features, already touched upon previously. The first concerns the
utility structure that is imposed by basing inference exclusively on the posterior
distribution. We have seen in the previous sections that such a zero-one loss
function, and a positive prior probability P (H0) may not be adequate assump-
tions for deciding whether a hypothesis should be judged as compatible with
the data; therefore we should also be wary of judgments based on such assump-
tions. Second, a Bayes factor comparison effectively compares the likelihood of
the data under H0 to the averaged likelihood of the data under H1. However,
this quantity is strongly influenced by whether there are some extreme hypothe-
ses in H1 that fit the data poorly. Compared to the huge amount of data that
we have just collected, the impact of these hypotheses (mediated via the con-
ventional uniform prior) should be minute. These arguments explain why most
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people would tend to judge the data as incompatible with the precise null, but
fail to see a scientifically interesting effect.
From the vantage point of whether the experimental effect is likely to be
replicated – and this is a question scientists are definitely interested in – the
BRC approach is more adequate. After all, it focuses on expected future success,
and not on past performance. H0 is not accepted because it is considered likely
to be true, but because it is sufficiently likely to be predictively successful.
Frequentists may object that Bernardo’s approach is a very complicated way
to obtain a simple result. After all, if we use confidence intervals instead of p-
values, we will be able to appreciate the small effect size as well as the fact that
the data are incompatible with the null hypothesis. A similar point can be made
in Mayo’s (1996) error-statistical framework: only a small discrepancy from the
null hypothesis is warranted with a high degree of severity, but no discrepancy
that points to a substantial extrasensory influence rather than to a tiny bias in
the machine. Hence, Lindley’s Paradox seems to vanish in thin air if we only
adopt the right frequentist perspective.
To this point I have a twofold reply: First, confidence intervals and severity
functions are, on a mathematical level, intimately connected to p-values and
Neyman-Pearson error probabilities. Therefore they share a lot of the founda-
tional problems of p-values, some of which have been mentioned above (see Roy-
all 1997, for an elaborate discussion). A fully convincing reply to these criticisms
is still pending. Second, confidence intervals do not involve a decision-theoretic
component; they are interval estimators. They do not determine whether a
precise null hypothesis should be accepted or rejected. (The case is a bit more
complicated for Mayo’s error statistics, but as I understand her, the kind of
inferences she wants to make is about severely warranted discrepancies from the
null, and not about decisions to accept or to reject a point null hypothesis.) If
we take statistical tests to be serious decision problems, if the word “test” is
more than a dummy for our preferred inference problem, then those frequentist
techniques do not provide a convincing account of hypothesis testing.
5 Conclusions
We have demonstrated how Lindley’s Paradox – the extreme divergence of
Bayesian and frequentist inference in tests of a precise null hypothesis with
large sample size – challenges the standard methods of both Bayesian and fre-
quentist inference. Neither frequentist significance tests nor subjective Bayesian
inference provides a convincing account of the problem. Therefore, I have intro-
duced Bernardo’s Bayesian Reference Criterion (BRC) as a full Bayesian, albeit
not subjectivist model of testing a precise null hypothesis. It turns out that
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BRC gives a sensible Bayesian treatment of Lindley’s Paradox, with a focus on
predictive performance and likely replication of the effect in deciding whether
to accept or to reject the null. The motivation of BRC also exhibits a notable
similarity to ideas voiced by Karl Popper.
Of course, Bernardo’s reference Bayesian approach is not immune to objec-
tions. But anyway, BRC underlines that Bayesian inference in science need not
necessarily infer to highly probable models – a misconception that is perpetu-
ated in post-Carnapian primers on Bayesian inference and that has attracted
Popper’s understandable criticism. To provide some evidence: Howson and
Urbach (1993, xvii) claim that “scientific reasoning is essentially reasoning in
accordance with the formal principles of probability” and Earman (1992, 33)
even takes, in his exposition of Bayesian reasoning, the liberty of announcing
that “issues in Bayesian decision theory will be ignored”. As argued in the pa-
per, such a purely probabilistic Bayesianism falls short of an appropriate model
of scientific reasoning.
In other words, Bayesianism should not be separated from its decision-
theoretic component that involves, beside the well-known probabilistic repre-
sentation of uncertainty, also a utility function of equal significance. Failure to
appreciate this fact is, to my mind, partly responsible for the gap between the
debates in statistical methodology and confirmation theory. This paper makes
an attempt to bridge it.
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♠✉st ♥♦t ❜❡ ❞❡♥✐❡❞✳ ❚❤❡ ♥❡❛r❧②✲❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝ ❡✈♦❧✉t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✐s ✇❡❧❧ ❝♦♥✜r♠❡❞
✇✐t❤✐♥ ❝❡rt❛✐♥ ♠❛r❣✐♥s ♦❢ ❡rr♦r✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ s♦♠❡ ♦❢ t❤❡ ♠♦st ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥t ❝♦♥✜r♠❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢
❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s t❤❡♦r②✱ ✐♥❝❧✉❞✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss✐❝ r❡❝♦✈❡r② ♦❢ t❤❡ ♦t❤❡r✇✐s❡ ❛♥♦♠❛❧♦✉s ♣❡r✐❤❡❧✐♦♥ ♦❢
▼❡r❝✉r②✱ ❛❧s♦ ❛♣♣❡❛r t♦ ❝♦♥✜r♠ t❤❡ ❛♣♣r♦①✐♠❛t❡❧② ❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s✳
❚❤✐s ❛❜✉♥❞❛♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❛♣♣❛r❡♥t ❝♦♥✜r♠❛t✐♦♥ s✉❣❣❡sts t❤❛t t❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡ ❝❧❛✐♠ t❤❛t ♠❛ss✐✈❡
❜♦❞✐❡s ♠✉st ❡①❛❝t❧② ❢♦❧❧♦✇ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝s ❢❛✐❧s t♦ ❝♦❤❡r❡ ✇✐t❤ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s t❤❡♦r②✱ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❢♦❧✲
❧♦✇✐♥❣ ♠❛② ❝♦♥st✐t✉t❡ s♦♠❡ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥ ♦r ❛♣♣r♦①✐♠❛t❡❧② ❝♦rr❡❝t ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥ ♦❢
❤♦✇ ❣❡♥❡r✐❝ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ❜❡❤❛✈❡✳
❲❡ ♠✉st ❤❡♥❝❡ r❡❝♦♥❝✐❧❡ ❛♥ ❛♣♣❛r❡♥t ❞✐❧❡♠♠❛✿ ❖♥ t❤❡ ♦♥❡ ❤❛♥❞ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣
❛♣♣❡❛rs ✐❧❧✉str❛t✐✈❡ ❛s ❛♥ ✐❞❡❛❧ ♦❢ t❤❡ tr✉❡ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s✳ ❖♥ t❤❡ ♦t❤❡r ❤❛♥❞ t❤❡
❛r❣✉♠❡♥ts ❛❣❛✐♥st t❤❡ ❝❛♥♦♥✐❝❛❧ ✈✐❡✇ ✐♥ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱ ✷✵✶✷✮ r❡✈❡❛❧ t❤❛t ♥♦♥✲✈❛♥✐s❤✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s
t❤❛t ❛❝t✉❛❧❧② ❢♦❧❧♦✇ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝s ✇♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ ❤✐❣❤❧② ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ✇✐t❤ r❡s♣❡❝t t♦ t❤❡ t❤❡♦r②✱
s✉❣❣❡st✐♥❣ t❤❛t t❤❡② ❛r❡ ♥♦t s✉✐t❛❜❧❡ ❛s ✐❞❡❛❧ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ♠♦❞❡❧s✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ❡✈❡♥ ✐❢ ✇❡
✇❡r❡ t♦ ❛❞♦♣t s✉❝❤ ♠♦❞❡❧s ❛s ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥s✱ ✐♥ ♦r❞❡r t♦ ❣❛✐♥ ❦♥♦✇❧❡❞❣❡ ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ♣❛t❤s ♦❢
❛❝t✉❛❧ ❜♦❞✐❡s✱ ✐t ✐s ✉♥❝❧❡❛r ❤♦✇ t♦ ❞r❛✇ ❝♦♥❝❧✉s✐♦♥s ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ♥♦♥✲♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ❝❛s❡s ❜②
❝♦♥s✐❞❡r✐♥❣ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ♠♦❞❡❧s t❤❛t ❛r❡ ❣❡♥❡r✐❝❛❧❧② ✐♥❝♦♠♣❛t✐❜❧❡ ✇✐t❤ t❤❡ t❤❡♦r②✳
✷
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -778-
■♥ t❤✐s ♣❛♣❡r✱ ✇❡ ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤ s✉❝❤ ❛ r❡❝♦♥❝✐❧✐❛t✐♦♥ ❜② ❛r❣✉✐♥❣ t❤❛t✱ ✐♥ ❧✐❣❤t ♦❢ t❤❡ ❢❛✐❧✉r❡ ♦❢
t❤❡ ❝❛♥♦♥✐❝❛❧ ✐♥t❡r♣r❡t❛t✐♦♥✱ t❤❡ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ s❤♦✉❧❞ ✐♥st❡❛❞ ❜❡ ❛❞♦♣t❡❞ ❛s ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② t❤❡✲
s✐s ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♦❢ ❝❡rt❛✐♥ ❝❧❛ss❡s ♦❢ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s t❤❛t ❡①❤✐❜✐t ♥❡❛r❧②✲❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝
♠♦t✐♦♥✳ ■♥ s❡❝t✐♦♥ ✷✱ ✇❡ ♣r♦♣♦s❡ ❛♥ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ ❝♦♥❝❡♣t ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡✲
♥♦♠❡♥❛ t♦ ❞❡s✐❣♥❛t❡ ❛ ❝❡rt❛✐♥ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ♦❢ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❡①❤✐❜✐t❡❞ ❛❝r♦ss ❛ ✇✐❞❡ ❝❧❛ss
♦❢ ✭♦st❡♥s✐❜❧② ❞✐✈❡rs❡✮ s②st❡♠s ♦❢ ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r t❤❡♦r②✳ ❯s✐♥❣ t❤✐s ❛♥❛❧②s✐s✱ ✐♥ s❡❝t✐♦♥ ✸✱
✇❡ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥ ❤♦✇ t❤❡ ♥❡❛r❧② ❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ ✐♥ ♥✉♠❡r♦✉s ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ s②st❡♠s
❝♦✉♥ts ❛s s✉❝❤ ❛ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ✇✐t❤✐♥ ❛♣♣r♦♣r✐❛t❡❧② ❝❧♦s❡ ✭t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧✮ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞s ♦❢ ❛♥✲
❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧s t❤❛t ❡①❤✐❜✐t ♣❡r❢❡❝t ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♠♦t✐♦♥✳ ❋✐♥❛❧❧②✱ ✐♥ s❡❝t✐♦♥ ✹✱ ✇❡ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥ ✇❤②
s✉❝❤ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧s ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❡♠♣❧♦②❡❞ t♦ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡ t❤✐s ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♦❢ t❤❡ r❡✲
❛❧✐st✐❝ ♠♦❞❡❧s✱ ✇✐t❤♦✉t ❤❛✈✐♥❣ t♦ r❡✐❢② t❤❡ ♣r♦❜❧❡♠ ♠♦❞❡❧s ♦r t❛❦❡ t❤❡♠ ❛s r❡♣r❡s❡♥t❛t✐✈❡
♦❢ ❛❝t✉❛❧ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s✳
✷ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ✐♥ P❤②s✐❝s
❚❤❡ ❛r❣✉♠❡♥ts ♦❢ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱ ✷✵✶✷✮ r❡✈❡❛❧ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ ❝❛♥♥♦t ❜❡ ✉s❡❞ t♦
♣r❡s❝r✐❜❡ t❤❡ ♣r❡❝✐s❡ ❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ♦❢ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✐♥ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②✳ ◆❡✈❡rt❤❡❧❡ss✱ t❤❡
❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡✱ ❞❡♠♦t❡❞ ❢r♦♠ t❤❡ st❛t✉s ♦❢ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧ ❧❛✇ t♦ ❛ t❤❡s✐s ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ❣❡♥✲
❡r❛❧ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❝❧❛ss❡s ♦❢ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s✱ ♠❛② st✐❧❧ ❜❡ ♦❢ ✈❛❧✉❡ t♦ ♦✉r ✉♥❞❡rst❛♥❞✐♥❣
❣❡♥❡r✐❝ ❞②♥❛♠✐❝❛❧ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ✐♥ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②✳ ❚❤❡ ❝❤❛❧❧❡♥❣❡ ✐s t♦ ✜♥❞ ❛♥ ❛♣♣r♦♣r✐✲
❛t❡ ✇❛② ♦❢ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③✐♥❣ s✉❝❤ ✏♥❡❛r❧② ❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝✑ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ ❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss t♦ ♣❡r❢❡❝t
❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ✐♥ ❧✐❣❤t ♦❢ t❤❡ ❢❛❝t t❤❛t ❛tt❡♠♣ts t♦ ♠♦❞❡❧ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s
t❤❛t ❝♦✉❧❞ st❛❜❧② ❢♦❧❧♦✇ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝s ❡♥❞ ✉♣ ✈✐♦❧❛t✐♥❣ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ✜❡❧❞ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✳ ■❢ s✉❝❤ ❛
r❡✐♥t❡r♣r❡t❛t✐♦♥ ♦❢ t❤❡ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ ✐s ✇❡❧❧✲❢♦✉♥❞❡❞✱ ✇❡ ♠✉st ❥✉st✐❢② ✐ts ❡♥❞♦rs❡♠❡♥t ✐♥ t❤❡
❢❛❝❡ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❦✐♥❞s ♦❢ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❡s ❛ss♦❝✐❛t❡❞ ✇✐t❤ ❛❝t✉❛❧ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♠♦t✐♦♥✳ ❚❤✐s ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❞♦♥❡
❜② ✐♥t❡r♣r❡t✐♥❣ t❤❡ r♦❜✉st ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♣❛tt❡r♥s ❛❝t✉❛❧❧② ♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ ✐♥ ♥❛t✉r❡ ❛s ❛
✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛✳ ■♥ t❤✐s s❡❝t✐♦♥✱ ✇❡ ❜❡❣✐♥ ✇✐t❤ ❛♥ ❡①♣❧✐❝✐t ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ♦❢ t❤✐s ❝♦♥❝❡♣t✬s
✉s❡ ✐♥ ♣❤②s✐❝s✳
✸
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❋✐❣✉r❡ ✷✳✶✿ P❤❛s❡ ❞✐❛❣r❛♠ ♦❢ ❛ ❣❡♥❡r✐❝ ♠❛t❡r✐❛❧ ❛t ✜①❡❞ ❞❡♥s✐t②✳
✷✳✶ ❚❤❡ P❛r❛❞✐❣♠ ❈❛s❡✿ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ✐♥ P❤❛s❡ ❚r❛♥s✐t✐♦♥s
❚❤❡ ♥♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥ ✇❛s ✐♥✐t✐❛❧❧② ❝♦✐♥❡❞ t♦ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡ ❛ r❡♠❛r❦❛❜❧❡
❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ✐♥ t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ t❤❡r♠❛❧ s②st❡♠s ✉♥❞❡r❣♦✐♥❣ ♣❤❛s❡ tr❛♥s✐t✐♦♥s✱ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r❧②
t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ s②st❡♠s ✐♥ t❤❡ ✈✐❝✐♥✐t② ♦❢ ❛ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝ st❛t❡ ❝❛❧❧❡❞ t❤❡ ✏❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ♣♦✐♥t✳✑
■♥ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝s t❤❡ st❛t❡ ♦❢ ❛ s②st❡♠ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ t❤r❡❡ st❛t❡ ✈❛r✐❛❜❧❡s
♣r❡ss✉r❡✱ t❡♠♣❡r❛t✉r❡✱ ❛♥❞ ❞❡♥s✐t②✳ ❆❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ t❤❡ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝ st✉❞② ♦❢ ♣❤❛s❡
tr❛♥s✐t✐♦♥s✱ ✇❤❡♥ t❤❡ st❛t❡ ♦❢ ❛ s②st❡♠ ✐s ❦❡♣t ❜❡❧♦✇ t❤❡ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r ✏❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ♣♦✐♥t✑ ✈❛❧✲
✉❡s (Pc, Tc, ρc) ❛ss♦❝✐❛t❡❞ ✇✐t❤ t❤❡ s✉❜st❛♥❝❡✱ ♣❤❛s❡ tr❛♥s✐t✐♦♥ ❜♦✉♥❞❛r✐❡s ❝♦rr❡s♣♦♥❞ t♦
❞✐s❝r❡t❡ ❝❤❛♥❣❡s ✐♥ t❤❡ s②st❡♠ ✭s✐❣♥✐✜❡❞ ✐♥ ✜❣✉r❡ ✷✳✶ ❜② t❤❡ t❤✐❝❦ ❜❧❛❝❦ ❧✐♥❡s✮✳ ■❢✱ ❤♦✇✲
❡✈❡r✱ ❛ s②st❡♠ ✐s ❛❧❧♦✇❡❞ t♦ ❡①❝❡❡❞ ✐ts ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ✈❛❧✉❡s✱ t❤❡r❡ ❡①✐st ♣❛t❤s ❛✈❛✐❧❛❜❧❡ t♦ t❤❡
s②st❡♠ ❛❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ✐t t♦ ❝❤❛♥❣❡ ❢r♦♠ ✈❛♣♦r t♦ ❧✐q✉✐❞ ✭♦r ❜❛❝❦✮ ✇✐t❤♦✉t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦✐♥❣ s✉❝❤ ❞✐s✲
❝r❡t❡ ❝❤❛♥❣❡s✳ ❚❤❡s❡ ♣❛t❤s ✐♥✈♦❧✈❡ ❛✈♦✐❞✐♥❣ t❤❡ ✈❛♣♦r✲❧✐q✉✐❞ ❜♦✉♥❞❛r② ❧✐♥❡ ❜② ♥❛✈✐❣❛t✐♥❣
❛r♦✉♥❞ t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ♣♦✐♥t ❛s ❞❡♣✐❝t❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❜r♦❛❞ ❛rr♦✇ ✐♥ ✜❣✉r❡ ✷✳✶✳
❚❤❡r❡ ❡①✐sts ❛ r❡♠❛r❦❛❜❧❡ ✉♥✐❢♦r♠✐t② ✐♥ t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥t s②st❡♠s ♥❡❛r t❤❡ ❝r✐t✲
✐❝❛❧ ♣♦✐♥t✳ ❖♥❡ s✉❝❤ ✉♥✐❢♦r♠✐t② ✐s ❞❡♣✐❝t❡❞ ✐♥ ✜❣✉r❡ ✷✳✷✳ ■♥ t❤✐s ✜❣✉r❡ ✇❡ s❡❡ ❛ ♣❧♦t ♦❢ ❞❛t❛
r❡❝♦✈❡r❡❞ ❜② ●✉❣❣❡♥❤❡✐♠ ✭✶✾✹✺✮ ✐♥ ❛ t❡♠♣❡r❛t✉r❡✲❞❡♥s✐t② ❣r❛♣❤ ♦❢ t❤❡ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝
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❋✐❣✉r❡ ✷✳✷✿ ❆❞❛♣t❡❞ ♣❧♦t ♦❢ ✭●✉❣❣❡♥❤❡✐♠✱ ✶✾✹✺✮ ❞❛t❛ r❡s❝❛❧❡❞ ❢♦r ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t②✳
st❛t❡s ❛t ✇❤✐❝❤ ✈❛r✐♦✉s ✢✉✐❞s tr❛♥s✐t✐♦♥ ❢r♦♠ ❛ ❧✐q✉✐❞ ♦r ✈❛♣♦r st❛t❡ t♦ ❛ ✏t✇♦ ♣❤❛s❡✑
❧✐q✉✐❞✲✈❛♣♦r ❝♦❡①✐st❡♥❝❡ r❡❣✐♦♥✳ ❙②st❡♠s ✐♥ st❛t❡s ❧♦❝❛t❡❞ ✐♥ t❤✐s ❧❛tt❡r r❡❣✐♦♥ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ✐♥
❧✐q✉✐❞ ♦r ✈❛♣♦r ♣❤❛s❡s ❛♥❞ ✭❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝s✮ ♠❛✐♥t❛✐♥s ❝♦♥st❛♥t t❡♠♣❡r❛✲
t✉r❡ ❛s t❤❡ ❞❡♥s✐t② ♦❢ t❤❡ s②st❡♠ ❝❤❛♥❣❡s✳ ❆♥ ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥t ❢❡❛t✉r❡ ❡①❤✐❜✐t❡❞ ✐♥ ✜❣✉r❡ ✷✳✷ ✐s
t❤❛t ✭❛❢t❡r r❡s❝❛❧✐♥❣ ❢♦r t❤❡ ρc ❛♥❞ Tc ♦❢ t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ♠♦❧❡❝✉❧❡s✮ t❤❡ tr❛♥s✐t✐♦♥ ♣♦✐♥ts ♦❢
t❤❡ ❡❛❝❤ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❞✐st✐♥❝t s✉❜st❛♥❝❡s ♥❡❛r ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t② ❛♣♣❡❛rs t♦ ❜❡ ✇❡❧❧ ✜t ❜② ❛ s✐♥❣❧❡ ❝✉r✈❡
r❡❢❡rr❡❞ t♦ ❛s t❤❡ ❝♦❡①✐st❡♥❝❡ ❝✉r✈❡✳ ❚❤✐s s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ t❤❡ ❝♦❡①✐st❡♥❝❡ ❝✉r✈❡s ❜❡st ✜tt✐♥❣
❞✐✈❡rs❡ ♠♦❧❡❝✉❧❛r s✉❜st❛♥❝❡s ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡❞ ❜② ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r ✈❛❧✉❡ β r❡❢❡rr❡❞ t♦ ❛s
t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❡①♣♦♥❡♥t ❢♦✉♥❞ ✐♥ t❤❡ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥✿
Ψ(T ) ∝
∣
∣
∣
∣
T − Tc
Tc
∣
∣
∣
∣
β
✭✶✮
✇❤❡r❡ t❤❡ ♣❛r❛♠❡t❡r Ψ(T )✱ ❝❛❧❧❡❞ t❤❡ ♦r❞❡r ♣❛r❛♠❡t❡r t❡❧❧s ✉s t❤❡ ✇✐❞t❤ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝♦❡①✐st❡♥❝❡
❝✉r✈❡ ❛t ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r t❡♠♣❡r❛t✉r❡ ✈❛❧✉❡ T ✳ ❆s ❞❡♣✐❝t❡❞ ✐♥ ✜❣✉r❡ ✷✳✷✱ ❛s T ❣❡ts ❝❧♦s❡r
❛♥❞ ❝❧♦s❡r t♦ t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ t❡♠♣❡r❛t✉r❡ Tc ❢r♦♠ ❜❡❧♦✇✱ t❤✐s ✇✐❞t❤ ❞r♦♣s ❞♦✇♥ ❡✈❡♥t✉❛❧❧②
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✈❛♥✐s❤✐♥❣ ❛t ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t②✳ ❲❡ ❝❛♥ t❤✐♥❦ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❡①♣♦♥❡♥t β ❛s t❡❧❧✐♥❣ ✉s ❛❜♦✉t ❤♦✇
r❛♣✐❞❧② s✉❝❤ ❛ ✈❛♥✐s❤✐♥❣ ♦❝❝✉rs✳ ❆s ❝♦♥✜r♠❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❛❜♦✈❡ ❞❛t❛✱ t❤✐s ♥✉♠❜❡r t✉r♥s ♦✉t
t♦ ❜❡ s✐♠✐❧❛r ✭✐♥ t❤❡ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞ ♦❢ β ≃ .33✮ ❢♦r ✈❛st❧② ❞✐✛❡r❡♥t ✢✉✐❞ s✉❜st❛♥❝❡s✳✶
❲❤❛t ✐s ❢❛s❝✐♥❛t✐♥❣ ❛❜♦✉t ❡①❛♠♣❧❡s s✉❝❤ ❛s t❤✐s ✐s ♥♦t t❤❡ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧ ✭♦r ✏♥❡❛r❧②✑ ✉♥✐✲
✈❡rs❛❧✮ r❡❣✉❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s✳ ❚❤❛t ✉♥✐❢♦r♠ r❡❧✐❛❜❧❡ r❡❣✉❧❛r✐t✐❡s ✭✈✐③✳ ✏✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧
❧❛✇s✑✮ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❢♦✉♥❞ t♦ ❛♣♣❧② t♦ ♥✉♠❡r♦✉s ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s ✭t❤♦✉❣❤ r❡♠❛r❦❛❜❧❡✮ ✐s ♥♦t❤✐♥❣
♥❡✇✳ ❚❤❡ ✐♥t❡r❡st✐♥❣ ♣❛rt ✐s t❤❛t s✉❝❤ ✉♥✐❢♦r♠ r❡❧✐❛❜❧❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❝❝✉rs ❞❡s♣✐t❡ t❤❡ ❢❛❝t t❤❛t
❛t ❧❡❛st ❛t ♦♥❡ ❧❡✈❡❧ ♦❢ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥ t❤❡ s②st❡♠s ❛r❡ s♦ ✐♥❝r❡❞✐❜❧② ❞✐ss✐♠✐❧❛r✳ ❋r♦♠ ❛ ❧❡✈❡❧ ♦❢
❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥ t❤♦✉❣❤t t♦ ❜❡ ♣❡r❤❛♣s ♠♦r❡ ✏❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧✑ t❤❛♥ t❤❡ ❣r♦ss st❛t❡ ✈❛r✐❛❜❧❡s ✭P ✱
T ✱ ❛♥❞ ρ✮ ✉s❡❞ t♦ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝ s②st❡♠s✱ t❤❡ ✈❛r✐♦✉s s✉❜st❛♥❝❡s ❡①❤✐❜✐t✐♥❣
s✐♠✐❧❛r ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❡①♣♦♥❡♥t ✈❛❧✉❡s ❤❛✈❡ q✉✐t❡ ❞✐✈❡rs❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s✿ ❆t t❤❡ q✉❛♥t✉♠ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✲
✐❝❛❧ ❧❡✈❡❧✱ ❢♦r ✐♥st❛♥❝❡✱ t❤❡ st❛t❡ ✈❡❝t♦rs ♦r ❞❡♥s✐t② ♠❛tr✐❝❡s r❡♣r❡s❡♥t✐♥❣ t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡
q✉❛♥t✉♠ ♠✐①t✉r❡s ✇✐❧❧ ❜❡ ✐♥❝r❡❞✐❜❧② ❞✐st✐♥❝t ✭❡✳❣✳ ❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ♦rt❤♦❣♦♥❛❧✮✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ✇❡
♥❡❡❞ ♥♦t ❣♦ ❞♦✇♥ t♦ ❛ q✉❛♥t✉♠ ❧❡✈❡❧ ♦❢ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥ t♦ r❡❝♦❣♥✐③❡ t❤❡ ✈❛st ❞✐✈❡rs✐t②✳ ❋r♦♠ ❛
❝❤❡♠✐❝❛❧ ♣❡rs♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ♠♦♥♦t♦♥✐❝ ♥❡♦♥ ✐s ❞✐✛❡r❡♥t ❢r♦♠ ❛ ❞✐❛t♦♠✐❝ ♦①②❣❡♥ ♠♦❧❡❝✉❧❡✱ ♦r ❛♥
❛s②♠♠❡tr✐❝❛❧ ❝❛r❜♦♥ ♠♦♥♦①✐❞❡ ♠♦❧❡❝✉❧❡✳ ❲❡ ♠✐❣❤t ❤❡♥❝❡ ❡①♣❡❝t s✉r♣r✐s❡ ❢r♦♠ ❛ ♣❤②s✐✲
❝✐st ♦r ❝❤❡♠✐st s✐♥❝❡ ❞❡s♣✐t❡ s✉❝❤ ✈❛st ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ t❤❡ ♦st❡♥s✐❜❧② ♣❡rt✐♥❡♥t ❞❡t❛✐❧s ❛t
t❤❡s❡ ❧❡✈❡❧s ♦❢ t❤❡♦r✐③✐♥❣✱ t❤❡ s✉❜st❛♥❝❡s st✐❧❧ s❤❛r❡ t❤✐s ♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t②✳ ❚❤✐s s✐♠✐❧❛r✲
✐t② ❞❡s♣✐t❡ s✉❝❤ ✭s♣❡❝✐♦✉s❧② r❡❧❡✈❛♥t✮ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐s ✇❤❛t ❞✐st✐♥❣✉✐s❤❡s t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❛❝r♦ss
t❤❡r♠❛❧ s②st❡♠s ❛s ❛ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥✳ ■♥ t❤❡ ♥❡①t s❡❝t✐♦♥ ✇❡ ❜❡❣✐♥ ❛
♠♦r❡ ❡①♣❧✐❝✐t ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❝❡♣t✬s ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ ❛♣♣❧✐❝❛t✐♦♥ ✐♥ ♣❤②s✐❝s✳
❚❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡ ✉s❛❣❡ ♦❢ t❤❡ t❡r♠ ♦r✐❣✐♥❛t❡❞ ✐♥ t❤❡ st✉❞② ♦❢ t❤❡r♠❛❧ s②st❡♠s✱ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
❤❛s ♥♦✇ ❜❡❡♥ ✐❞❡♥t✐✜❡❞ ✐♥ ❛ ♠✉❧t✐t✉❞❡ ♦❢ ♦t❤❡r ❞♦♠❛✐♥s✳ ❖✈❡r t❤❡ ♣❛st ❞❡❝❛❞❡✱ ❘♦❜❡rt
❇❛tt❡r♠❛♥ ❤❛s ❛r❣✉❡❞ ✐♥ t❤❡ ♣❤✐❧♦s♦♣❤✐❝❛❧ ❧✐t❡r❛t✉r❡ t❤❛t ✏✇❤✐❧❡ ♠♦st ❞✐s❝✉ss✐♦♥s ♦❢ ✉♥✐✲
✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❛♥❞ ✐ts ❡①♣❧❛♥❛t✐♦♥ t❛❦❡ ♣❧❛❝❡ ✐♥ t❤❡ ❝♦♥t❡①t ♦❢ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ❛♥❞ st❛t✐st✐❝❛❧
♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s✱✳✳✳ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ✐s r❡❛❧❧② ✉❜✐q✉✐t♦✉s ✐♥ s❝✐❡♥❝❡✑ ✭❇❛tt❡r♠❛♥✱ ✷✵✵✷✮✳ ❆ ✭❢❛r
❢r♦♠ ❝♦♠♣r❡❤❡♥s✐✈❡✮ ❧✐st ♦❢ ✈✐♥❞✐❝❛t✐♥❣ ❡①❛♠♣❧❡s ✐♥❝❧✉❞❡s t❤❡ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❢♦✉♥❞ ✐♥
❝♦♥t❡①ts ✐♥❝❧✉❞✐♥❣ ♥♦♥✲t❤❡r♠❛❧ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t② ♣❛tt❡r♥s ❡①❤✐❜✐t❡❞ ✐♥ ❛✈❛❧❛♥❝❤❡ ❛♥❞ ❡❛rt❤q✉❛❦❡
✶❚❤✐s s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ t❤❡ ✈❛❧✉❡ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❡①♣♦♥❡♥t ❡①✐sts ♥♦t ♦♥❧② ❢♦r t❤❡r♠❛❧ ✢✉✐❞ s②st❡♠s✱ ❜✉t ❛❧s♦
✐♥ ❞❡s❝r✐❜✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ ❢❡rr♦♠❛❣♥❡t✐❝ s②st❡♠s ✐♥ t❤❡ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞ ♦❢ ❛ t❤❡r♠❛❧ st❛t❡ t❤❛t ❝❛♥ ❜❡
❛♥❛❧♦❣♦✉s❧② ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡❞ ❛s t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ♣♦✐♥t✳
✻
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♠♦❞❡❧✐♥❣ ✭❑❛❞❛♥♦✛ ❡t ❛❧✳✱ ✶✾✽✾❀ ▲✐s❡ ❛♥❞ P❛❝③✉s❦✐✱ ✷✵✵✶✮✱ ❡①t✐♥❝t✐♦♥ ♠♦❞❡❧✐♥❣ ✐♥ ♣♦♣✉❧❛✲
t✐♦♥ ❣❡♥❡t✐❝s ✭❙♦❧❡ ❛♥❞ ▼❛♥r✉❜✐❛✱ ✶✾✾✻✮✱ ❛♥❞ ❜❡❧✐❡❢ ♣r♦♣❛❣❛t✐♦♥ ♠♦❞❡❧✐♥❣ ✐♥ ♠✉❧t✐✲❛❣❡♥t
♥❡t✇♦r❦s ✭●❧✐♥t♦♥ ❡t ❛❧✳✱ ✷✵✶✵✮✳ ❇❛tt❡r♠❛♥ ❤❛s ❞✐s❝✉ss❡❞ ♠❛♥② ❡①❛♠♣❧❡s ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛ ❞✐st✐♥❝t ❢r♦♠ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛✱ ✐♥❝❧✉❞✐♥❣ ♣❛tt❡r♥s ✐♥ r❛✐♥❜♦✇ ❢♦r♠❛t✐♦♥✱
s❡♠✐✲❝❧❛ss✐❝❛❧ ❛♣♣r♦①✐♠❛t✐♦♥✱ ❛♥❞ ❞r♦♣ ❜r❡❛❦✐♥❣✭❇❛tt❡r♠❛♥✱ ✷✵✵✷✱ ✷✵✵✺✮✳ ◆✉♠❡r♦✉s ♥♦♥✲
❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t② ❡①❛♠♣❧❡s ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❤❛✈❡ ❛❧s♦ ❜❡❡♥ ❞✐s❝♦✈❡r❡❞ ✐♥ ❝♦♥t❡①ts s✉❝❤ ❛s t❤❡ st✉❞②
♦❢ ❝❤❛♦t✐❝ s②st❡♠s ❡①❤✐❜✐t✐♥❣ ✏✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧ r❛t✐♦s✑ ✐♥ ♣❡r✐♦❞ ❞♦✉❜❧✐♥❣ ✭❋❡✐❣❡♥❜❛✉♠✱ ✶✾✼✽❀ ❍✉
❛♥❞ ▼❛♦✱ ✶✾✽✷✮✱ ♦r t❤❡ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t✐❡s ✐♥ ♠♦❞❡❧s ♦❢ ❝♦❧❞ ❞❛r❦ ♠❛tt❡r ❤❛❧♦s ❢♦✉♥❞
✐♥ ❛str♦♥♦♠✐❝❛❧ ♦❜s❡r✈❛t✐♦♥s ✭◆❛✈❛rr♦ ❡t ❛❧✳✱ ✷✵✵✹✮✱ t♦ ♥❛♠❡ ❛ ❝♦✉♣❧❡✳ ■♥ t❤❡ ♥❡①t s❡❝t✐♦♥
✇❡ ♦✛❡r ❛♥ ❡①♣❧✐❝✐t ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❝❡♣t✬s ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ ❛♣♣❧✐❝❛t✐♦♥ ✐♥ ♣❤②s✐❝s✳
✷✳✷ ❚❤❡ ❙❛♠❡ ❜✉t ❉✐✛❡r❡♥t✿ ❆♥❛❧②③✐♥❣ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
❚❤❡ t❡r♠ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ✐s ✉s❡❞ ✐♥ ♣❤②s✐❝s t♦ ❞❡s❝r✐❜❡ ❝❛s❡s ✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ ❜r♦❛❞ s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t✐❡s ❛r❡
❡①❤✐❜✐t❡❞ ❜② ❝❧❛ss❡s ♦❢ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s ❞❡s♣✐t❡ ♣♦ss✐❜❧② s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥t ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s ❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣
t♦ ❛♣♣❛r❡♥t❧② ✏♠♦r❡ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧✑ r❡♣r❡s❡♥t❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ t❤❡ s②st❡♠s✳ ❑❛❞❛♥♦✛ ✭✷✵✵✵✱ ♣✷✷✺✮
❞❡s❝r✐❜❡s t❤❡ t❡r♠ ♠♦st ❣❡♥❡r❛❧❧② ❛s ❛♣♣❧②✐♥❣ t♦ t❤♦s❡ ♣❛tt❡r♥s ✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ ✏❬♠❪❛♥② ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧❧②
❞✐✛❡r❡♥t s②st❡♠s s❤♦✇ t❤❡ s❛♠❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r✳✑ ❇❡rr② ✭✶✾✽✼✮ ❤❛s ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡❞ ✐t ❛s t❤❡ ✏✇❛②
✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ ♣❤②s✐❝✐sts ❞❡♥♦t❡ ✐❞❡♥t✐❝❛❧ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ✐♥ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥t s②st❡♠s✳✑ ❇❛tt❡r♠❛♥ ✭✷✵✵✷✱ ♣✹✮
❡①♣❧❛✐♥s t❤❛t t❤❡ ✏❡ss❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✑ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❢♦✉♥❞ ✇❤❡♥ ✏♠❛♥② s②st❡♠s ❡①❤✐❜✐t s✐♠✐❧❛r
♦r ✐❞❡♥t✐❝❛❧ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❞❡s♣✐t❡ t❤❡ ❢❛❝t t❤❛t t❤❡② ❛r❡✱ ❛t ❜❛s❡✱ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧❧② q✉✐t❡ ❞✐st✐♥❝t✳✑
❈❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❛t✐♦♥s s✉❝❤ ❛s t❤❡s❡ r❡✈❡❛❧ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝♦♥❝❡♣t ❤✐♥❣❡s ♦♥ t❤❡ s❛t✐s❢❛❝t✐♦♥ ♦❢ t❤❡
t✇♦ s❡❡♠✐♥❣❧② ❝♦♠♣❡t✐♥❣ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥s ♦❢ ❞✐s♣❧❛②✐♥❣ ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ❞❡s♣✐t❡ ♦t❤❡r
✭❡✈✐❞❡♥t❧② ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t✮ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ t❤❡ s②st❡♠s ❛t s♦♠❡ ❧❡✈❡❧ ♦❢ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥✳ ❚♦ ♠❛❦❡
t❤✐s ❝♦♥❝❡♣t✉❛❧ ❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥❝② ❡①♣❧✐❝✐t✱ ✇❡ ♣r♦♣♦s❡ t❤❡ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛✳
✭❯P✮✿ ❆ ❝❧❛ss XT ♦❢ ♠♦❞❡❧s ♦❢ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s ✐♥ ❛ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t T ✇✐❧❧ ❜❡ s❛✐❞
t♦ ❡①❤✐❜✐t ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥ ✇❤❡♥❡✈❡r t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss ❝❛♥ s✐♠✉❧t❛♥❡♦✉s❧②
♠❡❡t t❤❡ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ t✇♦ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥s✿
✭❙✐♠✮ ❚❤❡r❡ ❡①✐sts ❛ r♦❜✉st s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ s♦♠❡ ♦❜s❡r✈❛❜❧❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❛❝r♦ss
✼
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t❤❡ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s ♠♦❞❡❧❡❞ ❜② ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ XT ✳
✭❱❛r✮ ❚❤✐s s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♠♦❞❡❧❡❞ ✐♥ XT ✐s st❛✲
❜❧❡ ✉♥❞❡r r♦❜✉st ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ t❤❡✐r st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦
❝♦♥t❡①t T ✳
❚❤❡ ✜rst t❤✐♥❣ t♦ s♣❡❝✐❢② ✐s ✇❤❛t ❝♦✉♥ts ❛s ❛ ✏❝❧❛ss ♦❢ ♠♦❞❡❧s ♦❢ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s ✐♥ ❛
t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t✳✑ ■♥ ♦r❞❡r t♦ ❛✈♦✐❞ ❝♦♠♣❧✐❝❛t✐♦♥s ❛ss♦❝✐❛t❡❞ ✇✐t❤ ♠✉❧t✐♣❧❡ ✭♣♦ss✐❜❧② ♥♦t
❡♥t✐r❡❧② ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t✮ ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ ❛ ❢✉❧❧ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ t❤❡♦r②✱ ✭❯P✮ ✐s ❜❡st ❛♥❛❧②③❡❞ ✐♥ t❡r♠s
♦❢ t❤❡ ♠♦r❡ r❡str✐❝t✐✈❡ ♥♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❛ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t T ✇❤✐❝❤ ✐❞❡♥t✐✜❡s ✇✐t❤✐♥ ❛ ❣✐✈❡♥
t❤❡♦r② ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥ ❛♥❞ ✈❛r✐❡t② ♦❢ st✉❞✐❡❞ ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛✳ ❊①❛♠♣❧❡s ♦❢ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥t
t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①ts ✐♥ ❝❧❛ss✐❝❛❧ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s ✐♥❝❧✉❞❡ t❤❡ ❍❛♠✐❧t♦♥✐❛♥ ✈❡rs✉s t❤❡ ▲❛❣r❛♥❣✐❛♥
❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s✱ ♦r ✐♥ q✉❛♥t✉♠ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s ✇❡ ♠✐❣❤t ❞✐st✐♥❣✉✐s❤ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥ ✇❛✈❡ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s ❛♥❞
♦♣❡r❛t♦r ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s✳✷ ❆ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t ♠❛② ❛❧s♦ r❡str✐❝t t❤❡ ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛ ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r❡❞ ❜②
t❤❡ t♦t❛❧ t❤❡♦r②✳ ❋♦r ❡①❛♠♣❧❡✱ s♦✉r❝❡ ❢r❡❡ ❝❧❛ss✐❝❛❧ ❡❧❡❝tr♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ♠✐❣❤t ❜❡ ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r❡❞ ❛
❞✐st✐♥❝t t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t ✇✐t❤✐♥ t❤❡ ❢✉❧❧ t❤❡♦r② ♦❢ ❝❧❛ss✐❝❛❧ ❡❧❡❝tr♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ✇❤✐❝❤ ❛❧s♦
♠♦❞❡❧s t❤❡ ❡✛❡❝ts ♦❢ s♦✉r❝❡s✳ ■♥ s♦♠❡ ❝❛s❡s ✐t ✐s ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡ ❢♦r ❛ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t T t♦
s♣❡❝✐❢② ❛♥ ❡♥t✐r❡ t❤❡♦r② ✉♥✐q✉❡❧②✱ ✐♥ ♦t❤❡r ❝❛s❡s✱ ❛ s♣❡❝✐✜❝❛t✐♦♥ ✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ ✭♣♦t❡♥t✐❛❧❧②
♥♦♥❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t✮ ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ❛♥❞ s♣❡❝✐✜❝ ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛ t②♣❡s ♠❛② ❜❡ ❛♣♣r♦♣r✐❛t❡✳
●✐✈❡♥ ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t T ♦❢ ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛✱ t❤❡ ❡①♣❡rt ✇✐❧❧
t②♣✐❝❛❧❧② ❜❡ ❛❜❧❡ t♦ ✐❞❡♥t✐❢② ♣❡rt✐♥❡♥t st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ✏❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ ❝♦♥t❡①t T ✳✑ ❋♦r
❡①❛♠♣❧❡✱ ✐♥ ❝❧❛ss✐❝❛❧ ❡❧❡❝tr♦♠❛❣♥❡t✐s♠ t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥ ♠❛② ❝♦♠❡ ✐♥ t❤❡
❢♦r♠ ♦❢ ✜❡❧❞s s♣❡❝✐❢②✐♥❣ t❤❡ ✢♦✇ ♦❢ t❤❡ s♦✉r❝❡ ❝❤❛r❣❡s ❛♥❞ t❤❡ ❡❧❡❝tr♦♠❛❣♥❡t✐❝ ✜❡❧❞ ✈❛❧✉❡s
t❤r♦✉❣❤♦✉t ❛ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡❀ ✐♥ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t② t❤❡ ♠❡tr✐❝ ❛♥❞ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t✉♠ t❡♥s♦rs
♠✐❣❤t ♣❧❛② t❤✐s r♦❧❡❀ ✐♥ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝s✱ st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ♠❛② ❜❡ ♣❛r❛♠❡tr✐③❡❞ ❜② P ✱
T ✱ ❛♥❞ ρ ✭♦r ♣❡r❤❛♣s V ❛♥❞ N✮✱ ✇❤❡r❡❛s ✐♥ q✉❛♥t✉♠ st❛t✐st✐❝❛❧ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s ♦♥❡ ♠❛② ✉s❡
❞❡♥s✐t② ♦♣❡r❛t♦rs✳
❙❛t✐s❢❛❝t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ✭❙✐♠✮ ✐s ♣r✐♠❛r✐❧② ❛♥ ❡♠♣✐r✐❝❛❧ q✉❡st✐♦♥✳ ■♥ ♦r❞❡r t♦ ❝❧❛✐♠ t❤❛t s♦♠❡✲
t❤✐♥❣ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✲❧✐❦❡ ✐s ♦❝❝✉rr✐♥❣✱ t❤❡r❡ ♠✉st ❜❡ ❛♥ ❡✈✐❞❡♥t s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss ♦❢ s②s✲
t❡♠s ❡①❤✐❜✐t✐♥❣ t❤❡ ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥✳ ❚❤✐s ❡✈✐❞❡♥t s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ♥❡❡❞ ♥♦t ❜❡ ✭❞✐r❡❝t❧②✮ ✐♥ t❡r♠s
✷◆♦t❡✱ ✐♥ ❜♦t❤ ❞✐❝❤♦t♦♠✐❡s t❤❡r❡ ❡①✐st ♦❝❝❛s✐♦♥❛❧ ❝✐r❝✉♠st❛♥❝❡s ♦r ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥s s✉❝❤ t❤❛t t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡
❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ❝❛♥ ❝❡❛s❡ t♦ ❜❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t✳
✽
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♦❢ ❛♥② ♦❢ t❤❡ st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ✉s❡❞ t♦ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡ ❡❧❡♠❡♥ts ♦❢ XT ✳ ❙♦ ❢♦r t❤❡ ♣❛r❛❞✐❣♠
❡①❛♠♣❧❡ ♦❢ t❤❡ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♦❢ ♣❤❛s❡ tr❛♥s✐t✐♦♥s✱ ✭❙✐♠✮ ✐s s❛t✐s✜❡❞ ♦♥❝❡ ♣❤②s✐❝✐sts r❡❝♦✈❡r
s✉✣❝✐❡♥t ❡♠♣✐r✐❝❛❧ ❞❛t❛ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❦✐♥❞ ❞❡♣✐❝t❡❞ ✐♥ ✜❣✉r❡ ✷✳✷✳ ❚❤❡ r♦❜✉st s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ♦❢ ✭❙✐♠✮
❝❛♥ ❜❡ q✉❛♥t✐✜❡❞ ✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ t❤❡ r❡♠❛r❦❛❜❧❡ ❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❡①♣♦♥❡♥ts ♦❢ t❤❡s❡
✈❛r✐♦✉s s②st❡♠s ❡✈❡♥ t❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❡①♣♦♥❡♥t ♣❛r❛♠❡t❡r β ♠❛② ♥♦t ♥❡❝❡ss❛r✐❧② ❜❡ ♣✉t
✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ t❤❡ st❛t❡ q✉❛♥t✐t✐❡s ♦❢ T ✭❡✳❣✳ ❝❤❡♠✐str② ♦r st❛t✐st✐❝❛❧ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s✮✳
❙❛t✐s❢❛❝t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ✭❱❛r✮ ❞❡♣❡♥❞s ♣r✐♠❛r✐❧② ♦♥ t❤❡ s✐③❡ ❛♥❞ ♠♦st ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥t❧② t❤❡ ❞✐✈❡rs✐t②
♦❢ t❤❡ ♠♦❞❡❧s ✐♥ ❝❧❛ss XT ✳ ❚❤❡ ❧❛r❣❡r ❛♥❞ ♠♦r❡ ✈❛r✐❡❞ t❤❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ ❝❧❛ss XT ✇✐t❤
r❡s♣❡❝t t♦ t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ♦❢ T ✱ t❤❡ ♠♦r❡ ✏st❛❜❧❡ ✉♥❞❡r ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s✳✑ ■❢ XT
✐s s✉✐t❛❜❧② r✐❝❤ ✇✐t❤ ❞✐✈❡rs❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs✱ t❤❡♥ ❛ ♠❡♠❜❡r x ∈ XT ♠❛② ❜❡ ✏♠❛♣♣❡❞✑ t♦ ❛ r✐❝❤
✈❛r✐❡t② ♦❢ ♦t❤❡r ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ XT ✇❤✐❧❡ st✐❧❧ ♠❛✐♥t❛✐♥✐♥❣ t❤❡ ✈❡r② s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② s❤❛r❡❞ ❜② ❛❧❧
♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢XT t❤❛t ❛❧❧♦✇❡❞ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss t♦ s❛t✐s❢② ✭❙✐♠✮✳ ■♥ t❤❡ ♣❛r❛❞✐❣♠ ❡①❛♠♣❧❡ ♦❢ t❤❡r♠❛❧
✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✱ ✭❱❛r✮ ✐s s❛t✐s✜❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❢❛❝t t❤❛t ❛t t❤❡ ❝❤❡♠✐❝❛❧ ♦r t❤❡ st❛t✐st✐❝❛❧ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s
❧❡✈❡❧s ♦❢ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥✱ t❤❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ✐♥ ♦✉r ❝❧❛ss s❤❛r✐♥❣ t❤✐s s✐♠✐❧❛r ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❛r❡ s♦
❞✐✈❡rs❡✳
❲❡ ♥♦t❡ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝❡♥tr❛❧ ❝♦♥❝❡♣ts ♦❢ r♦❜✉st ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥ ❛♥❞ r♦❜✉st s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ♦♥ ✇❤✐❝❤
✭❱❛r✮ ❛♥❞ ✭❙✐♠✮ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡❧② ❞❡♣❡♥❞ ❛r❡ ♥♦t ❜✐♥❛r②✳ ❙♦♠❡ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛ ♠❛② ❜❡
✏♠♦r❡ r♦❜✉st✑ t❤❛♥ ♦t❤❡r ✐♥st❛♥❝❡s✱ ✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ ❜♦t❤ t❤❡ ✏❞❡❣r❡❡✑ ♦❢ s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ❞✐s♣❧❛②❡❞
❛♥❞ t❤❡ ✏❞❡❣r❡❡✑ ♦❢ ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s t❤❛t t❤❡ s②st❡♠s ❝❛♥ ✇✐t❤st❛♥❞ ✇❤✐❧❡ st✐❧❧ ❡①❤✐❜✐t✐♥❣ s✉❝❤
s✐♠✐❧❛r ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r✳ ❚❤❡ ❣r❡❛t❡r t❤❡ r♦❜✉st♥❡ss ♦❢ t❤❡ ♣❡rt✐♥❡♥t s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❛❝r♦ss
t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss ♦❢ s②st❡♠s ❛♥❞ t❤❡ ♠♦r❡ ✭T ✲st❛t❡✮ ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥ ✐♥ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss✱ t❤❡ ♠♦r❡ r♦❜✉st t❤❡
✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ✐s✳✸ ❚❤✐s ♥♦♥✲❜✐♥❛r② ❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥❝❡ ♠❡❛♥s ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♠❛② ❜❡ s✉❜❥❡❝t t♦ ✈❛❣✉❡✲
♥❡ss ❝❤❛❧❧❡♥❣❡s ✐♥ s♦♠❡ ❝❛s❡s✳ ❲❤✐❧❡ ❝❡rt❛✐♥ ❡①❛♠♣❧❡s✱ s✉❝❤ ❛s t❤❡r♠❛❧ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t② ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r
❛♥❞✱ ❛s ✇❡ ❛r❣✉❡✱ t❤❡ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ ❢r❡❡✲❢❛❧❧ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ❛r♦✉♥❞ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣❛t❤s
♠❛② ❜❡ ✐❞❡♥t✐✜❡❞ ❛s ❞❡t❡r♠✐♥❛♥t ❝❛s❡s ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✱ ♣❡♥✉♠❜r❛❧ ❝❛s❡s ✇❤❡r❡ ✐t ✐s ✉♥❝❧❡❛r
✇❤❡t❤❡r ❛ ❝❛♥❞✐❞❛t❡ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❝❧❛ss ✐s s✉✣❝✐❡♥t❧② s✐♠✐❧❛r ❛♥❞ r♦❜✉st ✉♥❞❡r ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s
♠❛② ❡①✐st✳
✸❖❢t❡♥ t❤✐s ❝❛♥ ❜❡ r✐❣♦r♦✉s❧② ❛ss❡ss❡❞ ❜② ❛♥ ❛♣♣r♦♣r✐❛t❡❧② ♥❛t✉r❛❧ ♥♦r♠✱ ♠❡tr✐❝✱ t♦♣♦❧♦❣②✱ ❡t❝✳ ❞❡✜♥❡❞
♦♥ t❤❡ st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ♦❢ T ✳ ❊✳❣✳ ✇❡ ♠✐❣❤t ✉s❡ s♦♠❡ ✐♥t❡❣r❛t✐♦♥ ♥♦r♠ t♦ q✉❛♥t✐❢② t❤❡ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥
t✇♦ ✭s❝❛❧❛r✮ ✜❡❧❞s ❢♦✉♥❞ ✐♥ XT ✳ ❚❤❡ ❝❤♦✐❝❡ ♦❢ ❛♣♣r♦♣r✐❛t❡ ♥♦r♠✱ t♦♣♦❧♦❣②✱ ❡t❝✳ ✐❞❡♥t✐❢②✐♥❣ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐♥
t❤❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ XT ✐s ❞✐r❡❝t❧② ❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥t ♦♥ t❤❡ ❝♦♥t❡①t T ✳
✾
San Diego, CA -785-
✸ ❚❤❡ ●❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❚❤❡s✐s
■♥ t❤✐s s❡❝t✐♦♥ ✇❡ r❡❝♦♥s✐❞❡r t❤❡ ❝❛s❡ ♦❢ ♥❡❛r✲❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ ✐♥ ♥❛t✉r❡ ✐♥ t❡r♠s
♦❢ t❤❡ ✭❯P✮ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s✳ ■♥ ✸✳✶ ✇❡ ❡①❛♠✐♥❡ ✇❤② s✉❝❤ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ q✉❛❧✐✜❡s ❛s ❛♥ ❡①❛♠♣❧❡ ♦❢ ❛
✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥✳ ■♥ ✸✳✷ ✇❡ t❤❡♥ ✐❞❡♥t✐❢② ❤♦✇ t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t ♦♣❡r❛t✐♦♥ r❡s✉❧t ♦❢ ❊❤❧❡rs
❛♥❞ ●❡r♦❝❤ ♦✛❡rs ✇❤❛t ✇❡ ✐❞❡♥t✐❢② ❛s ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❡①♣❧❛♥❛t✐♦♥ ♦❢ t❤✐s ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣✳
✸✳✶ ❚❤❡ ❙✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ❛♥❞ ❉✐✈❡rs✐t② ♦❢ ●❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
❈♦♥s✐❞❡r ❛ s❡q✉❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❝❧❛ss❡s (XǫGR)ǫ∈(0,s) ✐♥❞❡①❡❞ ❜② s♦♠❡ s✉✣❝✐❡♥t❧② s♠❛❧❧ ❡rr♦r ♣❛r❛♠✲
❡t❡r ǫ ∈ (0, s)✳ ❋♦r ✜①❡❞ ǫ✱ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss XǫGR ❝♦♥s✐sts ♦❢ ✭❧♦❝❛❧✮ s♦❧✉t✐♦♥s t♦ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ✜❡❧❞
❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✿
Tab = Gab ✭✷✮
✇❤❡r❡ t❤❡ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t✉♠ ✜❡❧❞ Tab ❞❡s❝r✐❜❡s t❤❡ ✢♦✇ ♦❢ ♠❛tt❡r✲❡♥❡r❣② ❛♥❞Gab ❞❡s❝r✐❜❡s
t❤❡ ✏❊✐♥st❡✐♥ ❝✉r✈❛t✉r❡✑ ❞❡t❡r♠✐♥❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ♠❡tr✐❝ ✜❡❧❞ gab✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ❡❛❝❤ ♠❡♠❜❡r ♦❢
XǫGR ♠♦❞❡❧s s♦♠❡ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞② ✇❤♦s❡ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡ ♣❛t❤ ❝♦♠❡s ❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❛ ✭t✐♠❡❧✐❦❡✮
❝✉r✈❡ γ t❤❛t ✐s ❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ❛❝t✉❛❧❧② ❜❡✐♥❣ ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✭✇❤❡r❡ t❤❡s❡ t✇♦ s❡♥s❡s ♦❢ ❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ❛r❡
♣❛r❛♠❡tr✐③❡❞ ❜② r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ❢✉♥❝t✐♦♥s ♠♦♥♦t♦♥✐❝❛❧❧② ❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥t ♦♥ t❤❡ s♠❛❧❧♥❡ss ♦❢ ǫ✮✳
❲✐t❤ t❤❡ ✭❯P✮ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ✐♥ ❤❛♥❞✱ ❢♦r ❛ ❣✐✈❡♥ ❞❡❣r❡❡ ♦❢ ✏ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss✑ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ ♥♦✇ ❛s❦ ✐❢ s✉❝❤
❛ ❝❧❛ss XǫGR s❛t✐s✜❡s t❤❡ ✭❙✐♠✮ ❛♥❞ ✭❱❛r✮ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥s ✐♥ t❤❡ ❝♦♥t❡①t ♦❢ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②
t❤❡♦r② ♣✉r❣❡❞ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝❛♥♦♥✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♠♠✐t♠❡♥t t♦ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ❛r❣✉❡❞ ❛❣❛✐♥st ✐♥ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱
✷✵✶✷✮✳
❚❤❡ s❛t✐s❢❛❝t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ✭❙✐♠✮ ✐s ❛♥ ❡♠♣✐r✐❝❛❧ ♠❛tt❡r ❛♣♣❛r❡♥t❧② ✇❡❧❧ ❝♦♥✜r♠❡❞ ❜② ❝❡♥t✉r✐❡s
♦❢ ❛str♦♥♦♠✐❝❛❧ ❞❛t❛ r❡❝♦✈❡r❡❞ ❢r♦♠ ❝❛s❡s ✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ ❛ r❡❧❛t✐✈❡❧② s♠❛❧❧ ❜♦❞② ✭❛ ♣❧❛♥❡t✱ ♠♦♦♥✱
s❛t❡❧❧✐t❡✱ ❝♦♠❡t✱ ♦r ❡✈❡♥ ❛ st❛r✮ tr❛✈❡❧s ✉♥❞❡r t❤❡ ✐♥✢✉❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❛ ♠✉❝❤ str♦♥❣❡r ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧
s♦✉r❝❡✳ ❊①❛♠♣❧❡s ✐♥✈♦❧✈✐♥❣ ♥♦♥✲♥❡❣❧✐❣✐❜❧❡ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐st✐❝ ❡✛❡❝ts ✭❧✐❦❡ t❤❡ ▼❡r❝✉r② ❝♦♥✜r♠❛✲
t✐♦♥✮ ❛r❡ ♦❢ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥❝❡✱ ❜✉t ❡✈❡♥ t❡rr❡str✐❛❧ ❝❛s❡s ✐♥❝❧✉❞✐♥❣ ●❛❧✐❧❡♦ ❛♥❞ ❧❡❛♥✐♥❣
t♦✇❡rs ♦r ♦t❤❡r ✭♥❡❛r❧②✮ ❢r❡❡✲❢❛❧❧ ❡①❛♠♣❧❡s ✐♥ ❞❡t❡r♠✐♥❛t❡❧② ◆❡✇t♦♥✐❛♥ r❡❣✐♠❡s ❝❛♥ ❝♦✉♥t
❛s ❝♦♥✜r♠✐♥❣ ✐♥st❛♥❝❡s ❢♦r ❝❡rt❛✐♥ ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ✈❛❧✉❡s✳ ❙✐♥❝❡ ♦❜s❡r✈❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ♣r❡❝✐s✐♦♥ ✐s ✐♥✲
✶✵
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❡✈✐t❛❜❧② ❜♦✉♥❞❡❞✱ ✐t ✐s ♦❢t❡♥ ❝❧❛✐♠❡❞ t❤❛t t❤❡ s❛t❡❧❧✐t❡✱ ♠♦♦♥✱ ♣❧❛♥❡t✱ ❡t❝✳ ✐♥❞❡❡❞ ✏❢♦❧❧♦✇s
❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝✱✑ ❞❡s♣✐t❡ t❤❡ r❡s✉❧ts ♦❢ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱ ✷✵✶✷✮✳ ■♥ s✉❝❤ ✐♥st❛♥❝❡s✱ t❤❡ ❜♦❞② ✐s ❛❝t✉❛❧❧②
♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ t♦ ❝♦♠❡ ✏❝❧♦s❡ ❡♥♦✉❣❤✑ t♦ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ t♦ ✇❛rr❛♥t s✉❝❤ ❡q✉✐✈♦❝❛t✐♦♥✳
❚❤❡s❡ ✐♥st❛♥❝❡s ❤❡♥❝❡ ❝♦♥✜r♠ ♠❡♠❜❡rs❤✐♣ ✐♥ ❛ ❝❧❛ss XǫGR ❢♦r s♦♠❡ ǫ t❤r❡s❤♦❧❞ ❜❡❧♦✇ t❤❡
❧❡✈❡❧ ♦❢ ❡①♣❡r✐♠❡♥t❛❧ ♣r❡❝✐s✐♦♥ ♦r ❛tt❡♥t✐♦♥✳
■♥ ♦r❞❡r t♦ ❛♣♣r❡❝✐❛t❡ t❤❡ s❛t✐s❢❛❝t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ✭❱❛r✮✱ ✇❡ ♠✉st ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t t❤❡♦r❡t✲
✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t ♦❢ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t② t❤❡♦r②✳ ❙t❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ♦❢ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s ❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣
t♦ t❤❡ t❤❡♦r② ❝♦♠❡ ✐♥ t❤❡ ❢♦r♠ ♦❢ t❤❡ t❡♥s♦r ✜❡❧❞s Tab ❛♥❞ gab✱ r❡❧❛t❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s
✭✷✮✳ ❆ss✉♠✐♥❣ ✇❡ ♦♥❧② ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r ✭❧♦❝❛❧✮ s♦❧✉t✐♦♥s t♦ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✱ t❤❡r❡ ❡①✐st s✐①
✐♥❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥t ✜❡❧❞ ❝♦♠♣♦♥❡♥ts ❞❡s❝r✐❜✐♥❣ gab ❛♥❞ s♦ t❤❡ ♠❛tt❡r✲❡♥❡r❣② ✢♦✇ Tab✳ ■♥ ♦t❤❡r
✇♦r❞s✱ ❢r♦♠ ❛ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧s ♦❢ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t② t❤❡♦r② ♣❡rs♣❡❝t✐✈❡✱ t❤❡r❡ ❛r❡ s✐① ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ ❞❡❣r❡❡s
♦❢ ❢r❡❡❞♦♠ t♦ ❤♦✇ t❤❡s❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ❛r❡ ❞❡s❝r✐❜❡❞ ❛t ❡❛❝❤ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡ ♣♦✐♥t✳
●✐✈❡♥ t❤❡ ✇❡❛❧t❤ ♦❢ ❡✈✐❞❡♥t ❝♦♥✜r♠✐♥❣ ✐♥st❛♥❝❡s ❢❛❧❧✐♥❣ ✉♥❞❡r ❛ ❝❧❛ssXǫGR ✇✐t❤ s✉✐t❛❜❧❡
ǫ✱ t❤❡r❡ ✇✐❧❧ ❜❡ s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥t ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥ ✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ t❤❡s❡ ❞❡❣r❡❡s ✭❡✈❡♥ ❛❢t❡r r❡s❝❛❧✐♥❣✮ ♦♥❝❡
✇❡ ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r t❤❡ s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥t ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ t❤❡ ❞❡♥s✐t②✱ s❤❛♣❡ ❛♥❞ ✢♦✇ ♦❢ t❤❡ ♠❛tt❡r✲❡♥❡r❣②
♦❢ ❛ ♣❧❛♥❡t✱ ✈❡rs✉s ❛ s❛t❡❧❧✐t❡✱ ❛st❡r♦✐❞✱ ❛♥✈✐❧✱ ❡t❝✳ ■♥ t❤❡s❡ ✏❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧ st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥✑
t❡r♠s✱ t❤❡ ❞✐✈❡rs✐t② ♦❢ t❤❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✐♥ ❛ ❣✐✈❡♥ ❝❧❛ss XǫGR ✇✐❧❧ ❜❡ q✉✐t❡ s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥t✳ ❉❡s♣✐t❡
t❤✐s ❞✐✈❡rs✐t②✱ s✉❝❤ ❜♦❞✐❡s st✐❧❧ s❛t✐s❢② t❤❡ ❞❡✜♥✐♥❣ r❡q✉✐r❡♠❡♥t ♦❢ ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss t♦ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣
❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝✳ ■t ✐s ✇✐t❤ r❡s♣❡❝t t♦ t❤✐s ❞✐✈❡rs✐t② ✐♥ t❤❡s❡ ❞❡❣r❡❡s ♦❢ ❢r❡❡❞♦♠ ✭♦❢ t❤❡ ❡♥❡r❣②✲
♠♦♠❡♥t❛✴❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ✐♥✢✉❡♥❝❡s ♦❢ t❤❡ ✏♥❡❛r✲❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s✑ ♦❢ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ✐♥
XǫGR✮ t❤❛t ❛ ✏r♦❜✉st st❛❜✐❧✐t② ✉♥❞❡r ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s✑ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡❞ ✐♥ ❛❝❝♦r❞❛♥❝❡ ✇✐t❤
✭❱❛r✮✳
❙♦✱ ❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ ♦✉r ✭❯P✮ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s✱ s✉❝❤ ♥❡❛r✲❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ ✐♥ ♥❛t✉r❡
❝♦♥st✐t✉t❡s ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥✳ ❍♦✇❡✈❡r✱ ♠❡❡t✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥s ♦❢ t❤❡
❛♥❛❧②s✐s ❞❡♣❡♥❞s ❡♥t✐r❡❧② ♦♥ t❤❡ tr✉t❤ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❛❜♦✈❡ ♠❛❞❡ ❡♠♣✐r✐❝❛❧ ❝❧❛✐♠s ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡
❡①✐st❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✇❡❧❧ ♠♦❞❡❧❡❞ ❜② ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ XǫGR ❝❧❛ss❡s ❢♦r ❛ s✉✐t❛❜❧❡
r❛♥❣❡ ♦❢ ǫ ✈❛❧✉❡s✱ ❛♥❞ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✐♥ ❡❛❝❤ ❝❧❛ss ❛r❡ s♦ ❢❛♥t❛st✐❝❛❧❧② ❞✐✈❡rs❡ ❢r♦♠ t❤❡
♣❡rs♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ♦❢ t❤❡✐r Tab ✭gab✮ ✜❡❧❞s✳ ■♥ t❤❡ ♥❡①t s❡❝t✐♦♥ ✇❡ t✉r♥ t♦ t❤❡ ♠♦r❡ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧
q✉❡st✐♦♥ ♦❢ ✉♥❞❡rst❛♥❞✐♥❣ ❤♦✇ s✉❝❤ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ✐s ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡ ✐♥ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②✱
❜② ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r✐♥❣ t❤❡ ♣r♦♣❡rt✐❡s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss❡s (XǫGR)ǫ∈(0,s) ✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ ❛♥ ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥t ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝
✶✶
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r❡s✉❧t ♦❢ ❊❤❧❡rs ❛♥❞ ●❡r♦❝❤ ✭✷✵✵✹✮✳
✸✳✷ ❊①♣❧❛✐♥✐♥❣ ●❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
❲❡ ❤❛✈❡ ♥♦✇ ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t❡❞ t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② t❤❡s✐s ✐♥ t❤❡ ❝♦♥t❡①t ♦❢ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②
❛s ❛♥ ❡♠♣✐r✐❝❛❧❧② ❝♦♥t✐♥❣❡♥t ❝❧❛✐♠ ❛❜♦✉t ❝❧❛ss❡s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❢♦r♠ XǫGR ✇❤♦s❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♠♦❞❡❧ ❛
♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠ s✉❝❤ t❤❛t t❤❡ ♣❛t❤ ♦❢ s♦♠❡ ❜♦❞② ❝♦✉♥ts ❛s ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ❜❡✐♥❣ ❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝ ✇✐t❤♦✉t
✈✐♦❧❛t✐♥❣ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ✜❡❧❞ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✳ ❲❡ ❤❛✈❡ ❛❧s♦ ❣✐✈❡♥ ❛ ♣❧❛✉s✐❜✐❧✐t② ❛r❣✉♠❡♥t s✉❣❣❡st✲
✐♥❣ ✇❤② ♦❜s❡r✈❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ❞❛t❛ ❛❧r❡❛❞② ♦❜t❛✐♥❡❞ ❜② ❡①♣❡r✐♠❡♥t❛❧✐sts ❝♦♥✜r♠s t❤✐s ❡♠♣✐r✐❝❛❧
❤②♣♦t❤❡s✐s✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ❣✐✈❡♥ s✉❝❤ ❝♦♥✜r♠❛t✐♦♥ ❛♥❞ t❤❡ ❞✐✈❡rs✐t② ♦❢ t❤❡ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t❛
♦❢ t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s✱ ♠❡♠❜❡rs❤✐♣ ✐♥ s♦♠❡ XǫGR ✇✐❧❧ ❜❡ s✉✣❝✐❡♥t❧② st❛❜❧❡ ✉♥❞❡r s✐❣✲
♥✐✜❝❛♥t ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧ st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ♦❢ t❤❡ t❤❡♦r② t♦ s❛t✐s❢② ✭❱❛r✮✳ ❆
r❡♠❛✐♥✐♥❣ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ q✉❡st✐♦♥ ♠✉st ♥♦✇ ❜❡ ❛♥s✇❡r❡❞✿ ❍♦✇ ❝❛♥ t❤❡ s②st❡♠s ❡①❤✐❜✐t✐♥❣
t❤✐s ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥ ❜❡❤❛✈❡ s♦ s✐♠✐❧❛r❧② ✇❤✐❧❡ ❜❡✐♥❣ s♦ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥t ❛t t❤❡ ❧❡✈❡❧ ♦❢
t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧ t♦ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②❄
●❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥❡❞ ❜② ❛♣♣❡❛❧✐♥❣ t♦ ❛♥ ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥t ✏❧✐♠✐t ♣r♦♦❢✑
♦❢ t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ ❞✐s❝✉ss❡❞ ✐♥ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱ ✷✵✶✷✮✳ ■t ✇❛s ❛r❣✉❡❞ t❤❡r❡ t❤❛t ❊❤❧❡rs
❛♥❞ ●❡r♦❝❤ ✭✷✵✵✹✮ ❛r❡ ❛❜❧❡ t♦ ❞❡❞✉❝❡ t❤❡ ✏❛♣♣r♦①✐♠❛t❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♠♦t✐♦♥✑ ♦❢ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣
❜♦❞✐❡s ✇✐t❤ r❡❧❛t✐✈❡❧② s♠❛❧❧ ✈♦❧✉♠❡ ❛♥❞ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ✐♥✢✉❡♥❝❡✱ ❜② ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r✐♥❣ s❡q✉❡♥❝❡s
♦❢ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t✉♠ t❡♥s♦r ✜❡❧❞s ✇✐t❤ ♣♦s✐t✐✈❡ ♠❛ss ♦❢ t❤❡ ❢♦r♠ ( T
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N✱ r❡❢❡rr❡❞ t♦
❛s ✏❊●✲♣❛rt✐❝❧❡s✳✑ ❚❤❡ s♣❛t✐❛❧ ❡①t❡♥t ❛♥❞ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ✐♥✢✉❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ t❤❡s❡ ❊●✲♣❛rt✐❝❧❡s ❝❛♥
❜❡ ♠❛❞❡ ❛r❜✐tr❛r✐❧② s♠❛❧❧ ❜② ♣✐❝❦✐♥❣ s✉✣❝✐❡♥t❧② ❧❛r❣❡ i ❛♥❞ j ✈❛❧✉❡s r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡❧②✳ ❚❤❡
t❤❡♦r❡♠ ♦❢ ✭❊❤❧❡rs ❛♥❞ ●❡r♦❝❤✱ ✷✵✵✹✮ ❡♥t❛✐❧s t❤❛t ✐❢ ❢♦r ❛ ❣✐✈❡♥ ❝✉r✈❡ γ t❤❡r❡ ❡①✐sts s✉❝❤
❛♥ ❊●✲♣❛rt✐❝❧❡ s❡q✉❡♥❝❡✱ t❤❡♥ ❜② ♣✐❝❦✐♥❣ ❛ ❧❛r❣❡ ❡♥♦✉❣❤ j✱ γ ❝♦♠❡s ❛r❜✐tr❛r✐❧② ❝❧♦s❡ t♦
❜❡❝♦♠✐♥❣ ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✐♥ ❛ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡ ❝♦♥t❛✐♥✐♥❣ t❤❡ T
(i,j)
ab ✐♥st❛♥t✐❛t❡❞ ♠❛tt❡r✲❡♥❡r❣②✳
❙♣❡❝✐✜❝❛❧❧②✱ ❧❡t ( g
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N ❜❡ t❤❡ s❡q✉❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ♠❡tr✐❝s t❤❛t ❝♦✉♣❧❡ t♦ t❤❡s❡ ( T
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N
❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ ✭✷✮ ✐♥ ❛r❜✐tr❛r✐❧② s♠❛❧❧ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞s (Ki)i∈N ♦❢ γ✱ ❝♦♥t❛✐♥✐♥❣ t❤❡ s✉♣♣♦rt ♦❢
t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ T
(i,j)
ab✳ ❚❤❡♥ ✐❢ ❢♦r ❡❛❝❤ i✱ ❛s j →∞ t❤❡ g
(i,j)
ab ❛♣♣r♦❛❝❤ ❛ ✏❧✐♠✐t ♠❡tr✐❝✑ gab
✐♥ t❤❡ C 1(Ki) t♦♣♦❧♦❣②✱ ✇❤✐❝❤ ❦❡❡♣s tr❛❝❦ ♦❢ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ t❤❡ ♠❡tr✐❝s ❛♥❞ t❤❡✐r ✉♥✐q✉❡
❝♦♥♥❡❝t✐♦♥s✱ t❤❡♥ t❤❡ ❝✉r✈❡ γ ❛♣♣r♦❛❝❤❡s ❣❡♦❞✐❝✐t② ❛s j →∞✳
✶✷
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❚♦ ✉♥❞❡rst❛♥❞ t❤❡ ✐♠♣❛❝t ♦❢ t❤❡ t❤❡♦r❡♠ ❢♦r ♦✉r ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❝❧❛ss❡s (XǫGR)ǫ∈(0,s)✱ ✇❡
♥❡❡❞ t♦ ❛♣♣r❡❝✐❛t❡ t❤❡ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ❧✐♠✐t✐♥❣ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡❞ ❜② ❊❤❧❡rs✲●❡r♦❝❤✳ ❚❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t
r❡s✉❧t ❡ss❡♥t✐❛❧❧② ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡s ❛ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ✏ǫ✲δ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣✑ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥✱ ✭❛✮ ❤♦✇ ✏♥❡❛r❧②✲❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝✑
✇❡ ✇❛♥t t❤❡ ❝✉r✈❡ γ t♦ ❜❡✱ ❛♥❞ ✭❜✮ ❤♦✇ ♠✉❝❤ ✇❡ ♥❡❡❞ t♦ ❜♦✉♥❞ t❤❡ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ❡✛❡❝ts
♦❢ t❤❡ ❜♦❞② ♦♥ t❤❡ ❜❛❝❦❣r♦✉♥❞ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡✳✹ ❚❤❛t ✐s t♦ s❛②✱ t❤❡ ❊❤❧❡rs✲●❡r♦❝❤ ❧✐♠✐t r❡s✉❧t
❝❛♥ ❜❡ t❤♦✉❣❤t ♦❢ ❛s t❡❧❧✐♥❣ ✉s t❤❛t ✏❢♦r ❡✈❡r② ❞❡❣r❡❡ ♦❢ ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss t♦ ❣❡♦❞✐❝✐t② ✇❡ ✇❛♥t
t❤❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s✬ ♣❛t❤ t♦ ❜❡✱ t❤❡r❡ ❡①✐sts ❛ δ✲❜♦✉♥❞ ♦♥ t❤❡ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ❡✛❡❝t ♦❢ t❤❡ ❜♦❞② t❤❛t
✇✐❧❧ ❦❡❡♣ t❤❡ ♣❛t❤ ❛t ❧❡❛st t❤❛t ❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ❣❡♦❞✐❝✐t②✳✑ ❚❤❡ ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥t t❤✐♥❣ t♦ ♦❜s❡r✈❡ ❛❜♦✉t
t❤✐s ǫ✲δ ✐♥t❡r♣❧❛② ✐s t❤❛t t❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t✐♥❣ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❞♦❡s r❡q✉✐r❡ ✐♠♣♦s✐♥❣ ❛ δ✲❜♦✉♥❞
♦♥ t❤❡ ♣❡rt✉r❜❛t✐✈❡ ❡✛❡❝ts ♦❢ t❤❡ ❜♦❞②✱ ✐t ❞♦❡s ♥♦t ✐♠♣♦s❡ ❛♥② s♣❡❝✐✜❝ ❝♦♥str❛✐♥ts ♦♥ t❤❡
❞❡t❛✐❧s ♦❢ ❤♦✇ t❤❡ ♠❛tt❡r✲❡♥❡r❣② ♦❢ t❤❡ ❜♦❞② ✢♦✇s ✇✐t❤✐♥ t❤❡ ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡ s♣❛t✐❛❧ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞
♦❢ t❤❡ ❝✉r✈❡✱ ♥♦r ❤♦✇ t❤❡ ♠❡tr✐❝ ✐t ❝♦✉♣❧❡s t♦ s♣❡❝✐✜❝❛❧❧② ❜❡❤❛✈❡s✳ ❙♦ t❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡ ♠❡tr✐❝
✐s ✏❜♦✉♥❞❡❞✑ ✇✐t❤✐♥ ❛ ❝❡rt❛✐♥ δ✲♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t ♠❡tr✐❝✱ t❤❡ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r ❞❡t❛✐❧s
♦❢ t❤❡ t❡♥s♦r ✈❛❧✉❡s✱ t❤❡ ❝♦rr❡s♣♦♥❞✐♥❣ ❝♦♥♥❡❝t✐♦♥✱ ❛♥❞ ❡s♣❡❝✐❛❧❧② t❤❡ ❝✉r✈❛t✉r❡ ❤❛✈❡
❝♦♥s✐❞❡r❛❜❧❡ r♦♦♠ ❢♦r ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥ s♦ ❧♦♥❣ ❛s t❤❡② st❛② ✏❜♦✉♥❞❡❞ ✐♥ t❤❛t ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞✳✑
❚❤✐s r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❊❤❧❡rs✲●❡r♦❝❤ t❤❡♦r❡♠ ❤❡♥❝❡ ❣✐✈❡s ✉s ❛ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢
❞❡t❛✐❧s✲❢r❡❡ ✇❛② ♦❢ ✉♥❞❡rst❛♥❞✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❞✐✈❡rs❡ ♣♦♣✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ ♦✉r r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
❝❧❛ss❡s (XǫGR)ǫ∈(0,s)✳ ■♥ ❡✛❡❝t t❤❡ ❊❤❧❡rs✲●❡r♦❝❤ ❧✐♠✐t✐♥❣ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❤✐❣❤❧✐❣❤ts t❤❛t ❢♦r
❡❛❝❤ XǫGR ❝❧❛ss✱ t❤❡r❡ ❡①✐sts ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r δ✲❜♦✉♥❞ ❛r♦✉♥❞ ❛ ❧✐♠✐t ♠❡tr✐❝ ✇✐t❤ s♦♠❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝
❛♥❝❤♦r γ s✉❝❤ t❤❛t ❛♥② ❜♦❞② ❝♦✉♣❧✐♥❣ t♦ ❛ ♠❡tr✐❝ t❤❛t st❛②s ✇✐t❤✐♥ t❤❛t ❜♦✉♥❞ ✭✐♥ ❛❞❞✐t✐♦♥
t♦ r❡♠❛✐♥✐♥❣ s♣❛t✐❛❧❧② ❝❧♦s❡ ❡♥♦✉❣❤ t♦ γ) s❛t✐s✜❡s t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ♣❛rt ♦❢ t❤❡
r❡q✉✐r❡♠❡♥ts ❢♦r ♠❡♠❜❡rs❤✐♣ ✐♥ XǫGR✳ ❇✉t ❛s ✇❡ ❥✉st ❡♠♣❤❛s✐③❡❞✱ ❢❛❧❧✐♥❣ ✉♥❞❡r t❤✐s δ✲
❜♦✉♥❞ ❞♦❡s ♥♦t ✐♠♣♦s❡ s♣❡❝✐✜❝ ❝♦♥str❛✐♥ts ♦♥ t❤❡ ❞❡t❛✐❧❡❞ ✈❛❧✉❡s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t❛
♦r ♠❡tr✐❝ ✜❡❧❞s✳ ■♥ ♦t❤❡r ✇♦r❞s✱ ♠❡♠❜❡rs❤✐♣ ✐♥ t❤❡ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❝❧❛ss XǫGR ✐s ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡ ❛s
❧♦♥❣ ❛s t❤❡ ❜♦❞② ✐s ❛ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ s♦❧✉t✐♦♥ t♦ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✱ ❛♥❞ ✐ts ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ❡✛❡❝t
❛♥❞ ❡①t❡♥t ❛r❡ s✉✣❝✐❡♥t❧② ❜♦✉♥❞❡❞ ✐♥ t❤❡ r✐❣❤t ✇❛②✱ ❜✉t ❜❡②♦♥❞ t❤❡s❡ r❡q✉✐r❡♠❡♥ts t❤❡
s♣❡❝✐✜❝ ❞❡t❛✐❧s ❝♦♥❝❡r♥✐♥❣ ✏✇❤❛t t❤❡ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ❡✛❡❝t ❞♦❡s ❜❡❧♦✇ t❤♦s❡ ❜♦✉♥❞s✑ ❛r❡
✹❋♦r ♣✉r♣♦s❡s ♦❢ ❡①♣♦s✐t✐♦♥✱ ✇❡ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡ t❤❡ ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡❞ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❛s ❛♥ ✏ǫ✲δ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣✱✑ s✉❣✲
❣❡st✐♥❣ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s ✐♥ q✉❡st✐♦♥ ❤❛✈❡ ❜❡❡♥ q✉❛♥t✐✜❡❞✱ t❤❡ ❛❝t✉❛❧ ❊❤❧❡rs✲●❡r♦❝❤ r❡s✉❧t ✐s
❢♦r♠✉❧❛t❡❞ ✭♣r✐♠❛r✐❧②✮ ✐♥ t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ t❡r♠s✳ ❙❡❡ ✭●r❛❧❧❛ ❛♥❞ ❲❛❧❞✱ ✷✵✵✽✱ ➓✸✲✺✮ ❢♦r ❛ ♠♦r❡ ❡①♣❧✐❝✐t❧②
q✉❛♥t✐✜❡❞ ❛♣♣r♦❛❝❤✳
✶✸
San Diego, CA -789-
✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t✳ ❍❡♥❝❡✱ t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❊❤❧❡rs✲●❡r♦❝❤ t❤❡♦r❡♠ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥s
❤♦✇ t❤❡ ǫ✲❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♥❡❛r ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❛♥❝❤♦rs ✐s ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡ ❞❡s♣✐t❡ s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥t ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ t❤❡
❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t❛ ♦❢ ♦✉r ♥❡❛r✲❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s✿ ❙♦ ❧♦♥❣ ❛s t❤❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s✬ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧
✐♥✢✉❡♥❝❡s ❛r❡ ❜♦✉♥❞❡❞ ✐♥ t❤❡ r✐❣❤t ✇❛② t❤❡✐r ✭♣♦s✐t✐✈❡✮ ♠❛tt❡r✲❡♥❡r❣② ❝❛♥ ✈❛r② ❛s ♠✉❝❤
❛s ✇❡ ❧✐❦❡ ✉♥❞❡r t❤♦s❡ ❜♦✉♥❞s✳
✹ ❊①♣❧❛♥❛t✐♦♥ ✇✐t❤♦✉t ❘❡✐✜❝❛t✐♦♥
❇❡❢♦r❡ ❝♦♥❝❧✉❞✐♥❣ t❤❡r❡ r❡♠❛✐♥s ❛ ♣♦t❡♥t✐❛❧ ❝❤❛❧❧❡♥❣❡ ❝♦♥❝❡r♥✐♥❣ ❤♦✇ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ ❡♥❞♦rs❡ ❛♥②
❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✏✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✑ t❤❡s✐s ✐❢ t❤❡ ❛❝t✉❛❧ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✐s
✐♥❝♦♠♣❛t✐❜❧❡ ✇✐t❤ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s t❤❡♦r②✳ ❘❡❝❛❧❧✱ ✇❤✐❧❡ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥✐♥❣ ❤♦✇ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss❡s XǫGR ✇❤♦s❡
r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ❛r❡ ✏ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡✑ t♦ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ♠♦❞❡❧s ❝♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ s♦ ❞✐✈❡rs❡✱ ✇❡
♥❡❡❞❡❞ t♦ t❛❦❡ t❤❡ ✏❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❧✐♠✐t✑ ♦❢ t❤❡ ♠❡tr✐❝s ( g
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N ❝♦✉♣❧✐♥❣ t♦ t❤❡ ❊●✲♣❛rt✐❝❧❡s
( T
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N ✐♥ ❛❝❝♦r❞❛♥❝❡ ✇✐t❤ t❤❡ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s ✭✷✮✳
✺ ❇② t❛❦✐♥❣ s✉❝❤ ❛ ✏❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❧✐♠✐t✑ t♦
✐❞❡♥t✐❢② t❤❡ ❞✐✈❡rs✐t② ♦❢ ♦✉r XǫGR ❝❧❛ss❡s✱ ❤❛✈❡♥✬t ✇❡ ♠❛❞❡ ❛♥ ✏❡ss❡♥t✐❛❧✑ ❛♣♣❡❛❧ t♦ t❤❡
❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ♠♦❞❡❧s ♣r❡❝❧✉❞❡❞ ❜② ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ✜❡❧❞ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s❄
❚❤❡ ❛♥s✇❡r t♦ t❤✐s ❝❤❛❧❧❡♥❣❡ ✐s t❤❛t t❤♦✉❣❤ ❛♣♣r❡❝✐❛t✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ǫ✲δ ✐♥t❡r♣❧❛②
✐♥ t❤❡ ❛♣♣r♦♣r✐❛t❡ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❧✐♠✐t ✇❛s ❡ss❡♥t✐❛❧ t♦ ♦✉r ❡①♣❧❛♥❛t✐♦♥
♦❢ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✱ t❤❡ r♦❧❡ ♣❧❛②❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t✐♥❣ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧ ❞♦❡s ♥♦t
r❡q✉✐r❡ ✉s t♦ r❡✐❢② t❤❡ ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥ ♦r ♠❛❦❡ ✐t r❡♣r❡s❡♥t❛t✐✈❡ ♦❢ ❛♥② ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠ ✐♥
❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s t❤❡♦r②✳ ❊✈❡♥ t❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡r❡ ❛r❡ s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥t ❝♦♠♣❧✐❝❛t✐♦♥s ❛ss♦❝✐❛t❡❞ ✇✐t❤ ✇❤❛t
❤❛♣♣❡♥s ❛t t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❧✐♠✐t ✭✶✮ t❤❡ ǫ✲δ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ t❤❡ s②st❡♠s ❤❛s ❛ ✇❡❧❧✲❞❡✜♥❡❞
♠❛t❤❡♠❛t✐❝❛❧ str✉❝t✉r❡ ✭t❤❡ C 1 t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❡s ❞❡✜♥❡❞ ❢♦r ❡❛❝❤ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞ ♦❢
γ✮ ❞❡s❝r✐❜✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❛♣♣r♦❛❝❤ t♦ t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t✐♥❣ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧✱ ❛♥❞ ✭✷✮ t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ t❤❡
♠♦❞❡❧s ✐♥ XǫGR✱ ✇❤✐❝❤ ❛r❡ ✏❝❧♦s❡ ❜✉t ♥♦t ✐❞❡♥t✐❝❛❧ t♦✑ ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧✱ st✐❧❧ ♦❜❡②
❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s t❤❡♦r②✳ ❆ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧ ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡s ✭❛s t❤❡ ♥❛♠❡ s✉❣❣❡sts✮ ❛ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢
❛♥❝❤♦r ❢♦r t❤❡ ✭t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧✮ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞s ✇✐t❤✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ t❤❡ ❡❧❡♠❡♥ts ♦❢ t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡
✺◆♦t❡✱ t❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡ ((i,j)gab)i,j∈N ❝♦♥✈❡r❣❡ t♦ ❛ ✇❡❧❧ ❞❡✜♥❡❞ ✏❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❧✐♠✐t✑ ✭✐♥ t❤❡ C
1 t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❡s✮
t❤❡ ❝♦✉♣❧❡❞ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t✉♠ t❡♥s♦rs ((i,j)T ab)i,j∈N ♠❛② ♥♦t✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ❡✈❡♥ ✐❢ t❤❡② ❞♦ ❝♦♥✈❡r❣❡ ✐♥ ❛
♣❤②s✐❝❛❧❧② s❛❧✐❡♥t ❛♥❞ ✐♥❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥t❧② ✇❡❧❧✲❞❡✜♥❡❞ ✇❛②✱ ❛t t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t t❤❡② ♠✉st ❡✐t❤❡r ❢❛✐❧ t♦ ♦❜❡② ✭✷✮ ♦r
✈❛♥✐s❤✳ ❋♦r ❛ ❞❡t❛✐❧❡❞ ❞✐s❝✉ss✐♦♥ s❡❡ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱ ✷✵✶✷✱ ➓✹✮✳
✶✹
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XǫGR ❝❛♥ ❜❡ s❛✐❞ t♦ ❝❧✉st❡r✳ ❍♦✇❡✈❡r✱ ✉s✐♥❣ t❤❡s❡ ♠♦❞❡❧s ❛s ❛♥❝❤♦rs t♦ ✐❞❡♥t✐❢② t❤❡ ♣♦✐♥ts
❛r♦✉♥❞ ✇❤✐❝❤ t❤❡ ❛❝t✉❛❧ s♦❧✉t✐♦♥s t♦ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s ❝❧✉st❡r ❞♦❡s ♥♦t r❡q✉✐r❡ t❤❛t t❤❡
❛♥❝❤♦rs t❤❡♠s❡❧✈❡s ❜❡ ❛❞♠✐tt❡❞ ✐♥ XǫGR✳
■♥ ❝♦♥tr❛st t♦ ♠♦r❡ tr❛❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ✏✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥s✱✑ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛ ❛r❡ ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡
❣r♦✉♣ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ ❝❧❛ss❡s ♦❢ XT ♥♦t ✐♥❞✐✈✐❞✉❛❧ s②st❡♠s✳ ❋♦r ♥♦♥✲✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥s
s❡✈❡r❡ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❡s ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❞❡tr✐♠❡♥t❛❧ ❜❡❝❛✉s❡ t❤❡② r❡♥❞❡r t❤❡ s♦❧❡ ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❡❞ ♠♦❞❡❧ t❤❡♦✲
r❡t✐❝❛❧❧② ✐♥❛♣♣♦s✐t❡✳ ❲✐t❤ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✱ ❤♦✇❡✈❡r✱ t❤❡ ❡①✐st❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❛ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧❧② ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❡❞
♠♦❞❡❧ ✏❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ❜✉t ❡①❝❧✉❞❡❞ ❢r♦♠✑ ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❝❧❛ss ♥❡❡❞ ♥♦t ❡♥t❛✐❧ t❤❛t ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ t❤❡
❝❧❛ss ❛r❡ ❧✐❦❡✇✐s❡ ♣♦♦r❧② ❜❡❤❛✈❡❞✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ✐❢ ❛ t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ✏♥❡❛r t♦✑ ❛♥ ✐❞❡❛❧✲
✐③❡❞ ♠♦❞❡❧ ❤❛s ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥❝❡ ✭❛s ✇✐t❤ t❤❡ C 1 t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❡s✮✱ s✉❝❤ ♣r♦①✐♠✐t② ♠❛② ❛❧❧♦✇
✐♥❢❡r❡♥❝❡s ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ✇❡❧❧✲❜❡❤❛✈❡❞ ❝❧❛ss❡s ✇✐t❤♦✉t ♠♦❧❡st✐♥❣ t❤❡✐r ❛❞♠✐ss✐❜✐❧✐t② ❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣
t♦ t❤❡ ❧❛✇s ♦❢ T ✳
❚❤✐s ✐s ♣r❡❝✐s❡❧② ✇❤❛t ♦❝❝✉rs ✇✐t❤ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✳ ▼❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ ❛ ❝❧❛ss XǫGR ❝❛♥
t❛❦❡ ❛❞✈❛♥t❛❣❡ ♦❢ t❤❡✐r ❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss t♦ t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧s ✇✐t❤♦✉t ✏❝♦♥tr❛❝t✐♥❣✑ t❤❡
♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❡s ♦❝❝✉rr✐♥❣ ❛t t❤❡ ❛❝t✉❛❧ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❧✐♠✐ts✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ✇❡ ✇❡r❡ ❛❜❧❡ t♦ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥
s✉❝❤ ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ❜② ❛♣♣❡❛❧✐♥❣ t♦ ✇❤❛t ✇❡ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡❞ ❛s t❤❡ ✏s♣❡❝✐✜❝ ❞❡t❛✐❧s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t✑
δ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ✐♥ t❤❡ C 1 t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❡s✳ ❙✐♥❝❡ ✇❡ ❛r❡ t❛❧❦✐♥❣ ❛❜♦✉t ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✱ ✇❡
❛r❡ ❛❜❧❡ t♦ ✐♥❢❡r ❞✐r❡❝t❧② ❢r♦♠ s✉❝❤ ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss t❤❛t t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t ❜♦❞✐❡s ♠♦❞❡❧❡❞ ❜② t❤❡
♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ XǫGR ❛r❡ ❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✐♥ t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s❡♥s❡s ❞❡✜♥❡❞
✇❤❡♥ ✇❡ ❝♦♥str✉❝t❡❞ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss❡s✳
✺ ❈♦♥❝❧✉s✐♦♥
❲❤✐❧❡ t❤❡ ✐♥❝♦♠♣❛t✐❜✐❧✐t② r❡s✉❧t ♦❢ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱ ✷✵✶✷✮ ❡♥t❛✐❧s t❤❛t t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ str✐❝t❧②
✐♥t❡r♣r❡t❡❞ ♠✉st ❜❡ r❡❥❡❝t❡❞ ❛t t❤❡ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧ ❧❡✈❡❧✱ ✐♥ t❤✐s ♣❛♣❡r ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ ❛r❣✉❡❞ t❤❛t
r❡✐♥t❡r♣r❡t✐♥❣ t❤❡ r♦❧❡ ♦❢ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ❛s ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② t❤❡s✐s ✐s ❜♦t❤ ✈✐❛❜❧❡ ❛♥❞
❝♦❤❡r❡♥t ✇✐t❤ ❝♦♥t❡♠♣♦r❛r② ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②✳ ❇② ❞❡✈❡❧♦♣✐♥❣ ❛♥ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛ ✐♥ ♣❤②s✐❝s✱ ✇❡ s❛✇ t❤❛t t❤❡ ✇✐❞❡s♣r❡❛❞ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♦❢ ❛ r✐❝❤ ✈❛r✐❡t②
♦❢ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣✱ ❢r❡❡✲❢❛❧❧✱ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ❛❝t✉❛❧❧② ♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ ✐♥ ♥❛t✉r❡ q✉❛❧✐✜❡s ❛s ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝
✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥✳
✶✺
San Diego, CA -791-
◆♦t ♦♥❧② ❝❛♥ t❤✐s ❛♣♣r♦①✐♠❛t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ❜❡ r❡❝♦✈❡r❡❞ ✐♥ t❤❡ ❢♦r♠ ♦❢ s✉❝❤
❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② t❤❡s✐s✱ ❜✉t ❜② r❡❝♦♥s✐❞❡r✐♥❣ t❤❡ ✐♠♣❧✐❝❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ ❧✐♠✐t ♦♣❡r❛t✐♦♥
♣r♦♦❢s ♦❢ t❤❡ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡✱ ✇❡ ✇❡r❡ ❛❜❧❡ t♦ ❣❡♥❡r❛t❡ ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❡①♣❧❛♥❛t✐♦♥ ❢♦r ✇❤② ✇❡ ❝❛♥
❡①♣❡❝t s✉❝❤ ❛ r❡♠❛r❦❛❜❧❡ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♦❢ t❤❡s❡ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s ❞❡s♣✐t❡ t❤❡ ❢❛❝t t❤❛t ❢r♦♠
t❤❡ ♣❡rs♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ♦❢ t❤❡✐r ♠♦r❡ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐st✐❝ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ✭t❤❡ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t✉♠
✜❡❧❞ ❛♥❞ ✐ts ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ✐♥✢✉❡♥❝❡✮ t❤❡② ♠❛② ❜❡ ✐♥❝r❡❞✐❜❧② ❞✐ss✐♠✐❧❛r✳ ❲❡ ❝♦♥❝❧✉❞❡❞
✇✐t❤ ❛ ❞❡❢❡♥s❡ ♦❢ ♦✉r ❛♣♣❡❛❧✐♥❣ t♦ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧s ✐♥ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥✐♥❣ t❤❡
✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣✳ ❯♥❧✐❦❡ ♠♦r❡ tr❛❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❢♦r♠s ♦❢ ❛♣♣r♦①✐♠❛t✐♦♥ ♦r ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✱
❛s r❡✈❡❛❧❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ✭❯P✮ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s✱ ✇❤❡♥ ✐t ❝♦♠❡s t♦ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛✱ t❤❡ ❝❧❛✐♠ ✐s
❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ❣r♦✉♣ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ ❡♥t✐r❡ ❝❧❛ss❡s ♦❢ ♠♦❞❡❧s✱ ♥♦t ✐♥❞✐✈✐❞✉❛❧ ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥s✳ ❍❡♥❝❡✱ ✐♥
t❤❡ ❝❛s❡ ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✱ ✐t ✐s ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡ t♦ t❛❦❡ ❛❞✈❛♥t❛❣❡ ♦❢ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t t②♣❡s ♦❢ ♠❛t❤❡♠❛t✐❝❛❧
♣r♦①✐♠✐t② t♦ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ❛♥❝❤♦rs ✇✐t❤♦✉t ❛❝t✉❛❧❧② ✐♥❢❡❝t✐♥❣ t❤❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss ✇✐t❤
t❤❡ ✐❧❧✐❝✐t ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ✇❤❡♥ t❤❡ r✐❣❤t ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ✭t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧✮ ❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ✐s ❡♠♣❧♦②❡❞
✐t ♠❛② ❜❡ ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡ t♦ ❞r❛✇ ✐♥❢❡r❡♥❝❡s ❛♥❞ ❣❛✐♥ ❦♥♦✇❧❡❞❣❡ ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ ♣r♦♣❡rt✐❡s ♦❢
♠♦❞❡❧❡❞ s②st❡♠s t❤❛♥❦s t♦ t❤✐s ♣r♦①✐♠✐t② ♦❢ t❤❡✐r ♠♦❞❡❧s t♦ t❤❡ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ❛♥❝❤♦r✳
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New Work for a Theory of Emergence
Abstract
Many discussions of emergence focus on the putatively irreducible causal powers of 
emergents.  I argue that the question of whether emergents are irreducible causes should be 
postponed in favor of the question of whether emergents are natural.  David Lewis contends 
that scientifically interesting properties are natural: they account for resemblances and 
distinguish causally relevant and irrelevant properties.  I consider bimanual coordination, as 
described by the HKB model, as an example of natural emergence.  I conclude that emergent 
properties are those that systemic processes have when they exhibit “instability” and argue 
that instability is the natural property that unites these processes.
1.  Introduction.
Complexity scientists use “emergence” to describe dynamical processes in open systems that 
produce spontaneous reorganization of their components.  Philosophical discussions tend to 
focus on the putatively irreducible causal powers of emergents relative to the causal powers 
of their subvenient micro-constituents.  I argue that the question of whether they are 
irreducible causes should be postponed in favor of the question of whether emergents are 
natural.  Lewis (1983) argues that scientifically interesting properties are natural: they 
account for resemblances among things and distinguish the causally relevant and irrelevant 
properties.  If emergent properties are scientifically interesting, then they are natural.  I 
consider bimanual coordination (described by the HKB model) as an example of emergence 
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in a natural system.  Inspired by Rueger (2000), I define emergence as a property that 
systemic processes have when they begin to exhibit “instability”, and argue that instability is 
the natural property that unites these processes.
2.  Emergents as Irreducible Causes.
Kim thinks that an ontological interpretation of emergence requires that emergent properties 
have either synchronic or diachronic “downward causal influence”.  This interpretation 
requires that
the emergents bring into the world new causal powers of their own, and, in particular 
that they have powers to influence and control the direction of the lower-level 
processes from which they emerge. (1999, 5-6)
Kim finds the notion of synchronic downward causal influence unintelligible because it 
violates the principle that if an object is caused to have a causal power at a time t, then it 
cannot exercise that causal power at t (1999, 147).  Exercising a causal power happens later 
than the time of acquisition.
Diachronic downward causal influence, according to Kim, creates an intolerable 
causal competition between emergents and their non-emergent bases.  Kim queries “if an 
emergent, M, emerges from basal condition P, why can’t P displace M as a cause of any 
putative effect of M?” (1999, 147)  Reductionists argue that an emergent property cannot 
causally compete with its subvening micro-based physical property.  There are several replies 
that attempt to salvage the causal efficacy of emergents without positing entirely distinct 
2
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properties.  For example, a Pereboomian account of emergence might suggest that token 
emergent causal powers are materially constituted by token microphysical-based causal 
powers (2011, 141).  Shoemaker’s (2001) account of mental causation suggests that emergent 
properties are determinables, the causal powers of which are a subset of the causal powers of 
their microphysical realizers.  I think this debate is a bit premature.  If we want an 
ontological interpretation of emergence on which emergents cause anything at all, then we 
need some reason to think that they are not grueish and gerrymandered.  Figuring out the 
precise relation that emergent properties have to micro-based properties should be postponed 
until we have some account of that.  Whatever is included in the category of “emergent”, the 
matter of determining whether or not the emergents are gerrymandered is to be settled by 
paying attention to systematic empirically theorizing.
3.  What Would It Mean for Emergence to be Natural?
Lewis (1983, 1986) argues that accounting for the kinds of similarity that distinguishes 
causally relevant and irrelevant properties requires a metaphysical theory that either includes 
universals as real primitives or provides an adequate nominalism that does the work that 
universal would do.  Both universals and nominals, according to Lewis, would perform this 
work by permitting a distinction between natural and unnatural properties:
Because properties are so abundant, they are undiscriminating. Any two things share 
infinitely many properties, and fail to share infinitely many others. That is so whether 
the two things are perfect duplicates or utterly dissimilar. Thus properties do nothing 
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to capture facts of resemblance.... Likewise, properties do nothing to capture the 
causal powers of things. Almost all properties are causally irrelevant, and there is 
nothing to make the relevant ones stand out from the crowd. (1983, 346)
The perfectly natural properties, for Lewis, would be coupled so tightly to resemblance that 
two things have exactly the same natural properties just in case they are qualitative duplicates 
(356).  Imperfectly natural properties come in varying degrees because they are built up from 
suitably “close-knit” perfectly natural properties (ibid., 347).  To account for the nature of 
this close-knit relationship Lewis suggests that perfectly natural properties could stand in 
resemblance relations to each other.  By doing so they would constitute families of 
imperfectly natural properties, which may themselves constitute families of even less 
perfectly natural properties.  Fundamental sciences study the perfectly natural properties and 
special sciences concentrate on families of imperfectly natural properties.  All of the 
disjunctive properties are unnatural and scientifically uninteresting because they do not 
comprise resembling properties.  
It is not entirely clear how closely imperfect natural properties must resemble in order 
to qualify as the domain of a special science.  However, I think Lewis’s suggestion here is 
even more provocative than it appears on the surface.  A property that falls under the domain 
of a particular science by being a member of a resemblance class might also be cross-listed 
under a different science if it falls under a different resemblance class.  Such properties may 
compose the domain of an interdisciplinary science.  Suppose that phenomena across a wide 
range of traditional fields from chemistry to economics could be accurately simulated using 
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the same mathematical model and that the predictive consequences of this model were all 
well confirmed.  Given that there is an interesting association between duplicability and 
simulability, this would suggest that there is enough resemblance between these phenomena 
to compose a domain that deserves its own systematic investigation – especially if there are a 
sparse number of law-like generalizations that govern a wide range of these phenomena. 
Complexity Science is an interdisciplinary science of just this sort, and emergence is a 
central part of its purview.  As Bedau remarks, “the models in complexity science are 
typically described as emergent, so much so that one could fairly call the whole enterprise the 
science of emergence” (2002, 5).
Lewis distinguishes genuine events from spurious events in order distinguish the 
causally relevant and irrelevant events (1983, 369).  Genuine events have natural properties, 
which makes them fit to figure into laws and causal relations.  Spurious events, on the other 
hand, are unfit for this task.  Like being grue, the properties of spurious events are 
gerrymandered. The natural/unnatural distinction explains what makes the causally relevant 
properties stand out from the rest.  Lewis also stresses that the coupling of causally relevant 
events to natural properties explains why “scientific investigation of laws and of natural 
properties is a package deal…so that laws and natural properties get discovered together” 
(ibid., 368).  He takes it as uncontroversial that causation involves laws.1 Whether or not they 
require laws, causal explanations cite natural properties.  Indeed, the notion of invariance is 
1  As Woodward (2003) argues, it is more likely that causes are defined by change-relating 
invariances, which may come in degrees of invariance.  
5
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wrapped up with the notion of resemblance.  If an invariant generalization remains invariant 
over a fairly wide range of different initial conditions and different types of intervention, then 
it is reasonable to think that it generalizes over the behavior of natural properties because 
those are the properties that account for resemblance between like cause and like effect.  If 
dynamical models of complex causal systems have explanatory power then the properties 
they cite are natural properties.  As I argue below, the HKB model explains a variety of 
surprising properties of coordinated movement.
4.  Emergence, Resemblance, and Causal Explanation.
During the last sixty years Complexity Science blossomed out of research originally 
grounded in General Systems Theory.  Because complexity scientists are interested in 
diachronic processes that display emergence, they look for the similarities relevant to 
emergence in the dynamics of these processes.  Is there a suitably related family of properties 
that corresponds to these different dynamical processes?  I argue that there is such a family. 
To justify such a sweeping claim is a daunting task, but I can give partial justifications by 
detailing a dynamical model that illuminates emergence in nature and by describing how 
other such models do similar work.
The HKB model is a first-order differential equation introduced by Kelso, Hakken, 
and Bunz to model the behavior of the coupled oscillator systems involved in bimanual 
coordination (Kelso 1995).  Here is a simple experiment that shows how the oscillator 
governing rhymic motions in your right and left hands exhibit emergent properties when 
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coupled together. Snap with the fingers on your right hand in a rhythmic fashion and then 
snap with your left hand at the same time.  Your snapping fingers will be oscillating in-
phase.  If you change the snapping rhythm to anti-phase, then you will be snapping a regular 
beat with a fingersnap on one hand followed by a fingersnap on the other.  Only in-phase and 
anti-phase rhythms are stable. Because the system has two stable states, the system is 
bistable.  Both the in-phase oscillations and the anti-phase oscillations are stable up to a 
certain frequency.  If the frequency crosses a certain critical threshold, the anti-phase pattern 
becomes unstable.  If you keep increasing the rate, you will find yourself snapping in-phase. 
This is a kind of phase transition known as a bifurcation.  The in-phase state is globally 
stable.  As fast as you can snap, you can snap in-phase.  Fluctuations in the systems may 
briefly pull you away from the in-phase pattern, but your snapping behavior will be attracted 
to the in-phase pattern and repelled away from all others.  The relative phase of the 
oscillations is the variable that captures the stable and unstable states of coordination.  This 
simple discovery is the basis for the HKB model of coordination.  
Eq.1 gives an idealized version of the HKB equation that ignores the intrinsic tuning 
of oscillators and systemic noise.
Eq.1  ϕ* = –a sin(ϕ) – 2b sin(2ϕ)
The parameter ϕ indexes the relative phase of the coupled oscillator system, and ϕ* is the 
change in relative phase over time.  In Eq.1 parameters a and b are the coupling strength 
coefficients and –a sin(ϕ) – 2b sin(2ϕ) is the coupling term.  Decreasing the ratio of b/a is 
equivalent to shortening the period of rhythmic coordination. Because the oscillators are 
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time-symmetric and cyclical, we can represent their periods as a 360° cycle where possible 
relative phase φ ranges from –π to π.
The below plots (taken from Kelso 1995, 55) depict the potential function of the HKB 
model.
Figure 1 
(taken from Kelso 1995, p. 55)
Solid black balls indicate stable attractors and open white balls indicate unstable repellers. 
At b/a  > .25 the system has three stable states corresponding to the two kinds of anti-phase 
patterns and the in-phase pattern.  At a critical value of b/a = .25 there is a phase transition to 
having only one stable state, which is the in-phase pattern.  Why would a gradual increase in 
frequency of snapping lead to a sudden change in the kinds of stable patterns that one is able 
to snap?  The key to the model is the parameter that measures relative phase.  It is what Kelso 
calls a collective variable, or order parameter, because it measures the cooperative macro-
level behavior of the system.  Kelso insists that “to understand coordinated behaviors as self-
8
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organized, new quantities have to be introduced beyond the ones typical of the individual 
components.” (1995, 52)  When the snapping oscillators are coupled, they constitute a new 
cooperative system.  No account of the behavior can be given at the level of single snapping 
fingers.  You need to introduce a new adjustable parameter in order to understand how and 
why the coupled system behaves as it does.  The model also makes two novel predictions of 
expected phenomena, critical fluctuations and critical slowing down, not previously 
recognized, but since confirmed (ibid., 71).
The most interesting feature of the HKB model is the breadth of phenomena that can 
be understood using the model.  Finger snaps are an arbitrarily chosen example of the types 
of bimanual coordination that the equation models.  Among the other factors that have been 
experimentally demonstrated to break the symmetry of HKB are handedness/ hemispheric 
asymmetry (Treffner and Peter 2002), mutilimb coordination (Mechsner et. al. 2001), 
attentional allocation, and speech-hand coordination (Treffner and Peter 2002).
We can now return to the questions that motivated this discussion: 
1) Is there a suitably related family of properties that corresponds to self-organizing 
complex systems such that they are grouped under a natural property?
2) Is there reason to think that such properties figure into causes and can be cited in 
causal explanations?
3) If so, does this natural property ground the distinction between systemic process 
that are ones of emergence and ones that are not?
9
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I suggest an affirmative answer to the first two questions.  The HKB model’s broad 
applicability implies that it describes systemic processes that share united features.  This is 
why the model applies to a wide variety of psychological and biomechanical phenomena in 
humans and non-human animals.  Other complex oscillatory models, such as the van der Pol 
model that accounts for limit cycle behavior in both neural polarization and electrical circuits 
employing vacuum tubes, are similarly interesting because of their interdisciplinary 
applications.  Likewise, these models give us the kinds of change-relating invariant 
generalizations that indicate systemic processes with causal powers.  In particular, the need 
to introduce order parameters to describe them signals that there is a unique feature of these 
kinds of self-organizing complex systems that unites them into a kind that has scientific 
significance.  My answer to the third question is affirmative as well, but to properly address it 
I first need to do some conceptual housekeeping.
5.  Conclusion.
Systems that conform to the HKB model resemble each other in a way that is appropriate to 
being grouped under a natural kind.  But the HKB conforming systems are only one type of 
system that exhibits non-liner phase transitions.  Some (e.g. limit cycles) go from having two 
stable states to having one stable state.  Others (e.g. Rayleigh-Benard convection) go from 
one stable state to two or more possible stable states.  These kinds of systems tend to teeter 
on the edge of chaos until something pushes them over into complete disorder; they achieve 
their greatest level of complexity just before they lose structure altogether.  Phase transitions, 
10
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I suggest, characterize only one kind of dynamical process united under the property of 
emergence.  What then characterizes emergence and determines whether or not being a 
process of emergence counts as a natural property?  For all that I have argued so far, 
emergence might characterize a gerrymandered set of properties that are themselves natural, 
but not constitutive of a natural family of properties.
Various definitions and desiderata for emergence have been offered in both the 
scientific and philosophical literature (Wimsatt 2007, Humphreys 2008, Bedau 1997 and 
2002, Holland 1998, Ryan 2007).  Reuger (2002) intimates a notion of emergence that fits 
well with the observations made in this essay.  
Suppose that the system's dynamics is characterized by an equation of motion with a 
control parameter p. If the phase space portrait stays qualitatively the same under 
perturbations of the dynamics, i.e., small variations in the value of p, the system is 
structurally stable.  If the perturbation generates a qualitatively different portrait of 
trajectories, the system is structurally unstable. (Rueger 2000, 472-473)
The property of being unstable, in this sense, should be defined as counterfactual supporting. 
A systemic process exhibits instability if it has an order parameter that would create a drastic 
change in response to certain slight variations in a control parameter.  We see this in the 
bimanual coordination cases.  For example, slight variations in the rate of snapping lead 
quickly to rapid changes in the kind of coordination exhibited.  When a system acquires a 
collective level property that is only described by a novel order parameter, then it increases in 
complexity; this is so whether or not the phase transition ever actually occurs.
11
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My conceptual housekeeping is now complete and I can offer a definition of 
emergence that reveals how emergence constitutes a category that unites various resembling 
processes under the property of having instability.
Def.1 A systemic process S exhibits instability iff there are small changes in the 
value of S’s control parameter(s) that would lead to drastic changes in the value 
of S’s order parameter(s).
Def.2 A systemic process S is a process of emergence iff S at time t does not exhibit 
instability I and at some later time t* S begins to exhibit instability I.
There is one thing to note about this definition, it does not imply that losing an instability is a 
process of emergence.  When systems plunge into chaos that is not emergence because it 
constitutes a loss of complexity.  Despite the terminology, this account entails that falling 
into chaos entails a decrease of instability. The process of increasing in instability is an 
interesting property.  I suggest that it is a good candidate for being a natural property because 
it unites instances of emergence under a genuine resemblance relation.  Given that emergence 
is a natural property of the evolution of complex systems, and that having a natural property 
entails having causal powers, it may now reasonably be asked whether or not those causal 
powers are reducible.  Whatever the answer to that question may be, both an adequate 
realism and an adequate nominalism about emergence should take account of its status as a 
natural property.
12
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Models, Sherlock Holmes and the Emperor Claudius 
Abstract 
Recently, a number of authors have suggested that we understand scientific models in the 
same way as fictional characters, like Sherlock Holmes. The biggest challenge for this 
approach concerns the ontology of fictional characters. I consider two responses to this 
challenge, given by Roman Frigg, Ronald Giere and Peter Godfrey-Smith, and argue that 
neither is successful. I then suggest an alternative approach. While parallels with fiction are 
useful, I argue that models of real systems are more aptly compared to works that portray real 
people, like the Emperor Claudius. This approach will allow us to avoid problems with 
fictional characters. 
 
Word count: 4468 words (and 2 figures equivalent to approx. 200 words) 
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1. Introduction 
Modelling forms an important part of scientific practice. It also presents us with a 
number of ontological puzzles. Consider the standard Newtonian model of the orbit of the 
earth. This model makes many simplifying assumptions: it assumes that the sun and earth are 
perfect spheres, for example, and that they are isolated from the other planets in the solar 
system. These assumptions are known to be false of the sun and earth. Indeed, no actual, 
concrete objects satisfy these assumptions. And yet scientists often talk as if there were such 
objects and as if they can find out about their properties. A scientist might say that the model 
consists of two spheres with homogenous mass distribution, for example, or she might 
discover that the orbit of the earth in the model is perfectly elliptical. 
Let us call the various assumptions and equations that scientists write down when they 
formulate a model the model description (Godfrey-Smith 2006; Weisberg 2007). When she 
uses the Newtonian model, the scientist wishes to understand a real system, namely the sun 
and earth. But not all models are like this. For example, a predator-prey model might invite 
us to consider a population consisting of two species, predator and prey, whose numbers are 
governed by certain equations, without claiming to represent any real population out in the 
world. And yet, even in these cases, scientists talk as if the model were an object whose 
behaviour they are investigating. For example, they might discover that in certain models 
general pesticides act to increase the proportion of prey to predator (Weisberg 2007, 223). 
Notice that often the very same model description is put to different uses. We might write 
down the equation for a simple harmonic oscillator simply in order to explore the properties 
of such a system, or we might use it to understand the motion of a pendulum or a chemical 
bond. 
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Modelling thus presents us with certain ontological puzzles. How are we to make sense 
of the fact that a large part of scientific practice involves talking and learning about things 
that do not exist? One way to answer these questions is to insist that, while no actual, 
concrete object satisfies the scientists’ model description, there is some other object that does 
satisfy it. According to Ronald Giere (e.g. 1988), for example, theoretical models are abstract 
objects defined by scientists’ modelling assumptions. While this view has seemed attractive 
to many, it is not without problems. For example, Martin Thomson-Jones (2010) asks how 
the abstract objects posited by Giere’s account can possess the spatiotemporal properties we 
appear to attribute to models, such as following an elliptical orbit or oscillating with a certain 
time period (see also Hughes 1997; Godfrey-Smith 2006). 
Recently, a number of authors have suggested that, rather than abstract objects, 
theoretical models should instead be understood in the same way as fictional characters, like 
Sherlock Holmes. The aim of this paper is to examine this proposal in detail. The most 
obvious challenge for such an approach concerns the longstanding controversy over the 
nature of fictional characters (Section 2.1). I shall consider two ways in which proponents of 
the view have sought to respond to this challenge, and argue that neither response is 
successful (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). I will then suggest an alternative approach. While parallels 
with fiction are useful, I will argue that models of real systems are more aptly compared to 
works that portray real people, like the Emperor Claudius (Section 3.1). This approach will 
allow us to avoid problems with fictional characters (Section 3.2). 
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2. The Indirect Fictions View 
2.1. Models and Fiction 
A number of authors have been struck by apparent parallels between the ontology of 
models and fiction (e.g. Godfrey-Smith 2006; Thomson-Jones 2007; Contessa 2010; Frigg 
2010a, 2010b; on models and fiction in general, see Suárez 2009). Consider the following 
passage from The Hound of the Baskervilles: 
Holmes leaned forward in his excitement and his eyes had the hard, dry 
glitter which shot from them when he was keenly interested. (Conan Doyle 
1902/2003, 22) 
Like scientists’ model descriptions, it seems, there is no actual, concrete object that this 
passage describes: there is no real, flesh-and-blood detective that satisfies the description 
Conan Doyle gives of Holmes. And yet, just as scientists talk as if there were objects that 
satisfied their model descriptions, so we talk as if there were a Sherlock Holmes: we say that 
Holmes is highly intelligent, that he smokes a pipe and plays the violin. We saw above that 
some have criticised Giere’s view on the grounds that we often ascribe spatiotemporal 
properties to models. We certainly have no problem attributing spatiotemporal properties to 
fictional characters: we say that Holmes is tall and that he lived at 221B Baker Street. 
These observations motivate what I will call the indirect fictions view of modelling 
(figure 1).1 According to this view, scientists’ model descriptions give rise to what are called 
                                                 
1
 Here I use ‘indirect’ in a different sense to Michael Weisberg (2007). Weisberg uses the 
term ‘indirect’ to describe the activity of modelling, in order to distinguish it from other 
forms of theorising. I use ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ to distinguish between two different 
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model systems (or sometimes simply models), and these model systems are to be understood 
in the same way as fictional characters like Sherlock Holmes. When scientists represent a real 
system they do so by establishing some form of representation relation between the model 
system and the real system. Different views are advanced regarding the nature of this relation. 
Peter Godfrey-Smith (2006) follows Giere (e.g. 1988) in talking of resemblance between 
model systems and the world, while Roman Frigg (2010b) speaks of a ‘key’ which specifies 
how facts about the model system are translated into claims about the real system. 
 
Figure 1: The indirect fictions view 
The biggest challenge for the indirect fictions view concerns the ontology of model 
systems. After all, the nature of fictional characters is far from clear. Realists argue that, even 
if he is not a regular, flesh-and-blood detective, we must grant that Holmes exists in some 
sense. Holmes, along with Emma Bovary, Middle Earth and the rest, are therefore given a 
place in our ontology as fictional entities. Realists then offer different accounts of the nature 
of these entities. Meinong (1904/1960), for example, famously distinguishes being from 
existence. On this view, Holmes is an object possessing all the properties that we normally 
take him to have, such as being a detective and smoking a pipe; he simply lacks the property 
of existence. By contrast, antirealists, like Russell (1905/1956), aim to show how we can 
                                                                                                                                                        
interpretations of the ontology of modelling: the former takes representation to occur via a 
model system, and the latter does not. 
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understand fictional characters, and our talk about them, without granting the existence of 
fictional entities. 
Proponents of the indirect fictions view have responded to this problem in a number of 
ways. Some look to existing theories of fictional characters. Thus, Roman Frigg (2010a, 
2010b) aims to fill out the view by drawing on an existing antirealist theory of fiction. Ronald 
Giere (2009) suggests a different strategy. Although, in his earlier work, Giere takes models 
to be abstract objects, he has recently suggested that he too is willing to think of models as 
akin to fictional characters. But Giere argues that philosophers of science need not be too 
concerned with the question of exactly what such entities are. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2006) 
appears to endorse a similar strategy.  
Let us now consider both of these responses in turn. 
2.2. Antirealism and the Indirect Fictions View 
Roman Frigg (2010a, 2010b) has proposed a version of the indirect fictions view that 
draws on an influential theory of fiction due to Kendall Walton (1990). On Frigg’s view, 
model descriptions give rise to model systems, and these model systems are ‘akin to 
characters and places in literary fiction’ (2010b, 100). Frigg acknowledges, however, that 
without a theory of fictional characters ‘explaining model systems in terms of fictional 
characters amounts to explaining the unclear with the obscure’ (2010a, 256). It is for this 
reason that he looks to Walton’s theory. 
According to Walton, the text of a novel functions as a ‘prop’ in games of make-believe: 
when we read the text, we are supposed to imagine things according to certain rules (1990, 
chap. 2). Frigg offers an application of Walton’s theory to scientists’ model descriptions. On 
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Frigg’s view, when we read the model description given by the Newtonian model of the solar 
system, for example, 
[w]e imagine the entity described in the description.... We understand the 
terms occurring in the description and we imagine an entity which has all 
the properties that the description specifies. The result of this process is the 
model system, the fictional scenario which is the vehicle of our reasoning: 
an imagined entity consisting of two spheres, etc. (2010b, 133; author’s 
emphasis) 
Frigg calls the relationship between the model description and the model system ‘p-
representation’ (2010a, 264). When scientists want to represent a real system, like the sun and 
earth, they must establish a second representation relation between their model system and 
the world, which he calls ‘t-representation’ (ibid.). 
Frigg’s aim, then, is to flesh out the indirect fiction view by drawing on an existing 
theory of fictional characters. The choice of Walton’s theory for this task is a little surprising, 
however. The reason it is surprising is that Walton is an antirealist about fictional characters 
(1990, chap. 10). In Walton’s view, works of fiction may seem to ask us to imagine things 
about people like Sherlock Holmes, and we may seem to be able to talk about them. But there 
simply are no such things, not even as Meinongian nonexistent entities. So if we were to 
understand model systems in the same way that Walton understands fictional characters then 
it seems that we would conclude that there are no model systems. 
Frigg intends to follow Walton in his antirealism (2010a, 264; 2010b, 120). An antirealist 
stance on model systems is difficult to reconcile with Frigg’s overall, indirect account of 
modelling, however. Model systems have a central place in that account: scientists use model 
systems to represent real systems (t-representation). According to Frigg’s account of t-
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representation, a model system X represents some real target system Y if and only if X 
denotes Y and ‘X comes with a key K specifying how facts about X are to be translated into 
claims about Y’ (2010b, 126). This might involve, for example, specifying ‘object-to-object 
correlations’, such as that ‘the sphere with mass me in the model system corresponds to the 
earth and the sphere with mass ms to the sun’ (ibid., 134). Once we have specified such 
correlations 
we can then start translating facts about the model system into claims about 
the world. For instance, calculations reveal that the model-earth moves on 
an ellipse, and given that the model system is an ideal limit of the target we 
can infer that the real earth moves on a trajectory that is almost an ellipse. 
(ibid., 135) 
If taken literally, however, all of these claims about t-representation would seem to be 
inconsistent with antirealism. If there are no model systems then there can be no facts about 
them and we cannot establish an object-to-object relation between model systems and the 
world. If there is no model-earth then it cannot move on an ellipse. 
One way to reconcile Frigg’s account with antirealism would be to offer some antirealist 
reinterpretation of what Frigg says about t-representation, which explains away the apparent 
commitment to fictional entities. If we were to take this route, however, all talk of using 
model systems to denote real systems, or of specifying object-to-object correlations between 
the two, would now be construed merely as a way of talking, rather than as offering an 
account of how modelling actually works. 
Another option would be to abandon antirealism. Frigg suggests that he is open to this 
possibility (2010b, 113). And, in fact, Frigg’s analysis of model systems differs from 
Walton’s analysis of fiction at a number of points, and sometimes seems at odds with 
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antirealism. For example, he writes that ‘the attribution of certain concrete properties to 
models … is explained as it being fictional that the model system possesses these properties’ 
(2010b, 116; see also 2010a, 261). On Walton’s theory, however, to say that it is fictional that 
the model system possesses certain properties is to say that we are to imagine that the model 
system possesses those properties. This would seem to conflict with antirealism: we cannot 
imagine things about model systems if there are none. However, if Frigg were to reject 
antirealism, and grant that we must posit fictional entities to serve as model systems, it seems 
that he would need to provide an account of what fictional entities are. And drawing on 
Walton’s theory will not help to provide such an account. 
2.3. Deferring the Problem 
So the key challenge remains: can proponents of the indirect fictions view flesh out the 
comparison between model systems and fictional characters by providing a coherent account 
of what fictional characters are? As we saw earlier, however, some have argued that this 
challenge need not be met. In fact, they claim, worries about the ontology of fictional 
characters need not concern philosophers of science. For example, in his recent work, Ronald 
Giere grants that scientific models and fictional characters are ontologically ‘on a par’ (2009, 
249). But he questions ‘whether we, as philosophers of science interested in understanding 
the workings of modern science, need a deeper understanding of imaginative processes and of 
the objects produced by these processes’ (ibid., 250). Peter Godfrey-Smith (2006) appears to 
endorse a similar attitude. Rather than defending any particular account of the ontology of 
fictional characters, he suggests that we might accept such objects as part of the ‘folk 
ontology’ of scientific modelling, even if in the long run we require an account of these 
objects ‘for general philosophical reasons’ (2006, 735). 
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I am sympathetic to this attitude. Later (Section 3.2) I will suggest that philosophers of 
science may indeed defer questions concerning fictional characters to philosophers of fiction. 
The important point to notice, however, is that this route is not open to those who defend the 
indirect fictions view. This view gives fictional characters a central place in modelling: on the 
indirect fiction view, scientists represent the world via fictional characters. To understand 
scientific representation we must therefore understand the relationship between a fictional 
character and the world. It is difficult to see how we could understand how such things 
represent without first understanding what they are. 
For example, both Giere and Godfrey-Smith describe the relationship between model 
systems and the world in terms of similarities or resemblances between the two. If their 
accounts of the model-world relationship are to be taken literally then this will clearly place 
constraints on the account of fictional characters we can adopt: it must be a realist account, 
on which there are fictional entities and these entities can be said to possess properties such 
as mass or velocity. If we wanted to take a different view of fictional characters then all talk 
of similarity or resemblance between model systems and the world would have to be radically 
reinterpreted. If defenders of the indirect fictions view wish their accounts of scientific 
representation to aspire to truth, rather than being merely convenient stories, then it seems 
that they cannot leave fictional characters to philosophers of fiction. 
3. A Direct Fictions View 
3.1. Models and Fiction Revisited 
As we have seen, some models (like the model of the sun and earth) represent real 
systems while others (like our predator-prey model) do not. The indirect fictions view 
suggests that we understand both in the same way: in each case, it is argued, the function of 
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the scientists’ model description is to create a model system, which is akin to a fictional 
character. The only difference between the two sorts of cases concerns what the scientists do 
with the model system afterwards. When they model an actual system, scientists establish 
another representation relation between the model system and the world. 
I think that these are the wrong parallels to draw between models and fiction. Rather than 
comparing all model descriptions to passages about fictional characters, I believe, we should 
distinguish carefully between cases where scientists model a real system and those where 
they do not. In the latter cases, model descriptions are like passages about fictional 
characters. In the former cases, however, scientists’ model descriptions are more like works 
of historical fiction, that represent real people, places and events (for a similar suggestion, see 
Cartwright 1983, chap. 7). Consider the following passage, from Robert Graves’ I, Claudius: 
Augustus assumed Antony’s Eastern conquests as his own and became, as 
Livia had intended, the sole ruler of the Roman world. (Graves 1934/2006, 
23) 
As commonly understood, this passage is not about any fictional character, but about the 
real Emperor Augustus, as well as his wife Livia, Mark Antony and the Roman Empire.2 
According to Walton, for example, when we read fiction that uses the names of well-known 
figures like Augustus, the names take their usual referents (1990, chap. 3). On this view, a 
novel like I, Claudius represents real people, places and events, by asking us to imagine 
propositions about them. Some of these propositions are true, such as that Augustus defeated 
                                                 
2
 Not all will agree with this interpretation, of course. Fortunately, we need not enter into 
that debate here. (For a helpful review, see Friend 2007.) 
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Mark Antony. Others are, it seems, entirely fabricated by Graves and so probably false, such 
as that Augustus was manipulated by the scheming Livia. 
This analysis of historical fiction suggests a better way to understand models of real 
systems. Recall Frigg’s discussion of the solar system model. On his view, when we read the 
scientists’ model description we first imagine an entity, the model system, which has all the 
properties given in the description. It is only in the ‘next step’, that we ‘connect our model to 
the target-system’ (2010b, 134), by specifying that the smaller sphere in the model system 
corresponds to the earth, the larger sphere to the sun, and so on. And yet it is surely more 
natural to regard the model description as asking us to imagine things about the sun and earth 
themselves. Frigg himself writes that the description ‘tells us to regard the earth and sun as 
ideal homogeneous spheres’ (ibid., 133), for example. Why not avoid excessive 
reconstruction and take the description at its word, as asking us to imagine things about the 
(actual) earth and the (actual) sun? Specifically, we are asked to imagine that the sun and 
earth are perfect spheres with certain masses, that they interact only with each other, and so 
on. Some of this is true (e.g. that the earth and sun are massive bodies) while some is known 
to be false (e.g. that they interact only with each other). 
 
Figure 2: A direct fictions view 
In place of the indirect fictions view, then, I propose a direct account (figure 2). When 
scientists model a real system they ask us to imagine things about that system directly, not via 
any fictional model system. As we saw in Section 1, sometimes the same model description 
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may be used in different ways. We might first explore the properties of the simple harmonic 
oscillator without having any real system in mind, and only later use it to understand the 
motion of the pendulum in the grandfather clock. According to the indirect view, when we 
apply the model to the pendulum, we do so by comparing our imaginary model system with 
the real pendulum. My suggestion is that another, more plausible, interpretation remains open 
to us. When we apply our model to the pendulum we simply imagine that the pendulum 
satisfies our model description. That is, we imagine that the pendulum is a point mass, that 
the force exerted on it is proportional to its displacement, and so on. 
The point being made here thus involves drawing a distinction between two different 
sorts of imaginings. Sometimes, we imagine people, places and objects that do not exist, like 
Sherlock Holmes or imaginary populations of predators and prey. Sometimes, however, we 
imagine things about real objects or people in the world, as when I imagine that the walls in 
my flat are painted a different colour, or that I play for Derby County. The mistake made by 
proponents of the indirect view, I believe, is to assume that all cases of modelling involve 
cases of the first sort of imagining. It is true that scientists sometimes conjure up imagined 
systems, just as novelists create fictional characters. But we need not assume that, when the 
scientist comes to represent the world, she must somehow use these imagined systems to do 
so. Another option remains open: the scientist may simply imagine things about the world. 
3.2. Avoiding Fictional Characters 
The direct view allows us to leave problems with fictional characters to philosophers of 
fiction. Recall that this deferral strategy is not open to the indirect view because, on that 
view, when scientists represent the world they do so via fictional characters. As a result, our 
account of scientific representation becomes dependent upon which view of the ontology of 
fictional characters we adopt. This is not the case on the direct account. On the view I have 
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proposed, when scientists represent the world they do so by imagining propositions about it, 
not via a fictional character. Problems with fictional characters do still arise, but only for 
models that do not represent any real system, like our predator-prey model. And philosophers 
of science may legitimately defer these problems to philosophers of fiction. All that matters 
in these cases is that scientists are able to imagine things about objects that do not exist. 
Nobody doubts that we have this ability; the debate concerns how we are to explain it. And 
nothing in my account hinges on the outcome of this debate. 
When scientists do not model a real system, then, I suggest that we remain neutral: 
perhaps we will need fictional entities to make sense of model descriptions, or perhaps not. 
Where scientists model a real system, however, we can be clear: there is no need to posit 
entities that satisfy the scientists’ model descriptions. The model description asks us to 
imagine propositions about a real system, and many of these propositions are false. But 
nothing in this requires us to posit any fictional entity. 
As we have seen, however, scientists often talk as if there were an object that satisfies 
their model description. How can the direct account make sense of this? One answer is 
suggested by Adam Toon (2010, 2012). Toon also draws on Walton’s theory of fiction, but 
the main ideas behind his analysis may be summarised briefly here. When scientists talk 
about theoretical models as objects, Toon suggests, we should not take this talk too seriously. 
Instead, they are pretending, ‘going along with’ the model in order to tell us what we are to 
imagine. For example, suppose we say that in the model the sun and earth are isolated from 
the other planets. When we say this we are not describing any abstract or fictional object; we 
are simply saying that the model tells us to imagine that the sun and earth are isolated from 
the other planets. 
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Toon’s analysis also suggests a way in which the direct account might explain how it is 
that we can learn about a model. Our initial model description asks us to imagine that certain 
assumptions are true of the sun and earth, such as that they are perfect spheres and that the 
force between them obeys Newton’s law of gravitation. If we accept these initial 
assumptions, however, we are also required to imagine further things, which follow from 
those assumptions. For example, we are to imagine that the earth moves in an ellipse, since 
this follows from the equation of motion that we write down. That the earth moves in an 
ellipse is therefore part of the content of the model, even though this was not specified 
explicitly in the model description. On this view, then, learning about a model is not a matter 
of discovering facts about an abstract or fictional object. Instead, we learn about a model by 
exploring the intricate web of imaginings which it prescribes. 
4. Conclusion 
Parallels with fiction offer useful tools for understanding scientific models. But we 
should be careful what parallels we draw. Comparing all model descriptions to passages 
about fictional characters yields an implausible interpretation of what scientists are doing 
when they model a real system, and leads us to longstanding disputes over the nature of 
fictional characters. A more plausible approach looks to fiction about real people, places and 
events. On this view, when scientists model a real system, they represent that system directly 
by asking us to imagine it in a certain way, and not via any fictional character. As a result, 
philosophers of science may leave problems with Sherlock Holmes to philosophers of fiction. 
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Abstract 
Many philosophers now regard causal approaches to explanation as highly promising, even 
in physics. This is due in large part to James Woodward’s influential argument that a wide 
range of explanations (including explanations in physics) are causal, based on his 
interventionist approach to causation. This article focuses on explanations, widespread in 
physics, involving highly idealized models. These explanations are not causal, yet they do 
not fall under any of the types of non-causal explanation Woodward describes. I argue that 
causal explanation is simply not as widespread or important in physics as Woodward and 
others maintain. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Many philosophers now regard causal approaches to explanation as highly promising, even 
in physics. In part this is because the major alternative, deductivist approaches to 
explanation, have fallen on hard times (Hempel 1965; Kitcher 1989). Problems of 
explanatory irrelevance and explanatory asymmetry (recall hexing spells and flagpoles) have 
motivated many to pay more attention to the role of causation in explanation. Preeminent 
among recent work on causal explanation is James Woodward’s influential argument that a 
wide range of explanations, including explanations in physics, are causal explanations, based 
on his interventionist approach to causation (Woodward 2003; Woodward 2007). After 
reviewing Woodward’s approach (Section 2), this paper argues that causal relations are 
insufficient for explanation because they do not account for the key feature of explanatory 
integration in physics (Section 3). Further, causal relations are unnecessary for explanations, 
widespread in physics, involving highly idealized models. These explanations are not causal, 
yet they do not fall under any of the types of non-causal explanation Woodward describes 
(Section 4). This constitutes a significant limitation on the scope of causal explanation in 
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physics that neither Woodward nor any other proponent of causal explanation has 
recognized. Causal explanation is simply not as widespread or important in physics as 
Woodward and others—such as Wesley Salmon, Phil Dowe and Michael Strevens—maintain 
(Salmon 1984; Dowe 2000; Strevens 2008). 
2. Woodward on causal explanation 
For Woodward, causal relations are captured in counterfactual claims about what would 
happen to an effect Y if an intervention on another variable (or set of variables) X were to 
occur. Causal explanations in turn appeal to these “interventionist” counterfactual 
dependencies. Woodward is clear that his account of causation is non-reductive, in the sense 
that it does not aim to give an account of causation exclusively in non-causal terms. 
Explanation is also non-reductive, for Woodward. He allows that not all causal explanations 
need be in terms of fundamental physics, and indeed that fundamental physics is an area in 
which explanations seem to be predominantly non-causal. He emphasizes that macro causal 
claims can often be more explanatory than causal claims about their micro realizers, and that 
these macro causal claims can be explanatory while offering only an approximate description 
of the relevant features of the target physical system. 
Consider an explanandum consisting of the statement that some variable Y takes a 
particular value. For Woodward, 
(1) [A] successful [causal] explanation will involve a generalization G [in the explanans] 
and explanans variable(s) X such that G correctly describes how the value of Y would 
change under interventions that produce a range of different values of X in different 
background circumstances (2003, 203). 
What makes the causal generalization G explanatory is that it can answer a relevant range of 
“what-if-things-had-been-different” questions, and it does this by supporting the correct 
counterfactuals about what would happen under scientifically relevant interventions on the 
explanans variable X. To do this, G must be invariant (roughly, describe the same sort of 
dependence of Y on the X) under the relevant range of interventions and in a range of 
relevant background conditions. Unlike deductivist approaches, successful explanations are 
not just nomologically sufficient, that is, they cannot just subsume the explanandum under a 
regularity and thereby show it is to be expected given the truth of the statements in the 
explanans. Rather, they must also describe relevant dependency relations—they must show 
how this explanandum would change if the intervention or background conditions were to 
change. Explanation locates the explanandum within a space of relevant alternative possible 
explananda. 
We have seen that on Woodward’s account, causal explanation requires counterfactuals 
describing possible interventions and possible covariation in changes in the values of 
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variables, and a notion of scientifically relevant possibility guiding the selection of 
interventions, dependencies and alternative possible explananda. The other key component of 
his account, of course, is an account of causal relations, including the cause-effect relation 
between variable X in the explanans and Y in the explanandum. For Woodward, if some 
intervention on X produces a change in the value of Y, then X is a token direct cause of Y. 
Roughly speaking,  
(2) An intervention I is a hypothetical experimental manipulation on X such that,  
(i) I causes X, 
(ii) I changes the value of X in such a way that the value of X does not depend on the 
values of any other variables that cause X, and  
(iii) I changes the value of X in such a way that if any change occurs in the value of Y, 
it occurs only as the result of the change in X and not from some other source. 
(See Woodward 2003, 98-107 for a more detailed account.) Woodward’s notion of 
intervention is not limited to what humans can actually do with physical systems. Rather, it is 
defined in terms of possible or hypothetical manipulations of values of variables within a 
model. 
Woodward rightly emphasizes that only some changes in the explanans and only some 
contrasts between the explanandum and its alternatives are of causal and hence explanatory 
relevance. As he puts it, “It is also true that if a large meteor had struck my office just as I 
was typing these words, I would not have typed them, but again, we are reluctant to accept 
the failure of the meteor to strike as part of the explanation for my writing what I did” (2003, 
226). The problem here is not that causal omissions can never figure in genuine 
explanations—Woodward is clear that sometimes they can—but rather that in this context a 
meteor intervention is not what Woodward dubs a “serious possibility.” Scientists approach 
empirical phenomena with a large stock of shared beliefs about which of the interventions or 
dependency relations are potentially causally and explanatorily relevant, and which 
alternatives to the explanandum are relevant as well. Woodward is clear that what counts as a 
causal factor is relative to a particular choice of variables and also to a particular range of 
values of these variables (Woodward 2003, 55-56). Different models—in Woodward’s terms, 
different sets of structural equations, variables and directed graphs—result in a different set 
of causes and hence a different explanation.  
So far explanation, causation and intervention have been defined in terms of statements 
about variables, values and dependency relations within a model. But not every 
transformation or modification one can perform on a model corresponds to a hypothetical 
manipulation on the physical system itself (in Woodward’s sense), and only those that do so 
correspond can underwrite causal claims. Causation requires that the values and dependency 
relations of variables in the model represent physical features of the target system. As 
Woodward puts it, successful causal explanation requires that the statements (about 
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counterfactuals, dependency relations, values of variables, causal relations and so on) in the 
explanandum and in the explanans be true or approximately true of the target system (2003, 
203). Without the truth or approximate truth of the explanandum, it fails to be an explanation 
of any physical phenomenon at all. Without the truth or approximate truth of the explanans, 
the statements about the model simply cannot describe any real causal relations in the target 
system. 
For example, the period of a pendulum may be approximately derived and explained in 
terms of its length, in a fixed gravitational field, by appealing to counterfactual claims about 
the behaviour of an idealized pendulum model satisfying Galileo’s pendulum law. The law 
states that the period of a pendulum is proportional the square root of its length: 
(3) T α √l   
The relevant counterfactual claim is: if the length l were increased to l*, in a fixed 
gravitational field, then the period T of the model pendulum would have increased to T*, in 
accordance with (3). However, the model does not support an explanation of the length of the 
pendulum in terms of its period, because the relevant interventionist counterfactual is false of 
the model: it is false that if the period were increased to T*—for instance by moving the 
pendulum to a weaker gravitational field—the length of the pendulum would have changed. 
Woodward uses this example to illustrate how his causal model of explanation solves the 
problem of explanatory asymmetry that bedevils deductivist approaches (2003, 197). For our 
purposes, the important point is that the interventionist counterfactual doing the explanatory 
work (and described in the explanans) is true of the model and is also approximately true of 
the target system. For Woodward, the fact that the dependency relations in the model 
approximate “what the real dependency relations in the world actually are” is fundamental to 
his account of causal explanation (Woodward 2003, 202). 
3. Causal relations are insufficient for explanation 
I contend that a consequence of Woodward’s account is that causal relations are insufficient 
for explanation in physics, and in two steps. First, some causal derivations fail to be 
explanatory. They may satisfy (1) and (2) above, and they may have significant predictive or 
heuristic value, but they do not explain. Second, where a causal derivation is explanatory, it 
is never merely by virtue of satisfying (1) and (2); rather, explanation requires that the causal 
story be integrated with a global model of broad scope and explanatory power. 
According to Woodward, what makes the causal generalization G in (1) explanatory is 
that it answers “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions, and it does this by supporting 
the correct counterfactuals about what would happen under interventions. Consider 
Woodward’s example of the explanation of the period of a pendulum, but this time prior to 
Galileo’s theoretical advances. Taking liberties with the actual historical order of events, 
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imagine (counterfactually) that Galileo had conducted his years of painstaking experimental 
observations of pendulums first, in advance of any other work on his new science of 
mechanics. Had he arrived at his pendulum law (3) and his idealized pendulum model this 
way, we would be inclined to say that his argument deriving the period of a pendulum is not 
explanatory. The pendulum model on its own supports a relevant and approximately correct 
set of counterfactual claims about interventions on a physical pendulum. Nonetheless, it 
would be merely a phenomenological or data model, as contemporary physicists would put it. 
It fits a given set of data well, and it may describe the correct dependency relations in an 
isolated model, but fails to connect with other, more global models. These sorts of models 
may have predictive and heuristic power, but they do not underwrite explanations in physics.  
Unfortunately, Woodward’s account yields the result that many phenomenological 
models do come out as explanatory, and this cannot be right. Woodward posits a base 
threshold of explanatoriness, above which stands a continuum running from less deep or 
good explanations to deeper and better ones (2003, 368). The worry is that (1) and (2) set the 
threshold very low indeed: generalizations that are invariant under any intervention at all 
exceed the threshold because they answer a “what-if-things-had-been-different” question 
(2003, 369). So Woodward would certainly view the counterfactual Galileo’s standalone 
pendulum model as underwriting a bona fide explanation of the period of the pendulum. But 
we have good reason to maintain that it does not, nor do the plethora of other 
phenomenological models in physics that capture some of the dependency relations in their 
target physical systems. 
As a matter of historical fact, the pendulum law is significant for Galileo precisely 
because it is a key step in his route to the fundamental laws of his new science of mechanics. 
Galileo measured the elapsed time of an object’s vertical fall over a distance equal to the 
length of the pendulum, for various pendulum lengths (Drake 1989, xxvii). He obtained a 
constant ratio of free-fall times to time for the pendulum to swing to vertical. With the 
pendulum law and that ratio, Galileo could calculate the times for other distances of free-fall 
and then, removing pendulums entirely from the calculation, write down his famous law of 
motion: that all objects fall at the same rate, regardless of their composition or mass, and that 
objects starting at rest accelerate uniformly as they fall, i.e. their speed is proportional to the 
square of the elapsed time of fall. He found the law fit well his previous measurements of 
descents along inclined planes.  
This suggests that the idealized model pendulum gets its explanatory power by its 
integration into Galileo's new science of mechanics. In this case, it is integration of a 
particularly simple sort: Galileo took his pendulum law to follow from his more general law 
of free fall, and the idealized model pendulum is simply a special case of a more general 
model covering falling objects in general. Newton’s subsequent achievement was greatly to 
increase this integration by explaining the motions of bodies in terms of the forces acting on 
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them and providing a unified framework for all gravitational systems. The important point 
for our purposes is that it is not sufficient that the idealized pendulum model approximate the 
correct dependency relations in a physical pendulum for it to be explanatory.  
Woodward does say that successful causal explanation must include relevant dependency 
relations and answer a relevant range of “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions, and 
that scientists share an understanding of which interventions and which dependency relations 
are explanatorily relevant. Woodward seems to recognize that merely describing local causal 
relations is not sufficient for explanation, while perhaps not fully appreciating the 
consequences for the role of causation in explanation. The challenge is not to rule out an 
explanatory role for the absence of falling meteors. Rather, the challenge is to underwrite the 
explanatory role of dependency relations in the local pendulum model. And this can be done 
only in the context of a wider integration with a global model in physics—here Galilean (or 
even better Newtonian) mechanics.  
The point is not just that some causal derivations satisfying (1) and (2) fail to be 
explanatory, as in the contrary-to-historical-fact Galilean account of the pendulum. It is also 
that no causal derivation is explanatory merely by virtue of satisfying (1) and (2). This is 
because what makes the dependency relations described in the explanans relevant (i.e., 
explanatorily relevant) is the integration of the local model described in the explanans with a 
global model of broad scope and explanatory power. Without such integration, the local 
model will generally fail to be explanatory, no matter how accurately it represents causal 
relations in the target physical system. And as we shall now see, with such integration the 
local model will generally be explanatory—even if it fails to represents any causal relations 
in the target physical system. 
4. Causal relations are unnecessary for explanation 
Woodward allows that not all explanations in physics need be causal and notes that 
fundamental physics is an area in which explanations seem to be predominantly non-causal. 
What Woodward has in mind, in these and other sorts of physics explanations he calls non-
causal, are cases in which the notion of an intervention on a physical system is incoherent or 
inapplicable. This includes global applications of fundamental physics to the whole universe 
or to large portions of it, where the notion of a local intervention is inapplicable (2007, 91); 
explanations that appeal to alternative situations not plausibly characterized as an 
intervention, e.g., altering the dimensionality of space-time (2003, 220); and situations that 
lack the invariance or stability properties needed to define an intervention on the system 
(2007, 77). These sorts of cases, however, are merely the tip of a very large iceberg of non-
causal explanation in physics. 
The issue is that, aside from explanations in textbooks (from which Woodward’s 
examples seem to be drawn), much of the explanatory practice in physics does not fit 
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Woodward’s characterization. These are cases in which the idealized models that underwrite 
putative explanations are largely non-representative of target physical systems. So while they 
approximately model the explanandum behaviour, they do not approximate aspects of the 
physical system described in the explanans. Moreover, these models are not corrigible, in the 
sense that they cannot be refined in a theoretically justified, non-ad hoc way to bring them in 
closer agreement with the target system. The point is that these are cases of explanation in 
which physicists view the scientifically relevant claims about interventions and systematic 
patterns of dependency relations that figure in a potential explanans to be statements about a 
highly idealized model, statements that are not even approximately true of the target system 
containing the phenomenon to be explained. If the explanatory practice of contemporary 
physics is taken seriously, there are highly idealized models of significant explanatory value.  
Valuable work has been done by philosophers of physics on the possible explanatory 
roles of highly idealized models (Rueger 2001; Batterman 2002; Bokulich 2008; Batterman 
2010; Bokulich 2011). Alisa Bokulich, for instance, has argued that “fictional models” can be 
explanatory if they meet certain conditions. Bokulich focuses on semi-classical models, 
which mix classical and quantum features. These models are known not to represent 
successfully the physical system because, for example, they include quantum particles 
following definite classical trajectories. The earliest and most well-known of these models is 
Niels Bohr's model of the hydrogen atom. As Bokulich puts it, "I want to defend the view 
that despite being a fiction, Bohr’s model of the atom does in fact explain the spectrum of 
hydrogen" (Bokulich 2011, 42). Robert Batterman is interested in how highly idealized 
models explain the universality of structural features, such as the common characteristic 
shape of droplets at breakup when water drops fall from a dripping faucet. 
We can explain and understand (for large scales) why a given drop shape at breakup 
occurs and why it is to be expected. The answer depends essentially upon an appeal to the 
existence of a genuine singularity developing in the equations of motion in a finite time. 
It is because of this singularity that there is a decoupling of the breakup behaviour 
(characterized by the scaling solution) from the larger length scales such as those of the 
faucet diameter. Without a singularity, there is no scaling or similarity solution. Thus, the 
virtue of the hydrodynamic singularity is that it allows for the explanation of such 
universal behaviour. The very break-down of the continuum equations enables us to 
provide an explanation of universality (Batterman 2009, 442-443). 
Asymptotic analyses that systematically abstract away from micro details enable idealized 
models to explain underlying structural or universal features. Batterman calls these 
“asymptotic explanations” (Batterman 2002, Ch. 4). 
One option for Woodward and other proponents of causal explanation is simply to reject 
any role for highly idealized models in explanation. These are putative explanations that fail 
to meet Woodward’s requirement for causal explanation, nor do they fall under his class of 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -832-
  
   
8
non-causal explanations in physics. These models are simply highly inaccurate 
representations of the physical world. One could argue that highly idealized asymptotic and 
semi-classical models have great heuristic and predictive value, but do not underwrite 
explanations. They can play no part in underwriting the true causal premises needed in an 
acceptable explanation. In my view, this kind of wholesale rejection of any role for highly 
idealized models in explanation would be a mistake. A closer look reveals a more nuanced 
and complex set of considerations.  
In the case of the Bohr model and other semi-classical models, there is no consensus 
among physicists that these models are explanatory, and rightly so. Clearly, their explanatory 
merits need to be examined on a case-by-case basis. At the very least, we have good reason 
to be skeptical that the Bohr model of the atom has any explanatory value, especially in light 
of the quite impressive explanations of the hydrogen spectrum given in terms of relativistic 
quantum theory.  
The situation with respect to asymptotic models is somewhat different. On the one hand, 
a case can be made that at least one of these models may be eliminated (in principle at least) 
in scientific explanation (Redhead 2004; Belot 2005). On the other hand, these sorts of 
models are used widely and are regarded as underwriting among the best explanations on 
offer in physics today. In addition to analyzing the use of asymptotic models to explain drop 
formation in hydrodynamics, Batterman has explored the use of asymptotic models to 
explain critical phenomena in thermodynamics and to explain the rainbow in catastrophe 
optics (Batterman 2002). Similar sorts of highly idealized, asymptotic models are accepted as 
explanatory in many areas of physics beyond those that are the focus of Batterman (and his 
critics). For instance, these sorts of models are taken to underwrite explanations of a wide 
variety of non-linear dynamical systems, from a damped, driven oscillator model of the 
human heart to gravitational waves ([self-reference omitted]).  
The gravitational waves case is particularly interesting. Physicists take themselves to 
have explained gravitational waves using Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity (GTR). 
However, even in the simplest models of binary systems that produce gravitational waves, 
the Einstein Field Equations (the equations of GTR) cannot be solved directly. The reason is 
that these are a set of coupled, nonlinear equations governing the relation between the 
distribution of matter and energy in the universe and the curvature of space-time (of which 
gravitational waves are one feature). An attempt to solve the Einstein Field Equations 
directly by applying regular perturbation methods results in divergences (infinities) in values 
for the properties of gravitational waves observable from earth. So physics takes what is by 
now a familiar strategy: replace the intractable original problem with a tractable one, called 
the post-Newtonian approximation, that makes essential use of singular perturbation theory 
and asymptotic models. The empirical results are predictions and explanations of 
gravitational wave phenomena. These phenomena have not been observed (at the time of 
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writing), but a handful of large gravitational-wave detectors should soon reach sensitivities 
high enough for direct detection of gravitational waves (Pitkin, Reid et al. 2011; [self-
reference omitted]).  
We have good reason to accept, at least provisionally, explanations in physics based on 
highly idealized models. However, I am not claiming to have presented a conclusive 
argument for doing so. Obviously, much work remains to be done. Further analysis of the 
details of Bokulich’s and Batterman’s examples is needed, and vastly more cases of putative 
explanation via highly idealized models in physics need to be examined in detail. The 
question that needs to be asked of each case is: does explanation of a phenomenon 
ineliminably require appeal to a highly idealized model in this case? Nor am I claiming that 
“model explanation” or “asymptotic explanation” are adequate normative accounts of 
explanation in physics that can underwrite this sort of explanatory practice. Rather, I am 
claiming that philosophers have good reasons to take seriously the fact that the explanatory 
practice of physics includes a large class of explanations based on highly idealized models, 
explanations that are clearly not causal on Woodward’s (nor any other plausible) account. I 
should also note that rejecting these sorts of cases wholesale as explanatory failures has as a 
consequence that physicists are massively mistaken about the explanatory merits of their 
theories and about the scope of their understanding of the natural world. This runs counter to 
Woodward’s own project of offering an account of explanation that has normative and 
descriptive elements in reflective equilibrium, an account “significantly constrained by prior 
usage, practice and paradigmatic examples” (2003, 8). 
The best option is to accept these sorts of cases as explanatory and recognize that the 
explanations fall outside the scope of causal explanation in physics. We have seen how 
Woodward allows that explanations in physics may be noncausal where the notion of an 
intervention is incoherent or inapplicable. Explanations appealing to highly idealized models 
constitute a new way in which the notion of an intervention is inapplicable. In these 
explanations, the correct counterfactual dependencies between I, X and Y may well obtain 
such that Woodward’s conditions (2)(ii) and (2)(iii) are satisfied. In other words, these cases 
fit very well Woodward’s central idea that explanations include statements of counterfactual 
dependencies describing the results of a hypothetical manipulation of variables in a model. 
However, the explanation is not causal because (i) is surely false: I does not cause X, because 
the dependency relations in the model do not correspond to or represent—even in an 
approximative way—physical dependency relations in the target system. Choosing this 
option is to acknowledge that there is a distinct, large and important class of non-causal 
explanations that have not been recognized by Woodward, nor, I suggest, by other 
proponents of causal explanation in physics. 
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5. Conclusion 
Recall that for Woodward, the notion of an intervention plays the crucial roles of 
underpinning both the truth and explanatory relevance of generalization G in the explanans 
of a successful causal explanation (1). In the context of physics, I have argued, “intervention” 
is simply not the right concept to play these roles. Even in cases where the notion of an 
intervention is coherent and applicable, it is not sufficient to meet the threshold of genuine 
explanatoriness in physics. As we have seen, what makes the dependency relations described 
in the explanans explanatorily relevant is the integration of the local model described in the 
explanans with a global model of broad scope and explanatory power. In other cases the 
notion of intervention is wholly unnecessary to underpin the truth of G, because G can be 
made true by facts about dependency relations in a model. These dependency relations are 
clearly not causal, because they are features of an idealized model that do not accurately 
represent corresponding features of the physical world.  
Among the many virtues of Woodward’s account of explanation are that it is explicitly 
model-based and that it makes explanation trace systematic patterns of dependencies rather 
than simply describing nomologically sufficient conditions. However, the argument given 
above that much successful explanation in physics involves highly idealized models counters 
Woodward’s claim that many (non-fundamental) explanations in physics are causal. I suggest 
that the argument against Woodward’s causal account tells equally strongly against other 
prominent defences of causal explanation in physics (e.g., Salmon 1984; Dowe 2000; 
Strevens 2008). There is good reason to believe that outside of textbook presentations, causal 
explanation is not as widespread in physics as its proponents have claimed. This point likely 
generalizes to other areas of science in which complex non-linear dynamical systems are 
modeled, such as biology and chemistry. These areas seem to have the same sorts of non-
reductive explanations appealing to highly idealized, partially non-representative models. If 
this is right, causal concepts are not as useful in scientific explanation as many philosophers 
currently believe, and certainly causal theories of explanation are not as successful as the 
current consensus holds. Perhaps deductivist approaches to explanation merit renewed 
interest.  
 
San Diego, CA -835-
  
   
11
References 
Batterman, Robert W. 2002. The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, 
Reduction, and Emergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
---. 2009. "Idealization and Modeling." Synthese 169: 427-446. 
---. 2010. "On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science." British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science 6(1): 1-25. 
Bokulich, Alisa. 2008. Reexamining the Relationship between Classical and Quantum 
Mechanics: Beyond Reductionism and Pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
---. 2011. "How Scientific Models Can Explain." Synthese 180: 33-45. 
Dowe, Philip. 2000. Physical Causation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Drake, Stillman. 1989. "Introduction." Two New Sciences, Including Centers of Gravity and 
Force of Percussion. Stillman Drake. Toronto: Wall & Thompson: i-xxxv. 
Hempel, Carl Gustav. 1965. Aspects of Scientific Explanation, and Other Essays in the 
Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press. 
Kitcher, Philip. 1989. "Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World." 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, volume XIII. Philip Kitcher and 
Wesley C. Salmon. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 410-506. 
Pitkin, Matthew, Stuart Reid, et al. (2011) "Gravitational Wave Detection by Interferometry 
(Ground and Space)." Living Revies of Relativity 14. 
Redhead, Michael. 2004. "Asymptotic Reasoning." Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Modern Physics, vol. 35, pt. B, no. 3, pp: 527-530. 
Rueger, Alexander. 2001. "Explanations at Multiple Levels." Minds and Machines 11(4): 
503-520. 
Salmon, Wesley C. 1984. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Strevens, Michael. 2008. Depth : An Account of Scientific Explanation. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
Woodward, James. 2003. Making Things Happen : A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
---. 2007. "Causation with a Human Face." Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of 
Reality: Russell's Republic Revisited. Huw Price and Richard Corry. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press: 66-105. 
 
 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -836-
An Epistemology of Causal Inference from
Experiment
Karen R. Zwier
Abstract
The manipulationist account of causation provides a conceptual analysis of
cause-effect relationships in terms of hypothetical experiments. It also explains
why and how experiments are used for the empirical testing of causal claims.
This paper attempts to apply the manipulationist account of causation to a broader
range of experiments—a range that extends beyond experiments explicitly
designed for the testing of causal claims. I aim to show (1) that the set of causal
inferences afforded by an experiment is determined solely on the basis of
contrasting case structures that I call “experimental series”, and (2) that the
conditions that suffice for causal inference obtain quite commonly, even among
“ordinary” experiments that are not explicitly designed for the testing of causal
claims.
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1. Introduction. The manipulationist account of causation, exemplified especially in the
work of Woodward (2003), is a powerful and interesting explication of the meaning of causal
claims. The account is intended as a conceptual clarification of what it is to be a causal
relationship, and it provides this clarification by making reference to hypothetical experiments
and ideal interventions. And since, according to the account, hypothetical experiments are
embedded in the very content of causal claims, it requires only a small logical step to explain
the role of experimentation in the empirical investigation of causal claims.
No one can deny that some scientists intend to test causal claims, and that they design and
carry out experiments for the purpose. Does the type of fertilizer applied to potatoes affect
crop yield? A scientist might perform an experiment by applying different types and
quantities of fertilizer and comparing the resulting yield. Does a certain drug improve
prognosis for patients with a certain condition? A group of scientists might perform a series
of randomized, double-blind trials to find out. The manipulationist account certainly seems to
be applicable for analyzing the success or failure of causal inference in experiments such as
these. However, it is not quite as easy to see if—or how—the manipulationist account might
apply to experiments that are not explicitly designed or carried out for the purpose of testing a
causal claim.
Experiments in the physical sciences, in particular, rarely seem to be framed in terms of
causal questions, at least not explicit ones. Consider an experiment aimed at measuring the
boiling temperature of nitric acid at atmospheric pressure. Is such an experiment intended to
test a causal claim? It certainly doesn’t seem so, at least not at first glance. But could the
experiment still afford causal inference, if we knew where to look and what assumptions to
apply? I take the answer to this latter question to be non-obvious, and the goal of this paper is
to make some progress toward an answer.
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This paper attempts to apply the manipulationist account of causation to a broader range
of experiments—a range that extends beyond the set of experiments that are explicitly
designed for the testing of causal claims. I wish to include anything that we might naturally
call an “experiment”—i.e., a scientific study in which the investigator deliberately sets up
and/or intervenes on a system for the purpose of studying it.1 I aim to show (1) that the set of
causal inferences afforded by an experiment is determined solely on the basis of contrasting
case structures that I call “experimental series”, and (2) that the conditions that suffice for
causal inference obtain quite commonly, even among “ordinary” experiments that are not
explicitly designed for the testing of causal claims.
The implications of this point are potentially far-reaching. Even experiments not branded
as “causal”, including those carried out in the course of research in the physical sciences, can,
under certain circumstances, afford causal inference. As a result, an experiment that meets
certain criteria has the ability to furnish causal content even in those areas of science (e.g.,
fundamental physics) where causal content is less obvious.
2. The Manipulationist Account of Causation. I begin with a brief overview of the
manipulationist account of causation. The manipulationist account, in its most basic form, is
intended as an account of the meaning of causal claims. A meaningful causal claim must have
an interpretation that refers to the result of some relevant hypothetical experiment. But what is
the relevant hypothetical experiment for a given causal claim? Roughly, the idea is the
following: for a causal claim such as “X causes Y ”, the hypothetical experiment under
1Purely observational studies (e.g., observing astronomical events through a telescope,
analyzing retrospective health information, etc.) that involve no intervention or set-up on the
part of the investigator will not be considered experiments for my purposes here.
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consideration is one in which the variable or factor X is manipulated or changed in some way,
and any corresponding change (or non-change) in Y is observed. According to the
manipulationist account of causation, consideration of such an experiment is logically
embedded in the very content of a well-formed causal claim, such that evaluation of the truth
or falsity of the claim will be tied to an evaluation of whether or not a change in X would be
seen if the experiment were to be performed.
We can state the idea more formally as a criterion for X to be considered a cause of Y :
MANIPULATIONIST CAUSE: X is a cause2 of Y iff, under some set of background
conditions BC = {BC1, BC2, . . . , BCn} having values {bc1, bc2, . . . , bcn}, given some
(possibly empty) set S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} of variables other than X and Y that are
held fixed at predetermined values {s1, s2, . . . , sm}, there is some ideal intervention3 I
on X that would change the value of Y .
2
“Cause”, as I use it here and throughout this paper, corresponds to Woodward’s
“type-level contributing cause”. The criterion that I give here is a modified and simplified
version of Woodward’s M, which requires detailed knowledge of the path from X to Y (see
Woodward (2003, 59)). In the context of my discussion here, I do not wish to assume that an
evaluator of causal claims always has that knowledge, and so I give a criterion that does not
require it. In addition, my criterion is intended to be more faithful to the implicit criterion for
causation in the mind of an actual experimenter who is—implicitly or explicitly—testing a
causal claim.
3The manipulationist account requires that an intervention variable have particular
characteristics in relation to both X and Y and the larger system of variables being considered.
For the purpose of brevity, I will not discuss these requirements here; see Woodward (2003).
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According to the above criterion, a hypothetical experiment relevant to the evaluation of
the claim “X is a cause of Y ” is one in which we hold some (possibly empty) set of variables
S fixed while intervening on X , and we observe any associated changes in the value of Y . The
claim “X is a cause of Y ” will be true if and only if changes would be observed in Y in the
context of some hypothetical experiment defined by a specific BC, S, and I .
An important thing to note about this way of spelling out the meaning of a causal claim is
that it makes use of a particular kind of counterfactual claim. In order to make sense of how
an intervention on one variable, X , “makes a difference” to another variable, Y , we need to
have some concept of what would have happened had the intervention on X not occurred. It
is only by comparing the case in which the intervention is performed with our background
understanding of what would have happened had the intervention not been performed (or had
a different intervention been performed) that we get a sense of an effect.
A second thing to notice about the hypothetical experiment referenced by a causal claim is
that it involves two different types of interactions with the experimental system. The values of
the background condition variables in BC are observed, as is the value of Y . Nothing is done
to directly force these variables to take on particular values. For X and for the set S, however,
interventions directly force these variables to take on certain values.4 The distinction between
observing the value of certain variables and intervening to set the value of others is absolutely
central to the manipulationist account of causation. The character of the knowledge that we
4Experiments with a non-empty S will be multiple-intervention experiments intended for
ruling out “unfaithfulness”, as it is called in the causal modeling literature. In cases of
unfaithfulness, observational data (and even some experimental data) can make it appear that
two variables are independent of one another despite one being a cause of the other. See
Spirtes et al. (2000, 13–14), Woodward (2003, 49–50), and Zhang and Spirtes (2008).
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gain from observing a natural course of events in a system and that of the knowledge that we
can gain from carefully designed interventions on that same system are essentially different.
When we know from mere observation that certain values of X are associated with certain
values of Y , this fact underdetermines the various types of causal connections that might exist
between the two variables. Assuming that the correlation is not a spurious result of sample or
selection bias, there are three different ways in which the variables might be causally
connected: (i) X could be a cause of Y , (ii) Y could be a cause of X , and/or (iii) X and Y
could share a common cause (or set of common causes). Interventions allow us to distinguish
among these three types of causal connections (and their several combinations), because each
kind of causal connection between X and Y would respond differently to interventions on X
or Y .
3. From Hypothetical Experiment to Real Experiment. The conceptual tools and criteria
discussed in the previous section serve the primary goal of the manipulationist account of
causation: that of explicating and interpreting causal claims in terms of hypothetical
experiments. Given a causal claim, these tools allow us to reconstruct the relevant
hypothetical experiment embedded in the claim (or a set of relevant hypothetical experiments
that reflect alternate interpretations of the claim).
Although the conceptual interpretation of causal claims is the primary goal of the
manipulationist account, the manipulationist account of causation carries with it an important
corollary for scientific practice. For those who wish not only to evaluate the content of a
causal claim but moreover to test its truth, the manipulationist account can provide norms and
recommendations for experimental testing. The truth or falsity of a causal claim can be
empirically tested as long the hypothetical experiment embedded in the content of the claim
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can be actually realized. Actual experiments intended to test a causal claim can—and
should—be modeled on the hypothetical experiment suggested in the content of the causal
claim.
Let us focus on how an actual experiment must be carried out if it is to test a causal claim:
EXPERIMENTAL INSTANCE FOR TESTING THE CLAIM “X IS A CAUSE OF Y ”: Under
some set of background conditions BC = {BC1, BC2, . . . , BCn} having values
{bc1, bc2, . . . , bcn}, hold some set S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} of variables other than X and
Y fixed at values {s1, s2, . . . , sm}, perform an intervention I on X , and observe the
value of Y .
The above operation, however, is only a single instance of an experiment and is
insufficient for answering the question “Is X a cause of Y ?” Recall that the hypothetical
experiment embodied in the claim that X causes Y makes use of a contrast between two
counterfactual states: the state of Y when X is manipulated in one way, and the state of Y if
X had been manipulated in a different way (or not at all). But actual experiments provide us
no access to such counterfactual knowledge.
The obvious way to estimate the results of counterfactual experimental instances is to test
many instances of the experimental system under similar conditions and to use statistical
analysis5 to estimate the expected response of the system under different interventions. Let us
define for this purpose an experimental series:
5Statistical analysis, as I intend it here, could be as simple as calculating a mean and
standard deviation from the set of measured results, or could involve the application of much
more sophisticated analysis techniques.
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EXPERIMENTAL SERIES FOR TESTING THE CLAIM “X IS A CAUSE OF Y ”: A set of
two or more experimental instances for testing the claim “X is a cause of Y ” such that:
1. Every instance in the set has the same (or sufficiently similar) values for BC and
S; and
2. The set can be partitioned into two or more non-empty subsets such that every
instance in each subset has the same value for the intervention I on X and no two
instances falling into different subsets have the same value for the intervention I
on X .
Observations made of the value of Y for each of the subsets described in item 2 above can
be collated and used to generate a statistical estimate of the expected value of Y under the
type of intervention used in that subset of experimental instances. If there is a significant
difference in the expected values of Y for different subsets, then we may conclude that X is a
cause of Y . If there is not a significant difference in the expected value of Y for different
subsets, the conclusion must be more tentative. If a sufficient number of instances has been
tested, we can legitimately conclude only that X is not a cause of Y under the particular
circumstances of the experiment (where “circumstances” includes the background conditions
BC, the choice of S on which to perform secondary interventions, and the range of values of
X that were effectively tested in the series). The possibility that X will manifest itself as a
cause of Y under other circumstances remains open, but the likelihood of that possibility can
be reduced by testing of other series with different values for BC, different values for S,
and/or interventions testing differing ranges of values of X .
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4. From Real Experiments to Causal Claims. We have already discussed the way in which
a real experiment can approximate the hypothetical experiment embedded in a causal claim.
Now I would like to turn our attention to experiments that are not explicitly concerned with
causation or the testing of causal claims. When analyzing an experiment that was not designed
for the purpose of testing causal claims, we simply seek to identify anything that could be
properly described as an experimental series (on the definition given in the previous section).
Consider as an example an experiment performed by Gasparo Berti, which aimed to
decide a philosophical controversy surrounding the possibility of a vacuum and test Galileo’s
predictions about the maximum height to which water could be raised by suction. The
experiment was most likely carried out sometime in the years 1642–1643 in the company of
several active participants in the scientific scene of Rome, including Raffaello Magiotti,
Athanasius Kircher, and Niccolo` Zucchi. A description of the experiment is found in a 1648
letter from Magiotti to Marin Mersenne. The following is an excerpt from the letter:
In regard to the history of quicksilver, you may know that the many wells of Florence,
which are cleaned each year by suction with siphons, gave Sig. Galileo the opportunity
to observe the height of the attraction which was always the same, about 18 Tuscan
braccia,6 and that in every siphon or cylinder, no matter how wide or thin. This was the
origin of his speculations on the subject in his work on the cohesion of solids.
Later, Sig. Gasparo Berti, here in Rome, made a lead siphon that stretched about 22
braccia from his courtyard to his room, and was filled from above in the following way.
First, leaving both valves open (D below and F above), vessel AG was filled with water.
[See figure 1.] Then, after closing valve D, the water of vessel AGPM was poured out
6The braccio was equivalent to slightly more than half of a meter.
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Figure 1: Diagram of Berti’s experiment, included in Magiotti’s letter to Mersenne
(through valve M), leaving the water inside the siphon at height AE. Later, making sure
to keep vessel HF full,7 the water AE was allowed to flow out through valve D, which
(since valve F was already open and immersed in water) pulled the water from above
and filled the whole siphon BA and the vessel AG. Finally, with vessel HF full and
having closed valve F, and with vessel AG full (having first closed M) and D open, the
water started to descend through the siphon, emptying the entire neck BF. The water
continued to fall until reaching N and did not descend further, but almost always
balanced itself [at N] when the experience was replicated. And it was possible to
observe this very well, since part BC of the siphon was made of glass on purpose and
the whole siphon was well glued and watertight. Sig. Berti believed that he could refute
Sig. Galileo with this experience, saying that the length from N to A was more than 18
7This was presumably done by continuous refilling.
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braccia, but he should have seen that the piece of the siphon AE doesn’t count, being
immersed in the water of vessel AG; EN was 18 braccia exactly.
I should not fail to mention one thing that gave me much to think about: while the
water of the siphon was falling and the neck BF was emptying, an infinite number of
tiny bubbles, like those in glasses and crystals, could be seen rising through the water
inside the glass BC: this, without a doubt, was some stuff that went to refill where the
air was missing. I could not convince myself that it was air because there was not
enough air in the water in vessel AG to refill that space (besides, the space NBF could
be made much larger and it would still refill). Nor could air have entered through pores
or the welding of the siphon, for if it had, it would have eventually allowed the
suspended water to fall. In fact, those bubbles have always remained in my mind: I can
only explain my whole sentiment about them briefly like that.8
Besides Magiotti’s letter, there are four other sources that describe Berti’s experiment: two
written by eyewitnesses Zucchi and Kircher, and two other secondary sources.9 These other
accounts all describe a similar and slightly more complex version of the experiment, which
may have been a later modification. In this version, a glass globe was mounted on the siphon
(see figure 2). The globe contained a bell attached to a magnetic device so that, once the
purported vacuum was achieved inside the globe, the bell could be rung from outside by using
another magnet.
The primary intention of the experiment, at least on Berti’s part, appears to have been a
desire to check (and perhaps refute) Galileo’s prediction of 18 braccia. A secondary intention
8Translation mine. The manuscript of the letter is published in de Waard (1936, 178–181).
9de Waard (1936) contains relevant excerpts (in the original Latin) from all four sources.
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Figure 2: Engraving of a more complex version of Berti’s experiment, reproduced in Schott
(1664/1687, 203)
was to investigate the empty space itself: was it or was it not a vacuum? It is obvious from
Magiotti’s letter that this latter was a question of interest for him, and it was likely the most
important question in the minds of the other participants as well; Zucchi and Kircher were
both Jesuits who were convinced of the impossibility of the vacuum.
The addition of the bell in the more complex version of the experiment was suggested by
Kircher and intended as an experimentum crucis to test the claim that the space in the globe
was a vacuum. The space was found to transmit both light and magnetism, and the bell could
indeed be heard when rung. These facts were enough to convince both Zucchi and Kircher,
and perhaps also Berti, that the space was not a vacuum. Maignan, a friend of Berti’s and a
later commentator on the experiment, proposed the counter-opinion that the sound of the bell
was being conducted by the bell’s wooden support rather than by the space itself, and argued
that the space was indeed a vacuum. It seems that Magiotti remained uncertain. Inasmuch as
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the various participants walked away from the experiment with different views, the
experimentum crucis was a failure.
Notice that the questions of interest for those performing and attending the Berti
experiment were not causal questions; none of the writings explicitly mention a curiosity
about the cause of the empty space, for example, nor is there any evidence of debate among
the participants about what caused the elevation of the water to be 18 braccia rather than
some other height. The questions posed and debated were, instead, factual questions and
questions of interpretation about the phenomenon: How high did the water stand? Could there
be any pores or imperfections in the device? Did the space transmit sound? Was the space a
vacuum, or was it not?
Despite the lack of interest in causal questions on the part of those involved in the
experiment, can causal conclusions can be drawn anyway? A first step toward deciding this
question is to itemize the procedure described in the excerpt from Magiotti’s letter and
classify each step as an intervention component (I) or an observation component (O):
1. (I) Construct and set up the pipe and vessels in the configuration given in figure 1.
Ensure that valve M is closed.
2. (I) Open valves D and F.
3. (I) Fill vessel AG with water.
4. (I) Open valve M.
5. (O) Observe that vessel AG empties. Water inside the siphon remains at height AE.
6. (I) Fill vessel HF with water.
7. (I) Open valve D and continue supplying HF with water.
8. (O) Observe that the water flows out through valve D and also flows from above to fill
siphon.
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9. (I) Close valve F and valve M.
10. (O) Observe that the water begins to descend down the siphon, emptying neck BF and
falling until it reaches N.
Assuming a similar set-up for the more complex version of the experiment,10 we might
simply modify the first step and add several steps to the end of the procedure:
1*. (I) Construct pipe mounted with glass globe and internal magnet-bell apparatus.
Arrange it and vessels in the configuration given in figure 2.
.
.
.
11. (O) Observe that light passes through the sphere.
12. (I) Move magnet around the exterior of the glass globe.
13. (O) Observe that the interior magnet moves in response to the exterior magnet’s
movement.
14. (O) Observe that sound can be heard from the bell inside the glass sphere.
It is interesting to notice that many—not just one—of the steps listed in the above
procedures are interventions on the experimental system. Most of them serve only as steps
toward the set-up of the apparatus. However, each can, in principle, be considered as an
intervention in an experimental instance for testing a variety of causal claims; the variable X
will be the thing intervened upon (for example, the intervention in step 4 is an intervention on
whether or not valve M is open), the variable Y can be any observation that follows (for
example, the observation in step 5 that vessel AG empties), and all other observations and
10Other accounts of the experiment describe a different procedure for filling the apparatus
with water, but the difference in procedure is inconsequential for the analysis I offer below.
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interventions involved in the experiment are considered either as observed background
conditions in BC or auxiliary interventions in S.
The question of whether or not the experiment affords causal inference amounts to the
question of whether or not the various experimental instances that make up the experiment are
part of an identifiable experimental series. Consider, for example, an experimental instance
centered around the intervention in step 4 above. The variable X might represent the state of
valve M (open or closed) and the variable Y might represent the state of the vessel AG (which
can be empty or full, but is observed as empty in step 5). The set-up established in steps 1–3
and other background conditions surrounding the experiment could all be represented by the
set BC. Now, if we can identify at least one other experimental instance with the exact same
values for BC but a different intervention on valve M, we will have identified an experimental
series for testing the claim that the state of valve M is a cause of the vessel AG emptying.
Berti’s experiment does in fact provide such an experimental instance. Assuming that there is
some time lapse between the execution of steps 3 and 4, we can consider as a second
experimental instance the time period after steps 1–3 have been performed but before valve M
has been opened. In this time period, vessel AG is observed to be full. Since there is a
difference in the state of vessel AG between the experimental instance in which M is opened
and the experimental instance in which M is not opened, we can conclude that the state of
valve M is a cause of the state of vessel AG.
The observation-intervention pair considered in the example experimental series just given
(i.e., a valve being opened and a vessel emptying) are such an ordinary matter of course that
we do not tend to think of it as the basis for a causal conclusion that can be drawn from the
experiment. That water only empties from a vessel that has some open outlet is a mundane
fact that each person experiences so many times in life that it becomes an implicit piece of
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causal knowledge. Still, inasmuch as the experiment establishes a contrast between
performing and not performing an intervention (or alternatively, performing one type of
intervention vs. performing a different type of intervention) and the corresponding difference
in the observations made in each case, the experiment also affords the conclusion that one
variable (the variable intervened upon) causes another (the variable observed to covary with
the variable intervened upon).
But are there more substantial causal questions that could have been answered by the
experiment in question? The interventions performed in the more complex version of the
experiment, if compared to a relevant contrast case, could be interpreted as tests of causal
questions. For example, when it is observed in step 11 that light passes through the spherical
glass vessel, the implicit contrast case is whether or not light passes through the spherical
glass vessel when it was originally filled with ordinary air. Presumably there were no
noticeable differences between the appearance of images viewed through the vessel in the two
cases. Likewise, we might compare the intervention in step 12 when it is performed in the
context of the experimental set-up and when it is performed in a contrasting context (for
example, with a column of water filling the siphon up to mark N, but not brought about
through suction, so that the spherical glass vessel is filled with ordinary air).
The participants in the experiment were not, however, thinking in terms of these
contrasting experimental instances. Even if they had been, they would have been unable to
agree on a causal conclusion because they were unable to agree about what the interventions
in the experiment had achieved. It is clear in Berti’s experiment what the intervention is (or
rather, what the sequence of interventions is: steps 1–4, 6–7, 9, 12) but what those
interventions achieve was precisely the subject of debate. Some of the participants—the
vacuists—thought that those interventions achieved a vacuum in the spherical vessel, while
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others—the plenists—thought that the vessel was still filled with some sort of attenuated
matter. If they had been able to agree, for example, that there was a vacuum in the vessel, then
they might have been able to agree that ordinary air (as opposed to vacuum) was not a cause
of the transmission of light or magnetism. In addition, they would have been able to reach a
conclusion about the effect of the vacuum on the transmission of sound by noting any
difference in the volume of the bell’s ring in each case.
But there was no such agreement. Instead, some of the participants were already certain,
prior to the experiment, that a vacuum could not transmit light or sound or magnetic
phenomena. They took themselves to be certain of the causal relationships, and they
attempted to test the presence or absence of the vacuum by the presence or absence of its
purported effects. An experiment which could have been understood to test various causal
claims instead used a prior confidence in those causal claims to test whether or not the cause
factor was present. Even so, the actual theoretical use to which the experiment was originally
put does not prevent anyone who is later informed of the details of the experiment from
drawing causal conclusions.
5. Conclusion. Many experiments that are not designed for the purpose of causal inference
will still afford causal inferences. The requirements I have placed on an experimental series
for testing a causal claim will be found quite commonly in “ordinary” scientific experiments.
We can see that this is true especially when we consider that, in cases where there is a time
lapse between the set-up of the experiment and the intervention on the purported cause
variable (if the time latency of the observed result is small in comparison to the time lapse), a
comparison of observations made before and after the intervention is performed will usually
correspond to an experimental series for testing if the variable intervened on is a cause of the
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subsequent observation.
Interestingly, the fact that many “ordinary” experiments will afford causal inference
means that any experimental science has a plentiful source of causal content. I see this
unacknowledged point as significant to debates about whether or not there is causal content in
fundamental physics.11 In acknowledging the epistemic dependence of fundamental physics
on experiment, we must also acknowledge at least a potential for causal content.
11For a set of papers in this debate, see the volume edited by Price and Corry (2007).
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Abstract 
 
While introspective methods went out of favour with the decline of Titchener’s 
analytic school, many important questions concern the rehabilitation of 
introspection in contemporary psychology. Hatfield (2005) rightly points out that 
introspective methods should not be confused with analytic ones, and goes on to 
describe their “ineliminable role” in perceptual psychology. Here I argue that certain 
methodological conventions within psychophysics reflect a continued uncertainty 
over appropriate use of subjects’ perceptual observations and the reliability of their 
introspective judgements. 
  My first claim is that different psychophysical methods do not rely equally on 
the introspective capabilities of experimental subjects. I contrast “minimally‐
introspective” tasks with “introspection‐heavy” ones. It is only in the latter, I argue, 
that introspection can be said to have a non‐trivial role in the subjects’ performance. 
My second claim is that my rough‐and‐ready distinction maps onto a number of 
important “dichotomies” in vision science (Kingdom and Prins 2009). Not 
coincidentally, the introspection‐heavy categorisation captures many of the tasks 
typically considered less able to yield useful information regarding the processes 
underlying visual sensation.   
 
1. Introduction  
 
Recent work on introspection in psychology has been careful to separate the specific 
commitments of Titchener’s analytical school from the discussion of introspection 
more generally. For example, Hatfield (2005) defines introspection broadly as, “a 
mental state or activity in or through which persons are aware of properties or 
aspects of their own conscious experience” (p.260). He later defines introspection 
as, “deliberate and immediate attention to certain aspects of phenomenal 
experience,” arguing that, “it continues to be used as a source of evidence in 
perceptual and cognitive psychology” (p.279). In this paper I will challenge the 
appropriateness of Hatfield’s definitions in the branch of perceptual psychology 
known as psychophysics1, offering an alternative account.  
                                                        
1 Psychophysics is defined by Gescheider (1997) as “the scientific study of the relation between 
stimulus and sensation.” The disciplinary demarcation between psychophysics and perceptual 
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Figure 1 
A Metameric Match Experiment. The subject is asked to adjust the intensities of R, G 
and Y monochromatic lights so that the yellows are indistinguishable.  
 
Hatfield discusses the psychophysical task of metameric colour matching (see fig. 1) 
as one example of a perceptual experiment reliant on introspection (p.278). 
However, it is reasonable to question whether Hatfield’s definitions can effectively 
target those activities which are introspective, or if they are too permissive and 
encompass a range of activities ordinarily thought of as just perceptual and not 
reliant on introspection. First, though, there is an important exegetical question over 
how to understand Hatfield’s claim that introspection is a source of evidence in 
experiments such as the metameric matching one.  
 
One possible reading, which I reject, is that Hatfield just points to the fact that 
psychophysics, unlike behaviourist psychology assumes and moreover requires that 
experimental subjects have conscious perceptual experiences2. For the mission of 
psychophysics, an experimental approach to the mind inaugurated by Fechner 
(1860), is to chart and measure the physical energies needed to elicit specific 
conscious perceptual states. But I strongly doubt that Hatfield intends to 
characterise methods in psychology as introspective purely in terms of a contrast 
with the behaviourist research program. In fact, Hatfield is in agreement with 
Danziger (1980) that our understanding of introspection in psychology has been 
distorted by the behaviourist reaction to Titchener’s analytical school.  
 
What is more, the mere having of conscious states is a different thing from the 
possession of some ability to report reliably on the nature of those states. It is the 
latter capacity that is typically identified with introspection. For example, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
psychology more generally has become somewhat blurry in recent years, with many experiments 
that are classified as psychophysical dealing with complex perceptual states, not just simple 
sensation.  
2 Not to say that the behaviourist psychologists all assumed that human beings were unconscious 
zombies, but that their experimental methods were indifferent to the presence or absence of 
consciousness. 
!"#$%&'
''''('
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Schwitzgebel’s (2011) sceptical case against introspection does not target the idea 
that we have conscious states, or that those states are important to our mental 
economy, but is concerned to argue that to a greater extent than we care to admit 
the contents of those states are indeterminate or unknown to us. My interpretation 
of Hatfield’s notion of introspection will hinge on this point. I understand his claim 
that contemporary perceptual psychology relies on introspective evidence to be the 
claim that psychologists exploit their subjects’ introspective ability in order to glean 
information about the human perceptual system, and furthermore it is a 
presupposition of this experimental practice that subjects are competent 
introspectors in the sense that they are capable of giving verbal or motor responses 
which reliably indicate the presence or absence of particular features of their 
conscious experiences. For example, a psychophysical experiment which measures 
the absolute detection threshold for a dim spot of light is said to be reliant on the 
subject’s capacity to introspect in the sense that her subjective awareness of the 
spot is a crucial data point that the experimenter has access to because of the 
subject’s capacity to introspect.  And thus the experimenter must assume that the 
subject can faithfully indicate those times that the spot enters her conscious field of 
view.  
 
Yet a problem with this account is that it is not clear how it can be employed to 
distinguish introspection from ordinary perception, for doesn’t the subject’s activity 
in the detection task just boil down to her looking for a dim spot of light? This worry 
could prompt us to take Hatfield as endorsing a more restrictive definition. For 
Hatfield also suggests that what characterises introspection over ordinary 
perception is that one attends to one’s experience of an object, not just the object 
itself (p. 279, “immediate attention to… phenomenal experience”). This makes 
introspection importantly different from perception because as many would have it, 
perception is generally “transparent” and our perceptual encounter with the world 
is not interrupted with moments of attention to experience itself. The difficulty with 
this reading is that it then becomes unclear how the more restrictive definition of 
introspection could apply to many of the psychophysical tasks that Hatfield wants it 
to apply to, such as stimulus detection and the metameric matching experiment. 
Subjects perform such tasks by directing their attention to external stimuli, namely 
the coloured lights, and need not attend to their own phenomenal experience, qua 
experience. Nor do they need to consider their experience in a more fine grained or 
detailed way than in ordinary perception.  
 
In short , the problem is that while Hatfield’s restrictive definition has the virtue 
allowing one to demarcate introspection from perception, it cannot reasonably be 
applied to the range of psychophysical tasks that Hatfield claims it does. And 
furthermore a case could be made that it should not apply to any perceptual 
experiment, since these generally involve attention to external objects, not attention 
to phenomenal experience itself. Yet the more liberal definition makes all perceptual 
activity concurrently introspective in a somewhat trivial sense.  
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It strikes me that a different approach to defining introspection ‐‐ in the context of 
psychophysics ‐‐ is needed, one that does not characterise introspection in terms of 
an object of attention or focus of awareness. In this paper I propose that the tasks 
that should be said to involve introspection are the ones which rely on experimental 
subjects’ capacity to analyse and compare sensory experiences that bear non‐obvious 
relationships of similarity and difference to each other. Thus on my account 
introspection can be part of the process of perceiving and attending to an external 
object, and need not be overtly directed at phenomenal experience. The subject may 
interpret her task to be simply that of attending to the external stimulus, but she can 
be reporting on aspects of her phenomenal experience nonetheless.  It is also a 
feature of my view that the extent to which tasks rely on introspection is a matter of 
degree. In the next section I give a set of examples of common psychophysical tasks 
that are either “introspection‐heavy” or “minimally‐introspective”. In the third 
section I describe how the cluster of introspection‐heavy tasks – though not 
described in this way by scientists themselves – has commonly attracted suspicion 
from psychophysicists as being less likely to produce data that is “objective” and 
informative about neural mechanisms. I ask whether this is mere coincidence, or if 
the methodological norms of psychophysics reflect a certain wariness towards 
introspection.  
 
 
2. Introspection in Psychophysics as Controlled Comparison  
 
2.1 Examples Of Introspectively Demanding and Undemanding Psychophysical 
Tasks.  
 
The metameric match paradigm, illustrated in figure 1 has been used to diagnose 
specific types of colour vision deficiency since the late 19th century. Differences in 
the number of retinal cone types an individual has, and the spectral sensitivities of 
those cone classes, lead to measurable differences in the proportion of red to green 
in a composite light that he or she judges to look identical to a yellow 
monochromatic standard. Note that in this task the only perceptual judgment that 
the subject need make is over whether the composite and monochromatic light are 
visually indistinguishable. If the lights are presented as abutting (as in fig. 1) then 
the subject simply has to judge whether or not the colour field is homogeneous. No 
attention to the specific qualities of the perceived colour is required.  
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Figure 2 
An Asymmetric Match Experiment. The subject is asked to adjust the proportions of R 
and G monochromatic lights so that the yellows match in hue. The intensity of the Y 
light is fixed, so the yellows cannot be matched for brightness and are therefore 
distinguishable even when hue is judged to be equivalent.  
 
Contrast this task with an asymmetric match paradigm (fig. 2). In this case the two 
central stimuli are not matched for luminosity but the subject must say whether or 
not they match in hue regardless of their visible difference in brightness. This 
requires that the subject analyse her experience of the two colours in terms of 
separate dimensions of hue and brightness, and make a judgment as to the identity 
of just one of these dimensions, disregarding the difference in the other. Thus the 
subject must make a series of comparisons between pairs of stimuli in order to find 
the pair that holds the unique but non‐obvious relationship of sameness of hue. This 
relationship is non‐obvious in that it is not marked by a simple defining 
characteristic like a homogenous spatial profile.  
 
It should be fairly intuitive that this task is “introspection‐heavy” in a way that the 
metameric matching task is not. The contrast between these two tasks points us to 
the central intuition behind my new characterisation of introspection. The idea is 
that the metameric matching task is “minimally‐introspective” because it can be 
performed without any careful comparison of the phenomenal qualities one 
experiences on presentation of the two stimuli. The metameric paradigm relies on 
introspection only in the minimal sense that it assumes the subject can know and 
reliably report when her conscious visual field is homogeneous with respect to 
colour3. The asymmetric matching task, on the other hand, is “introspection‐heavy” 
because it does require this careful comparison of sensory experiences that bear 
non‐obvious relationships of similarity and difference to each other.  
 
Asymmetric matching paradigms have been used to study achromatic perception of 
lightness and darkness (fig. 3a , see Gilchrist 2004) and to study colour constancy. 
Figure 3b gives an example of an asymmetric task in which the observer views a 
                                                        
3 i.e. relies on introspection defined in the first, permissive sense. To reiterate the discussion of 
section 1, the problem with the minimal notion of introspection is that it cannot distinguish 
introspection from ordinary perception.  
!"#$%&'
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scene under two different lighting conditions. She is instructed to adjust the colour 
of the central patch in one image until it looks as if made from the same paper as the 
central patch in the other (Foster, 2011). Importantly, even when the patches are 
matched there will still be a visible difference in colour between them, and the 
experiment relies on the subject having a clear sense of what sameness of material 
would look like in spite of these differences. Again, the task is “introspection‐heavy” 
in comparison to a task in which the subject just has to report on the absolute 
identity or distinguishability of two stimuli. In particular, it relies on the subject’s 
ability to make a “judgment call” on the one best match, given a range of close 
contenders which vary along a number of different dimensions. I describe the 
introspection‐heavy tasks as requiring controlled comparison because the demand 
placed on the subject is to perform some kind of analysis and comparison, but 
within parameters that are pre‐specified by the experimenter.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 
(a) Achromatic asymmetric match experiment where black annulus influences 
perceived brightness of one of the circles. Subject is asked to determine point of 
subjective equality of the brightness of the two circles. 
(b) Asymmetric colour constancy experiment. Subject is asked to adjust the colour of 
one of the patches (marked with arrow) until it looks as if it is made from the same 
paper as the other. (From Foster 2011, permission needed.) 
 
Another kind of paradigm that intuitively fits the idea of controlled comparison is a 
rating scale task. In a series of experiments published recently (To et al 2008, 2010, 
Tolhurst et al 2010) subjects were presented with nearly 300 pairs of photographs – 
an original and a modified version – and were asked to rate how similar the pairs 
were on a scale from 0 (completely identical) to any arbitrarily high value (see fig. 
!"#$%&'()*+,&-.%%'
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4a). In one of these publications, Tolhurst and colleagues (2010) also present results 
of a simple two‐alternative‐forced‐choice (2‐AFC) contrast discrimination 
experiment in which subjects just had to report which of a pair of otherwise 
identical photographs contained a small, high contrast central patch (see fig. 4b). 
They then apply their model of contrast discrimination to the rating scale data. The 
rating scale task falls under my introspection‐heavy category, while the contrast 
discrimination task is minimally‐introspective. In the former, the subject must make 
a judgement as to the relative similarity of a large number of pairs of stimuli, that 
differ in different ways, whereas in the latter task she detects the presence or 
absence of a high‐contrast patch in a rather automatic fashion. Figure 4 illustrates 
how similar stimuli can be used in these two very different experiments, so it is not 
complexity of stimulus per se that determines how introspectively demanding the 
task is. Rather, the determining factor is the nature of the response that the subject 
must make to the stimulus. That is, whether the response is simply choice between 
saying the high contrast patch appeared first or second out of two stimuli, or if it 
calls for a more careful examination of the perceived properties of the stimuli.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Example of stimuli used by Tolhurst et al. 2010 (a) Rating scale task. For each of 294 
image pairs, subjects were asked to rate how similar or different they appeared on a 
numerical scale of their own devising. (permission needed) 
!"#$
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(b) 2‐AFC contrast discrimination. Subjects had to report if the high contrast central 
patch appeared in the first or second stimulus.  
 
Before moving on, I would like to emphasise that my two categories are intended to 
reflect a qualitative difference in how introspectively demanding these tasks are, 
and that I will say nothing in this paper about how to quantify this difference, and 
how it is that introspective demands admit of degree.  For example, the question of 
whether or not metameric matching is even less introspectively demanding than 
contrast discrimination will be left unanswered. It seems plausible that 
introspective demands, like attentional demands, come in degrees but I offer no 
suggestions of how one might measure this. It is also plausible that there will be 
some tasks that occupy middle ground between my categories and are hard to 
classify either way. I will not deal with such cases here. My aim in presenting a set of 
tasks that are intuitively more reliant on introspection than the others has been to 
highlight one way that introspection may be said to play a role in perceptual 
psychology, and to this end I have focused on the most clear cut cases.  
 
2.2 Other Classifications of Psychophysical Tasks  
 
One of the attractive things about psychophysics as a subject for philosophy of 
science is the fact that throughout its short history methodological questions about 
the best way to measure sensory responses have been debated in a perspicacious 
way by leading protagonists. Moreover, such controversies still resonate in the 
living memory of the discipline, and are recounted even in the most recent 
textbooks. One way in which methodological debates commonly unfold is with a 
distinction first being drawn between two broad classes of psychophysical 
techniques, and the relative merits of the two classes are subsequently discussed.  
 
In their textbook Kingdom and Prins (2009) devote a chapter to the “dichotomies” 
that have been most significant to psychophysicists past and present. The first of 
these, Brindley’s (1960, 1970) distinction between Class A and Class B observations 
is particularly relevant to my account of introspection. Brindley characterised Class 
A observations as any tasks in which the observer just had to report on the absolute 
similarity or dissimilarity in the appearance of a pair of stimuli. For example, the 
measurement of the detection threshold for a spot of light is Class A because the 
subject need only indicate whether the trial in which the spot is present is 
distinguishable or not from the reference stimulus in which the spot is absent. 
Likewise, the measurement of the discrimination threshold for the brightness of the 
spot is also Class A, as it just requires the subject to report if the trial in which the 
luminosity of the spot is increased looks different from the trial in which the 
luminosity remained at baseline. In contrast, Brindley (1970:133) categorised as 
Class B, “[a]ny observation that cannot be expressed as the identity or non‐identity 
of two sensations…”; for example, “all those [observations] in which the subject 
must describe the quality or intensity of his sensations, or abstract from two 
different sensations some aspect in which they are alike.”  
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Brindley’s description of Class B observations is interchangeable with my 
characterisation of introspection‐heavy tasks. Indeed, the tasks which I presented as 
examples of my minimally‐introspective category – metameric matching and 
contrast discrimination – are Class A, whereas all kinds of asymmetric matching and 
rating scale tasks are Class B. In essence, both of these categorisation schemes can 
be understood as drawing a distinction between tasks in which the experimental 
subject is treated somewhat like a thoughtless measuring instrument, and methods 
that rely on the subject’s status as a critical being who can attend to and reflect on 
her own conscious states. The point is not that the A/minimally‐introspective Class 
treats the subject as if unconscious, or that it requires the subject to have sensory 
capacities but not cognitive ones. Rather, it is that the A/minimally‐introspective 
Class makes no demands on any capacity for reflection on and comparison of 
occurrent sensory states, whereas tasks in the B/introspection‐heavy Class do4.  
 
To illustrate this, imagine a machine that can read off the conscious sensory states of 
a subject performing a contrast discrimination task. In order to predict the subject’s 
responses to any trial, all the machine must do is to assign a number to the 
intensities of the subject’s experience of contrast for the central regions of the two 
different stimuli. If they have the same values the machine predicts the answer is 
‘same’, and if they differ the machine predicts an answer of ‘different’. Once the non‐
trivial problem of reading off individuals’ phenomenal states is solved, the rest is 
uncomplicated! If an equivalent machine were to be built for the rating scale task, 
the blueprint could not be so simple. There is no one quality of the subject’s 
conscious experience of the stimuli that the machine could measure and use to 
predict the response. Rather, the machine would have to rely on some complicated 
model of how various differences in the experienced qualities of the images are 
weighted against each other to give and impression of greater or lesser degrees of 
similarity5. In other words, a model of introspective comparison and not a simple 
measurement algorithm.  
 
The mind‐reading machine thought experiment again confronts us with the fact that 
the distinction being drawn is not between tasks that are in no way introspective 
and those that completely are. Rather, it is about the extent to which these tasks call 
upon some putative introspective capacity. For the first machine, dealing with the 
                                                        
4 In support of this idea that the key distinction in play here is between subject‐as‐measuring‐
instrument and subject‐as‐reflective‐being, it is worth noting that Brindley’s one example of a 
psychophysical document explicitly hostile to Class B observations is the 1943 Optical Society of 
America (OSA) report that, as Stevens (1951:31) relates, “reduces psychophysics to the employment 
of a human observer as a null instrument under a set of strictly specified conditions” And Brindley’s 
one example of a psychophysicist liberal with regards to Class B is Stevens (1951), who explicitly 
rejects the OSA definition as too narrow and restrictive (and cf. Helson 1949). 
5 Interestingly, however, Tolhurst et al. (2010) can predict trends in the similarity rating data to a fair 
degree of accuracy with a model of entirely unconscious neuronal response functions. The fact that 
there is “machine” that can predict responses to the contrast discrimination and rating scale 
experiments, without peering into the conscious states of subjects should not detract from the fact 
that any hypothetical machine attempting to examine conscious states in order to predict responses 
would have a to treat the two experiments differently.  
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contrast discrimination experiment, can still peer into the conscious states of 
observers and this captures some minimal notion of introspective activity. Yet the 
second machine, dealing with the rating scale experiment, needs not only to 
determine what the subject experiences, but also to determine what the subject 
makes of her experience, what is more and less salient about the different qualities 
presented in her visual phenomenology. This is an introspective undertaking of a 
weightier kind.  
 
It is hard to say how influential Brindley’s distinction has been. It came under 
immediate criticism from Boynton and Onley (1962) but was clearly accepted in 
some form by Marks (1978) and Teller (1984), and is discussed at length in 
Gescheider’s (1997) psychophysics textbooks. Kingdom and Prins (2009, p.18) 
choose not to employ it as an overarching basis for classifying psychophysical 
experiments because of the problem that certain tasks cannot be classified as either 
A or B.  
 
Kingdom and Prins’ preferred distinction  is between tasks that measure 
performance and those that measure appearance, which they characterise in the 
following way: 
“If the measurement can be meaningfully considered to be better under one 
condition than under another, then it is a performance measure, if not it is an 
appearance measure.” (p.22) 
Performance tasks are any ones designed to chart perceptual “limits” (e.g. contrast 
discrimination, detection of a spot of light against a differently coloured 
background). An example of an appearance task is an experiment comparing the 
strength of the Müller‐Lyer illusion with fin angles of 45° and 60°. Even if the length 
of the central bars appears to be more different when the fins are 45°, there is no 
sense in which the subject is “better” at the task in that condition. So this Class B 
observation can also be said to be an appearance measure. Thus there is an overlap 
with my distinction: appearance tasks tend to be introspection‐heavy, and 
performance tasks tend to be minimally‐introspective. But it is not as well matched 
as is the case with Class A vs. B. In particular, the metameric match task that I 
classify as minimally‐introspective turns out to be an appearance measure.6  
 
3. Not All Psychophysical Methods Were Created Equal 
 
All I have argued so far is that there is an intuitive way of differentiating 
psychophysical tasks that are more reliant on introspection from those that are not, 
and that my categorisations turn out to be roughly co‐extensional with 
categorisations of tasks developed within the psychophysical tradition. The 
                                                        
6 A related dichotomy is Sperling’s (et al. 1990) Type 1 vs. Type 2 distinction. In Type 1 experiments 
the subject’s response maybe either correct or incorrect with respect to some physical dimension of 
the stimulus (e.g. for either is more oblique than line 2). For Type 2 the experimenter is cannot 
classify responses as correct or incorrect. Note again that the metameric match turns out to be Type 
2, even though Class A/minimally‐introspective.  
San Diego, CA -865-
Draft. Please do not quote without permission. Comments welcome. 
  11 
question now is what to make of this finding. Is it just a coincidence that the 
distinctions coincide? It should come as no surprise to the reader that my next point 
will be that the categories that line up on the introspection‐heavy side have tended 
to meet with more diffidence and suspicion from psychophysicists than those on the 
other side.  
 
Brindley (1970) presents type A observations as especially informative about the 
physiological mechanisms underlying perception because they can be used to test 
“psycho‐physical linking hypotheses”, that two stimuli (e.g. yellow monochromatic 
light, and a certain mixture of red and green lights) will produce the same neural 
activity and hence the same sensation.  
 
On the relative status of the two classes he writes that,  
“The use of Class A observations as a basis for analysing the function of the eye 
and visual pathway is not controversial; every writer on vision admits, at least 
by implication, that they can be legitimately used. On the use of the kinds of 
observation here called Class B, there have been differences of opinion … The 
conservative opinion, in its most extreme form, is that only Class A observations 
are of any value, and in a discussion of visual mechanisms all Class B 
observations may be entirely disregarded.” (1970, p. 134)  
Brindley himself takes this view to be too narrow, but is critical of Stevens’ (1951) 
“extreme liberal opinion” for failing to make the distinction. Later in the book, when 
discussing Hering’s opponent theory of colour he writes as if it is still moot whether 
the kinds of phenomenological reports presented by Hering in support of his theory 
can actually be taken as evidence for a kind of colour mechanism (p.208). 
 
One might think that this is all besides the point in a discussion about introspection 
because the reason why the value of Class B observations was held in question was 
not because they are introspection‐heavy, but because their failure to underwrite 
psychophysical bridge principles. But I do not think that this problem is so 
disconnected to from the issue of introspection. For if Class B tasks were to be 
granted some supporting assumptions, like the ones offered for Class A, then one 
could equally say that they are informative of underlying neural mechanisms. For 
example, in the case of the asymmetric hue matching experiment, why not assume 
that when the hue sensation for each stimulus is equal, that is evidence that there is 
a neural pathway somewhere between the photoreceptors and the cortex that 
conveys the same message in both cases? This would be a special case of the 
assumption made in support of inferences from Class A observations that, 
“whenever two stimuli cause physically indistinguishable signals to be sent from the 
sense organs to the brain, the sensations produced by these stimuli, as reported by 
the subject in words, symbols or actions, must also be indistinguishable” (Brindley 
1970, p.133). 
 
Yet, Class B observations are treated differently. The reason for this difference is 
likely because Brindley and other theorists (e.g Marks 1978) have been wary of 
attributing to subjects the kind of introspective powers that would be needed to 
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analyse hue separately from all other sensory qualities, and determine exactly the 
point of equivalence of hue.  In other words, if these theorists had shared 
Titchener’s faith in the analytical acumen of introspection, they would have had no 
reason to treat Class B observations differently from Class A.   
 
This pattern of unequal treatment can be seen not just in the discussion of Class A 
and B observations, but also with respect to the other dichotomies discussed by 
Kingdom and Prins. They note that it is fairly common for psychophysicists to refer 
to some tasks as more “objective” or “subjective” than others, with all the value‐
laden connotations of these terms. Kingdom and Prins explain this usage in the 
following way:  
“All psychophysical experiments are in a trivial sense subjective, because they 
measure what is going on inside the head, and if this is the intended meaning of 
the term then the distinction is redundant7. The dichotomy is more often 
invoked, however, to differentiate between different types of psychophysical 
procedure. The distinction has been used variously to characterize Class A 
versus Class B observations, tasks for which there is versus tasks for which there 
is not a correct and an incorrect response8, forced‐choice versus non‐forced‐
choice procedures, and criterion‐dependent versus criterion‐free procedures.” 
(p.18‐19) 
 
The notion of subjectivity at play here is encapsulated in the idea that experiments 
are subjective if they are introspection‐heavy. For all the tasks on the wrong side of 
the subjective‐objective tracks are ones which rely on the subject’s judgments 
concerning the appearance of the stimuli, involving complex comparisons which 
cannot be independently verified by examining the physical properties of the stimuli 
themselves.  
 
To conclude, there is a sense in which the title of this paper is misleading. I have not 
showed that the psychophysicists have avoided using experimental methods more 
reliant on introspection, or that the use of such methods has always been 
questioned. Indeed, when Kingdom and Prins write that, “Both performance‐based 
and appearance‐based experiments are important to our understanding of vision. 
Measures from both types of experiments are probably necessary to fully 
characterize the system” (p.26),  they are articulating a methodological pluralism 
that many psychophysicists would endorse. However, the crucial point is that the 
methods on the wrong side of the divide, those more reliant on introspection, 
continue to need their advocates, whereas those on the other have been accepted 
without question. This is an indication of the contested status of introspection 
within the psychophysics tradition.  
 
 
                                                        
7 Cf. the worry discussed above that all psychophysical experiments rely on introspection in a trivial 
or “minimal” way, hence the distinction between introspection and perception is made redundant.   
8 I.e. performance vs. appearance or Sperling’s Type 1 vs. Type 2. 
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Background: What are now increasingly called individual based models (IBMs) have 
been used in ecology since the 1970s when theoretical ecology began in earnest. The 
best known examples from that time include the forest computer simulation model 
(named JABOWA) of Daniel Botkin (Botkin et al 1972) and the computer simulation 
model of Donald DeAngelis (DeAngelis et al 1991) for a freshwater ﬁsh cohort. These 
were identiﬁed with the systems ecology school of theoretical ecology and the approach 
was anticipated to offer a unifying theoretical framework for ecology (Huston 1988), a 
goal whose possibility is still being debated (Roughgarden 2009, Vellend 2010). Since 
then hundreds of IBMs have been published in ecology. Moreover, IBMs are being 
actively developed in other disciplines, especially the social sciences, and dozens of 
software environments have been created to facilitate IBM research (Allen 2010, Borrill 
and Tesfatsion 2012). This talk reviews progress for IBMs in ecology, details several 
remaining difﬁculties, and suggests clariﬁcation where needed.
Provisional Deﬁnition: For now, an IBM is provisionally considered to be a computer 
simulation in discrete time steps for the creation, disappearance and movement of a 
ﬁnite collection of discrete interacting entities. The germination, growth and death of a 
collection of individual trees on a plot of ground, or the birth, growth and reproduction of 
a collection of individual ﬁsh in a pond are the classic examples.
Challenges Met: Grimm and Railsback (2005) detail seven “challenges” that IBMs have 
faced in ecology: long time needed to develop the model, difﬁculty in analyzing results, 
lack of common language to communicate model and results, requirement for too much 
data, uncertainty and error propagation, lack of generality, lack of standards. Ecological 
IBM modelers have faced these challenges head on. They have collectively proposed 
and implemented a protocol (called the “ODD protocol”) for how a model is to be 
speciﬁed (Grimm et al 2006, 2010), and they have coalesced around a freely 
downloadable programming platform, NetLogo (Wilensky 1999, 2013), as a standard for 
developing and executing IBMs (Lytinen and Railsback 201, Railsback and Grimm 
2011). Moreover, NetLogo can be embedded within Mathematica (Wolfram Research) 
thereby endowing the IBM modeling module with the statistical and analytical tools of 
Mathematica’s powerful industry-standard mathematical programming environment. The 
steps by the ecological IBM modeling peer group go a long way toward resolving many, 
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but not all, of the reservations that have dogged IBMs since their inception. Here are 
some remaining problems.
Exclusionary Deﬁnitions: Despite their progress, ecological IBM modelers have also 
taken decisions that seem counter productive. They  employ an unnecessarily  exclusive 
deﬁnition of what counts as an IBM. Grimm and Railsback (2005), following Uchmanski 
and Grimm (1997), stipulate that to be considered an IBM in ecology, the model must 
satisfy four criteria:
1. Detail about each individual's life cycle must be present in the model, including the 
growth and development of each individual as it ages.
2. The dynamics of resources used by  individuals must be explicitly  represented - a 
"carrying capacity" cannot be used because it is supposedly  a population-level 
concept and that cannot be known to an individual.
3. Integers and not real numbers must used to represent the size of a population-the 
model must feature discrete events and not refer to rates.
4. Variability must be allowed and must exist among individuals of the same age -
environmental phenotypic variation, not heritable genetic variation, in as much as 
Grimm and Railsback (2005) consider evolutionary ecology as beyond the scope 
ecological IBMs. 
Inconsistent  Deﬁnitions: Grimm and Railsback (2005) acknowledge that these criteria 
rule out many models as IBMs. Notable among the excluded models are “predator-prey 
systems with individuals as discrete units with local interactions but no life cycles or 
variability among individuals”. However, this criterion conﬂicts with standard practice in 
the wider IBM community. Wolfram’s Mathematica website has a demonstration by 
Sayama (no date given) of a “real-time agent-based simulation of a predator-prey 
ecosystem” wherein rabbits run around in a square area and are chased by foxes. 
Castiglione (2006), in the Scholarpedia peer-reviewed open-access encyclopedia entry 
about agent-based modeling, also features a direct comparison of an an individual-
based fox-rabbit model compared with the venerable Volterra predator/prey model that 
is formulated as pair of coupled non-linear differential equations. The fox-rabbit models 
proposed as examples of IBMs would nonetheless be ruled out as ecological IBMs by 
Grimm and Railsback even though they are offered precisely as illustrations of IBMs in 
the wider IBM literature.
Why So Restrictive? In acknowledging that their deﬁnition is restrictive, Grimm and 
Railsback (2005) refer to models that seem in some respect to be IBMish but are not 
true IBMs, as “individual-oriented”. Why do Grimm and Railsback care so much about 
retaining their exclusionary  deﬁnition? Because they are committed to the ideal that 
“IBMs can lead to a fundamentally new view of ecological systems and processes”. 
They write that unlike true IBMs, “individually-oriented models do not allow us to fully 
trace the systems properties back to the behavior of the individual animals". The 
ecological IBM modelers regularly disparage the “classical framework” for describing 
ecological systems as “relatively simple and characterized by system-level state 
variables”, vs “the IBM view that ecological processes and systems emerge from the 
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traits of adaptive individuals”, 
and they view their exclusionary 
d e ﬁ n i t i o n o f a n I B M a s 
necessary to accomplish this 
aim. Let us consider then 
whether the restrictions are in 
fact necessary to attaining a 
“fundamentally new view of 
ecological systems.”
“ I n d i v i d u a l l y O r i e n t e d ” 
Models Are Sufﬁcient: I now 
review two examples of models 
that are IBMish but do not 
satisfy Grimm and Railsback’s 
(2005) criteria, and show that 
t h e s e d o r e p r e s e n t a 
fundamentally  new approach to 
formulating ecological models.
(1) Optimal Size of an Optimal 
Forager: In 1995 I published a 
model for how a lizard could 
learn to forage opt imal ly 
(Roughgarden, 1995). The 
model predicted the “optimal 
cutoff distance” such that all 
prey closer than this distance 
are taken and all prey beyond 
this distance are ignored. The 
optimal distance is that which 
maximizes the lizard’s rate of energy capture. A simple algorithm was exhibited that 
would allow a lizard to dynamically learn where the optimal cutoff was. The ﬁgure above 
illustrates the model using parameters estimated from ﬁeld data for Anolis lizards in the 
Eastern Caribbean. The lower panel shows the optimal cutoff distance as a horizontal 
line. Prey are appearing randomly  at distances from 0 to 3 m away from the lizard. Each 
vertical line represents a prey item that was chased and caught. Notice that vertical 
lines rarely cross the optimal cutoff, and those that do are principally  at the beginning of 
the simulation when the lizard is still learning where the optimal cutoff distance is. The 
upper panel shows how the lizard’s energy capture rate within a day approaches the 
optimal capture rate, shown as a horizontal line. The realized capture rate ﬂuctuates 
initially reﬂecting the lizard making mistakes by chasing insects beyond the optimal 
cutoff distance or ignoring insects in front of the optimal cutoff distance. The existence 
and quantitative properties of the optimal cutoff distance were tested and conﬁrmed in 
ﬁeld studies of Anolis lizards on the island of Anguilla (Shaﬁr and Roughgarden 1998).
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Based on this model for the 
daily  energy capture by a lizard, 
the daily growth rate of a lizard 
could be predicted. The next 
ﬁgure shows a scatter plot of 
lizards’ daily growth increments 
from ﬁeld data compared to that 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  p r e d i c t e d 
assuming a lizard is an optimal 
forager. The open circles 
pertain to females and the 
closed circles to males. The 
theoretically predicted optimal 
growth rate is the solid curve. 
N o t i c e t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e 
agreement between actual 
growth increments and that 
expected from optimal foraging 
theory. Females cease growing 
and drop off the curve when 
they have reached a length of 
about 45 mm and the males 
drop off the growth curve at 
about 60 mm in length. These 
sizes are typical of adults on 
those Eastern Car ibbean 
islands with only one species of 
anole (the so-called solitary 
size). 
The next task is to predict why the lizards stop growing at the sizes they do in order to 
begin reproduction at that time. 
To accomplish this, the optimal 
growth rate curve can be 
integrated through time to yield 
a predicted curve of how the 
size of a lizard changes as it 
ages as shown in the adjacent 
ﬁgure. 
This theoretically predicted 
growth curve is then combined 
w i t h ﬁ e l d e s t i m a t e s o f 
s u r v i v o r s h i p a n d w i t h a 
maternity function predicted 
f rom the fecundi ty of an 
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optimally foraging female as a 
function of the age at which she 
stops growth and switches to 
produc ing eggs. Fur ther, 
assuming density  dependence 
consistent with ﬁeld data 
s h o w i n g a m a x i m u m 
abundance of 100 lizards per 
100 sq m, the steady state 
abundance as a function of 
b o d y s i z e i s p r e d i c t e d . 
According to density-dependent 
natural selection theory (K-
selection) the body size that maximizes the steady-state abundance is the optimal body 
size. The ﬁgure above shows the optimal body  size for females to be about 45 mm, as 
in fact observed. This example illustrates a complete and successful modeling protocol 
that begins with properties of an individual and culminates in an evolutionary prediction 
of the adult body size for lizards on an island in the absence of congeneric competitors.
The logic to this model is clearly bottom-up  and in the spirit of deriving population-level 
predictions from the explicit properties of individuals. Nonetheless, this model fails every 
one of the four Grimm/Railsback criteria. It would be considered as “individually 
oriented”, although not an IBM per se.
(2) Population dynamics of barnacles on an open stretch of rocky intertidal habitat. The 
ﬁgure below offers a schematic diagram of the system of ocean currents off the coast of 
C a l i f o r n i a a n d O r e g o n . 
B a r n a c l e s a r e s m a l l 
crustaceans whose adult 
phase lives attached to rocks 
in the zone between low and 
high tides. These animals 
release tiny shrimp-like larvae 
that live in the surface waters 
eating phytoplankton until they 
grow to a size large enough to 
attach to a rock, whereupon 
they metamorphose in to 
adults. I developed a model for 
the population dynamics of 
t h e s e o r g a n i s m s 
(Roughgarden et al 1988). In 
the model, one equation 
pertains to the rate at which 
larvae settle out from the water 
onto vacant space on rocks. 
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Another equation pertains to the ﬂow of larvae in the offshore currents. These two 
equations are coupled at the ocean-land boundary. Together they express a model for 
the population dynamics of barnacles. This model is formulated using a bottom-up logic 
based on the mechanisms for occupying space and the release of space following 
mortality.  This model might is a “mechanism based model,” or MBM, but the state 
variables are the number of barnacles per area of rock and the number of larvae per 
surface area of ocean, both of which are real numbers not restricted to integers. This 
model too fails to satisfy any of the Grimm/Railsback criteria, but could be considered 
“individually oriented” although not an IBM as such.
These examples show that “individually oriented” models are sufﬁcient to achieve the 
goal of a “fundamentally new view of ecological systems and processes” as compared 
with the differential equations of classic population biology dating to the 1940’s and 
earlier. In contrast, IBMs as deﬁned by Grimm and Railsback seem primarily applicable 
only to very large organisms such as vertebrates and trees, and even then might be 
worthwhile only for special applications where the individuals are each speciﬁcally 
identiﬁed, tagged and tracked. 
Individuality Confused with Agency: The difference between an individual based 
model and an agent based model (ABM) is confusing, with most workers considering 
these terms to be synonymous. For example, Castiglione (2006) writes, “An entity is an 
`agent’ if it has some degree of autonomy, that is, if it is distinguishable from its 
environment by some kind of spatial, temporal, or functional attribute. That is, an agent 
must be identiﬁable. Moreover, we further require that agents must have some 
autonomy of action and that they  must be able to engage in tasks in an environment 
without direct external control.” Thus, identiﬁability  and autonomy make an entity an 
agent in the IBM literature. So in this sense, “agent” and “individual” are roughly 
equivalent. Similarly, Peck (2012) writes  “I follow Railsback and Grimm and make no 
distinction” between IBMs and ABMs. He adds that “grains of sand ... might be 
considered model agents ... although they do not make choices.” 
However, I think it is better to use the term “agent” more narrowly--to refer speciﬁcally to 
a goal-seeking individual, where the goal is to increase the individual’s ﬁtness, such as 
the optimally foraging lizard mentioned above. Furthermore, I require that prior to each 
realized action, an individual has a choice of one or more alternatives and choses the 
action it carries out according to the criterion that (it thinks) its ﬁtness would thereby 
increase. So, to most workers an IBM and ABM are synonymous, where as in my 
deﬁnition, an ABM is a subset of IBM in which the individual chooses actions to pursue 
the goal of increasing its ﬁtness. Choice and ﬁtness-seeking deﬁne a biological agent.
Individuality Confused with Programming Metaphor: The deﬁnition of an IBM that 
most workers employ anticipates that the model will be developed using object oriented 
programming methods. The ﬁgure below is drawn from an Apple Computer publication 
about programming for the iPhone and iPad using the language Objective-C (Apple Inc. 
2010). The idea, say for a hand-calculator application, is that a constellation of objects 
exists, such as the number and function keys together with a viewing screen as well as 
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s o m e e n t i t i e s c a l l e d a 
controller and a model. An 
event transpires such as 
someone pressing a key like 
“7”, which triggers a controller 
t o c a u s e s a “ 7 ” t o b e 
displayed on the view. If 
another “7” is pressed the 
controller causes another “7” 
to be displayed, and if a “+” is 
pressed the controller sends 
the previous numbers to a 
model who adds them and 
sends the result back to the 
controller for display. The 
p o i n t h e r e i s t h a t t h i s 
programming metaphor envisions a bunch of interacting agents each with unique 
capabilities that collectively produce realize a function, such as a hand-calculator 
application, not immediately  evident from 
inspecting the properties of the individual 
agents. The notion of a hand-calculator 
could be said to emerge from the aggregate 
action of the constituent components. 
However, what the calculator does in any 
instance depends on random events. The 
calculator just sits there endlessly, so to 
speak, awaiting random keys presses from 
a user, and then exhibiting results, all 
without any direction.
The object-oriented programming metaphor 
differs from the procedural programming 
metaphor, which is perhaps best envisioned 
with the analogy of a recipe for cooking. 
Indeed, the now-classic language, Pascal, is 
explicitly set up to enforce writing a program 
like writing a recipe: list the ingredients at 
the beginning--what the variables are and 
what operations are allowed on them, and 
then move to how the ingredients are 
combined to produce a 
chocolate cake. Procedural 
programming envisions a 
directionality, from input to 
output, from beginning to 
end.
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Both these programming metaphors are useful in ecology, but should not be confused 
with the issue of whether a model is formulated bottom-up (ie, “individually oriented”) vs 
top down. Indeed, consider the populations comprising a food web. The ﬁgure above 
illustrates a simpliﬁed version of a complex food web  for the terrestrial community on St. 
Martin in the Eastern Caribbean (Roughgarden 1995). Like the hand-calculator 
previously mentioned, a community just sits there. Something happens to one 
component, like a rain squall that causes the insects on the forest ﬂoor to prosper, 
which in turn causes the spiders and lizards to prosper, which in turn causes the kestrel 
to prosper, which in turn causes increased deposition to the detritus layer and so on. 
The community sits there, bubbling away, without any direction--a perfect system for 
object-oriented programming where the populations in the community are the objects.
In contrast, a biological population is a directional entity. It grows in abundance, and 
adapts through evolution--a perfect system for procedural programming. It is ironic that 
object-oriented IBMs have been applied to population dynamics when the natural 
application of the approach is to communities. In any  case, the value of an object-
oriented programming vs a procedural programming metaphor should not be confused 
with the value of a bottom-up individual-oriented protocol vs a top-down protocol for 
model formulation
Conclusion: IBMs and ABMs originated in the 1960s when mainframe computers were 
ﬁrst becoming available to ecological researchers. These computers provoked interest 
in using computer simulation for ecological modeling rather than relying on 
mathematical analysis. In judging the merits of model craftsmanship  based on 
simulation vs analysis, I usually  come down on the side of analysis. With simulation it 
may be impossible to drill down to what assumptions are responsible for conclusions, to 
discern the causal connections between initial conditions and results, and simulation 
invites unsophisticated and sloppy research together with naive hocus-pocus about the 
magic of emergence. 
Ecological workers with IBMs and ABMs not only bear the burden of avoiding an 
uncritical embrace computer simulation, they risk shooting themselves in the foot. First, 
they propose unnecessarily  restrictive deﬁnitions of what can count as an IBM, 
deﬁnitions that turn out to be inconsistent with usage of IBM workers in different 
domains. Second, they fail to distinguish between a living organism who acts through 
choice to increase its ﬁtness and a dead particle. Third they confuse taking an individual 
organism as the conceptual starting point for ecological theorizing with the choice of 
programming metaphor--object oriented programming vs procedural programming. 
Ecological IBM and ABM workers need to clean up their act on these matters least they 
ruin a good thing.
Speciﬁcally, I recommend that the following deﬁnitions be adopted: (1) an IBM shall be 
any model for which the properties of the higher level are derived from properties at the 
lower level--ie, an IBM is any model formulated with bottom-up logic, any model that is 
“individual oriented”. (2) an ABM shall be any IBM in which the individuals at the lower 
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level are goal-seeking and take actions based on choices that maximize their goal. (3) 
Use of object-oriented programming vs procedural programming shall be considered 
irrelevant to the designation of a model as an IBM or ABM, and shall be undertaken 
according to what seems most natural to the application.
IBMs and ABMs, as distinct from computer simulation itself, offer three new conceptual 
advantages. First, they emphasize and implement a bottom up style of formulating 
ecological models--from a lower level to a higher level, eg.,  from an individual to social 
groups and thence to a population, or from organs to an organism. This perspective 
contrasts with traditional modeling in theoretical ecology based on the logistic and 
Lotka-Volterra competition and predator-prey equations. It also contrasts with the top-
down approach to animal behavior required by  Maynard Smith’s (1982) population-
genetic based solution concept of the evolutionarily-stable strategy (ESS), a approach 
that begins with the population’s gene pool and trickles down to individual behavior.
Second, IBMs and ABMs stress an alternative programming metaphor for ecological 
systems--the metaphor of object-oriented programming rather than procedural 
programming. This metaphor seems best for modeling ecological communities where 
the “objects” are species united through a common food (or interaction) web, and not for 
modeling populations whose dynamics still seem best represented through a procedural 
programming metaphor that represents the directionality  of population growth and 
natural selection. 
Third, the use of ABMs strongly endorses taking the individual as the fundamental focal 
or “ﬁrst class” object for ecology and evolution--working up  from the individual to 
populations and communities or down from the individual to the genes within them. 
Resting evolutionary theory  on ABMs would contrast starkly with population genetics 
that takes the gene as the fundamental object, and works up from there to the 
phenotype, the population, and beyond. The agent oriented approach in ecology 
contradicts the widely shared perspective in evolutionary biology that, as Dawkins 
(1976) articulated, ``Our genes made us. We animals exist for their preservation and 
are nothing more than their throwaway survival machines.” Instead, according to agent-
based ecology, whole individuals are the primary actors on the evolutionary stage, and 
the genes within them but a stage crew of temporary  workers hitchhiking along for the 
evolutionary ride.
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